Relations between the European Union (EU) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have undergone a profound transformation, evolving from a narrow, energy-based dependency to a complex strategic partnership grounded in resilience, connectivity and mutual diversification. In an international environment defined by great-power competition, energy transition and the weaponization of interdependence, Europe’s engagement with the Gulf has become a central pillar of its search for geopolitical resilience. The Gulf, historically a supplier of hydrocarbons, has redefined itself as a hub of finance, logistics and technological innovation at the intersection of Asia, Africa and Europe. For the EU, cooperation with Gulf partners is now essential not merely for securing energy flows but for embedding long-term stability in a fragmented multipolar order.
The EU-Gulf axis has gained strategic depth since 2022, when the war in Ukraine reshaped global energy markets and exposed Europe’s supply chain vulnerabilities. The energy war between Russia and the EU forced a fundamental rethinking of Europe’s external dependencies. As Gulf producers stepped in to fill the gap, new layers of interdependence emerged: financial, technological and security-based. By 2025, the European Commission had institutionalized this engagement through the creation of a Directorate-General for the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf, and by extending the mandate of the EU Special Representative for the Gulf Luigi Di Maio for another two years after his first appointment in 2023. These innovations marked a departure from fragmented diplomacy toward a more coherent strategy designed to align Europe’s diversification and resilience goals with Gulf modernization agendas such as Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 and the UAE’s Net Zero 2050 plan.
EU-Gulf relations are now multidimensional, encompassing not only energy and trade but also maritime security, defense-industrial cooperation, digital transformation, trade routes and critical raw materials. At its core lies a shared recognition that resilience in an age of geopolitical uncertainty cannot be achieved in isolation. Both Europe and the Gulf seek to manage systemic shocks — whether stemming from conflict, technological disruption or climate change — through diversified partnerships that balance autonomy with interdependence. This convergence of strategic thinking, more than any single agreement, defines the current phase of EU-Gulf relations.
From Asymmetry to Strategic Convergence
Historically, EU-Gulf relations were defined by asymmetry. Europe’s postwar modernization was built upon affordable energy imports from Gulf producers, but political and security relations remained minimal. The 1973 oil crisis exposed Europe’s dependence on Middle Eastern energy and underscored the risks of exclusion from Gulf politics. Yet for decades, the EU lacked the instruments or the will to act strategically. Initial contacts between the two sides were established in 1983, following the creation of the GCC in 1981.
Relations between Europe and the GCC formally began with the signing of the Cooperation Agreement in 1988, although they were preceded by longstanding bilateral relations rooted in historical ties. The 1988 Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and the GCC was intended to institutionalize dialogue but remained largely symbolic. The Gulf states, anchored in the US security umbrella, saw little reason to develop parallel strategic ties with Europe.
This imbalance persisted into the early 21st century. Efforts to negotiate a free trade agreement in the 1990s and 2000s faltered amid disagreements over market access and political divergences. The EU viewed the Gulf primarily through the lens of trade liberalization, while the GCC prioritized political stability and defense. The Arab uprisings of 2011 began to alter this calculus. As the upheavals exposed the fragility of regional orders and accelerated Gulf activism in the broader Middle East, Europe recognized the growing geopolitical weight of the Gulf monarchies. The wars in Syria and Yemen and the reconfiguration of alliances under the first Trump administration (2017-2021) underscored that the Gulf had become a decisive player in shaping regional stability and energy markets.
Three structural shifts catalyzed the new phase of engagement. The first was the United States’ gradual pivot to Asia, which reduced Washington’s focus on Middle Eastern security and created a space for European initiatives. The second was China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which expanded Beijing’s presence in Gulf infrastructure and logistics, raising concerns in Brussels about strategic dependency. The third was the shock of the Russia-Ukraine war, which forced Europe to diversify energy supplies and re-engage with Gulf producers on an unprecedented scale. The result was a transition from transactional exchange to strategic convergence, where energy, connectivity and security became interlocking components of a shared agenda.
Institutional Consolidation and Strategic Vision
The year 2025 marked the institutional consolidation of EU–Gulf relations. The creation of a dedicated Directorate-General for the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf symbolized the recognition that the Gulf could no longer be treated as a subset of broader MENA policy. Concentrating expertise and resources under one administrative structure allowed Brussels to pursue integrated strategies linking energy transition, digitalization and security. The extended mandate of the EU special representative for the Gulf further deepened political engagement, providing a diplomatic interface for sustained dialogue with Gulf capitals.
