The assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in a US-Israeli airstrike on February 28, 2026, marked the end of a long era defined by widespread debate and disagreement over his domestic and foreign policies. His sudden absence represents a pivotal moment, signaling a turning point not only for Iran’s internal political structure but also for the network of regional proxies and international alliances. Contemporary Iran cannot be examined without considering Khamenei’s era and legacy, given his central role, influence and status as one of the Iranian establishment’s most powerful pillars over four and a half decades, a period fraught with internal and external conflicts.
The killing of the establishment’s undisputed central figure raises critical questions: what is the impact of his absence on Iran’s future? Does his death signal the collapse of the establishment, or do remaining centers of influence and ideological structures ensure its continuity? Who will succeed him as supreme leader, and how will the political system evolve? What consequences will his absence have for Iran’s regional alliances and network of proxies? Could armed militias become more actively involved in ongoing conflicts? And what options does Iran have in responding to Khamenei’s assassination?
How Consequential and Impactful Is Khamenei’s Assassination for the Future of the Iranian Establishment?
Beyond the extensive supra-constitutional powers and authorities that the Constitution grants the supreme leader — which could, in theory, be extended to any appointed successor to safeguard the establishment from collapse — no future leader is likely to wield the same influence over the establishment’s stability, strength and continuity that Khamenei exercised for over more than 45 years of political leadership. This is due to multiple factors and considerations, the most significant of which include:
The Strategic Core: Khamenei as the Establishment’s Heart and Mind
The Iranian establishment revolves around key centers of power, chief among them was Khamenei, who served as the central axis linking all others. He was not only the state’s most powerful figure but the architect of its institutions, Constitution, military and revolutionary apparatus, embedding an ideological and doctrinal framework that prioritized the establishment over citizens’ welfare. His authority shaped both domestic and foreign policy through an ideological lens. Through his consolidation of power, close ties to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and weakening of rival institutions, he became both a symbol and operator of Iran’s political engine.
Khamenei was not an ordinary political leader or a traditional cleric; he was a symbol around whom all the threads of the Iranian game converged — from revolution to state-building, from war to opposition, from the nuclear program to ballistic missiles to foreign adventures and more. His personality came to inspire both admiration and anger at once. His path through Iran’s system of religious rule began in the city of Mashhad and rose to the highest leadership position in the country, turning his life into a window into the history of contemporary Iran with all its transformations, conflicts and crises.
In practical and constitutional terms, Khamenei became the backbone, mastermind and beating heart of the system. He possessed the unique ability to gather the establishment’s centers of gravity in his own hands — what some describe as the “surreal code” that allowed him to hold the system together. It is often said that if Ruhollah Khomeini ignited the revolution, it was Khamenei who preserved it and ensured its continuation and export. From his youth, he was one of its pillars, symbols and key influencers in shaping its trajectory and sustaining its principles.
His departure will therefore deprive the system of much of its solidity, strength and continuity, and may even lead to the unraveling of the remaining centers of power that follow him in influence and importance.
Religious Authority and Historical Leadership Experience
In addition to his religious authority, Khamenei possessed extensive experience in managing Iran’s system of religious governance — one unmatched by his potential his successors. He had a charismatic presence and wielded considerable influence among believers in the doctrine of Wilayat al‑Faqih and religious rule in Iran, both inside the country and beyond. His unparalleled experience shaped his ability to navigate and negotiate the complex regional and international issues surrounding Iran. Viewed as a pragmatic political figure, Khamenei was capable of balancing flexibility — softening positions when the establishment’s future stability was threatened — with rigidity in upholding revolutionary principles.
Khamenei was renowned for his high-level strategic planning on major issues related to the state’s future and its political system, his calm decision-making style and his capacity to withstand crises. As Iran’s ultimate decision-maker with the final word on all decisions, he emerged as the guardian of Iran’s revolutionary project. His absence therefore represents a deep blow to the country’s leadership which benefited not only from his accumulated experience in war and negotiations but also from his galvanizing power which aligned the state’s various institutions and competing power centers.
