On November 4, 2026, a raft of cooperation agreements, including a landmark defense agreement, were signed between Saudi Arabia and Syria during Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharra’s visit to Riyadh. This took place against the backdrop of unprecedented regional developments throughout 2026, particularly the repercussions of the Iran war and the continuation of the multiple threats facing Saudi Arabia, let alone Israeli incursions into southern Syria, which continue unabated. However, what is distinct about these deals is not just the security dimension, but the defense aspect being coupled with a spate of development and economic agreements covering multiple sectors.
These agreements show that bilateral relations are not confined to Saudi political support for the new Syrian leadership. Instead, the two countries are building a multifaceted partnership to boost security, defense, economic and development cooperation. These plans reflect a shared understanding that Syrian stability is essential for the restoration of its war-ravaged state institutions, its economy and social services.
The joint communiqué was not confined to bilateral relations. It touched on the dangers any military escalation could pose to regional security and stability, maritime navigation, sustainable energy supplies and global economic stability. It also called for ceasing all acts that threaten navigation in the Red Sea, the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Strait of Hormuz. Such calls show that there is a common recognition that the two countries’ security will be impacted by developments that occur beyond their immediate geographic boundaries and that the development of defense cooperation occurs within a wider context to defuse regional threats. This report discusses the underlying factors driving this wide-ranging cooperation and touches on potential hurdles that could prevent them from realizing their mutual interests.
Motives and Timing
The timing of these agreements must be considered against the backdrop of recent regional developments which have led both countries to converge in several areas, most notably the defense sphere, to serve the interconnected strategic interests of Damascus and Riyadh. The kingdom seeks to contain threats that emanate from beyond its borders and prevent the exploitation of neighboring territories to safeguard national security. Syria, on the other side, seeks to forge regional partnerships that help it address domestic and security challenges and rebuild its capabilities — doing away with previous approaches of depending on foreign powers.
Repercussions of Regional Escalation and Iranian Threats
The escalation of regional tensions following the US-Israel war on Iran and the likelihood of continued conflict are key factors explaining the timing of the agreements. Recent developments show that any wide-ranging confrontation involving the three parties (the United States, Israel and Iran) will not be confined exclusively to them, but will spill over into the region. Key facilities and maritime routes will be targeted. Militant groups will be mobilized and transnational supply networks will be reactivated.
For Saudi Arabia, the Iranian threat is no longer restricted to political leverage or diplomatic moves. Tehran and its allies have demonstrated the use of missiles, drones and armed groups to target oil installations, airports, cities and infrastructure. In this context, the threats posed by the Houthi militia are salient, in light of their continued missile and drone attacks on Saudi targets. Such attacks pose a challenge to the defense systems deployed around key installations, and those defending Saudi airspace and maritime routes.
For Syria, there are concerns about being drawn into the regional escalation. This could happen through the reactivation of armed groups and networks tied to Iran, or the use of borders to rebuild supply channels between Iran, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon. Accordingly, Saudi Arabia and Syria are aligned in their determination to ensure that Syrian territory is not once again used as a platform for Iranian military projection or as a transit route for the transfer of weapons and military equipment to non-state armed actors.
Continued Israeli Incursions Into Southern Syria
Israel’s actions in Syria constitute another factor enhancing the intersection of interests between Riyadh and Damascus. Since the fall of the Assad regime, Israel has conducted operations within Syrian territories, expanding its footprint in the south. Tel Aviv continues targeting military positions and defense infrastructure in Syria, undermining the ability of the new Syrian leadership to rebuild a new, independent military.
Thus, Syria is grappling with a security dilemma. Damascus is required to rebuild its defense capabilities and restore sovereignty over its territories even though it does not possess the capabilities to counter Israel’s military superiority or impose new rules of engagement. Hence, rapprochement with Saudi Arabia provides Damascus with room to expand its regional political canopy and improve its negotiating position in relation to the Israeli withdrawal from its territories, especially in the south.
Saudi Arabia views the Israeli military’s free reign in southern Syria as a factor contributing to the imposition of a new Israeli fait accompli, following the collapse of Iranian clout.
Accordingly, providing political and security support for Syria is a tool for achieving regional equilibrium and enhancing regional stability. It is not necessarily a preparation for a military confrontation with Israel. The significance of the Saudi role lies in the possibility of leveraging Riyadh’s regional and global ties in strengthening the Syrian negotiating position in the context of the Israeli withdrawal from southern Syria. Nevertheless, this intersection of interests continues to be confined to a delicate calculus. Riyadh does not seek to confront Israel or cause it to intensify its incursions into Syria. This could drag the region into a conflict that is not in line with the kingdom’s priorities. Therefore, supporting the rebuilding of Syrian defense capabilities and enhancing its political and negotiating position remain more consistent with the kingdom’s interests than involvement in offensive arrangements or incurring direct military obligations.
