Amid profound shifts in the global strategic landscape and mounting tensions across several interconnected fronts, Chinese President Xi Jinping made a three-day state visit to Washington from September 23 to September 25, 2026. His trip, the first by a Chinese leader to the US capital in more than a decade, came less than two months before the expiration of the bilateral trade truce, adding urgency to efforts to stabilize relations between the world’s two largest economies. The talks centered on some of the most contentious issues shaping the US-China relationship, including Taiwan, trade, artificial intelligence (AI), Iran and access to rare earth minerals. Beyond addressing individual disputes, the discussions sought to manage the broader trajectory of strategic competition, contain potential points of escalation, and prevent rivalry from developing into an open-ended confrontation. They also offered an opportunity to assess whether the two sides could sustain the de-escalation process and establish a more durable framework for managing their differences. The Washington summit followed a diplomatic process set in motion by the US president’s visit to Beijing in May 2026. Xi’s arrival in Washington was accompanied by an unusually elaborate reception ceremony, reportedly one not seen in the US capital for decades. The symbolism of the occasion underscored China’s growing weight in global affairs and Washington’s recognition of Beijing as an increasingly consequential actor in international affairs.
The summit attracted extraordinary global attention, bringing together the leaders of the world’s two most powerful states and largest economies at a critical juncture, as both regional and international orders undergo profound restructuring. The understandings and agreements reached in Washington have implications well beyond the bilateral relationship, raising a series of broader questions: What did each side seek to gain from the other, and what were their respective strategic objectives? Which outcomes were most significant, whether at the strategic or tactical level? Did the summit produce meaningful breakthroughs on the most difficult issues dividing the two countries, or did it primarily establish mechanisms for managing escalation and containing tensions? And given the persistence of unresolved disputes, could the relationship return to confrontation once the immediate incentives for restraint diminish? The summit also raised questions about the political symbolism of President Donald Trump departing from established diplomatic protocol to meet his Chinese counterpart on the airport tarmac. More broadly, it offers a lens through which to examine how Trump’s perception of Chinese power has evolved from his first term to his second and if anything, has changed in Washington’s approach to Beijing. It also allows an assessment of whether the summit signaled a strategic recalibration which generated much attention in the United States and abroad.
The Summit’s Ceremonials and the Aim to Manage Competition
The second summit between the two presidents in 2026 underscored a mutual US-Chinese interest in managing strategic competition while preserving direct channels of communication. On the US side, Trump personally welcomed Xi with an unusually elaborate display of military honors, signaling the importance his administration placed on maintaining high-level dialogue with Beijing. The reception at Joint Base Andrews departed from established US diplomatic practice, with Trump greeting Xi as he stepped off the aircraft.[1] Visiting heads of state are typically received by the vice president, secretary of state or designated protocol officials, while the formal ceremonial welcome takes place later at the White House. The symbolism was reinforced by an aerial display: a B-2 stealth strategic bomber flew over the base accompanied by four F-22 Raptor fighter jets shortly after Xi’s arrival. Washington also deployed approximately 479 military personnel from the armed forces, while artillery units fired a 21-gun salute in honor of the Chinese president.
The reception ceremony combined a conspicuous display of US military power with an equally deliberate political tribute to the Chinese president, underscoring the personal importance Trump attached to the visit. The scale of the welcome also appeared designed to resonate with a domestic audience ahead of the midterm elections, while projecting an image of diplomatic confidence and exceptional respect toward Xi. By extending such elaborate honors, Trump sought to create a favorable atmosphere for the talks, encourage greater flexibility from his Chinese counterpart on contentious bilateral issues, and secure outcomes that could strengthen his political standing at home. The symbolism was particularly striking given the rarity with which US presidents have personally greeted foreign leaders at the airport. Such treatment has traditionally been reserved for a small number of figures whose ceremonial and protocol status is considered to transcend that of ordinary heads of state, including popes. Presidents Ronald Reagan, George W. Bush and Barack Obama each personally welcomed a pope upon arrival in the United States.