The Engine of Iran’s Geopolitical Project
Compared with the figures who might potentially assume the position should the regime survive the current intense pressures, Iran’s expansionist geopolitical project is directly tied to the supreme leader. The survival and continuity of Iran’s regional project depended to a large extent on Khamenei himself. The relationship between the Iranian system — of which Khamenei was the primary center of gravity — and its regional proxies is one of existential interdependence. Khamenei also adopted a consistent posture of resistance toward the West.
Supporters remember him as a symbol of steadfastness and the guardian of Iran’s geopolitical project stretching from Iraq to Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and Palestine. Critics, by contrast, denounce him as a leader who was excessively centralized in his rule, concentrating power in his own hands, deepening internal and regional polarization and transforming Iran into a highly centralized state under his military and security grip. Despite the debates surrounding his personality, there is broad agreement that he was the ultimate decision-maker, and that the state’s institutions and its social, military and religious networks operated fully under his authority.
For this reason, the discussion surrounding him extends beyond the man himself to the future of the system after his absence — whether Iran will continue the model of governance he entrenched or undergo fundamental political transformations in the post‑assassination phase. His departure will undoubtedly have a profound impact on what is known as the “Axis of Resistance.”
The Glue of Internal Cohesion
Khamenei had long acted as the figure who led, protected and maintained cohesion among all wings of the system — its official, unofficial and parallel institutions. His absence may therefore trigger an escalation of internal conflicts and an intensification of power struggles among the establishment’s factions, including the IRGC and the “conservative” and “reformist” currents. Each faction is expected to seek control over authority and resources, especially in light of the complex domestic crises caused by ongoing economic sanctions and the establishment’s internal weakening after sustaining both external and internal blows that have fragmented its geopolitical project and damaged its capabilities. This risk is compounded if joint US‑Israeli strikes continue. For these reasons, Khamenei’s departure could ignite a far more violent struggle among the remaining power centers — assuming they survive further US and Israeli attacks — potentially even leading to mutual physical elimination.
In short, although some strategic analysts and Iran specialists argue that Khamenei’s absence will not immediately bring down the establishment, his departure will create a vacuum that cannot be filled. It may therefore mark the beginning of the unraveling of the remaining nodes of power, influence and continuity that he held together. This makes the defining feature of Iran after Khamenei a phase of uncertainty and profound instability, one that threatens the survival of the entire system — especially amid mounting crises, pressures, external strikes and the Iranian public’s loss of confidence in state institutions and their ability to stop the ongoing deterioration.
Iran’s Governance After Khamenei’s Demise
Post-Khamenei Iran: Governance and Potential Scenarios
The following outlines the most prominent potential forms of post-Khamenei governance.
System Continuity Through a Successor
This scenario assumes the political system continues under a new supreme leader, potentially resembling Khamenei’s own appointment and allowing “hardliners” to consolidate control. Succession represents a foundational moment: it transfers not only political office but also the constitutional, security and ideological center of gravity that transcends all three branches of government, commands the army and the IRGC and steers the state and bureaucracy. The successor’s name matters, but more critical is the alliance he brings: seminaries and religious institutions, the supreme leader’s office, IRGC networks and economic-security arms, the Assembly of Experts, the Guardian Council and the Expediency Discernment Council.
Constitutional Framework: Selection and Qualifications
Selecting body (Assembly of Experts): Constitutionally, the Assembly of Experts, formally elected, appoints the supreme leader by reviewing qualified jurists and choosing one.
Qualifications: Charisma is not required; instead, candidates must possess ijtihad (jurisprudential competence), justice, piety, sociopolitical insight, administrative competence and courage. Many candidates have strong institutional experience but lack the jurisprudential standing or popular support of Khamenei or Khomeini.
Transitional arrangements (Article 111): If the position is vacant, a temporary council — consisting of the president, chief justice and a Guardian Council jurist chosen by the Expediency Discernment Council — assumes leadership. This elevates the judiciary, Guardian Council and Expediency Discernment Council as pivotal institutions during transition.