Altered Security Dynamics in Syria and Its Periphery
The Saudi-Syrian agreements were concluded amid broader changes in Syria’s security environment and the surrounding region. These changes involve not only rebuilding Syria’s military and security institutions following the fall of the former regime, but also a shift in the nature of threats, the balance of power and the roles of external actors. On the one hand, the Sharaa government is seeking to reassert control over Syrian territory, unify its military and security structures and dismantle the multiple centers of power that emerged during years of conflict. On the other hand, the region is witnessing a realignment of military deployments and security alliances. This process is unfolding as the United States withdraws its direct military presence from areas it previously occupied in Syria and neighboring Iraq, while the question of disarming Iraqi militias remains unresolved.
Furthermore, the Islamic State (ISIS) remains a potential security threat amid concerns that it could exploit the weakening of certain coordination and surveillance mechanisms following the US withdrawal from Syria and Iraq. Meanwhile, Syria-Jordan relations continue to face security challenges despite mutual efforts to strengthen their political and economic partnership. Jordanian airstrikes in Syria’s Daraa Governorate in late October 2026, which provoked Syrian anger over violations of its sovereignty and civilian casualties, underscored persistent disagreements over border security, efforts to combat drug and weapons smuggling and the activities of armed groups. Subsequently, Jordanian authorities thwarted an attempt by militants to infiltrate the country from Syrian territory, highlighting Amman’s continued concerns about cross-border threats. Though Damascus and Amman have agreed to establish a joint security committee to address the repercussions of the airstrikes and strengthen operational and intelligence coordination, these developments indicate that securing the Syrian border remains dependent on more robust security capabilities.
These developments pose a challenge for Syria: building a national security apparatus capable of addressing both domestic and external threats while forging new regional partnerships to strengthen stability and restore the state’s role. These priorities also align with the Saudi Arabia’s interests in preventing the emergence of a security vacuum stretching from Iraq to Syria, containing the activities of transnational armed groups, and ensuring that Syrian territory does not become an arena for renewed regional rivalries or a source of security threats to neighboring countries.
Expanding Saudi Defense Partnerships
The Saudi-Syrian defense agreement is part of Riyadh’s defense diversification strategy. This aims not to keep security guarantees and alliances confined to global powers, but to boost cooperation frameworks with countries whose interests and assets are dependent on and related to the region’s security — though they may be located in a different geographic region. This policy was manifested in the signing of the Makkah Joint Defense Agreement involving Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan in August 2026. The pact reflects an intended policy to build a wider network of defense partnerships in which Saudi Arabia benefits from Turkish military and industrial capabilities and Pakistan’s military might, in addition to employing its economic and political resources to boost defense coordination and cooperation.
In this context, Syria occupies a particularly important geographic and strategic position, given its location and the interconnected nature of its security with that of neighboring Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Türkiye. Accordingly, developing security and defense cooperation with Damascus goes beyond strengthening Syria’s military capabilities. It also allows the kingdom to extend its network of partnerships into the Levant, improve coordination on cross-border threats and connect its own security interests more closely to developments in its northern neighborhood.
This direction is further reinforced by Syria’s own interest in expanding defense cooperation with the kingdom, potentially transforming it from a bilateral arrangement into a multilateral framework involving other regional powers.
Overall, expanding the kingdom’s defense partnerships does not necessarily signal a decline in the strategic importance of its relationship with the United States. Rather, it reflects a shift toward diversifying the sources of security and defense cooperation and reducing dependence on a single partner in managing security risks. This approach is particularly relevant given the interconnected nature of threats across the Gulf and the Levant. Regional crises have demonstrated that the kingdom’s security cannot be separated from the stability of its neighboring countries. Accordingly, developing defense partnerships with Levantine states, particularly Syria, represents a geographic and strategic extension of Saudi Arabia’s policy of diversifying its partnerships.
Strategic Transit Cooperation
The scope of this rapport is not restricted to direct military and security considerations but also extends to supply chain issues in light of ongoing regional instability. This comes especially as maritime tensions in the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab expose the risks of depending on these maritime chokepoints. These developments have enhanced the Gulf states’ plans to search for alternative routes linking the region’s countries to the Mediterranean and European markets. In this context, Syria stands out, given its geographic location, as a potential link in a rail and overland network passing through Jordan and Türkiye. In addition, there are plans to transport Iraqi oil westward via Syrian territories to Mediterranean ports.
Thus, the Saudi-Syrian defense and development agreements can be viewed as part of laying the security groundwork for establishing these routes. The viability of any logistical corridor via Syrian territories rests on Syria’s ability to strictly regulate borders, protect rail networks, pipelines and ports, as well as shield them from threats by armed groups or regional tensions. Syria’s stability could give the kingdom additional options in diversifying the means of transporting commodities and energy and reaching European markets in a way that keeps Riyadh-bound supply chains more flexible in times of crises.