Before the establishment of the Directorate General for the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf, the EU’s division of the MENA region into three separate sub-regions (North Africa, the Middle East and the Arabian Peninsula) complicated its engagement with the Gulf states. Owing to geographical proximity and historical ties, the EU has predominantly focused its policies and initiatives on the first two sub-regions. Frameworks such as the Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue, the Barcelona Process, the European Neighborhood Policy and the Union for the Mediterranean were all conceived as mechanisms to manage relations with the southern neighborhood. However, in the process of delineating these regional frameworks, the Gulf was, before the 2020s, effectively left outside the EU’s strategic map.
Moreover, between 2023-2025, these institutional innovations sought to bridge Europe’s internal fragmentation, harmonizing the diverse approaches of member states toward Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Doha and Kuwait. They also mirrored the Gulf’s own transformation from energy exporters into global investors and technological hubs. Sovereign wealth funds from the region have become crucial actors in Europe’s financial and industrial landscape, investing in green technologies, ports and critical raw materials. This reciprocal investment flow has redefined the relationship as one of co-development rather than dependency.
By 2023, bilateral trade between the EU and the GCC surpassed 170 billion euros. In 2024, total EU–GCC trade in goods reached 161.7 billion euros — a decline of approximately 5% compared to the previous year — nonetheless confirming Europe’s position as the Gulf’s second-largest trading partner after China.
The significance of EU–GCC relations lies less in their quantitative dimension than in the qualitative transformation of their structure. Beyond traditional energy and trade, cooperation is increasingly diversifying into emerging sectors such as renewable energy, hydrogen production, artificial intelligence and logistics. Europe’s Global Gateway initiative and the Gulf’s various modernization agendas now converge to form a new interregional framework that links sustainability with strategic resilience. This evolving partnership was further institutionalized during the first EU-Gulf Cooperation Council Summit, held in Brussels on October 16, 2024, under the theme “Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity.” Co-chaired by European Council President Charles Michel and the Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani as the rotating President of the GCC, the summit underscored the growing mutual interest in fostering closer, future-oriented relations between the two regions. As President Michel noted, both sides “share a common goal — to promote growth and generate more prosperity for our citizens.” The joint statement issued at the conclusion of the meeting reaffirmed this ambition, committing the EU and GCC to build a strategic partnership founded on mutual respect, trust and shared benefit amid increasingly complex geopolitical conditions.
Maritime and Security Dimensions
Security cooperation forms the backbone of this emerging partnership. The Gulf is among the most strategically sensitive maritime regions in the world, and Europe’s prosperity remains dependent on the uninterrupted flow of goods and energy through its chokepoints. The European-led EMASOH mission in the Strait of Hormuz, established in 2020, was a landmark in EU foreign and security policy, signaling a willingness to project stability in the Gulf’s maritime domain. Though modest compared to US operations, it represented a qualitative shift: Europe now considers Gulf security integral to its own.
In the mid-2020s, this cooperation expanded beyond the Strait of Hormuz to encompass the Red Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean, where European naval missions began to coordinate with Gulf partners to safeguard critical routes. The logic of this engagement is resilience-oriented: maritime security, supply-chain protection and technological surveillance are intertwined. As Gulf monarchies invest in advanced naval capabilities, unmanned systems and space-based monitoring, European industries have become key collaborators in co-developing these technologies.
The evolving pattern of defense-industrial cooperation marks one of the most significant features of deepening relations. European companies have become central suppliers and partners for GCC states seeking to localize arms production as part of their economic diversification plans. Since 2018, this localization has shifted the focus from procurement to joint production. In the UAE, for instance, the national defense conglomerate EDGE has launched joint ventures with European firms in shipbuilding, communications and unmanned systems. Similar ventures exist in Saudi Arabia under the umbrella of SAMI. Moreover, in 2024, Saudi Arabia unveiled a domestically manufactured electric patrol vehicle incorporating advanced drone and artificial intelligence technologies at the Riyadh World Defense Show, and introduced its first AI-powered unmanned naval combat vessel.