Succession in Practice: Text Versus Reality
Although the assembly formally appoints the supreme leader, elections for its members are influenced by “hardliner”-dominated institutions. Succession is usually an elitist compromise announced by vote rather than open competition. The IRGC operates as a multidimensional power network — economic, security, regional and domestic mobilization — so any successor must secure its practical acceptance or adopt collective/institutional leadership approaches to manage risks.
Potential Paths
Three outcomes are possible: managed continuity, gradual military expansion/conquest or erosion and collapse. The transition may begin as controlled but shift unpredictably. Prior to recent US-Israeli attacks, leaked intelligence suggested succession might favor IRGC-linked elements rather than radical change.
Mapping Potential Successors: Patterns More Than Personalities
In Iran, no formal announcement typically precedes succession, and candidate lists remain speculative. Assessments rely on indicators such as proximity to the Office of the Supreme Leader, acceptance within the religious seminaries, jurisprudential qualifications, positions in sensitive institutions, security clearance and fulfillment of Article 109 of the Constitution. The latter does not require the highest scholarly rank, but rather sufficient jurisprudential competence to issue fatwas across various fields.
Among the Prominent Figures Discussed:
Ayatollah Ali Reza Arafi is frequently mentioned due to his leadership role in the seminaries and membership in key institutions. He is viewed as combining seminary legitimacy with administrative experience. However, his limited public appeal and his capacity to manage the significantly expanded IRGC network pose challenges.
Ayatollah Gholam Hossein Mohseni-Ejei, currently head of the judiciary, derives strength from his institutional authority and security-political presence. Yet questions persist regarding whether he possesses, in the view of the religious establishment, sufficient ijtihad and seminary acceptance to combine the doctrine of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist with the influence of the IRGC.
Other circulating names — such as Mohsen Qomi, Mohsen Araki and Hashem Hosseini Bushehri — represent what may be termed a “functional-institutional” pattern. The emphasis here is not personal superiority, but the capacity of this model to avoid sharp divisions within the loyalist Shiite establishment, domestically and beyond. These figures embody institutional continuity: religious-administrative actors rooted in the regime’s core, closely tied to official religious structures and state institutions, often presented as the least costly option for stability.
Mojtaba Khamenei remains central to succession discussions. His potential appointment, however, carries sensitivity due to concerns about inheritance and his relatively limited official administrative experience. His leadership would likely be interpreted as both dynastic succession and a strategic alignment with security power centers, particularly the IRGC. While this could ensure policy continuity, it risks division within the religious elite over legitimacy, potentially encouraging alternatives such as a weak formal leader alongside a powerful deep state or a collective leadership council. The Mojtaba Khamenei model represents combined political and religious succession — traditionally improbable within Iran’s seminary culture — yet practically plausible given his networks, IRGC ties and continuity of his father’s trajectory.
In June 2025, The New York Times and several other newspapers reported that Khamenei had identified three potential successors from whom the Assembly of Experts would select one, amid concerns that he might be targeted by the United States and Israel. According to the source cited by the newspaper, Mojtaba Khamenei was not among those candidates.
However, this account was later cast into doubt. In January 2025, The Washington Post published a report discussing Khamenei’s illness and alleged preparations for Mojtaba Khamenei to replace him, claiming he had been secretly chosen by members of the clergy. Iranian officials rejected that report, describing it as based on “rumors and allegations.” They emphasized that the supreme leader is not appointed by clerics, but by the Assembly of Experts, whose members are elected by the Iranian people every eight years.
Iranian statements further stressed that Khamenei’s public positions and conduct reflected his opposition to his sons entering politics, let alone succeeding him. Reinforcing this position, Ayatollah Mahmoud Mohammadi Araghchi, a member of the Assembly of Experts, stated that Khamenei had declined a request from certain assembly members to consider one of his sons for future leadership. An Iranian newspaper subsequently reported that its sources confirmed Khamenei’s firm rejection of any succession by his sons, adding that the Assembly of Experts respected this stance.
