The Middle East has long served as a testing ground for transatlantic relations, exposing both deep convergence and persistent divergence between the United States and the European Union (EU). Both actors share core strategic interests in regional stability, secure energy flows, counterterrorism and the prevention of weapons proliferation. However, their policy instruments, strategic cultures and modes of engagement differ significantly. Washington has traditionally relied more readily on military power, privileged security partnerships with Israel and key Gulf states, and a greater willingness to act unilaterally when deemed necessary. This US approach is nevertheless increasingly being challenged by the rise of middle powers and by the broader reframing of the international order.
These structural differences have become even more pronounced under the Trump administration. One distinctive feature has been the increased importance of personal networks and informal channels, particularly through the role of special envoys such as Tom Barrack, whose access to the highest political levels has sometimes bypassed traditional bureaucratic and diplomatic structures. In the case of France, for example, engagement has at times occurred directly at the presidential or foreign minister level, rather than through established administrative counterparts such as ministerial advisers responsible for the Middle East. Under previous administrations, special envoys rarely played such a central role in shaping presidential decision-making. The personalization of diplomacy under Trump has therefore complicated coordination and follow-up mechanisms between European states and Washington across various regional files.
At the same time, the volatile and often unpredictable nature of US regional policy has reinforced European perceptions that their role is neither clearly defined nor necessarily valued as that of a supportive junior partner. This relative marginalization of European involvement appears even more visible under the second Trump administration, where US policymaking has further emphasized transactional diplomacy, executive discretion and a reduced interest in structured transatlantic coordination in Middle Eastern affairs. The EU by contrast, has generally privileged multilateral diplomacy, economic statecraft, humanitarian engagement and the promotion of international law and human rights. This structural divergence has become more visible during periods of heightened regional crisis.
Transatlantic alignment remains strong on counterterrorism and the containment of jihadist networks. Both sides were central to the campaign against the so-called Islamic State (Daesh) in Iraq and Syria. The United States led the Global Coalition’s military campaign, Operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq and Syria, while the EU and its member states provided stabilization funding, humanitarian assistance and support for governance reform in liberated areas. Cooperation has continued in Iraq, where European programs have focused on community reintegration, rule of law reform and reconstruction, complementing ongoing US security assistance and advisory missions. In Syria, although both sides are committed to preventing an ISIS resurgence, their positions have not always fully aligned. Following the military weakening of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), European governments, especially France, have shown greater hesitation in offering unconditional support to the Syrian central government. This caution is partly rooted in domestic political considerations, as Kurdish forces benefited from significant public sympathy in Europe due to their decisive role in the fight against ISIS. In France in particular, segments of public opinion and parts of the political class remain attached to the Kurdish cause, making full normalization with Damascus politically sensitive. At the same time, the United States has adjusted its position toward the Kurds over time, moving from strong military backing to partial disengagement, especially under the Trump administration. These shifts, however, reflect tactical recalibrations rather than a fundamental strategic divergence, as Washington’s primary objective continues to be the prevention of an ISIS resurgence and the stabilization of key territories. This convergence is illustrated by the broad consensus on transferring approximately 7,000 ISIS detainees from northeastern Syria to Iraq after the weakening of Kurdish control. While disagreements have emerged over legal frameworks and implementation mechanisms, the divergence concerns methods rather than substance. A similar dynamic can be observed in Iraq, where the United States opposed the nomination of Nouri al-Maliki as prime minister and exerted pressure to limit the influence of pro-Iran militias. European governments largely share these objectives of stabilization, counterterrorism and strengthening state authority, yet they do not possess the same leverage as Washington and therefore tend to favor engagement and institutional support over ultimatums. The difference lies primarily in relative capacity and instruments of influence rather than in strategic goals.
Iran represents a zone of cooperation despite tactical nuances. Both the United States and the EU have condemned Iran’s missile development and support for non-state armed actors, and both have imposed sanctions on Iranian entities linked to proliferation activities. However, Washington has tended to emphasize maximum pressure and military deterrence, while Brussels has continued to stress the necessity of diplomatic channels to prevent escalation. Despite tactical differences, neither side formally abandoned the objective of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and both sides of the Atlantic opposed the prospect of both a weak nuclear deal and the risk of a regional war in the context of US military pressures against Iran in February 2026.
The Israeli–Palestinian conflict remains one of the most visible areas of divergence. The United States has long been Israel’s principal security partner, providing extensive military assistance and often shielding it diplomatically in international forums. The EU supports Israel’s right to security but has been more vocal in criticizing settlement expansion in the occupied territories and consistently reaffirms its support for a negotiated two-state solution based on international law. Several EU member states, including France, the UK, Spain and Ireland, have recognized the Palestinian state, reflecting domestic political trends that are generally more sympathetic to Palestinian claims than those prevalent in US federal politics. During periods of intense conflict in Gaza or along Israel’s northern front, Washington has typically prioritized strategic alignment with Israel and regional deterrence, whereas European institutions have more forcefully emphasized humanitarian law, civilian protection and accountability mechanisms. Nonetheless, both actors continue to endorse negotiated conflict resolution in principle, even if they diverge on sequencing and leverage.
Energy security has historically reinforced convergence, though its relative weight has shifted. Europe’s dependence on Middle Eastern hydrocarbons, while significant, has been partially mitigated by diversification efforts, especially following disruptions linked to regional conflicts and the broader reshaping of global energy markets after the Russia-Ukraine war. The United States, having become a major energy producer, views the Gulf less through the lens of direct supply dependence and more in terms of global market stability and strategic partnerships. Both actors have engaged the Gulf states on investment, energy transition and regional de-escalation, yet Washington’s diplomacy has often been more overtly transactional, combining arms sales and security guarantees with investment deals. The EU has generally attempted to link economic cooperation with governance reform, human rights dialogue and climate commitments.
Despite periodic tensions, structural incentives for cooperation remain strong. Both the United States and the EU seek to prevent large-scale regional war, contain nuclear proliferation, limit the influence of violent extremist organizations and avoid destabilizing migration flows. Both are wary of expanding Russian and Chinese influence in the region, particularly in strategic sectors such as ports, telecommunications and arms sales. While the United States often retains the decisive military edge and crisis-management capacity, the EU contributes regulatory power, financial assistance and diplomatic networks that can sustain long-term stabilization efforts.
The future of transatlantic engagement in the Middle East will depend on whether these complementary assets can be effectively coordinated. Divergence over tactics, sanctions intensity, military posture and diplomatic sequencing need not translate into strategic rupture. However, if unilateral initiatives repeatedly outpace consultation, mistrust could deepen. In a region characterized by fragile states, proxy competition and unresolved conflicts, transatlantic cohesion remains a significant variable. The challenge is less about reconciling ultimate objectives, which remain broadly aligned, than about harmonizing instruments in a way that balances deterrence with diplomacy and short-term crisis management with long-term political reform.