These partnerships enable the Gulf states to acquire cutting-edge defense technologies while simultaneously expanding Europe’s defense-industrial footprint in the region. The relationship is no longer one of supplier and client but of co-developers and co-investors. Gulf investment in the European defense ecosystem has accelerated since 2022, targeting smaller firms in robotics, drone systems and secure communications. This influx of capital has stimulated innovation within Europe’s defense industry and created new synergies with Gulf modernization plans. The result is a two-way exchange of technology and capital that enhances both sides’ strategic flexibility and reduces their dependence on US industrial dominance.
Energy Transition and Critical Raw Materials
While hydrocarbons remain a foundation of EU–Gulf relations, the strategic horizon is defined by the transition to post-oil economies. Europe’s decarbonization agenda, anchored in the European Green Deal of 2019 and the Critical Raw Materials Act of 2023, aligns with Gulf ambitions to diversify revenue sources and capture value in new energy sectors. The Gulf’s competitive advantage in solar energy and its financial capacity make it an ideal partner in developing hydrogen and renewable projects.
Green hydrogen has become the flagship of this cooperation. Pilot projects linking Gulf energy firms with European ports and utilities are already under way, with the goal of establishing large-scale hydrogen corridors by the end of the decade. These initiatives embed new forms of interdependence: Europe gains access to low-carbon energy sources, while Gulf states secure long-term demand for their renewable exports. Beyond energy, the partnership extends to the processing of critical minerals required for batteries, wind turbines and electronic components. Gulf capitals are investing in refining and processing facilities, emerging as alternative hubs to Chinese-dominated supply chains.
This alignment of energy transition strategies represents a paradigm shift. The Gulf is no longer viewed as a source of vulnerability but as a partner in resilience-building. By collaborating on hydrogen, renewables and critical materials, the EU and GCC are constructing an interregional infrastructure of sustainability that reinforces both economic diversification and geopolitical stability.
Connectivity and Infrastructure Diplomacy
Connectivity has emerged as another defining pillar of the EU–Gulf partnership. The India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) announced at the G20 Summit in 2023, epitomizes this ambition. Conceived as a multimodal transport and trade network linking India to Europe via the Gulf, IMEC reflects a strategic convergence between European, Gulf and Indian interests. It seeks to bypass traditional chokepoints like the Suez Canal, reduce transit times and diversify global supply chains away from Chinese-controlled routes.
For Europe, IMEC is both an economic and a geopolitical instrument. It enhances resilience by creating alternative corridors and integrates seamlessly with the EU’s Global Gateway strategy. For the Gulf states, it offers the opportunity to anchor their diversification efforts in global connectivity projects. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are positioning themselves as logistical anchors, investing heavily in ports, rail and digital infrastructure that connect Asia to the Mediterranean. Projects such as NEOM, Duqm and Jebel Ali illustrate how Gulf megaprojects intersect with Europe’s connectivity ambitions.
IMEC proposes to link the Indian subcontinent to the Arabian Sea, the Arabian Peninsula and the Eastern Mediterranean and onwards to Europe via rail, road, maritime, energy and digital-infrastructure networks. At the same time, IMEC is viewed less as a purely economic project than as a geo-economic and geopolitical instrument: for India the corridor offers a stepping-stone to deeper integration with Europe, for the Gulf states (notably the UAE and Saudi Arabia) the opportunity to transform their role into transit-and-hub economies and for Europe (and its trans-Atlantic partners) an alternative axis of connectivity as a counter-weight to China’s infrastructure diplomacy under the Belt and Road Initiative.
From an economic-connectivity standpoint, the IMEC proposes several layered benefits. First, by developing multimodal infrastructure — ports, railways, roads, pipelines and digital cables — the corridor aims to reduce transaction costs, shorten transit times and enhance supply-chain resilience between Asia, the Middle East and Europe. The official Indian government description emphasizes “ports, railways, roads, sea-lines and pipelines” as part of this seamless logistics architecture.
For instance, the northern section of the corridor (from the Gulf via Jordan/Israel to Europe) could operate 46 trains daily, with an initial capacity of 1.5 million TEUs (20-foot equivalent units) annually, scalable to about 3 million TEUs. With India’s vast market, rising manufacturing capacity and ambition to move into higher value-added supply chains, the corridor could provide improved access to European markets while also facilitating the Gulf states’ ambitions to become logistics gateways.