Trump also adopted a markedly different tone from his characteristically confrontational rhetoric, striking a more measured and conciliatory posture toward China. He spoke publicly of a “great friendship” with Xi, presented the Chinese president with a statue of an eagle as a symbol of US strength, and invited him on a rare tour on the presidential helicopter. The carefully choreographed gestures extended beyond the political sphere. First Lady Melania Trump hosted a dinner for Xi and his wife, Peng Liyuan, featuring prominent Chinese culinary traditions and ingredients. She also accompanied Peng to the Smithsonian’s National Museum of Asian Art, highlighting the cultural links between the two countries. Taken together, the gestures formed part of a broader diplomatic effort to cultivate goodwill with the Chinese leadership and create a more favorable atmosphere for the summit.
On the Chinese side, Xi used his arrival in the United States to advance a clear message: China and the United States should be “partners, not adversaries.” He called for the two countries to manage their rivalry peacefully, develop a new model of coexistence between major powers, and assume what he described as the responsibilities expected of leading global powers.
Xi also drew a parallel between China’s goal of achieving the “Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation” and the United States’ “Make America Great Again” agenda, arguing that the two national projects need not be mutually incompatible and could coexist in ways that serve broader global interests. He outlined a framework for what he called a “constructive, strategically stable China-US relationship,” in which cooperation would provide the foundation for managing competition, differences would remain contained and manageable, and long-term peace could be sustained. Beijing also rejected the idea of treating the relationship as a zero-sum struggle in which one power’s ascendancy necessarily requires the other’s defeat, while acknowledging that strategic rivalry between the two countries remains a fundamental reality. As part of his broader emphasis on people-to-people ties, Xi invited 100,000 US students to study in China over the next five years.
Following the summit, and in line with presidential directives, China sent two giant pandas to Washington under its longstanding loan program, commonly known as “panda diplomacy.” Xi described the animals as “envoys of friendship between the Chinese and American peoples,” reinforcing Beijing’s message that it seeks to cultivate a more stable and carefully managed relationship with Washington.
Panda diplomacy has long served as a symbolic instrument of Chinese statecraft, with the deployment of pandas often accompanying efforts to ease tensions and strengthen diplomatic ties. Conversely, the withdrawal of pandas has frequently been interpreted as a sign of deteriorating relations. Beijing recalled pandas from the United States in 2024 amid escalating trade tensions, and also withdrew pandas from Japan after Japanese officials raised the possibility of military intervention alongside Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack.
Parameters of the Mutual Intent to Manage Competition
Several influential factors explain why both Washington and Beijing have favored managing their strategic competition rather than allowing tensions to escalate further.
The Impact of Internal Crises in the Two Countries
Both countries are confronting domestic pressures that are shaping policymakers’ calculations and strengthening the case for containing strategic competition. In the United States, deepening partisan divisions between Republicans and Democrats, particularly over control of Congress and the functioning of the legislative branch, are influencing the broader political environment. Against this backdrop, Trump has an interest in fostering conditions that could strengthen his position ahead of the upcoming midterm elections. He is also counting on tangible outcomes from the summit to help restore domestic support weakened by the economic consequences of the conflict with Iran, including higher energy prices, inflation and rising living costs.
China, meanwhile, is contending with a prolonged real estate crisis that has weakened household confidence and constrained domestic consumption, increasing Beijing’s reliance on exports to sustain economic growth. These pressures have created a degree of convergence in the economic interests of Washington and Beijing, giving both sides an incentive to stabilize their relationship. Washington has an interest in containing inflationary pressures and reducing the cost burden on US households, while Beijing needs greater economic breathing room to manage weak domestic demand and the continuing effects of the property sector downturn.
Awareness of the Significance of the Levers Both Sides Possess
Both Washington and Beijing have also come to recognize the limits of their respective leverage in the broader strategic competition, reinforcing the case for managing rivalry rather than attempting to force unilateral concessions. Each side has tested the practical limits of the other’s leverage on contentious issues and encountered significant constraints on its ability to compel the other to change course. China retains several important sources of leverage over the United States, most notably its dominant position in the global rare earth supply chain.[2] Rare earth elements are essential to a range of advanced technologies and sensitive defense applications, making uninterrupted access strategically important to US national security. China accounts for a substantial share of global rare earth mining, processing and refining capacity (80%-90%), while also occupying critical positions across supply chains on which US industries depend. Any major disruption could therefore generate significant consequences for US manufacturing and strategic sectors. Beijing also possesses leverage through its role as a major market for US agricultural exports, particularly soybeans, as well as through its strategic relationship with Tehran. These factors have complicated Washington’s ability to sustain maximum economic pressure on China and have contributed to adjustments in US tariff policy and delays surrounding a reported $14 billion arms package for Taiwan, as of the time of writing. China’s financial leverage over Washington, however, is more limited than it once was. Although Beijing remains a significant holder of US Treasury securities, it is no longer the largest foreign holder, having been surpassed by Japan and the UK. Moreover, US debt is held by a broad range of foreign investors, reducing Washington’s exposure to any single country’s investment decisions. This diversification limits the extent to which a reduction in Chinese purchases of US Treasury securities alone could destabilize US financial markets.
