Iran’s announcement on November 21, 2025 that it considers the Cairo Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) null and void constitutes a genuine turning point in its longstanding confrontation with the international community over its nuclear program. By discarding an already fragile framework of cooperation, Tehran crosses a significant political and technical threshold, markedly escalating the standoff and narrowing the remaining space for diplomatic de-escalation. This decision is likely to trigger further friction between Iran and Western states, which view the Cairo Agreement as one of the few remaining diplomatic avenues for managing the nuclear file. The resulting lack of transparency over Iran’s activities could, in turn, heighten mistrust and fuel military tensions, increasing the risk of miscalculation on both sides.
The declaration, delivered by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in a formal communication to IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi, came less than 24 hours after the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution censuring Iran for persistent non-cooperation. This sequence of events not only deepens the crisis surrounding Iran’s nuclear activities but also underscores the growing fragility of the global non-proliferation regime.
The Cairo Agreement, reached in September 2025 after diplomatic negotiations in the Egyptian capital, was conceived as a modest but meaningful step toward restoring international monitoring of Iran’s nuclear program. Although not a legally binding treaty, the Cairo understanding between Iran and the IAEA took the form of a technical arrangement that set out procedures for the eventual resumption of inspections and reporting at key nuclear sites. Its stated purpose was to halt the downward spiral in verification and to restore a minimal degree of transparency after years of mounting opacity. Despite its limited and contested scope, many observers treated the agreement as a modest diplomatic opening, made possible by the threat of renewed UN sanctions and by internal dynamics under President Masoud Pezeshkian, who had pledged more pragmatic engagement with the West. From the outset, however, Iranian officials underlined that the concessions were conditional and reversible, warning that any hostile action — notably the reimposition of sanctions — would automatically nullify the arrangement.
The IAEA’s November 20, 2025 resolution served as the immediate trigger for this reversal, building on Iran’s earlier statement that the Cairo Agreement had ceased to apply once the E3 (France, Germany and the UK) moved to reactivate UN sanctions in late September 2025. Adopted with 19 votes in favor, three against and 12 abstentions, the censure required Iran to provide immediate and technically credible explanations for undeclared nuclear material, grant the agency full access to relevant sites and supply up-to-date information on its enriched-uranium stockpile and safeguarded facilities. The resolution reflected accumulated frustration within the agency over Iran’s failure, over the previous five months, to address outstanding questions related to the presence of highly enriched uranium traces indicative of undeclared activities. For the IAEA, the absence of transparency rendered verification of the peaceful nature of Iran’s program increasingly impossible.
Araghchi’s response was rapid and unequivocal. In statements disseminated through Iranian state media and diplomatic channels, he declared the Cairo Agreement officially terminated, attributing responsibility to what he described as Western “provocations.” According to Araghchi, the United States and the E3 had “killed” the agreement by instrumentalizing the IAEA for political ends. He asserted that the resolution lacked technical justification and constituted yet another instance of alleged bias within the agency. While he refrained from explicitly threatening withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a possibility occasionally raised by Iranian officials, his remarks nonetheless reaffirmed Tehran’s rejection of any demand for zero enrichment on Iranian soil.
This posture reflects a calculated political strategy. Domestically, rejecting the Cairo Agreement strengthens “hardliner” factions that interpret external pressure as vindication of their longstanding skepticism toward engagement. It also aligns with the construction of an official narrative that seeks to justify the country’s severe economic difficulties, driven by sanctions and deep structural mismanagement, in political rather than technocratic terms.
Internationally, however, the move entails considerable risks. By dismantling the limited oversight mechanisms restored in September 2025, Tehran further isolates itself diplomatically and increases the likelihood of miscalculation. With diminished access for inspectors, external intelligence agencies may increasingly rely on indirect or covert monitoring, raising the specter of preemptive actions reminiscent of Israeli military and covert operations against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.
By September 2025, Iran had amassed 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60% purity — a level approaching weapons-grade — and had sharply curtailed access for inspectors, prompting repeated IAEA warnings. In this context, the collapse of the Cairo Agreement represents a setback for efforts to reconstitute a minimal verification baseline. The IAEA now faces substantial blind spots in monitoring key facilities at a time when, according to agency estimates, Iran possesses enough enriched material for 10 nuclear bombs, should it decide to pursue them. The implications extend beyond the nuclear realm: a more confident or nuclear-capable Iran could embolden its regional allies and proxies — including Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen — potentially destabilizing maritime routes and energy markets already rattled by geopolitical turbulence.
International reactions to Araghchi’s announcement have been predictably sharp but varied. The United States, which co-sponsored the IAEA resolution that precipitated Tehran’s move, has framed Iran’s nuclear steps as continued escalation warranting sustained diplomatic and economic pressure. The E3 jointly expressed “utmost concern,” urging Tehran to reverse course while reiterating their commitment to diplomatic engagement. Russia and China opposed the IAEA resolution, calling for restraint and warning against further escalation, mindful of their growing economic ties with Iran. Notably, Niger voted against the censure, signaling emerging geopolitical alignments; Niger’s recent moves in the uranium mining sector and reported outreach to non-Western partners underscore a broader realignment.
From a policy standpoint, addressing this crisis requires a dual approach combining credible deterrence with pragmatic incentives. First, a unified response through the UN Security Council could signal international resolve. Yet coercion alone is unlikely to alter Iran’s calculus. The experience of the past decade demonstrates that pressure must be coupled with viable diplomatic pathways. Consequently, offering phased sanctions relief in exchange for verifiable, monitored steps — such as reinstating surveillance equipment and addressing safeguards issues — may provide the leverage needed to reengage Tehran. Second, broadening the diplomatic format to include regional actors could foster a more comprehensive and sustainable arrangement. Moreover, the EU has expressed readiness to facilitate such efforts and the Iranian foreign minister will continue his dialogue with EU states during his visit to the Netherlands and France. Third, reinforcing the institutional independence and technical credibility of the IAEA is essential to counter perceptions of politicization that undermine its authority. In conclusion, the termination of the Cairo Agreement following the IAEA’s latest censure epitomizes Iran’s increasingly reactive nuclear posture. Yet it also exposes the vulnerabilities of a state grappling with economic strain and strategic isolation. A combination of firm deterrence, calibrated incentives and inclusive diplomacy offers the best prospect for preventing further escalation and preserving the integrity of the global non-proliferation regime. The stakes are considerable: failure to act risks accelerating regional instability and weakening the foundational norms of nuclear governance at a moment of unprecedented geopolitical uncertainty.
