September 30, 2026 could mark a defining moment in Iraq’s modern history, as the end of the US military mission Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) signals a major shift in the country’s security architecture, with potentially far-reaching implications for domestic stability, foreign relations and strategic decision-making. Under the US-Iraq security agreement signed in September 2024, the United States has completed the withdrawal of approximately 2,500 troops from the Kurdistan Region and closed Erbil Air Base, nearly 23 years after US forces first entered Iraq. The transition places Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s government at the center of a defining challenge: demonstrating that Iraqi security institutions can safeguard the country without relying on a US military presence. It also raises difficult questions about state sovereignty, internal stability, the proliferation of weapons outside state control, residual terrorist threats and Iraq’s regional and international partnerships.
Against a fluid regional strategic landscape, the withdrawal will test Baghdad’s ability to exercise effective authority across Iraqi territory, prevent attacks by armed factions against Arab states and bring all weapons under state control. The prospect of a confrontation over unauthorized arms is particularly consequential, given that Iran-aligned militias wield influence not only through their military capabilities but also due to their political representation in Parliament and their presence within other state institutions. Reasserting the state’s monopoly on the use of force therefore requires more than a security-sector adjustment; it entails redefining the relationship between armed factions and government institutions. The central question is whether Baghdad can establish a unified chain of command and ensure that military operations, security policy and sovereign decisions are determined by the state rather than competing centers of power. This challenge is sharpened by the refusal of Iran-aligned groups, including Kata’ib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, to disarm, as well as their attacks on the United States and Arab states on behalf of Tehran.
The militias’ refusal to surrender their weapons, even after the condition of withdrawing foreign forces from Iraq has been met, underscores their continued alignment with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a powerful institution shaping Iran’s strategic and security policies. The IRGC has portrayed the US withdrawal as a victory for Tehran’s regional strategy, despite the fact that the timetable was established under a bilateral agreement signed by Washington and Baghdad in 2024. It also views the Iraqi and Lebanese disarmament questions as interconnected; any concessions by Iran-aligned factions in Iraq would set a precedent for demands to disarm Hezbollah in Lebanon. From Tehran’s perspective, such developments could erode its regional influence, particularly as the emergence of a government in Syria hostile to Iran’s agenda is reshaping the strategic environment along Iraq’s northern frontier.
The militias’ continued resistance to disarmament after the US withdrawal threatens to obstruct Baghdad’s efforts to establish full sovereignty and could create a strategic vacuum if the government fails to unify security decision-making under state authority. This dynamic risks turning Iraq into an arena for renewed US-Iranian confrontation, potentially exposing the country to fresh US military strikes. Baghdad could also face increased pressure from Washington through sanctions and restrictions affecting oil revenues or exemptions that have enabled Iraq to conduct certain transactions involving Iran. Such measures could compound the country’s already difficult economic, security and social challenges, intensifying popular frustration and raising the risk of widespread instability. The central concern is that the failure to bring armed factions under state control could leave Iraq increasingly vulnerable to external coercion and internal unrest.
Tehran may regard the US withdrawal as the removal of a major constraint on its ambitions in Iraq, creating an opportunity to expand its influence amid mounting regional volatility and strategic uncertainty. The resulting vacuum could shift the balance of power further toward Iran-aligned armed factions, potentially consolidating a political order in which militias exercise disproportionate influence over state institutions and security decisions. Such a trajectory could extend militia control into additional strategic areas, replicating patterns established in Sunni-majority cities and provinces formerly held by ISIS, while deepening the corruption that successive Iraqi governments have struggled to contain. Iran’s regional strategy depends in part on cultivating loyal political and armed actors capable of advancing its geopolitical interests, a dynamic made more consequential by the continuing confrontation between Washington and Tehran. For Baghdad, this creates a more complex strategic environment in which managing relations with Iran will remain difficult, notwithstanding initiatives associated with the Zaidi government.
