The brief but intense conflict between Iran and Israel in June 2025 marked a decisive break in the strategic calculus of the Iranian republic. Israeli air and missile strike, coordinated with US intelligence support, inflicted extensive damage on Iran’s nuclear facilities, military infrastructure and segments of its energy sector. Iranian forces retaliated with large-scale missile barrages, but the confrontation ended within less than two weeks under a US-brokered ceasefire. The war exposed both the strengths and weaknesses of Iran’s deterrence posture and triggered an intense debate among the country’s political and security elite over how to prepare for future conflicts.
The most consequential aftershock of the war lies in its impact on Iran’s nuclear doctrine. The destruction of key nuclear assets, the assassination of senior scientists and the degradation of enrichment capabilities have rekindled calls within the security establishment to consider overt weaponization. Iran retains sufficient technical expertise and enriched uranium – up to 60 percent purity – to produce fissile material for several weapons within months, though weaponization timelines remain uncertain. Israeli strikes eliminated at least 14 nuclear scientists and engineers, lengthening the process. Yet much of Iran’s weapons-related research was completed over two decades ago, as evidenced by documents seized by Mossad in 2018, and the primary bottleneck may now be restoring capabilities such as uranium metal conversion at Esfahan. Protecting remaining assets from further Israeli attacks has become a strategic priority, with surviving scientists relocated to secure sites in Tehran and northern Iran.
The domestic political impact of these losses has been profound. The execution in August 2025 of nuclear researcher Rouzbeh Vadi, accused of providing classified information during meetings in Vienna to Mossad, was heavily publicized in “conservative” media as an act of punishment for high treason. The incident underscored fears of infiltration and espionage, further fueling calls for tighter security and more centralized decision-making. In an unprecedented move since the Iran–Iraq war, the leadership established a National Defense Council (NDC) within the Supreme National Security Council on August 3, 2025. Chaired by the president and operating under the constitutional framework of Article 176, the NDC is tasked with defining national defense and security policy within the guidelines set by the supreme leader, coordinating all political, economic, intelligence and cultural activities with security priorities and mobilizing both material and immaterial resources to meet internal and external threats. The appointment of veteran political figure Ali Larijani to head the Supreme National Security Council signaled an attempt to overcome institutional fragmentation and improve coordination between civilian leadership, the IRGC and other agencies.
At the doctrinal level, the war has reinforced the centrality of deterrence. For the past two decades, Iran has relied on a hybrid approach: conventional missile and drone capabilities to threaten adversaries, coupled with a nuclear program presented as peaceful but maintaining a latent weapons potential. The June 2025 conflict demonstrated that even deeply buried facilities such as Natanz and Fordow are vulnerable to precision strikes. While the attacks have delayed enrichment activities by months, possibly two years, they have not erased Iran’s technical knowledge or enriched stockpiles. In Tehran’s strategic debate, there is growing recognition that deterrence credibility cannot depend solely on conventional assets and nuclear ambiguity. The emphasis is now shifting toward survivable, diversified strategic capabilities capable of withstanding first strikes.
This reassessment intersects with a longstanding religious and political constraint: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s so-called fatwa banning the production and use of nuclear weapons. Issued in the early 2000s, the fatwa has served as both a moral anchor domestically and a diplomatic shield internationally, underpinning Iran’s claim that its nuclear activities are for peaceful purposes. However, its legal and theological status is inherently contingent, as fatwas reflect the judgment of a living jurist and can be reinterpreted or rescinded if conditions change. The war has eroded the taboo around even discussing its revocation. Senior IRGC commanders, many of whom have combat experience in Syria and Iraq, are reported to have urged Khamenei to reconsider the prohibition in light of Israel’s demonstrated willingness to penetrate Iran’s defenses. They frame nuclear weapons as the ultimate insurance policy against regime change, invoking North Korea’s deterrent posture as a model. While no official step has been taken to rescind the fatwa, the fact that the debate has become visible within policy circles marks a significant shift. Prior to the direct military confrontations with Israel in 2024 and 2025, internal Iranian discussions centered on the possibility of militarizing the nuclear program as a means of securing a suspension of sanctions. Since 2024, however, the debate has continued to focus on this militarization scenario – now framed as a response to Israeli military operations.
The political risks of altering the fatwa are substantial. Khamenei’s legitimacy rests on both his role as supreme leader and his claim to uphold Islamic principles in governance. Revoking a decree repeatedly presented as a moral red line could alienate clerical supporters and sections of the public. Yet the security establishment faces mounting evidence that the current deterrence framework may be inadequate in the face of existential threats. A possible compromise under discussion involves “reinterpretation” rather than outright revocation, potentially allowing possession of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances while maintaining a public stance against their use.
Diplomatically, Iran remains cautiously engaged. In the war’s aftermath, Tehran has indicated a willingness to explore renewed discussions with the United States, aiming for partial restoration of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, but only if tangible sanctions relief and credible security guarantees are on the table. Iranian diplomats are seeking to decouple hostility toward Israel from possible dialogue with Washington, preserving space for negotiations while hedging against their failure. The official position toward the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has hardened, with calls for new arrangements that align with parliamentary legislation and give the Supreme National Security Council final approval over cooperation.
The war also revealed critical weaknesses in Iran’s nuclear infrastructure security. Israeli strikes targeted not only enrichment facilities but also supporting systems such as electrical grids, centrifuge assembly lines, and transportation links, exploiting operational bottlenecks. Iran is now prioritizing the dispersal of critical facilities and research into alternative fuel cycles that could be adapted for weapons use if necessary. Command-and-control structures are being reassessed to ensure that retaliatory capabilities could survive a first strike. For international actors, these developments present a strategic dilemma. The June 2025 conflict demonstrated that pre-emptive military action can delay but not destroy Iran’s nuclear potential and may even strengthen arguments for weaponization inside Iran. The credibility of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the IAEA’s monitoring role has already been damaged. If Tehran concludes that treaty membership cannot protect it from attack, its incentive to remain within the NPT framework will diminish.
The coming years will test the resilience of Iran’s current balance between religious principle and strategic necessity. If diplomacy yields tangible benefits, the fatwa could survive as a symbol of restraint. If not, the pressures of deterrence and regime survival may outweigh theological continuity, paving the way for a doctrinal transformation that would be one of the most consequential shifts in Iranian security policy since 1979. The post-war moment is thus a crossroads. Iran’s evolving war doctrine is moving toward a more explicit focus on deterrence, resilience, and redundancy, with nuclear calculations at its core. Whether the country ultimately crosses the nuclear threshold will depend on the interplay of domestic politics, regional security dynamics and the willingness of external powers to address its threat perceptions. The fate of the fatwa will be central to this trajectory — upheld, reinterpreted or revoked, each path carries profound implications for the security architecture of the Middle East and beyond.
