Iran’s December 5 military exercise in the Gulf attempted to demonstrate its confidence that its missile force is alive and well. In the country’s second drill since the 12-Day War, Eghtedar (Authority), the IRGC Navy hit targets on the occupied UAE islands — Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Siri islands — with ballistic and cruise missiles fired from the central region. The cruise missiles fired included Qadr 110, Qadr 380, Qadir, and a ballistic missile 303, which is not heard of before. IRGC Navy also simulated coordinated attacks using drones, micro-UAVs, and its signature speedboat to repel an aggressor attack on the disputed islands. The exercise was intensive but in a defensive posture, also involving short-range air defence systems Nawab, Majid, and Misagh.
As per unnamed Israeli officials quoted in media, Iran’s ballistic missile cache and production plants suffered less than what was assumed at the end of the hostilities. With the help of North Korea, Russia, China, and other allies, Tehran is reported to have restored the missile factories and production has returned to pre-June levels when its missile stockpile totalled to over 2,000.
“This is a threat that Israel will not be able to accept for long, and we must coordinate with the Americans the red lines and actions we will take in the future, perhaps even in the near future,” the Israeli official reportedly told a journalist.
To Iran, the perception of its soaring missile arsenal and operational production plants re-establishes its deterrence, sans nuclear program, which remains in tatters since the ceasefire was announced.
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) communiqué prompted Iran’s military drills, in which the bloc denounced “the provocative positions” taken by Iran, including housing projects, which “does nothing to alter historical and geographical facts.” The statement also challenged Iran’s claims over the Durra (Arash) offshore gas field.
On December 1, Iran hosted a five-day joint exercise of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization member and observer states, including China, Russia, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq, involving tactical weapons for counter-terror operations. The first military drill since the war with an assortment of Middle Eastern, South and Central Asian states, along with Russia and China, was used by the Iranian government to dispel the perception of isolation.
What Iran cannot manufacture indigenously seems to be finally on the assembly line in Russia. Leaked documents quoted by a Ukrainian media outlet indicate that 16 Su-35 fighter jets, ordered in 2022, will be delivered in 2026 and 2027.
“Everything being ordered is configured for export: English-language labelling, English-language technical passports, an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ measurement system, and requirements that the items must be recently manufactured. This all indicates that it is intended for a foreign partner,” the outlet reports, quoting the Russian documents while releasing their photos.
The media outlet adds “All documentation refers to customer ‘K10’ across them, but in one document, ‘K10’ is specifically named ‘Iran.’” This leaves no doubt as to who the order is for. This means we can identify that Russia is specifically creating Su-35s and acquiring the above-mentioned parts for them. We also know that it is one client because there is a single unified order number, “P/1936411141768” (this is in Russian Cyrillic, so it is R/1936411141768 in English).”
Iran could have challenged Israeli jets had Russia delivered the aircraft in 2024. Two squadrons of Iranian air force pilots and maintainers have already completed training in Russia. Following a brief thaw, the ties between Tehran and Moscow have returned to normalcy. Iran depends on Russia for its vital military systems, such as radar, missile program, and tanks, to name a few.
An imperative question is if Russia shares source-code for Su-35s with Iran, this would enable Tehran to configure its indigenous weapon systems with the platform, as the US does in the case of Israel. It is also unclear as to what is the weapon package Tehran will be receiving with the 4.5 generation fighters.
Iran is gradually and successfully boosting its space-based surveillance and reconnaissance capability by sending more sophisticated satellites, three of which are scheduled for launch aboard a Russian rocket on December 28. Tehran’s increasing dependence on sending satellites into orbit from Russia indicates a degree of caution about its exposing its space launch capabilities. To sum up, Iran’s military muscle is far from recuperation. The 12-Day War spared its short-range missiles, naval assets and ground forces. With friendly support, Tehran is reviving its ballistic missile capabilities as well as satellites for surveillance. Its airpower is nominal, while radar and air defence batteries are slowly coming online, but in numbers fewer than before. So, is Iran ready to take on the UAE to defend the occupied islands? Yes, militarily speaking, Tehran is equipped to give a good fight. Does Abu Dhabi seek an armed conflict with Tehran? Absolutely not. To Iran’s relief, the GCC states seek to maintain calm in the Gulf waters so maritime trade can continue smoothly. The UAE is keeping its claim alive, albeit more proactively recently. The recent two-day naval exercise by the IRGC Navy served more as a public display than an effective deterrent against adversaries unlikely to pursue military confrontation. In reality, it appeared primarily intended to bolster the IRGC’s diminished image at home following earlier setbacks.
