On July 6, 2025, the BRICS group convened in Brazil under the theme “Strengthening Global South Cooperation for More Inclusive and Sustainable Governance.” The summit was expected to reaffirm the bloc’s growing importance as a platform for emerging economies. Yet, the absence of two of its most prominent leaders, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, quietly shifted attention away from official declarations and toward underlying questions about the bloc’s internal dynamics and strategic direction.
Putin’s absence is generally viewed in light of the ongoing International Criminal Court arrest warrant, which has limited his international mobility. President Xi’s decision not to attend, however, was less anticipated. Beijing provided no official explanation. It is speculated that a combination of domestic economic concerns and diplomatic recalibration may have informed the choice, though it remains open to interpretation.
This year’s summit took place against the backdrop of the bloc’s expansion in 2023, when six new countries, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and Indonesia, were invited to join or begin the accession process. While most of these countries have formally confirmed their participation, Saudi Arabia is still assessing whether to join the bloc. This enlargement was framed as an effort to widen the representation of the Global South and build a more balanced global governance structure. However, it has also introduced new complexities. As the group grows in membership, it also grows in divergence, politically, economically and strategically.
Tensions between founding members India and China are one example. Despite both being key players in BRICS, they remain at odds over issues ranging from border disputes and India’s efforts to reduce dependence on Chinese imports. Their rivalry, while managed diplomatically, complicates efforts to set collective agendas or issue unified positions on sensitive matters. The bloc also continues to navigate the implications of Russia’s war in Ukraine. While BRICS members have largely refrained from direct condemnation of Moscow’s actions, their silence should not necessarily be interpreted as consensus. For most, it reflects a pragmatic balancing act, one that attempts to maintain relations with Russia without compromising their own ties to Western economies. Yet this approach has also limited the bloc’s ability to articulate clear positions on major global conflicts, particularly when member views diverge significantly.
Economically, BRICS has long advocated for reforming global financial systems and reducing dependence on Western-dominated institutions. The creation of the New Development Bank was one step in that direction. However, broader policy coordination has remained limited. In response to economic pressure, such as the imposition of tariffs by major Western economies, the BRICS 2025 summit has included strong rhetorical criticism, describing such measures as irresponsible. Yet these statements have not been matched by coordinated action or the development of credible alternative mechanisms. A recent message from US President Donald Trump, posted on X (formerly Twitter), warned that countries increasing cooperation with BRICS could face a 10% rise in tariffs on top of existing rates. This kind of messaging puts member states in a sensitive position. Countries like China and India, despite their BRICS affiliation, may seek to avoid antagonizing the United States, particularly in light of economic interdependence. For them, pragmatic bilateral engagement may take precedence over bloc-based confrontation. Russia, for its part, faces limitations beyond diplomacy. The war in Ukraine and accompanying sanctions have significantly constrained its economy and international partnerships. Within BRICS, Russia remains active but appears less capable of proposing or leading new initiatives.
China’s changing role may be even more significant. Previously a central force behind the bloc’s strategic and financial ambitions, Beijing now appears more cautious in its international outreach. Domestic challenges — including a housing bubble, an aging population and external pressures on the manufacturing sector, which accounts for around 27% of GDP, may be prompting a recalibration of foreign policy priorities. The result is a more inward-facing posture and a possible reduction in leadership bandwidth within BRICS.
This creates a vacuum in leadership that has yet to be filled. India’s global profile is rising, and it has shown more assertiveness on the world stage. Still, its strategic tensions with China constrain its ability to lead BRICS in a unifying way. Brazil and South Africa remain committed participants but are also navigating their own domestic constraints. The newer members, while symbolically important, are still adapting to the bloc’s structure and have yet to play major defining roles.
The absence of the Chinese and Russian presidents should not be viewed as a definitive signal of decline. The absences may reflect temporary or tactical decisions. Still, their non-attendance underscores the broader issue: BRICS is in a period of transition. It has grown larger and more visible, but also more ideologically and strategically diverse. Whether the bloc can move beyond symbolic declarations and achieve concrete cooperation will depend on its capacity to manage internal differences and identify shared priorities. If it can do so, BRICS may yet shape a more plural global governance landscape. If not, it risks being seen as a forum for discussion rather than action.