The sudden deaths of Iran’s president and foreign minister will have a limited impact on the future of US-Iran relations. Nevertheless, Iran’s special presidential elections could affect a potential US-Iran military escalation. Indeed, during the election period, the Iranian state’s focus will be inward because of the need to manage internal competition between different political factions and groups. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen if the supreme leader will open the political space to include the “moderate” factions. Even if the campaign is limited to a competition between the “hardliners,” Tehran’s priority will probably be to manage and organize the political competition amongst the political establishment rather than seek a military escalation at the regional level. Most importantly, one has to consider that Iranian foreign policy is broadly defined by the supreme leader; despite this supervision, Iranian presidents have influence over the decision-making process regarding the implementation of the country’s strategy toward the United States.
The registration of candidates for the unscheduled presidential elections will take place between May 30 and June 3, 2024. Then, the Guardian Council will publish a short list of presidential candidates, at the latest, two weeks later. The official presidential campaign will last two weeks from June 12 until election day on June 28. Just days before the helicopter crash in which the Iranian president and foreign minister were killed, Iran and the United States held indirect talks in the Sultanate of Oman. Beyond the immediate challenge of organizing the presidential elections, the supreme leader is also preparing for his own succession. Therefore, in Tehran, there is a political will to avoid unexpected regional and international instability in order to focus on internal political challenges.
On the Iranian side, the indirect talks were held under the supervision of Ali Bagheri Kani, Iran’s acting foreign minister. On the US side, several indirect meetings were attended in Oman by top US Middle East policymaker Brett McGurk. The lines of communication between the United States and Iran in Oman and the Swiss role as a bilateral diplomatic channel of communication will remain open during and after the Iranian presidential elections. Indeed, the Swiss Embassy in Tehran represents US interests in Iran. On the US side, there is also a political will to avoid a direct military escalation at a time when the Biden administration is preparing for the November US presidential elections.
Since 1980, diplomatic relations between Iran and the United States have remained frozen. Despite the non-existence of direct diplomatic relations, the United States decided to express official condolences for the deaths of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, and other members of their delegation in a helicopter crash in northwest Iran according to the US State Department. This public position will not change the prospect of a thaw in the Iran-US relationship.
Indeed, the first consequence of the death of the Iranian president was the postponement of nuclear negotiations between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to resolve the current impasse. This delay in restarting the nuclear talks could further deteriorate Iran-Western relations given the importance of the nuclear file in shaping the dynamics. According to the IAEA, stocks of enriched uranium amounted to 6,201.3 kilograms on May 11 (compared to 5,525.5 kilograms in February 2024), more than 30 times the limit authorized by the 2015 Iranian nuclear agreement. In the case of the 60% threshold, close to the 90% necessary to develop an atomic weapon, Tehran increased its stock to 142.1 kilograms (compared to 121.5 kilograms previously). Although international talks on the nuclear file have recommenced in 2024, the institutional hostility between the Iranian republic and the United States dates back to 1979. The absence of formal diplomatic relations since the Iranian revolution and the attack on the US embassy in Tehran have continued to shape foreign policy on both sides resulting in longstanding hostility between the United States and Iran since 1979.
The institutional hostility between the United States and Iran will be reinforced and amplified if the “hardliners,” who rose to power in 2021, continue to dominate the political scene after the 2024 Iranian presidential elections. There are also international factors that will probably prevent in the short-term any prospect for détente in Iran-US relations such as the war in Gaza, political and ideological polarization inside Iran, and continued isolation from the other. Moreover, Iranian regional policy, Iranian drones and missile programs, as well as Iranian military support for Russia in war with Ukraine, will complicate any diplomatic attempts for a US-Iran rapprochement in the coming months. Further, the situation will continue to worsen if the Iranian republic opts for a reliance on military strategy over diplomatic solutions.
Successive US administrations have attempted to negotiate with Iran, some with more success than others, for example, the nuclear negotiations which curbed Iran’s nuclear ambitions in exchange for sanctions relief. President Hassan Rouhani and President Barack Obama were more amenable to possible diplomatic exchanges than their predecessors, President George Bush Junior and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Despite this temporary thaw, it is clear that the nuclear issue alone will not bring Washington and Tehran closer on the regional and international scenes. A comprehensive approach is needed. This strategy should include the following: Iranian regional policy, drone and missile programs as well as the issue of restoring bilateral diplomatic relations. These challenges are far beyond the authority of the Iranian president. Despite these limitations and the relevance of broader questions, the next Iranian president will have to manage the risk of a military escalation on a day-to-day basis to guarantee the survival of the Iranian political system at a time of rising internal political challenges.