Second, the corridor offers diversification benefits. For Europe, it promises an alternative route that bypasses the Suez Canal and Red Sea shipping lanes — areas subject to heightened maritime risk (for example from Houthi attacks in the Red Sea). For India, the corridor advances its “Act East/West” connectivity ambitions and supports its global supply-chain integration beyond China-led frameworks. Third, the corridor has energy and digital-connectivity components: it envisages electricity-grid links, hydrogen pipelines and submarine fiber-optic cables, thereby adding a layer of techno-economic modernization and sustainability to the corridor’s logic. Thus, IMEC represents a hybrid economic infrastructure initiative combining trade, energy and data.
Beyond economics, IMEC is embedded in the broader geopolitics of connectivity and influence. Foremost, the corridor is widely interpreted as part of a broader Western (US/EU) strategy to draw India closer, while offering Gulf actors an alternative alignment that reduces dependence on China, and potentially mitigating the geopolitical influence of Beijing’s infrastructure projects. From an European-centered perspective, IMEC “provides a boost to India’s strategy to escape encirclement by Beijing” and simultaneously enables Gulf states to become bridges between East and West.
Indeed, the corridor aligns with the Indo-Pacific orientation of many partner states — India, the United States, European countries – and their desire to shape connectivity governance in a multipolar world. For Europe, IMEC offers a means to diversify trade and energy links away from over-reliance on China, Russia and the Suez-Red Sea axis. Second, the corridor is also about regional security and stability. The Gulf states have pursued through their “hub” strategy (ports, logistics, financial centers) a repositioning in global value chains, and IMEC fits neatly into that ambition. It also embeds new security-connectivity linkages: digital infrastructure, energy transit lines and logistics nodes often carry strategic significance. For instance, a secure under-sea cable route or hydrogen pipeline traversing the Arabian Peninsula confers strategic redundancy and geopolitical leverage.
Third, IMEC carries normative implications: it signals a shift in how the Global South (notably India and the Gulf) perceive their roles in inter-regional integration, not solely as recipients of infrastructure but as active connectors. This resonates with India’s ambition to become a global manufacturing and transit node beyond the narrower regional sphere. Moreover, the corridor can be read as part of the broader contest over rules of connectivity: who sets standards, who controls logistics hubs and whose governance frameworks dominate.
Notwithstanding its appeal, the IMEC initiative faces a series of significant impediments. At the implementation level, the ambition remains at the MoU stage: a detailed design, governance architecture or financing model has not yet been fully operationalized. The multiplicity of sovereign actors, regulatory differences and the requirement for large-scale investment pose real obstacles. Regionally, the Middle East context presents acute risks: the corridor traverses a space fraught with conflict, including Iranian maritime disruptions in the Red Sea and network vulnerabilities around the Bab al-Mandab/Suez axis. Indeed, some analysts identify that the corridor’s impetus is partly derived from the need to bypass these very vulnerabilities — but the underlying instability nonetheless remains. Further, geopolitical contestation exists: for example, Türkiye has voiced opposition to being bypassed and has proposed its own alternative connectivity projects.
Financially, the scale of investment is daunting. Building deep-sea ports, high-capacity rail links, pipelines and digital cables across multiple jurisdictions will require coordination between public and private sectors, risk allocation frameworks and long-term demand visibility. The corridor’s viability is contingent on actual cargo flows, digital-energy interlinkages and stable transit partnerships. Without guaranteed volumes and ensuring cost-competitiveness against existing sea-routes, the economic business case remains fragile.
Politically, the initiative requires sustained commitment from all partners. Changing domestic priorities, leadership turnover, external shocks (such as a resurgence of great-power rivalry, commodity price shocks or global demand shifts) may erode momentum. The corridor’s anchor effect depends on the enduring alignment of incentives among India, the Gulf and Europe — and this alignment is not assured.
For India, IMEC offers a path to bolster its role in the global supply-chain reorganization, enhance its maritime and logistics footprint and strengthen ties with Europe and the Gulf. By participating as a transit-export base, India can better leverage its manufacturing ambition and strategic location. However, India must ensure that infrastructure complementarity, manufacturing competitiveness and institutional reforms keep pace to derive tangible benefits.