Conversely, Beijing recognizes that Washington retains substantial leverage over the Chinese economy and its strategic development. That leverage rests on several key areas. First, the United States remains a critical market for Chinese exports, making US tariffs a potentially significant source of pressure on Chinese manufacturers and exporters. Second, Washington holds considerable influence over China’s access to advanced semiconductor technologies. US leadership in AI and other cutting-edge technologies, combined with restrictions on Chinese access to advanced chips and critical chip-manufacturing equipment, gives Washington important tools for limiting China’s technological capabilities and constraining aspects of its military modernization. Taiwan represents another major source of US leverage. Beijing remains concerned about the possibility of expanded US political, military or strategic support for Taiwan and the implications this could have for China’s territorial claims and broader security interests. Taken together with the central role of the US market in China’s export-oriented economic model, these factors give Washington significant instruments of economic and strategic pressure, reinforcing Beijing’s incentive to avoid an uncontrolled escalation with the United States.
The Cost of Separating the Two Economies
Both Washington and Beijing recognize the substantial risks of decoupling the world’s two largest economies, given the depth of their economic interdependence. A complete separation would carry significant costs not only for the two countries but also for the global economy. Together, the United States and China accounted for approximately 42.8% of global economic output, when the world economy was valued at roughly $110.98 trillion. The United States contributed nearly $28.75 trillion, while China accounted for about $18.74 trillion, according to World Bank figures. Their bilateral trade relationship is likewise a major component of global commerce. Trade in goods and services between the two countries constitutes one of the world’s largest bilateral economic flows. In 2024, the United States imported approximately $463 billion in goods from China, while China imported about $165 billion from the United States, according to UNCTAD data. In 2025, bilateral trade in goods totaled roughly $414.7 billion, comprising $106.3 billion in US exports to China and $308.4 billion in US imports from China. The interdependence extends well beyond direct trade. US and Chinese companies are deeply integrated through global markets, investment networks, manufacturing systems and supply chains. A full-scale decoupling would therefore risk slowing global economic growth, disrupting production and supply networks and substantially increasing the costs of manufactured goods and consumer products. The resulting economic shock would extend far beyond Washington and Beijing, making a managed reduction in strategic risks more viable than an abrupt rupture in economic ties.
Change in the US Position on China
US public, elite and official attitudes toward China also appear to be shifting toward greater engagement and a more pragmatic approach to bilateral relations. A 2026 poll by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs found that the share of Americans who viewed China’s regional ambitions as a threat to the United States had fallen from 52% to roughly 41%. At the same time, about 57% of Americans expressed support for greater cooperation and engagement with Beijing.
The survey also pointed to a broadening of support for engagement across the US political spectrum. A majority of Republicans who do not identify with the MAGA movement, along with a majority of Democrats, favored cooperation and closer ties with China. Trump’s recent conduct has likewise suggested a degree of divergence from the more confrontational position held by some of his political supporters. His unusually warm reception of Xi and emphasis on maintaining a constructive relationship with Beijing offered a visible indication of his administration’s interest in keeping bilateral engagement on track.
Demands of Each Side Regarding Thorny Issues
Xi entered the summit with considerable economic leverage, supported by an extensive global export network that had continued to expand despite US restrictions and tariffs. Trump, by contrast, arrived amid a series of domestic and international pressures, including the economic fallout from the conflict with Iran, the absence of a decisive resolution to the broader Middle East crisis and the continuing war in Ukraine, which had complicated Washington’s relations with its NATO allies. Rising fuel and energy prices had also contributed to mounting domestic economic pressures and weakened political support for the Trump administration. Thus, the two leaders approached the summit with different priorities and demands on the contentious issues at the center of their negotiations.
