On September 9, Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) concluded an agreement in Cairo, brokered by Egypt, to resolve their escalating disputes. Tensions had peaked in June 2025, when Israel and the United States launched large-scale military strikes on Iran and its nuclear facilities. The attacks brought nuclear diplomacy to a standstill, suspended the work of international inspectors and deepened uncertainty over the future of Iran’s nuclear program, including its stockpile of highly enriched uranium. This report examines the circumstances leading to the agreement, outlines its main provisions and assesses its implications.
A Context of Escalation and Threats
The Cairo agreement was reached two months after the US-Israeli military escalation against Iran in June 2025, during which Iranian nuclear facilities were targeted and heavily damaged, according to US and Israeli assessments. In response, Iran suspended its cooperation with the IAEA. President Masoud Pezeshkian signed into law a bill passed by the Parliament halting all forms of cooperation with the agency, accusing it of having effectively facilitated Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear sites during the 12-day war in June.
Since then, international inspectors have been unable to carry out monitoring or inspection activities in Iran, leaving the status of Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to 60% purity — a level just short of weapons-grade — uncertain. International stakeholders have voiced serious concerns, questioning whether the stockpile was destroyed in the attacks or secretly relocated by Iran beforehand.
After the ceasefire, Iran adopted a policy of brinkmanship, refusing to return to negotiations and taking further escalatory steps. European powers sought to establish a channel for dialogue with Tehran to defuse the crisis, but their efforts failed. Several rounds of talks held in European capitals and Türkiye collapsed, as Iran refused to meet key conditions: providing clarification about its 440 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60%, resuming cooperation with the IAEA, and re-engaging in talks with the United States. As a result of this impasse, the E3 — Germany, the UK and France — triggered the snapback mechanism to reimpose sanctions on Iran on August 28.
Under the snapback process, Iran was given until October 1 to reach a settlement with the IAEA that would permit the resumption of inspections, monitoring and dispute resolution — or face the automatic reimposition of UN sanctions. Tehran rejected this move as illegal and warned it might withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Meanwhile, Washington maintained its maximum pressure sanctions on Iran, particularly targeting its oil exports and financial sector, seeking to deepen Tehran’s isolation and increase pressure on the ruling establishment. The situation became more precarious as the United States and Israel continued to threaten renewed military action. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recently stated that any future Israeli operations against Iran would depend entirely on Tehran’s conduct, especially regarding its nuclear and ballistic missile programs — a threat that adds significant leverage over Iran.
In this tense environment, several regional powers, including Egypt and Türkiye, have sought to mediate and de-escalate tensions. They have played an active role alongside Russia and China, which are supporting a six month extension of the deadline before sanctions are reimposed. The plan is designed to give diplomacy a chance to bridge outstanding differences and buy time to address the technical and political complexities of Iran’s nuclear program — while keeping the process under European control, rather than letting it lapse on October 1.
The Details of the Agreement
In this context, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi signed an agreement in Cairo under the auspices of Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty. While not all of the agreement’s provisions were disclosed, Grossi stated at a joint press conference after the signing that the deal was technical in nature and underscored the “essential” inspections that must resume in Iran under the NPT. Under the Safeguards Agreement previously concluded between Iran and the IAEA, Tehran is obligated to prepare a “special report” detailing the location and condition of its nuclear material — including its stockpile of highly enriched uranium — in the aftermath of incidents such as attacks or earthquakes.
Upon returning to Vienna on September 10, Grossi stressed the importance of granting inspectors access to the sites that had been attacked, stating, “This includes all facilities and installations in Iran, and it also contemplates the required reporting on all the attacked facilities, including the nuclear material present at those.”
From Tehran’s side, Araghchi said the agreement was consistent with the law passed by Parliament and had been negotiated with the approval and authorization of the Supreme National Security Council. He emphasized that the deal addresses Iran’s security concerns and challenges while setting out the technical requirements for cooperation with the IAEA. However, he warned that any “hostile action” against Iran — including the reimposition of UN sanctions — would lead Tehran to consider the agreement with the IAEA null and void.
A preliminary analysis of the agreement suggests that it sets the stage for:
- -The return of international inspectors to their duties, even partially, given the restrictions Iran has imposed over the past years as part of its nuclear ambiguity policy.
- -Continued adherence to the NPT and the Safeguards Agreement signed between Iran and the agency.
- -Iran’s disclosure of the fate of its 440 kilograms of enriched uranium and the granting of access to the nuclear facilities that were attacked — key and urgent issues that Tehran had been using as leverage against the United States and European parties.
Opportunities and Challenges
Despite the many obstacles hindering the success of these understandings, it is hoped that this agreement will help ease tensions and address the lack of cooperation between Tehran and the IAEA. If successful, it would serve as a new framework for restoring mutual trust and a starting point for a new phase in the relationship between Iran and the IAEA.
Potential Opportunities
In the short term, this agreement may offer an opportunity to restore diplomatic channels and ultimately lead to the lifting of sanctions on Iran, especially if Tehran resumes cooperation with the IAEA, allows the return of international inspectors and discloses the fate of its highly enriched uranium. These steps would address key European concerns and meet two of Tehran’s conditions prior to the activation of the snapback mechanism.