Nevertheless, in March 2023, debate surfaced within the seminaries regarding Mojtaba Khamenei’s eligibility. Some clerical figures argued that he had the right to seek the position like any other qualified Iranian citizen and religious scholar, without guardianship restrictions. They maintained that being the son of the supreme leader did not disqualify him, provided he met the required political and religious qualifications. This discussion intensified after cleric Sadegh Mohammadi and Assembly of Experts member Mousavi Jazayeri suggested the possibility of Mojtaba Khamenei succeeding his father. Taken together, these developments indicate that Mojtaba Khamenei could not be entirely ruled out and may, at that critical juncture, have been regarded as the most likely candidate.
An Outsider
The transfer of authority in the position of supreme leader in Iran constitutes a complex dilemma that extends far beyond selecting a particular religious or political figure. The regime’s structure is built upon a delicate equilibrium between religious legitimacy and institutional and security power. For that reason, restricting the discussion to media-circulated names — such as Mojtaba Khamenei, Ali Reza Arafi or even Hassan Khomeini, despite his “reformist” inclinations — risks oversimplifying a far more intricate internal equation. Under the Constitution, the Assembly of Experts holds the authority to appoint any jurist who satisfies the required religious and political qualifications. This provision opens both theoretical and practical space for the selection of a less prominent figure, provided that he is acceptable to the establishment’s principal centers of power, particularly the IRGC, the Office of the Supreme Leader and official religious institutions. In moments of institutional transition, political systems often gravitate toward what may be described as a “quiet consensus:” the elevation of a figure who does not trigger factional sensitivities and who is capable of managing the fragile balance between competing forces — assuming a rational calculus among the IRGC and key actors in Tehran.
The IRGC Becoming the Sole, Absolute Authority
A significant number of analysts argue that if Iran were to descend into internal disorder, or if opposition factions sought to capitalize on the country’s current circumstances to mount an uprising against the regime, the IRGC could judge the moment appropriate to step in, dismantle existing state institutions and assume authority on its own.
According to Reuters, citing knowledgeable sources, the CIA had assessed prior to the airstrikes that, in the event of the death of Khamenei, “hardliner” figures within the IRGC would stand as the most probable successors. This assessment rests on the IRGC’s longstanding grip over the core mechanisms of the Iranian state, alongside its entrenched presence across institutions — particularly in the economic and intelligence sectors. Moreover, its expansive economic network and its close relationship with the clergy could furnish it with a measure of religious legitimacy to govern, should the clerics anticipate the imminent collapse of the governing system.
Total Establishment Collapse, the Scenario Preferred by Trump
During the 12-Day War, President Donald Trump’s objective was clearly defined: the destruction of Iran’s three nuclear facilities — Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan. Once that objective was achieved, he agreed to end the war. In the current conflict, however, his goals have expanded to include regime change, and he has openly urged the Iranian people to rise up and contribute to overthrowing the ruling system. To advance this objective, the campaign began with the assassination of the head of state. Since then, US and Israeli airstrikes and missile attacks have destroyed hundreds of command-and-control centers, with the apparent aim of incapacitating Iran ahead of the establishment’s collapse. While such an outcome may be conceivable, it faces substantial obstacles. Among the most significant are the difficulty of deploying US and Israeli ground forces to stabilize and control events inside Iran; the IRGC’s tight security grip and its repeated warnings of severe consequences for any domestic uprising; and the relative weakness of the internal opposition in organizing and leading transformative change. Should Trump succeed in achieving regime change, he may consider backing Reza Pahlavi, son of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, to lead the country. Although Trump recently indicated that this could be an option, he also suggested that a figure emerging from within Iran might be more appropriate to guide the country and return authority to its people. Alternatively, he could support a personality acceptable to the various strands of the Iranian opposition based in Western countries, or encourage them to draft a new constitution defining Iran’s future political system. In any scenario, the United States and Israel would seek to secure their interests if they ultimately succeed in toppling Iran’s political system during this war.
Reaching a Deal; the Venezuela Scenario
The United States recognizes that the Iranian establishment retains a measure of popular support and has a long record of suppressing attempts to overthrow it. Accordingly, the US administration may seek a negotiated arrangement with Iranian officials that secures US interests and reassures Israel, similar to what occurred in Venezuela following the arrest of President Nicolás Maduro. Such a deal would allow the establishment to remain in power during the next phase of the war, provided it revises its declared policies, reaches an agreement on the nuclear program and alters its ideological doctrine.