Trade and Investment
The two sides discussed extending the trade truce scheduled to expire in October 2026. Trump pressed Xi to further open the Chinese market to major US corporations, with prominent US business and technology executives — including Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang, Tesla CEO Elon Musk and Boeing CEO Kelly Ortberg — participating in the summit. Trump also sought Chinese compliance with soybean purchase commitments reached at the May 2026 summit, under which Beijing agreed to buy approximately 25 million tons of US soybeans annually through 2028 but had so far fulfilled only about half of that commitment. Washington also pushed for completion of a deal for China to purchase 200 Boeing aircraft. Xi, meanwhile, sought an extension of the trade truce, which had helped contain the escalation of the bilateral trade conflict, reduce reciprocal tariffs and avert a deeper economic decoupling. Beijing’s objective was to preserve the benefits of economic interdependence while reducing the strategic and economic risks associated with its dependence on the US market.
Geopolitical Disputes
Conflicts in East Asia, particularly over the Taiwan Strait; Eastern Europe, where Russia and Ukraine remain at war; and the Middle East, where the United States is confronting Iran, featured prominently on the summit agenda. Both Washington and Beijing possess significant influence over the trajectory of these crises and, potentially, over efforts to resolve them. Each leader therefore sought specific commitments from the other.
Taiwan
Taipei remains China’s most complex and sensitive strategic issue, while Washington views the island as central to the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. Trump said he had discussed US arms sales to Taiwan with Xi, prompting concern in Taipei that the island could become a bargaining chip in US-China negotiations and that Washington might ultimately trade away some of its support. In practice, however, the United States has limited room to make substantive concessions on its defense commitments to Taiwan. Washington recognizes not only the issue’s symbolic importance amid shifts in the global order but also the potential damage to US credibility across the Indo-Pacific if it were to retreat from its commitments to Taipei.
For his part, Xi sought to delay or block the approximately $14 billion arms package for Taiwan and obtain a clearer US position on the island’s independence. Beijing regards Taiwan as a “red line,” while also recognizing that it cannot fundamentally alter Washington’s position on the issue. More broadly, China tends to prioritize economic and trade matters in its dealings with the United States while deferring more difficult strategic questions and seeking to prevent those disputes from escalating beyond its control.
Iran
Tehran represents the most sensitive strategic issue for Washington. Trump sought assurances that Beijing would refrain from military cooperation with Tehran, particularly following Western intelligence reports that China had provided Iran with advanced military technologies that helped its missiles and drones strike US targets in Arab countries with greater precision. Washington also wanted Beijing to use its influence to persuade Tehran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, given that China is Iran’s largest oil customer and one of its principal trading partners.
Beijing, however, appears unwilling to curtail its relationship with Iran without securing meaningful concessions from Washington on Taiwan, trade and technology. In the absence of a significant US quid pro quo, China is likely to preserve its support for Tehran. Accepting Washington’s demands could also weaken an important Chinese partner in the Middle East, thus making a major Chinese role in advancing the US position unlikely.
At the same time, China has a strong interest in ending the conflict through an arrangement that protects its own strategic and economic interests. Beijing would be among the first major powers to suffer from a prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz, through which nearly half of China’s crude oil imports pass, particularly if the disruption were accompanied by the closure of the Bab al-Mandab Strait. Yet Beijing also views the conflict as a strategic burden on Washington that diverts US military and political attention away from the Indo-Pacific. The US-Iran war therefore presents China with both a serious economic risk and a potential strategic opportunity, encouraging Beijing to maneuver between containing the conflict and preserving the advantages it may derive from Washington’s continued involvement in the Middle East.
Rare Earth Minerals
This is one of the most sensitive areas of the US-China relationship. Trade and agriculture allow room for bargaining, compromise and transactional deal-making; advanced technology is fundamentally different. It has evolved beyond an economic sector into a core component of both countries’ national security strategies. Trump therefore pressed his Chinese counterpart to increase supplies of rare earth minerals to US markets, as part of Washington’s broader effort to preserve its technological edge and secure a dominant position in AI. The issue has become particularly acute since Beijing imposed export restrictions on some of the most critical rare earth minerals supplied to the United States, effectively turning control over these resources into a strategic instrument. The implications extend directly into the US national security sphere because rare earths are essential to the production of sophisticated military systems and advanced weapons on which US military superiority depends. China accounts for roughly 70% of global rare earth extraction and more than 90% of processed rare earth production, giving Beijing considerable leverage over supply chains.
