The outbreak of large-scale hostilities between the United States, Israel and Iran on February 28, 2026 rapidly escalated into a regional crisis affecting the Middle East and the South Caucasus. Coordinated US-Israeli strikes targeting Iranian military infrastructure and nuclear-related facilities triggered Iranian retaliatory actions against Israel and civilian and military targets in Türkiye, Azerbaijan, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar and Oman. Within days, the confrontation raised serious concerns about regional stability, maritime security and the security of global energy markets.
As the conflict unfolded, major international actors were forced to react quickly. Two responses are particularly significant: those of the EU and China, both highly exposed to the military escalation in the Gulf through diplomatic and political partnerships, energy dependence and economic interests. Yet their reactions reveal different strategic cultures, threat perceptions and geopolitical priorities.
The EU’s response has been cautious, internally divided and strategically limited. European governments were reportedly not consulted in advance of the US-Israeli operation, leaving many capitals surprised and politically exposed. Initial statements from EU institutions emphasized concern over escalation, respect for international law and the urgent need for de-escalation. However, EU member state reactions quickly diverged. Spain publicly criticized the strikes as unilateral military action lacking international legitimacy. France, Germany and the UK adopted a more balanced position, expressing concern over escalation while affirming Israel’s right to defend itself against Iranian missile and drone attacks.
In practical terms, European involvement has remained largely defensive. France reinforced air-defense capabilities and deployed fighter aircraft in the Eastern Mediterranean to intercept potential drone threats near European positions and bases. Paris maintains a longstanding network of defense partnerships across the Gulf and the broader Middle East, which shaped its immediate reaction to the crisis. Formal defense agreements link France to Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE. These agreements include provisions for consultations in the event of external threats and, if necessary, the provision of military support to assist in defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of partner states. In addition to these formal arrangements, France maintains structured security cooperation with Jordan, Iraq and the Lebanese Armed Forces, as well as operational coordination with Kurdish partners involved in counterterrorism operations.
Within hours of the escalation, French forces reportedly engaged and destroyed drones threatening allied airspace in a context of self-defense. Reinforcements were subsequently deployed, including Rafale fighter aircraft, air-defense systems and airborne surveillance assets aimed at protecting regional partners and maintaining situational awareness. Rafale aircraft based at the French air base in Al Dhafra (UAE) participated in air-defense operations that contributed to the interception of drones targeting UAE territory.
French naval deployments were also adjusted in response to the evolving situation. The multi-mission frigate Provence was positioned in the Arabian Sea, while the air-defense frigate Forbin operated in the Red Sea within the framework of Operation Aspides, which aims to safeguard maritime navigation. Another frigate, Languedoc, was dispatched to the Eastern Mediterranean to contribute to the protection of Cyprus and to reinforce the broader European security presence in the area. At the strategic level, the French carrier strike group repositioned closer to Europe, allowing political and military authorities to retain a full range of operational options while contributing to the defense of European interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.
France also prepared contingency measures to protect and potentially evacuate its nationals in the region. Approximately 400,000 French citizens are present across the Middle East either as residents or travelers, making consular protection a major priority during the crisis. Evacuation assistance mechanisms were therefore established in coordination with the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, particularly in Qatar and the UAE.
In addition, French military planners began preparations aimed at ensuring the freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, a critical chokepoint for global energy flows. Maintaining maritime security in this corridor is viewed as essential not only for European economic stability but also for the broader functioning of global energy markets. French officials have emphasized that these deployments form part of a broader strategy combining military presence and diplomatic engagement. By maintaining a flexible and rapidly deployable force posture in the Middle East, France seeks both to protect its national interests and to reinforce strategic partnerships with regional actors who play a key role in global energy security and regional crisis management.
Moreover, the UK authorized the use of certain facilities to support defensive operations and maritime security. US President Donald Trump openly criticized what he described as the hesitation of several European governments. He also targeted British Prime Minister Keir Starmer after London declined to support the strikes. “This is not Winston Churchill that we’re dealing with,” Trump remarked, referring to Starmer’s position that the UK does not support “regime change from the skies.” Germany expressed political support for Israel and US political objectives while avoiding direct military participation. At the EU level, institutions focused primarily on diplomatic engagement, calling for emergency consultations at the UN and urging all parties to prevent regional military escalation.
