Recently, the Southern Transitional Council (STC) in Yemen launched Operation Promising Future, militarily advancing across Hadhramaut, Shabwa and Al-Mahra provinces. Against the backdrop of lingering concerns and issues, the latest offense has triggered a consequential shift in the country’s domestic landscape. Recent developments indicate a complex security environment in Yemen amid evolving regional dynamics and fragile local power balances.
Hadhramaut is Yemen’s largest governorate, and much of the country’s vital oil infrastructure is located there. The latest escalation is largely driven by internal contestation over governance, security and control of strategic resources, including oil facilities, and reports suggest that it occurred amid the truce between the Hadhramaut Tribal Alliance and local authorities. The STC stated that it acted in response to escalating security threats, citing smuggling routes, the proliferation of weapons and narcotics networks and the presence of al-Qaeda.
Yemen’s Internationally Recognized Government (IRG) and its executive body, the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), however, view STC’s actions as unilateral and as undermining the credibility of previously reached agreements with the STC. President Rashad al-Alimi described the deployment of external forces to Hadhramaut as a breach of established frameworks, stressing that security decisions must be made through consensus within the PLC. He warned that uncoordinated actions risk undermining the state’s legal authority and fragmenting the national decision-making structure at a delicate time, and he spoke to the new governor, assuring fair representation for the people of Hadhramaut and support mechanisms enabling local people to manage their resources. His statements were also echoed by political and civil society groups within Hadhramaut, who issued their own calls for de-escalation. Yemen’s IRG remains the sole entity with international legitimacy, and any unilateral call for secession would only complicate prospects for peace, as actions on the ground inevitably hold implications for the future of any political arrangements.
As competing narratives intensified, the situation on the ground became increasingly fragile. In the Wadi region, tensions escalated between the Hadhramaut Tribal Alliance, led by Sheikh Amr bin Habrish, and STC-affiliated armed groups. Tribal fighters seized the Al-Masila oil company site in late November, citing concerns that forces aligned with the STC were preparing advances toward Wadi Hadhramaut, while STC-aligned Hadhrami Elite Forces quickly extended their control over key facilities in Seiyun, including the First Military Region headquarters, the airport and the presidential palace. The rapid shift in power was mirrored in Al-Mahrah, where the STC expanded its position and control in Al-Ghaydah. These unprecedented actions disrupted oil and gas operations, with PetroMasila suspending production in several blocks due to escalating security risks, leading to shortages in fuel supplies for power stations across the region. The STC also expanded its presence in the port city of Aden, which has been the base of the IRG. The immediate consequences underscored how vulnerable the governorate remains to disruptions in the security environment. Hadhramaut’s oil fields constitute a significant majority of Yemen’s oil output, and even temporary shutdowns create cascading effects across essential services and local economies.
These developments are unfolding against a broader regional and international backdrop, as global powers closely monitor Yemen’s stability given its strategic proximity to the Red Sea, the Bab al-Mandab Strait and key international shipping corridors. Any escalation in this area risks disrupting global trade and invariably becomes a matter of international concern. Hence, even limited escalations in this region can quickly snowball, setting off disruptions that neither local actors nor external powers can easily contain. Domestic tensions in Hadhramaut should also be assessed in conjunction with the broader political and security developments within Yemen in the last couple of years. The Houthis remain in control of Sana’a but have come under severe attack from the United States, which has weakened their capability and has changed their strategic calculus. At the same time, there are growing concerns about internal fragmentation. So in short, Yemen now has three major centers of power, and only one of them is internationally recognized. This increases the likelihood that competing authorities and their affiliated forces will solidify parallel structures of power, amplifying mistrust and widening the scope for miscalculation. The STC’s articulation of a long-term political project centered on southern autonomy only complicates this environment, as it raises questions about how any future political process will accommodate competing visions while preventing further escalations.
The latest escalation comes at a time when regional powers, particularly Saudi Arabia, are trying to stabilize Yemen and revive political dialogue. Recent development initiatives, including the Saudi Development and Reconstruction Program for Yemen to enhance electricity generation in Aden, Mukalla, Seiyun and Taiz, reflect a broader effort to tackle longstanding structural challenges essential to achieving lasting stability. In Hadhramaut itself, infrastructure projects such as the expansion of the Al-Abir road and the rehabilitation of the Al-Wadi’ah border crossing highlight ongoing commitments to improve connectivity and economic resilience. Yet the durability of any stabilization will depend on the ability of local actors, including tribal alliances, governorate authorities, the STC and government institutions, to align their security priorities and prevent local grievances from escalating into broader confrontations. Hadhramaut’s geography, economic significance and political complexity mean that developments there reverberate across Yemen’s fragile political landscape, amplifying fissures that could derail both national reconciliation and regional initiatives. Managing the situation will require not only de-escalation but also a genuine effort to define a coherent security architecture that addresses local demands, safeguards national institutions and maintains the delicate regional balance.
Saudi Arabia’s latest diplomatic initiative, led by Major General Mohammed al-Qahtani has focused on initiating provisions to de-escalate tensions. Riyadh coordinated a preliminary arrangement with local authorities and the Hadhramaut Tribal Alliance to keep the PetroMasila facilities neutral and functioning, which includes the withdrawal of existing forces such as STC units and the deployment of Hadhrami units under the governorate’s supervision. This approach aligns with Saudi Arabia’s role as the key regional mediator, while the IRG continues to receive backing from influential actors, including the EU. Attempts to secure statehood through territorial control alone face clear limits because international legitimacy depends on recognition by regional and global powers, which the STC does not currently possess. Yemen’s internal developments have wide-ranging regional and global consequences. Any deterioration increases strain on vital maritime routes and allows non-state actors and terrorist groups to exploit the chaos, ultimately undermining long-term security and stability.
Ultimately, it is crucial to uphold previous agreements and maintain consensus within the PLC, as the IRG remains the only legitimate channel for delivering financial mechanisms, development aid and humanitarian assistance. Without coordinated governance and concrete improvements in local conditions, Yemen risks worsening an already severe humanitarian crisis, creating an environment where instability intensifies, parallel power centers solidify and the chances for any sustainable political settlement are further diminished.