For his part, the Chinese president sought concessions from Washington, including an easing of restrictions on China’s access to advanced chips and semiconductor manufacturing equipment, as well as a rollback of US efforts to constrain Beijing’s development of AI. Yet there is little evidence that either side’s leverage has consistently been sufficient to force a fundamental change in the other’s behavior. The emerging balance is therefore one of mutual strategic dependence: Beijing has considerable influence through its control of critical raw materials, while Washington retains substantial leverage through its command of advanced technologies.
The Visit’s Results, Significations and the Impact on Contentious Issues
Despite the unprecedented reception accorded to the Chinese president, the summit produced no substantive breakthroughs on the most contentious issues between the two sides, beyond a limited two-month trade truce. Much of the meeting was instead defined by ceremonial gestures and the two leaders’ efforts to project an image of pragmatic coexistence between strategic rivals whose interests increasingly diverge across the global order. The visit’s principal outcomes are summarized below.
A Brief Truce Rather Than a Trade Settlement
The summit’s principal tangible outcome was a tactical agreement to extend the trade truce,[3] originally due to expire on October 10, 2026, by another two months, moving the deadline to January 10, 2027. The extension falls well short of the six-month renewal previously proposed by Washington and is considerably shorter than the period Beijing had sought, which would have kept the truce in place until the end of Trump’s presidential term.
Although the extension demonstrates that diplomatic channels between Washington and Beijing remain open, it stops short of a comprehensive trade settlement capable of fundamentally reshaping their commercial relationship. The visit also produced no commitments from China to purchase Boeing aircraft or US soybeans, while the longstanding US trade deficit with China remained unresolved.
No Breakthrough on Contentious Issues
The summit produced no substantive breakthroughs on the most contentious issues, apart from Trump’s proposal to replace the term “artificial intelligence” with “super-intelligence.” The discussions also addressed the two leaders’ shared view that the Strait of Hormuz should remain open and that the conflict with Iran should come to an end. Yet this apparent consensus concealed the central disagreements: how such an outcome should be achieved and under what conditions. Trump made clear to his Chinese counterpart that Washington would not accept any Chinese military assistance to Iran.
The two sides also agreed on the possibility of holding two further meetings before the end of 2026. The first would take place in November, when the Chinese president invited Trump and his wife to attend the APEC summit in Shenzhen. The second is expected to be held in the United States during the G20 summit in December. The summit is therefore best understood as an exercise in managing, rather than resolving, the complex interdependence between Washington and Beijing. Both sides sought to ease immediate economic pressures while preserving their strategic leverage, producing a temporary truce rather than a durable settlement. The most consequential disputes — spanning trade and investment, semiconductors and rare earth minerals — remain unresolved.
Acknowledging China’s Status as a Rival
Strategic analysts interpreted the ceremonial welcome extended to Xi as more than diplomatic protocol: it was seen as a recognition of China’s emergence as a peer power, with Xi being received not simply as the leader of a rising state but as Trump’s principal counterpart on the global stage. The United States retains formidable advantages, including overwhelming military capabilities, an extensive network of alliances and unparalleled financial and technological centers. China, however, has developed into a major economic, industrial, commercial and military power, accumulating a growing array of instruments through which to project influence beyond its borders.
From this perspective, the summit reflected a broader shift in the global distribution of power, in which sanctions, unilateral pressure and traditional forms of US dominance have become ineffective. Washington was unable to persuade Beijing to adopt a confrontational position toward Iran or extract major concessions on the most contentious bilateral issues. China, meanwhile, has increasingly established itself as an independent center of influence in global affairs, even as the United States under Trump has pursued a more volatile and unpredictable foreign policy that, some analysts argue, has indirectly strengthened Beijing’s international position.
The contrast was also visible in the leaders’ demeanor during the summit. Xi projected composure and consistency, while Trump, despite his characteristically forceful style, adhered closely to diplomatic protocol and adopted a comparatively restrained tone, including on the sensitive question of Taiwan. This reinforced an emerging perception of two markedly different approaches to statecraft: Xi’s emphasis on strategic continuity and long-term positioning, contrasted with Trump’s preference for transactional diplomacy, rapid deal-making and tactical improvisation.
Trump placed considerable emphasis on his personal relationship with Xi, whereas the Chinese leader appeared more deliberate in using the summit to reaffirm the boundaries of what Beijing considers non-negotiable. Foremost among these is Taiwan, which remains the clearest expression of China’s strategic red lines that cannot be crossed.