This scenario, however, appears unlikely, given the uncompromising mentality dominating state institutions, the substantial losses Iran has sustained, the destruction of infrastructure and the crippling of its capabilities. Most importantly, the assassination of Khamenei — who held immense political and religious symbolic significance for the state and its institutions — further complicates such an outcome. Its realization would depend on concessions from both sides, particularly Iran, and on a conviction that preserving the political system in its current form could ensure survival and spare the country additional devastation.
Implications for Iran’s Regional Network
The absence of Khamenei from the Iranian political scene has affected not only the domestic political system but also the network of alliances and Shiite groups abroad:
An Ideological Vacuum Among Shiite Groups
Khamenei’s departure has undoubtedly created an ideological void among Iran-backed Shiite groups in the region and worldwide. The entire ideology of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist may be disrupted if this void is not filled in a way that preserves Iran’s central role and its ideological connections with groups beyond its borders. Strategically, a decisive blow to the central state will have far-reaching consequences for the periphery. Khamenei was the architect of Iran’s regional influence project and the mastermind behind the “strategic depth” strategy, positioning Iran as the center of Shiism regionally and globally. His departure, and potential regime change in Iran, may shift the country’s orientation from a regional Shiite axis to a more secular one, causing fragmentation and disorientation among these Shiite groups. Since October 7, 2023, Iran and its axis have remained on the defensive after Israel leveraged the Palestinian factions’ attack to upend the strategic environment, pursuing comprehensive regional hegemony — first by dismantling the Iranian axis, then by eliminating Tehran’s center, as a precursor to subjugating the region’s countries.
The Entry of Factions Into the War
While the conflict appears existential, the US-Israeli campaign against Iran may trigger the involvement of factions, as Hezbollah and groups in Iraq and Yemen have pledged. Limited engagement has already occurred on the Lebanese front, with Hezbollah striking Israel, including Haifa, and in Iraq, where Iraqi Hezbollah and other Iran-affiliated groups attacked US bases in Erbil. Other Iran-backed actors, such as the Houthis in Yemen, may also intervene, potentially closing the Bab al-Mandab Strait to maritime traffic. While their participation may significantly impact the current conflict and expand its geographical scope, it also exposes these groups to domestic pressure from political opposition within their countries, which resists being dragged into Iranian adventurism. This is already evident in Lebanon and Iraq, where governments pressure each other to avoid external entanglement that could harm national interests.
Further Dismantling of the “Axis of Resistance”
These groups may also be targeted by the United States or Israel for their involvement, weakening them. The United States and Israel are fully prepared to confront their participation, as demonstrated by Israel’s rapid response to Hezbollah attacks and readiness for large-scale operations in Beirut’s southern suburbs, continuing actions begun after October 7, as well as strikes on factions in Iraq.
In this context, Khamenei’s departure has left the Iranian axis in a difficult position: constrained by limited opportunities to demonstrate loyalty under military pressure; facing a religious dilemma due to the absence of a central reference linking Tehran to the peripheries; and limited in influence, unable to counter Israel’s ambitions for regional dominance. These conditions may lead some factions toward disarmament and marginalization, removing them from the power equations in their respective countries.
Iran’s Options in Responding to the Killing of Khamenei
The assassination of a figure as significant as Khamenei, and his symbolic importance within the Iranian system, could push Tehran to adopt more complex retaliatory military options that extend beyond targeting regional military bases.
Direct Targeting of the US Navy
Days earlier, Trump had spoken about the possibility of US soldiers being targeted by Iran, prompting criticism that his administration was endangering US troops. Conscious of the sensitivity regarding US casualties, and in retaliation for Khamenei’s assassination, the IRGC launched attacks on US soldiers on Sunday, March 1, 2026, resulting in several deaths. The US military acknowledged three soldiers killed and five seriously injured. US Central Command provided no further details on the locations of the casualties.
