Renewed hostilities between Syria and Israel in late 2025 highlight the fragile security landscape emerging from Syria’s post-Assad transition. The Israeli raid on Beit Jinn on November 28, followed by airstrikes that killed 13 Syrian soldiers, marked the deadliest incursion since Bashar al-Assad’s ouster nearly a year earlier.
Israel described the operation as a preemptive strike to apprehend members of the Lebanese Jamaa Islamiya militant group (a political-Islamist party with an armed wing aligned with Hamas) in Beit Jinn who were allegedly planning IED and rocket attacks into Israeli territory. Damascus, however, condemned it as a “criminal attack,” a blatant violation of Syrian sovereignty and a direct challenge to a political transition that is still struggling to assert its authority. The episode underscores a deeper question confronting regional actors and international partners: whether Syria’s fragile reconstruction can withstand renewed regional confrontation and whether Israel’s military strategy risks igniting instability and chaos in the newly emerging Syrian political system.
The background to this escalation lies in the dramatic end of the Assad regime in December 2024, triggered by a swift offensive led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and Turkish-backed factions. Assad’s flight to Russia closed a devastating 13-year war that had hollowed out Syrian society and displaced millions. Initially, many observers doubted whether a transitional government dominated by groups with Islamist roots could stabilize the country. Yet President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s administration rapidly adopted pragmatic policies aimed at national reintegration. It negotiated ceasefires with the Kurdish-led SDF, sought to unify armed factions under a central command and engaged diplomatically with Washington, Moscow and Beijing. By the fall of 2025, the government had quelled the sectarian violence in coastal Alawite regions and reached a tenuous peace in Aleppo. A US-drafted UN resolution later eased sanctions and terrorism designations on senior officials, enabling nascent recovery efforts.
Despite these advances, southern Syria emerged as the central fault line threatening the transition. Suwayda, a Druze-majority province historically opposed to Assad, descended into violence in July 2025. Skirmishes between Druze militias and Bedouin groups evolved into intense sectarian conflict driven by resource scarcity, local power struggles and the remnants of pro-Assad networks. The fighting displaced more than 185 000 people and strained already fragile state services. Israel seized on the turmoil to justify a series of strikes on Syrian military sites near Damascus, claiming the need to protect the Druze from hostile pro-Assad elements.
These operations, carried out between July 12 and July16, undermined local ceasefire arrangements and seriously disrupted reconstruction efforts in the province. A US-mediated truce announced on July 16 — followed by a broader US-brokered ceasefire between Syria and Israel on July 19, briefly reduced the level of violence, but did not end it. Israel expanded its occupation in the Golan Heights, citing threats from Iranian proxies. By invoking the 1974 disengagement agreement, Israel re-entered the UN-monitored buffer zone, built new military outposts and signaled an indefinite presence. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s symbolic visit to the occupied Golan in November, framed as a reaffirmation of Israeli sovereignty, heightened tensions with Damascus and complicated ongoing diplomatic interactions.
The Beit Jinn raid later that month marked a new escalation. Israel claimed that foreign fighters were in the area, a charge that Syrian officials dismissed as entirely fabricated. Damascus responded by insisting that no security agreement with Israel was possible before Israeli attacks stopped and Syrian sovereignty and borders were fully respected.
Yet behind the public rhetoric, backchannel negotiations encouraged by the United States and the UAE hinted at a possible non-aggression framework. The proposal reportedly included Israeli guarantees for Druze safety in exchange for suspending airstrikes. Netanyahu rejected any comprehensive deal, however, prioritizing a posture designed to prevent a reconstitution of Syrian military capacity. For the Syrian government, acquiescing to Israeli demands carries political risks, while retaliatory escalation could jeopardize foreign aid and economic stabilization.
The regional implications of these developments extend beyond southern Syria. Iran, already weakened by domestic economic pressures and the June 2025 Israeli strikes on its nuclear infrastructure, has seen its influence diminish sharply. Its networks in Syria, including Hezbollah-aligned militias, have struggled to regroup under the new political order. This vacuum has emboldened regional rivals, particularly Türkiye, which continues to back the Syrian National Army in the north and views southern Syria as a strategic frontier. Ankara’s attempts at limited de-escalation with Israel have done little to erase its perception that Israel’s presence beyond the Golan constitutes an expansionist threat. Turkish officials have indicated that they reject any confrontation with Israel in Syria, despite what they view as Israel’s destabilizing actions there. Moreover, normalization between Damascus and Tel Aviv is not in Türkiye’s interest, given the ongoing competition between Israel and Türkiye to establish spheres of influence in Syria, particularly regarding control of Syrian airspace.
Lebanon, still recovering from its 2024 ceasefire with Israel, finds itself exposed once more. Direct Lebanese-Israeli talks in December aimed to expand the truce framework but faltered amid Israeli strikes on Hezbollah remnants. The instability in Syria risks providing space for these actors to regroup, heightening the risk of spillover across an already fragile border. Great-power competition further complicates the picture. The United States, now seeking to build a partnership with the new Syrian authorities, has provided political legitimacy to Sharaa through public meetings while simultaneously supporting Israel’s security posture. This dual strategy exposes contradictions, particularly as Washington encourages de-escalation that Israeli military actions appear to undermine. Russia maintains a limited military presence to secure its strategic assets but lacks the influence it once wielded. China, meanwhile, eyes reconstruction opportunities to expand its regional footprint.
The unresolved dispute over the Golan Heights lies at the core of the current crisis. Advocates of regional normalization argue that a weakened Iran and a pragmatic Syrian government create conditions for historic progress. Yet persistent mistrust, unresolved territorial claims and fears of escalation continue to block meaningful diplomacy. Sharaa has sought to portray Syria as a stabilizing actor, insisting that external interference must cease for regional peace to take root. Israel, for its part, maintains that only sustained military dominance can guarantee security.
Breaking this cycle requires bold, coordinated diplomacy. A comprehensive disengagement plan, supervised by the UN and supported by regional stakeholders, could demilitarize the border and integrate local communities, particularly the Druze, into a reformed Syrian governance framework. International donors must scale up economic support to avert state collapse, stabilize the currency, restore fuel supplies and revive essential services. Israel should be pressed to withdraw from Syrian territory and engage in confidence-building measures. For Israel, long-term security is best served by a stable, functioning Syrian state rather than indefinite occupation. Failure to act risks renewed mass displacement, grave human rights violations and a resurgence of radicalized networks capable of destabilizing the region for years.
As winter settles over the Golan, the region stands at a crossroads. The Syrian transition, still fragile and incomplete, intersects with Israel’s military strategy and the broader geopolitical realignments reshaping the Middle East. The opportunity to prevent a new cycle of conflict exists, but it will require sustained international engagement and the political will to confront difficult compromises. The alternative is a slide toward renewed war; one the region is ill-equipped to endure.