The Summit and the Future of Sino-US Competition
The evidence suggests that the summit’s overriding purpose for both sides was not to resolve their underlying strategic disputes, but to preserve a temporary period of de-escalation and establish mechanisms for managing their rivalry. It also underscores the fundamentally different positions of the two powers: an established power seeking to preserve its predominance and a revisionist power whose rapid rise has increasingly challenged the existing distribution of power. Despite two presidential summits in 2026, the most contentious issues remained unresolved.
Xi’s visit to Washington should therefore be understood neither as the beginning of a Sino-US rapprochement nor as the end of their strategic rivalry. Rather, it points to an implicit understanding that competition will continue alongside diplomacy and calibrated maneuvering, while both sides seek to avoid the kind of confrontation that could become economically and politically exhausting. The emerging objective is to keep their rivalry above the threshold of genuine peace but below the threshold of war. Hence, the future trajectory of US-China tensions is likely to develop along three broad paths:
First: Renewed Escalation
This scenario is supported by the absence of substantive breakthroughs at the summit. The only concrete achievement was a short-term extension of the trade truce, rather than a comprehensive settlement, leaving the principal sources of friction intact. These disputes are not peripheral disagreements; they concern fundamental questions about the future of the international order and the distribution of global power.
Washington increasingly views China as a revisionist power seeking to reshape the international order in ways that would diminish the United States’ position as the predominant global power, particularly as the gap between the two countries’ capabilities continues to narrow. Beijing, meanwhile, is seeking a greater role in shaping global affairs. Yet the prospect of renewed escalation is tempered by both governments’ awareness of the domestic economic and political costs of uncontrolled confrontation, as well as the potentially catastrophic consequences of allowing rivalry to progress toward armed conflict.
Second: Managed De-escalation
This scenario would not entail sufficient rapprochement to resolve the fundamental disputes between the two powers. Instead, it would involve managing their rivalry and preventing escalation from reaching a level that could trigger war. A comprehensive settlement remains difficult because it would require concessions on influence, power, strategic interests, global leadership and international status.
The United States remains committed to preserving its position as the dominant global power while rejecting a model in which China and the United States share power on a more equal basis. China, for its part, is unlikely to accept a role confined to that of a regional power or counterweight, given the fact that it enjoys ultra-regional capabilities. Several factors could nonetheless sustain managed de-escalation: Washington’s recognition of China’s growing power, reflected in the highly ceremonial treatment accorded to Xi; the strategic importance of maintaining the trade truce; each side’s awareness of the other’s sources of leverage; the deep interdependence of their economies; and their shared interest in preserving global economic stability.
Third: A Freeze Followed by Renewed Fluctuations
This is arguably the most plausible trajectory: a temporary pause in escalation followed by repeated swings between confrontation and de-escalation as disputes evolve and the broader strategic environment changes. Neither side possesses sufficient leverage to decisively settle the rivalry in its favor. At the same time, China’s growing capabilities and the narrowing gap with the United States underscore the difficulties of relying on military pressure to compel Beijing and may instead encourage both sides to seek incremental gains on individual disputes.
The trajectory is further complicated by Trump’s transactional and often unpredictable approach to China, with his positions shifting between cooperation and confrontation. Such fluctuations can weaken the consistency of US policy and complicate its diplomatic position, while creating additional space for China to expand its diplomatic influence and strengthen ties with other major powers.
In conclusion, the Trump-Xi summit bears little resemblance to the Reagan-Gorbachev meetings of the 1980s, which contributed to a broader process of détente and ultimately helped bring the Cold War to an end. The latest meeting was tactical rather than transformative. Its principal purpose was to preserve the trade truce, keep diplomatic channels open and manage the existing competition so that it does not escalate into a prolonged and devastating conflict between the two powers.
[1] The first of its kind at Andrews Air Force Base since President John F. Kennedy received British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan there in 1962.
[2] Samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium, yttrium, as well as thulium, holmium, erbium, ytterbium and europium.
[3] Under the agreement, the United States pledged not to impose new tariffs on China, while Beijing committed to allowing the United States and other consumers to continue obtaining rare earth elements and critical minerals. As part of the truce, the United States reduced tariffs on Chinese goods, while Beijing lifted its restrictions on rare earth exports. China controls the bulk of global exports of these minerals, which are essential components in many key US industries, including technology, aircraft and weapons.