The capacity of Iraq’s security institutions to maintain order and defend national territory without external military support will be a defining test of the post-withdrawal period. The prospect of a repeat of 2014, when ISIS overran a third of Iraqi territory in the aftermath of the 2011 US withdrawal, remains a source of concern. Iraq continues to face overlapping threats, including militia involvement in regional conflicts, fragile security arrangements and gaps in territorial control. These vulnerabilities are compounded by ISIS sleeper cells operating in Iraqi urban centers and in Syrian areas near the border, as well as by the security risks associated with the Al-Hol and Al-Roj camps, which hold people with perceived or actual ties to ISIS. Concerns also persist over the group’s efforts to recruit children through its “Cubs of the Caliphate” program and potentially mobilize them to carry out attacks in Iraq and Syria.
Although the withdrawal of US forces could be presented as a milestone in restoring Iraqi sovereignty, a poorly managed exit amid adverse domestic and regional conditions risks creating a strategic vacuum with far-reaching consequences. Iraq could once again become more vulnerable to Iranian dominance, evoking concerns about the post-2003 power shift and the possibility of renewed regional instability. Washington should therefore act before these risks deepen by providing the Iraqi government with the political, security and institutional support needed to consolidate state authority. Analysts also point to underlying sources of social discontent that could reignite sectarian and ethnic tensions reminiscent of the early years following the US-led invasion. These pressures extend beyond Sunni and Kurdish communities to include younger Shiites increasingly disillusioned with the politicization of religious authority, the concentration of power and deteriorating socioeconomic living standards. At the heart of this frustration is the perception that Iranian strategic priorities have repeatedly taken precedence over Iraq’s national interests and the development of an inclusive civic identity rooted in the country’s resources, human capital and historical heritage.
Zaidi’s ability to manage Iraq’s external relations without compromising its sovereignty is another major challenge. Given Iraq’s importance to Iran’s regional strategy, Tehran could seek to reinforce allied militias by supplying additional missiles and drones, strengthening their capacity to protect Iranian interests and potentially drawing Iraq deeper into regional confrontations. The risks are particularly acute amid renewed concerns about a fresh escalation between Washington and Tehran, as increased US military deployments in the region fuel speculation about potential strikes against Iran and allied armed groups. Any suggestion that such action might follow the US midterm elections remains uncertain, but the prospect of renewed hostilities underscores the strategic pressures confronting Baghdad as it navigates an increasingly volatile regional environment.
With Hezbollah in Lebanon weakened and the Houthis in Yemen having sustained significant military setbacks, the IRGC may increasingly turn to strengthening its allied militias in Iraq as a means of preserving Iran’s regional influence. This potential shift warrants close scrutiny, as it could further complicate Baghdad’s efforts to pursue a balanced foreign policy and undermine its strategic partnerships with Arab Gulf states. An expansion of militia power could also imperil regional economic integration, including the Gulf-Iraq electricity interconnection project, cross-border development initiatives and the steady expansion of trade and investment ties between Iraq and its Gulf neighbors.
To conclude, Iraq stands at a defining crossroads, facing the need to reconsider the identity of the state, the direction of its foreign policy and the scope of its regional engagement. Navigating this transition will require a fundamental recalibration of national priorities: placing development and institution building ahead of militarized politics, subordinating ideological commitments to national interests and ensuring that domestic imperatives take precedence over Iranian interests.
Failure to manage this transition amid mounting regional uncertainty, by contrast, could further entrench militia-aligned forces within the state’s decision-making structures and expose Iraq to renewed proxy confrontations. It could also erode the institutional authority of a country whose political trajectory carries significant weight across the Arab world, while intensifying the risks of violence and instability throughout the Middle East. Ultimately, Iraq’s ability to consolidate state authority, pursue an independent foreign policy and prioritize development over factional rivalries will determine not only its own future but also the broader regional balance of power.
Opinions in this article reflect the writer’s point of view, not necessarily the view of Rasanah