The IRGC public relations office stated that its naval missiles, supported by drones, severely damaged the USS MST, a US aircraft carrier refueling ship, approximately 700 kilometers off Chabahar. In a significant escalation, Iran announced it had targeted the USS Abraham Lincoln with four missiles. Regardless of the actual damage, if the Iranian account is accurate, striking the US aircraft carrier represents a qualitative escalation and a breach of long-established red lines, foreshadowing a potentially more severe US retaliatory strike against Iran in the coming days.
The Threat of Closing the Strait of Hormuz
US-Israeli attacks have revived fears of Iran closing the Strait of Hormuz. Iran has long used this threat when facing US and Israeli pressure. The world fears Iran may act if it sees its military options limited in confronting these attacks, since a large portion of global oil passes through this strait.
Although Iran has not officially declared the closure of the strait, it has blocked some ships attempting transit. The UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported notifications from ships in the Arabian Gulf about a potential closure. Shipping data on Sunday, March 1, 2026, showed at least 150 tankers — including crude oil and LNG carriers — anchored in Gulf waters near the strait’s entrance. The IRGC confirmed that three oil tankers belonging to the United States and the UK had been hit by missiles. On March 2, 2026, Iranian media quoted an IRGC commander stating that Iran had closed the Strait of Hormuz and threatened to burn any ship attempting passage. However, US Central Command maintained that the strait remained open to international shipping.
Intensifying Attacks on Regional Allies
Since the war began, Iran has targeted several regional countries hosting US forces and bases. Following Khamenei’s assassination, Iran intensified its attacks, expanding the military response to the United States and Israel to all Gulf states — Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman. Iran targeted airports, ports, institutions and embassies, including the US embassy in Riyadh, aiming to increase the security and economic cost of the war and pressure Gulf states to demand that the US administration halt hostilities against Iran.
Conclusion
There is no doubt that Khamenei’s absence from the Iranian political scene has triggered a strategic earthquake, affecting not only the ruling establishment but also Shiite groups internationally. His departure will leave a void that cannot be filled under any circumstances, and the remaining centers of power may well crumble in his absence.
His absence also constitutes a pivotal historical moment for the clergy that has ruled Iran for over 45 years. This moment is not merely a constitutional transition at the top of the Iranian political hierarchy, but a test of the very structure of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist: is it the authority of a single individual, or a system of institutions? Does its legitimacy derive from jurisprudence as the supreme authority or from the network of power that surrounds and sustains it?
Analysis shows that the constitutional text grants the Assembly of Experts the power of selection and sets specific jurisprudential, ethical and administrative conditions. However, reality reveals that succession is determined within a complex balance of power among the seminaries, the Office of the Supreme Leader, the IRGC and the councils regulating the legal and political process. Therefore, the name of the successor — whoever it may be — serves more as an indicator of the alliance prevailing during the power vacuum than as an expression of pure jurisprudential will or open electoral competition.
The maps of potential successors to Khamenei indicate that the establishment by its very structure leans toward “managed continuity” —producing a leadership that maintains the general direction and reassures the centers of power, whether through an uncharismatic institutional jurist or a more complex formula distributing influence between the religious leadership and the security apparatus. As for the option of hereditary succession — if it occurs — it will not be seen merely as a formal deviation but as a redefinition of the relationship between jurisprudential legitimacy and network-based legitimacy, potentially creating tensions within the seminaries themselves.
Therefore, the future of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist will not be decided solely by the question of succession but by the deeper question of how the form of guardianship might change. Will it remain a centralized authority embodying both decision-making and symbolic power, or will it transform into a more abstract, institutionalized system in which power is managed through security-bureaucratic balances under a functional, religiously sanctioned guise?
The Iranian experience since 1979 has demonstrated the establishment’s ability to adapt to crises by redistributing roles without dismantling its superstructure. However, a transition under intense security pressures exacerbates the fragility of the moment and leaves open the possibilities of continuity, structural transformation and gradual erosion. In any case, the moment of succession will remain a mirror reflecting the true balance between religion and politics, jurisprudence and power, and the constitutional text and the realities of the deep state. Hence, the post-Khamenei era is not just the end of a phase, but may be the beginning of a new stage in the history of the Iranian republic — a stage in which the meaning and limits of leadership are redefined, and the viability of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist as a governance theory in a changing world is tested.