The agreement could also create a crucial opening for nuclear diplomacy and offers Oman an opportunity to continue its efforts to persuade Washington and Tehran to return to the negotiating table, talks that had been suspended since the outbreak of war in June.
If negotiations between Washington and Tehran resume, this could pave the way for the Russian proposal — supported by China — to grant a six-month extension of the nuclear agreement, as well as for the Europeans to withdraw the activation of the snapback mechanism. Such a compromise would give all sides the time and space needed to work toward a new nuclear agreement with Iran and avert the prospect of renewed war in the region.
The agreement is likely to accelerate efforts to prepare the ground for reversing the snapback mechanism, a process that began with South Korea, which currently holds the presidency of the UN Security Council, submitting a resolution to restore sanctions on Iran. European leaders are pushing for a swift and decisive resolution. EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas wrote on X that “Today’s framework deal for resuming inspections of Iran’s nuclear facilities could mark a crucial step for nuclear diplomacy, provided there is rapid implementation by Iran.”
Moreover, the deal affirms the effectiveness of regional diplomacy consistently pursued by Saudi Arabia and its pivotal role in matters of regional peace and security. The agreement stands as one of the outcomes of the Saudi-Iranian reconciliation, which has opened up regional and Arab avenues for Iran.
The agreement is also viewed as an initial opportunity to reduce the likelihood of military escalation — an outcome that no party is willing to bear. However, its significance for the Iranian establishment lies in its potential to mitigate the risk of renewed US and European sanctions, along with the resulting economic and political burdens. Although its immediate effects remain limited, there has been a relative improvement in the local currency’s value. The Iranian establishment is facing growing internal pressure from popular and “reformist” groups seeking to leverage these developments to push for more rational compromises on the nuclear issue. It appears that the Iranian leadership is showing a degree of diplomatic openness under the banner of “heroic flexibility,” which may provide a framework for reducing some of the escalatory measures previously threatened by “hardliners,” such as withdrawing from the NPT or threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz. Nonetheless, the success of this approach will depend on future developments, not on the agreement alone.
Potential Challenges
Although the understanding is significant and has reset the relationship between Iran and the IAEA, it still faces considerable challenges — most notably, the interpretation and possible manipulation of its provisions. In fact, differences in interpretation emerged within a day. Grossi stated that the understanding includes access to all facilities and infrastructure in Iran without exception, including sites targeted by Israeli and US strikes in June. However, Araghchi said the agreement does not currently allow inspectors to access Iranian nuclear sites, adding that such access requires a separate agreement and must be discussed in future negotiations with the IAEA.
Moreover, Israel’s confrontational approach and its stated goal of completely dismantling Iran’s nuclear program could lead it to undermine the agreement by resuming military strikes against Iran — a move that would almost certainly cause the collapse of the deal. The Iranian foreign minister already warned that any “hostile action” against Iran, including the reimposition of UN sanctions, would render the agreement with the IAEA null and void.
Tehran has also made clear that it will not accept an understanding reached under pressure. If European states move ahead with restoring sanctions, the agreement could unravel, as Iran has made the lifting of sanctions a condition for cooperation with the IAEA and implementation of the deal, as stressed by Araghchi.
Conclusion
It may be difficult for Iran to accept any decision that strips it of its right to enrichment, a right guaranteed under the NPT. Previous negotiations have broken down over US demands that Iran halt enrichment on its own soil, a demand that could resurface under pressure from Israel and US right-wing factions. However, this appears to be a firm red line for Tehran. As Araghchi has stressed, Iran’s nuclear program is peaceful, and the country will not agree to any deal that deprives it of its right to civilian nuclear development.
Furthermore, there are mutual doubts and deep-rooted mistrust. From Iran’s side, confidence has significantly declined, especially after Israel launched an attack on Iran while negotiations were ongoing with the United States. Iranians believe that Washington and the IAEA were either involved in or responsible for the military strike. On the other hand, the United States, Israel and European powers remain skeptical of Iran’s true intentions, fearing the understanding may merely be a tactic to buy time. As a result, European reactions have been cautious, emphasizing transparency and swift implementation, while Washington has not officially commented on the agreement — reflecting its doubts and a wait-and-see approach.
Ultimately, while the agreement has been welcomed in some circles in both Iran and the United States, there remain hawkish groups on both sides that hold rigid positions. These groups could derail the agreement at any stage, particularly in Iran, where ideology has long hindered understanding with the West. Institutions such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have also historically opposed such agreements when they threaten their interests.
In any case, the Cairo agreement sets the stage for reshaping nuclear diplomacy which could open the door to a new nuclear agreement with Iran, addressing one of the main sources of tension and conflict in the Middle East. Yet the central question remains: was Tehran’s acceptance of this understanding merely a tactical move, prompted by the war that has weakened its position, undermined its confidence and constrained its “hardliner” policies — as well as by the looming threat of renewed international sanctions that could jeopardize the establishment’s survival?
In other words, was it an exercise in “heroic flexibility” in response to hard realities beyond the establishment’s capacity to withstand, or does it represent a strategic decision influenced by domestic pressure to abandon nuclear ambitions that could endanger the country and the system? The answer to this question could signal a major shift in Iran’s overall approach and behavior.