Challenges to Cooperation
The various interests and motivations prompting Saudi Arabia and Syria to strengthen their agreements and understandings across the defense and economic sectors and develop them into substantive partnerships are nevertheless constrained by a range of hurdles. These arise from the prevailing situation in Syria and the sensitivity of regional power dynamics. Accordingly, the strategic value of any such agreements will depend on the two sides’ ability to navigate these constraints and define the scope of their cooperation in ways that advance their mutual interests, without assuming commitments that exceed their respective capabilities or becoming entangled in confrontations whose consequences have not been carefully assessed.
Supporting Syria While Avoiding Escalation With Israel: A Balancing Act
The Israeli factor is one of the most sensitive obstacles to expanding Saudi-Syrian defense cooperation. While Damascus seeks to use regional partnerships to strengthen its defensive capabilities and improve its negotiating position over southern Syria, Israel may regard any increase in Syrian military strength as a potential threat to the strategic balance, particularly the military superiority it seeks to maintain in Syria and the wider region. Against this backdrop, the kingdom faces a delicate balancing act. Supporting Syria’s stability and the restoration of its sovereignty serves Saudi Arabia’s strategic interests, but Riyadh seeks to avoid a partnership that could trigger direct escalation with Israel or draw it into military commitments, including armed confrontation, that do not align with its priorities. Moreover, Israel could interpret efforts to accelerate the development of advanced Syrian defensive capabilities as grounds for intensifying its incursions. Such actions could undermine the Syrian government’s efforts to consolidate security, rebuild its military and maintain domestic stability. Accordingly, preserving a clear distinction between supporting the Syrian state, including strengthening its defensive capabilities, and entering into offensive arrangements or direct military confrontation will be essential to safeguarding the integrity of the Saudi-Syrian agreement.
The Iranian Threat
Although Iran’s ability to use Syria as a strategic arena has declined considerably since the fall of Assad’s regime, this does not mean that the threat has been eliminated. Rather, its nature has changed. Instead of depending on a direct military presence or control over Syrian decision-making centers, Tehran maintains a degree of influence through the local networks it cultivated throughout the Syrian conflict, alongside limited subversive efforts aimed at undermining the stability of the new Syrian government and its regional realignment.
Various indicators suggest that Tehran retains the ability to foment unrest through its proxies, albeit on a smaller scale than before, particularly along Syria’s borders with Lebanon and Iraq. This is reflected in the interception of a major drug-smuggling operation originating in Lebanon and the discovery of a cell that had been plotting an attack on the Homs oil refinery.
The Impact of Syria’s Internal Challenges on Cooperation With Saudi Arabia
The success of Saudi-Syrian cooperation depends heavily on stability within Syria. The transitional period continues to face several challenges, including unifying state institutions, managing relations between the government and the country’s diverse political and social groups and addressing security conditions in certain regions. These challenges have implications for the Syrian state’s ability to make consistent defense policy decisions and honor long-term commitments. Moreover, any failure by the Syrian government to manage domestic power dynamics could drain its military and security resources, diverting them toward containing internal crises rather than developing regional defense partnerships.
In conclusion, the nature and timing of the agreements point to a significant shift in Saudi-Syria relations. They reflect growing recognition that the kingdom’s security is closely tied to stability in the Levant and that rebuilding the Syrian state presents an opportunity to reshape part of the security environment surrounding Saudi Arabia. Syria is therefore seen not simply as a country requiring political and economic support, but as a state whose institutional stability and ability to secure its borders could play a crucial role in containing cross-border threats, curbing the resurgence of Iran-backed influence networks and preventing Syrian territory from becoming a launching pad for the expansion of regional conflicts.
On the other side, Syria sees rapport with Saudi Arabia as a chance for repositioning itself within the Arab world, thus gaining political, economic and military support to rebuild state institutions. It would also help Syria in protecting its sovereignty and grant it wider latitude for addressing Israeli pressures and domestic internal challenges. The decline of the US military footprint in Syria and Iraq, and the accompanying devolvement of security responsibilities to the governments of both countries dictate that Damascus must search for a regional partnership that enables it to address threats arising from a security vacuum. These threats could be posed by ISIS or the continued influence of militias loyal to Iran in Iraq.
From this perspective, the agreements represent more than a framework for military cooperation for Syria; they form part of a broader effort to redefine the country’s foreign relations. This entails moving away from dependence on alliances that involved using Syrian territory as an arena for regional conflicts and toward establishing partnerships with countries committed to strengthening the Syrian state’s central authority and stability.
For the kingdom, the agreements’ strategic significance lies in broadening the scope of regional security by supporting stability in one of the region’s most prominent arenas of geopolitical rivalry and expanding a network of defense partnerships through which Saudi Arabia can develop and shape future security arrangements.