European policy is also constrained by domestic politics and competing strategic priorities. Public opinion in several member states shows strong resistance to deeper military involvement in another Middle Eastern conflict. More importantly, the EU’s primary security focus remains the war in Ukraine. European policymakers fear that escalation in the Gulf could divert US military attention, resources and political bandwidth away from supporting Kyiv. Rising energy prices triggered by instability in the Gulf are another concern, as they could indirectly benefit Russia by increasing its export revenues. Some European officials have warned that the geopolitical consequences of the conflict could weaken Western cohesion by stretching resources across multiple theaters simultaneously.
China’s response has been more rhetorically consistent but operationally cautious. Beijing strongly criticized the US-Israeli strikes, framing them as violations of Iranian sovereignty and as actions lacking authorization from the UN Security Council. Chinese officials called for an immediate ceasefire, respect for territorial integrity and a return to diplomatic negotiations over regional security and the Iranian nuclear issue. Together with Russia, China requested emergency discussions at the Security Council shortly after the outbreak of hostilities.
Despite its political support for Iran in international forums and its expanding strategic partnership with Tehran, China has officially avoided any form of direct military involvement or direct confrontation with the United States. Nevertheless, intelligence experts suggest that the recent increase in the accuracy of Iranian missiles may be due to Iran gaining access to China’s BeiDou satellite navigation system, potentially used to target Israeli and US military assets in the Middle East. If confirmed, this would allow Iran to circumvent US GPS jamming capabilities and could signal a challenge to the longstanding US dominance in satellite-based battlefield navigation. Despite this alleged military support, overall, Beijing has focused on risk mitigation and diplomatic positioning. At the same time, the Chinese government organized the evacuation of several thousand Chinese citizens from Iran and issued travel warnings for nationals across the region. Chinese diplomacy has also intensified engagement with Gulf states through special envoys, emphasizing the need to safeguard maritime security and prevent the disruption of oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz. China’s restraint reflects both structural constraints and strategic calculation. Although Beijing has deepened its economic and political ties with Iran — including cooperation within frameworks such as the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization — it remains heavily dependent on energy imports from the Gulf. Moreover, Iran has recently sought to mobilize these multilateral platforms diplomatically: the Iranian Foreign Ministry announced a fourth phone call between the Indian and Iranian foreign ministers, during which Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi explicitly raised the potential role of BRICS. India, which currently holds the BRICS chairmanship, has nevertheless refrained from issuing any statement on the ongoing conflict.
Roughly half of China’s oil imports transit through the region, making stability in maritime chokepoints a critical national interest. Beijing therefore seeks to balance rhetorical support for sovereignty and opposition to Western military intervention with a pragmatic desire to avoid escalation that could disrupt energy flows, threaten Belt and Road infrastructure or endanger Chinese nationals abroad.
Despite their differences, the EU and China share several core objectives in responding to the crisis. Both actors prioritize rapid de-escalation, protection of maritime trade routes and stabilization of global energy markets. Both emphasize diplomatic channels, particularly the role of the UN, and neither seeks direct confrontation with the United States. Their responses also reflect a common concern that a wider regional war could trigger severe economic disruption, including energy price shocks and supply chain instability.
However, significant differences remain. The EU is structurally linked to the United States through the transatlantic alliance and therefore cannot fully distance itself from Washington’s strategic choices. Even when European governments criticize unilateral military action, they remain embedded in a broader security partnership with both the United States and Israel. China, by contrast, operates outside these alliance structures and can adopt a more explicitly critical rhetorical position toward US actions while maintaining operational neutrality.
This conflict with Iran therefore highlights contrasting geopolitical roles. The EU appears as a cautious and reactive actor constrained by internal divisions and by its overriding commitment to the Russia-Ukraine war. China emerges as a strategic observer seeking to expand diplomatic influence while avoiding direct entanglement. Both actors call for de-escalation, but their underlying motivations differ: Europe seeks to prevent the erosion of transatlantic focus on Ukraine, while China seeks to maintain regional stability and reinforce its image as a mediator in an increasingly multipolar world.
For policymakers, several implications emerge. The US administration should recognize that limited consultation with European partners before major military operations risks undermining cohesion within the transatlantic alliance. At the same time, China’s diplomatic activism suggests that Beijing will continue to position itself as a stabilizing actor in regional crises where the United States is directly involved. Managing overlapping conflicts — from Ukraine to the Gulf — will therefore require greater coordination among allies, clearer crisis-management mechanisms and renewed emphasis on diplomatic off-ramps. Without such efforts, simultaneous geopolitical confrontations risk accelerating fragmentation of the international order and weakening the capacity of major powers to manage global instability.
