Iran last week launched its fifth satellite into near-earth orbit from its own soil. The life of Iran’s previous four satellites was short-lived. In its 14th attempt, Tehran fired the Noor I satellite into space using the Qased Space Launch Vehicle (SLV) from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) missile test range on April 22. The very next day, the IRGC spokesman announced plans to launch the Noor 2 satellite using a completely solid-fueled SLV. Launching a capable satellite and multi-stage non-liquid powered vehicle from a mobile transporter-erector is not an easy undertaking, and is unlikely to be achieved within weeks or months.
The IRGC was suspected to have a parallel space program but this was never officially acknowledged until the surprise achievement last week. Activities at the Imam Khomeini Spaceport acted as a perfect distraction and cover for the Shahroud missile test site. The IRGC premises were not used to avert a fresh hacking attempt from rivals. In fact, the satellite and the launch vehicle also belonged to the IRGC.
The Objectives of the Space Program
Iran’s space and nuclear programs share the same rationale. Both have a dominant military dimension, which Iran denies. The space program aims to secure Iran’s communication, surveillance and reconnaissance missions.
The military satellite’s launch ensures for Iran uninterrupted access to space and on-orbit operations, as well as providing it with situational awareness of space and surveillance capabilities of Earth. To meet its more specific needs, Iran’s launching capability provides the IRGC with command, control and communication capabilities via space, which may later be transformed into a space-based defense of the country’s territory. Tehran, at some point, might like to arm the satellite to attack similar objects of rival nations. The IRGC has an infatuation with fantasy weapons. In 1974, Russia launched the Salyut 3 which was equipped with a 23-mm anti-aircraft cannon, and fired at a plane from an orbiting satellite. Iran may also fancy downing rival satellites with direct-ascent anti-satellite missiles. The United States, China, Russia and India have already tested weapons to shoot down satellites.
The presence of orbiting satellites has monumental significance for Iran’s ballistic and cruise missile guidance systems and their deterrence capability. As much as the SLV capability directly feeds into Iran’s ballistic missile program, it also brings into the calculus the debate on the militarization of space and the resulting need to draft a corresponding defense policy.
For a climate-change impacted and water-stressed country like Iran, space surveillance can also help with early detection of floods and droughts besides providing data for efficient and environment-friendly farming practices and town planning. However, this is subject to the IRGC’s willingness to share data with the civilian government.
The IRGC, through this defiant feat, intends to project power from space. Now, Iran may very well strive to carve out a greater role in the global technological landscape as well as in the international legal and regulatory environment.
Iran’s Technological Journey
Iran’s interest in space technology dates back to 1958 when it was among the founding members of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPOUS). With the UNGA’s adoption of Resolution 1472 (XIV) on December 12, 1959 to formally set up COPUOS, Iran became one of the 23 member-states involved in pioneering global legislation to regulate the use of space.
Iran remained actively involved until 1968 and also became a member of the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) established by the International Council for Scientific Unions (ICSU), now the International Council for Science. Iran signed the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty) in 1967. The COSPUOS, COSPAR and the Outer Space Treaty seek the peaceful use of space, which is also part Iran’s Space Agency’s (ISA) guidelines. The ISA was established in 2004.
The ISA reports to the Supreme Council of Space, chaired by Iran’s president, which issues policy guidelines regarding the use of outer space, as well as for building, launching and deploying satellites. In addition, the agency approves all government and private sector space programs and identifies areas of potential regional and international cooperation.
With ISA’s establishment, Iran’s mission to develop a SLV began while a parallel effort was also in progress under the supervision of the IRGC. This effort remained shrouded in mystery until very recently.
The IRGC’s first bid to develop a SLV was obliterated on November 12, 2011 when an explosion rocked the Shahid Modarres solid-fuel research facility near Bidganeh and Malard, killing Brigadier General Hassan Tehrani Moghaddam along with 38 others. After a decade of efforts supported by the smuggling of equipment from abroad, a solid-propellant motor called Salman was developed. It was used to power Qased SLV’s second stage flight, which made possible the successful orbital entry last week. Its swivel nozzle helped with vital flight control and a light-weight carbon-fiber casing extended its range; neither of these two improvements seem the result of indigenous research. It is safe to assume that the motor might be similar to the one used by a vintage rocket from Russia, China or North Korea but obtained through the black market. Nonetheless, IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Amirali Hajizadeh expressed pride over his organization’s advancement of the space project.
Since its entry into low orbit, it has been circling 425 km above the Earth at an angle of 59.8 degrees of the equator. Each trip around the Earth’s axis takes 90 minutes.
Iran could have kept the launch a secret as the SLV did not need the usual umbilical tower, but a Shahab 3 modified missile launcher was used. The first stage rocket was filled up with liquid fuel inside the underground shelter. After the assembly, it was brought out on a level surface for the launch. The solid-fueled mid-stage helped reduce the preparation time and extended the range as well. The SLV is surely important due to strategic reasons as it will help Iran refine its ballistic missile program. But the cargo it was carrying is no less significant. The satellite weight was around 100 pounds, but it will not be a real game changer. It can be used for limited military purposes such as reconnaissance missions.
Now the IRGC Takes It to Space –What Is Next?