For Gulf states, especially the UAE and Saudi Arabia, the corridor aligns with their economic diversification agendas (e.g., the UAE’s Logistics Hub and Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030). By becoming a transit node between Asia and Europe, the Gulf states can capture value beyond hydrocarbon exports and become indispensable elements of global connectivity chains. Yet the Gulf states must manage regional risks, ensure transparency in hub operations and attract the logistics and manufacturing flows that will fill their capacities.
If realized, IMEC could reshape trade flows, spur new logistics-and-manufacturing hubs across Asia, the Middle East and Europe and contribute to a more diversified global supply-chain map. It could support energy-transition objectives (via green-hydrogen pipelines, digital-grid links) and offer India and the Gulf a transformative economic role.
Geopolitical Resilience and Strategic Autonomy
At a deeper level, the EU-Gulf partnership reflects the search for resilience in an era of fragmentation. The rise of multipolarity and the weaponization of interdependence have made strategic diversification a necessity for both Europe and the Gulf. For the EU, Gulf engagement complements the transatlantic alliance by providing an independent axis of stability; for Gulf monarchies, Europe offers diversification away from the rivalry between Washington and Beijing. The operative concept is not harmony but resilience — defined as the capacity to absorb shocks and adapt to systemic change. The institutional and economic frameworks introduced since 2023, in conjunction with the EU’s new Gulf Focus policy, have entrenched this rationale, establishing durable mechanisms for dialogue and cooperation capable of withstanding political volatility.
Prospects for 2030: Scenarios of Resilience
Looking toward 2030, three broad trajectories can be envisaged. The first, Resilient Convergence — that is, a scenario in which EU-Gulf relations evolve into a robust, adaptive and institutionalized partnership capable of withstanding geopolitical and economic shocks — would entail the consolidation of cooperation through structured mechanisms comparable to the EU-ASEAN dialogue. By this stage, hydrogen corridors would be operational, the IMEC fully functional and maritime collaboration extended across the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. The partnership would thereby evolve into a central pillar of an emerging multipolar system of global governance.
The second trajectory, Fragmented Resilience, envisions a scenario of uneven and thematically limited progress. In this pathway, cooperation in maritime security and energy diversification would persist, yet global power rivalries, strategic divergences and bureaucratic inertia would impede the development of a fully integrated framework. Initiatives such as the IMEC and hydrogen corridors would move forward only partially, resulting in a form of functional but incomplete resilience — a partnership that endures and adapts in specific domains, yet falls short of comprehensive institutionalization.
The third trajectory, Strategic Drift, denotes a scenario in which the absence of a coherent and sustained European strategy toward the Gulf leads to a gradual loss of direction and influence. In this outcome, the EU’s limited strategic engagement would allow bilateralism, regional fragmentation and intensifying global rivalries to undermine collective initiatives. Consequently, the Gulf states would deepen cooperation with Washington and Beijing, while Europe’s role would progressively diminish to that of a secondary economic actor, rather than a strategic partner.
The most plausible trajectory is likely to fall between Convergence and Fragmentation. Substantial progress in energy and maritime cooperation can be expected, albeit constrained by intensifying great-power rivalries. Preventing strategic drift will depend on Europe’s ability to sustain political commitment, preserve institutional coherence and allocate consistent investment to joint initiatives.
Conclusion
The evolution of EU-Gulf relations from energy dependence to strategic resilience marks one of the most significant shifts in Europe’s external policy since the end of the Cold War. The partnership is no longer confined to hydrocarbons or trade; it encompasses security, technology, connectivity and defense-industrial cooperation. It is also underpinned by a shared recognition that resilience — economic, technological and geopolitical — is now the measure of strategic success.
For Europe, the Gulf provides diversification, investment and access to emerging technologies. For the Gulf states, Europe offers legitimacy, markets and a pathway to global influence beyond the rivalry between the United States and China. The challenge ahead is to ensure that this interdependence remains balanced and politically sustainable. Managing great-power competition, avoiding asymmetric dependencies and maintaining institutional coherence will determine whether the partnership becomes a model of interregional resilience or another casualty of global fragmentation.
In a world where geopolitical shocks are the new normal, the EU-Gulf axis stands as a laboratory for the politics of resilience. Its success will shape not only the future of European foreign policy but also the architecture of multipolar cooperation in the 21st century.
