The new Iraqi government led by Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi recently launched “Operation Dawn,” conducting a series of anti-corruption raids in Baghdad’s Green Zone. Zaidi’s anti-corruption campaign has dominated the political scene in the country as it has targeted several high-profile former ministers, parliament members, senior bureaucrats and government officials. Although the campaign has received support from several political blocs, it has also drawn criticism from others. Whether the campaign will be a genuine change from past efforts remains uncertain and too early to judge, especially because of the institutionalized and deeply structural nature of corruption in Iraq.
As per the Iraqi Supreme Judicial Council, the ongoing campaign has two goals: holding those who commit financial and administrative corruption accountable and recovering funds and assets. Recently, the Iraqi judiciary announced it is introducing a plan for conditional settlements to recover corruption funds. Dozens of government officials, advisers and Parliament members have been arrested so far, and officials have recovered assets exceeding $250 million, including cash, gold, properties and vehicles. The detainees include Deputy Oil Minister for Distribution Affairs Ali Maarij and former Deputy Oil Minister Adnan al-Jumaili. Among those sought are lawmakers Hussein Moanes of the Huqooq bloc, the political wing associated with the Iran-backed Kata’ib Hezbollah, and Alaa Sakar of the Reconstruction and Development Alliance, both of whom reportedly have evaded arrest. Iraqi authorities expect further arrests and asset seizures as the scope of the campaign expands.
There are several structural and political challenges that the current government faces in its campaign against corruption. Firstly, one of the most persistent challenges is to reform the political system that has been marred by institutionalized corruption. The political economy is intertwined with the muhasasa system (sectarian appointment) that emerged after the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. Although it was theoretically designed as a mechanism to ensure fair representation among different communities, it has evolved into a quota-based distribution of bureaucrats, ministries and other high-profile government positions. As a result, public contracts and procurements also frequently became tools for rewarding loyalists, making it a critical aspect of maintaining political alliances. Moreover, this has paved the way for the institutionalization of corruption in Iraq. The country has consistently ranked among the world’s most corrupt countries in the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). In the 2025 CPI, it scored 28 out of 100, ranking 136th globally. While billions of dollars have flowed into Iraq through oil revenues over the past two decades, improvements in public services, infrastructure and institutional capacity have remained limited.
Secondly, any genuine attempt to confront corruption is often met with domestic political challenges, which complicate the political stability of the country. Investigations and allegations of corruption are construed as instruments of political vendetta by opposition groups, which undermines the prospect of wider support. Moreover, despite successive governments launching ambitious anti-corruption initiatives, none has actually succeeded in effectively addressing Iraq’s deeply entrenched corruption problem. Zaidi now faces the same predicament, requiring the political will and resilience to pursue investigations against senior leaders across all political parties. Anything less would cast doubts over the genuineness of the campaign and invite accusations of political targeting.
Thirdly, the presence of armed militia groups and their relations with Iran remain a key problem. Many militias maintain economic networks and exert influence over state institutions, border crossings and customs, further weakening governance. Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) factions, including Kata’ib Hezbollah, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba and the Badr Organization, over time have consolidated influence over key Iraq-Iran border crossings. As per reports, their control has enabled the evasion of customs duties through intimidation of border officials, paving the way for embezzlement of funds and other corrupt practices. This is particularly problematic as it also serves as a mechanism for Iran to circumvent US sanctions, raising concerns in Washington and undermining US confidence in Iraq’s commitment to accountability and reform. As the new government intends to expand the scope of economic and energy cooperation with the United States, it will be necessary for Baghdad to take adequate measures to tackle this problem. Zaidi will also face challenges in overcoming the credibility deficit that continues to deter foreign investment. Given Iraq’s history of corruption in the energy sector, isolated investigations are unlikely to increase investor confidence unless they are accompanied by sustained institutional reforms that improve the overall business environment in Iraq.
Fourthly, weak institutions and the absence of transparency and accountability continue to undermine Iraq’s anti-corruption efforts. Limited judicial independence and inadequate enforcement have enabled corruption networks to operate with impunity, which has also eroded public trust and institutional credibility. As per the UNDP, nearly “20 percent of the country’s public funds have been lost to corruption.” UNDP Resident Representative for Iraq Titon Mitra said, “Between $150 billion and $450 billion in assets may have been moved overseas or hidden within Iraq,” making recovery extremely difficult or, in some cases, even impossible. The 2019 Tishreen movement was primarily a reflection of the prolonged public frustration with Iraq’s entrenched corruption and governance failures. However, the movement did not achieve tangible outcomes, which again highlights the structural factors that hinder efforts and reforms in Iraq. Hence, any constructive outcome would require comprehensive reforms as well as building institutional capacity, operating free from any kind of political interference. Such a transformation requires long-term planning and strong local, regional and international support.
Fifthly, extending anti-corruption efforts beyond Baghdad with the support of provincial governments will be challenging, especially as corruption in Iraq interlinks governors, local officials, tribal actors and businesses. Consequently, reforms at the central level are unlikely to succeed unless they are accompanied by effective implementation and oversight across Iraq’s governorates and local institutions.
In the current context, Zaidi will have to balance several priorities and considerations. Strengthening relations with the United States and securing continued US support remain essential for Iraq’s economic recovery. Iraq recently agreed to tighten controls on US dollar transactions to curb illicit financial flows to Iran and Iran-backed militias, in return for Washington resuming shipments of US currency that had been suspended during the Iran war. The timing of the anti-corruption campaign, preceding Zaidi’s visit to Washington, prompted questions about whether it intended to strengthen Iraq’s position in discussions with the US administration over bilateral economic cooperation and curbing Iranian influence in Iraq.
Ultimately, the success of the new government’s anti-corruption drive will be measured on the basis of its capacity to bring long-term reforms. Achieving tangible and constructive results will depend on curbing the influence of political elites and strengthening institutional mechanisms to prevent the abuse of political power. This is a challenge that extends well beyond targeting individual corrupt officials. As of now, Zaidi has opened a political window for reform, but sustaining that momentum will require addressing the structural issues that have normalized corruption in Iraq.