The Iranian satellite is equipped with a single camera and the head of the US Space Command General Jay Raymond quipped it was a “tumbling webcam in space, unlikely providing intel.” The quality of images from the cameras aboard the satellite do not exceed Google Earth’s low-resolution imagery. Others are equating the capabilities and size of the Noor 1 to Israel’s three-decade-old Ofek series satellite.
Iran’s eyes in the sky provide it with a self-operated real-time radio navigation system (i.e. Global Positioning System (GPS)) vital for accurately firing ballistic and cruise missiles during times of conflict. Tehran will not have to worry that Moscow or Beijing may stop the GPS under pressure from its rival when things heat up.
However, the question remains as to when Iran’s next more sophisticated satellite will be ready for launch via a liquid powered SLV. It will also be interesting to observe how long Tehran can keep the satellite in orbit. Iran’s satellite is vulnerable to hacking attacks. If this occurs, Iran will incur heavy costs, such as losing the prestige of having a platform in space. Secure and constant communication as well as the dependable operation of the devices aboard the Noor 1 remain the challenge ahead for Iran.
Venturing into space is the most challenging undertaking. One leap does not guarantee success in the next project and vice versa. While the technological gap is immense, the discreet exchange of know-how from friendly powers may become further limited come October 18 when the United States or the UK will likely invoke the snap-back clause under the controversial nuclear deal.
Iran’s satellite development program seems rather slow and less exciting than an actual refinement of its ballistic missile program leading to an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Currently, Iran has capped the range of its missiles to 2,000 kilometers but its space program can provide the necessary knowledge and technical finesse to Iran’s engineers to extend the range and payload with greater accuracy. Iran’s ambition now is to build solid-fueled SLVs. Although they do not entirely help with refining an ICBM, solid-fueled SLVs will surely bring invaluable insight into the complexities of projective velocity, maneuverability and metallurgy. If Iran has been purchasing successfully from the black market, its development of solid-fueled SLVs would be sooner rather than later, possibly in a year.
Iran’s space program provides satellite communication which is a prerequisite for an effective drone-based warfighting and surveillance strategy which is in Iran’s arsenal with varying capabilities.
Who Leads Iran Into Space?
With COVID-19 taking its toll on Iran, the successful launch of the Noor 1 is a vital morale booster for the Iranian government and the military, albeit not so much for the Iranian people. For the ISA too, the IRGC’s successful satellite launch is bittersweet. The agency is faced with a powerful competitor whose clout and resources are far greater in all respects. Though it will be suicidal for Iran to merge its space and missile program under one roof, the likelihood cannot be ruled out. Taking a pragmatic approach, the supreme leader and the president would like the ISA to grow in tandem with the IRGC’s aerospace arm. Competition for a nationalistic project usually proves beneficial for Iran’s leadership. Thus, the ISA’s finances may not see a cut while the IRGC’s aerospace program is likely to remain as the country’s core strategic asset. At best, the ISA’s team may get to develop newer and more sophisticated satellites with the SLV development aspect remaining with the IRGC.
The Diplomatic Imbroglio
Iran’s satellite launch success comes at a cost. The West has long viewed Iran’s space program as an extension of its quest for long-range ballistic missiles. Thus, there are likely prospects of punitive sanctions against Iran. However, this depends on where Western nations place Iran on the escalation ladder.
With October only months away, Iran may try to lie low on the deployment of its next satellite and let the sanctions on conventional arms be removed. Overall, the JCPOA will continue to block Iran’s bids for the transfer of sophisticated technology.
There are differing views on whether the West must insist on halting all testing and development of Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Category 1 missiles. Iran disagrees with Western nations that its ballistic missile and space programs are in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed Iran’s nuclear deal.
The text of the resolution clearly states that Iran is to avoid “any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons.”
Responding to a flurry of high profile statements and tweets after Iran’s satellite launch, Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif tweeted, “US has been bullying all against UNSC Resolution 2231 since 2017. Europe obeyed the US instead of 2231. Neither can lecture Iran based on flimsy misreadings of UNSCR 2231.”
Russia’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova voiced support for Iran. While reacting to the US response to Iran’s successful launch, she said, in no way does the UNSC Resolution 223 restrict Tehran’s rights and abilities to explore space for peaceful purpose. She added that Iran does not make missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons.
The satellite launch will boost Iran’s defiant narrative while exposing the space domain to confrontation and even conflict.
Conclusion
With the launch of the Noor 1, Iran’s space program has lost its civilian cover. The IRGC’s singlehanded control over the SLV as well as the satellite are enough to convince the world that Iran’s space program has strategic objectives. It also raises questions surrounding the technological support provided by foreign powers to Iran, particularly through the black market. China and Russia do not seem to object to the IRGC’s handling of Iran’s space program but the JCPOA parties do not seem to agree. Iran’s surprise feat comes a few months ahead of the JCPOA completing its five-year term and the lifting of an arms embargo on Iran. It is important to note that Iran is already violating its JCPOA obligations.
With Moscow and Beijing aligned with Tehran, as well as the possibility of the JCPOA being annulled and UNSC sanctions being reimposed, this leaves Iran with the ultimate defiant measure: fast track its nuclear enrichment to critical levels necessary to build a bomb and further refine its delivery systems. Thus, Iran’s precious and timely success in launching the satellite into orbit reduces the West’s policy options. With the US presidential elections fast approaching, President Donald Trump cannot afford to show flexibility towards Iran and needs to continue with his maximum pressure strategy to prevent Tehran from developing its nuclear and ballistic missile program.
