The Syrian government and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have been locked in a year-long dispute over the terms of integrating the SDF into Syrian state institutions, missing a late-2025 deadline with little progress. Following the deadline’s lapse, Syrian forces rapidly seized territory from the SDF, after which both sides signed a broad integration agreement on January 18 and are now set to resume US-backed talks to finalize the details. The recent escalations between the Syrian army and the SDF highlight the lingering challenges concerning domestic stability in Syria. Beyond its military dimension, the current situation in Syria reflects the interconnectedness of regional dynamics and their implications for Syria’s internal stability, while also exposing deeper structural fault lines amid a shifting regional security environment.
After the fall of the Assad regime, the interim government consolidated power even though roughly a quarter of Syria remained under SDF control. As a part of the March 2025 agreement, President Ahmed al-Sharaa and SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi had signed a deal to bring SDF-controlled institutions, border crossings and oil fields under state control. Despite the attempts to integrate, tensions between the SDF and the Syrian government have been simmering for the past several months. Recently, these tensions flared in Aleppo, where SDF-linked fighters used heavy weapons, defying prior agreements that prompted Syrian army retaliation. Subsequent clashes, including drone attacks and artillery exchanges, escalated the conflict, eventually leading Damascus to launch military operations. A ceasefire was finally agreed for four days and later extended until February 8, even as both sides accuse each other of violations. The truce comes amid continued Syrian government advances that have resulted in the reclamation of territory from the SDF. The setbacks faced by the SDF have significantly weakened its leverage for negotiations.
For the SDF, resistance to integration reflects the high political and economic stakes involved, as it controls territories in northeastern Syria that have up to 80% of the country’s oil and gas resources and a significant share of the agricultural base. However, its position has now been eroded by internal divisions and weak cohesion. Before the war, energy accounted for up to 25% of GDP and generated approximately $3 billion annually. Today, production hovers at around a quarter of pre-war levels. Regaining sovereignty over these resources will be critical for Syria’s recovery. Control over energy resources enables Damascus to attract foreign investors and pursue a coherent national reconstruction strategy. Recent agreements with companies from the United States, the Gulf states and Türkiye, alongside massive power generation projects, now signal cautious international reengagement attempts. None of this would be feasible with fragmented territorial control. Hence, for Damascus, integrating the SDF is no longer a security imperative; it is a prerequisite to improving the Syrian economy and consolidating power.
Domestic security has emerged as the central pillar of Syria’s effort to rebuild regional and international confidence. At this juncture, restoring internal stability is not merely about projecting authority; it is also essential to preventing domestic turbulence from becoming an entry point for external exploitation, particularly amid a regional security environment in which Israel has repeatedly violated international law to expand buffer zones. This explains the government’s focus on domestic security, ceasefire management and reintegration mechanisms for former SDF members.
Apart from domestic issues, regional geopolitical dynamics and shifting Western engagement also influence Syria’s internal security and stability. The US role has become increasingly decisive in shaping the transition in Syria. For a decade, the SDF was recognized and supported by the United States as an anti-terror force to fight against ISIS despite the fact that it remained a non-state entity controlling a vast region that encompasses the bulk of Syria’s oil and gas resources. The Trump administration has changed US policy by directly engaging Damascus and acting as a mediator for SDF integration. Recent US decisions and actions suggest growing support for the Syrian government. Washington’s inclusion of Syria in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS also signaled a broader acceptance of centralized state authority in Syria. After more than a decade of cooperation to fight against ISIS, Washington appears to be gradually pulling back from its alliance with the SDF. US officials, including envoy Tom Barrack, have openly said that the original rationale for the partnership has largely expired. Instead, Washington now prefers to work directly with the Syrian government under Sharaa. This shift reflects both a transactional reassessment of Trump-era thinking and a longer-standing US preference for a unified, centralized Syrian state over autonomous Kurdish governance structures. For the SDF, these developments have intensified pressure to integrate into the Syrian state amid growing uncertainty over the durability and nature of US support as conditions on the ground continue to shift. European diplomacy has also increasingly converged with Washington’s position. The EU now emphasizes SDF integration within a unified Syrian state, coupled with constitutional safeguards for Kurdish political and cultural rights. Sharaa has publicly pledged that the Kurdish language and cultural rights will be protected and enshrined in the future Syrian constitution.
For neighboring countries like Iraq, stability in Syria remains a major concern, especially considering the proximity and nature of the borders between both countries. As per reports, scores of suspected militants escaped from Shaddadeh prison, with 81 later recaptured, after the SDF withdrew guards from Al-Hawl and nearby facilities. The Syrian government accused the SDF of abandoning posts amid stalled talks on transferring prison control. Amid the recent escalations, Iraq has deployed additional forces along its border. The transfer of ISIS detainees from SDF-held areas to Iraq reflects Washington’s concerns over the durability of the Syrian ceasefire amid ongoing clashes and risks of prison breakouts. These developments could also reinforce the ISIS threat narrative used by pro-Iran militias in Iraq to justify their continued militarization and political relevance, especially amid political developments in Baghdad and the US withdrawal from the region.
In the current context, Türkiye’s role has been particularly consequential. Ankara has long viewed the SDF primarily through the lens of the PKK threat and has therefore coordinated closely with Damascus during recent military operations. The erosion of the SDF’s territorial control aligns with Türkiye’s evolving objectives, especially in the context of its peace initiative following the PKK’s decision to disarm, reducing Ankara’s tolerance for autonomous armed Kurdish formations across its border. For the Gulf states, the integration of the SDF and the restoration of stability in Syria are necessary for enhancing their political and economic engagement. For Damascus, the Gulf states’ support is essential for post-conflict recovery and reconstruction.
Looking ahead, prioritizing Syria’s unification and internal stability will require not only strengthening state capacity but also creating credible pathways for genuine political inclusion. Striking this balance is essential to preventing renewed fragmentation and ensuring mechanisms for long-term stability, particularly as unresolved governance gaps risk being exploited to deepen regional anxieties and pave the way for external interference.
