During his presidential campaign, US President Donald Trump made bold claims about his ability to resolve the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, touting his negotiation skills as a key asset. Trump repeatedly asserted that he could bring the conflict to an end within 24 hours if reelected, a promise that garnered significant attention and skepticism. Examining these claims, their potential implications and how they might reshape transatlantic relations are critical to understanding the geopolitical landscape under the second Trump administration.
Beyond the bilateral dynamics of US-Russia relations, the meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Putin serves as a message to President Trump: he will not be able to drive a wedge between the two countries. While Trump might threaten Russia to implement new sanctions if peace talks fail within 100 days, the real issue is not his ability to pressure Putin but his willingness to do so. Trump’s overarching strategic objective is to “detach” Russia from China — similar to Nixon’s effort to distance China from the USSR in the 1970s. This makes it unlikely that Trump will aggressively escalate economic pressure on Russia in the short term as he will likely give his direct diplomatic efforts with Moscow a chance to succeed.
The United States’ economic leverage is nevertheless limited. In 2021, the total trade volume between the two countries was approximately $29.7 billion. By 2023, this figure had declined to around $4.9 billion. Although new sanctions targeting Russian oil or Rosatom remain possible, they would likely trigger unintended consequences, such as rising global oil prices — an outcome the new Trump administration would be eager to avoid. With new UK and US sanctions targeting Russia’s oil industry and G7 states seeking to tighten the enforcement of the oil price cap, some hope that Moscow’s vital hydrocarbon revenues will be squeezed even further, exacerbating the losses caused by the collapse of Russian gas exports to Europe and flagging coal sales. One obvious option would be for the United States to further tighten sanctions on Russia’s “shadow” fleet of tankers that helps Moscow evade the G7’s oil price cap.
In Russia, hydrocarbons are expected to account for 27% of federal budget revenues in 2025, down from 53% in 2018. In fact, Russia is becoming less dependent on hydrocarbons, a quiet revolution overlooked in the West. India, Azerbaijan and the Central Asian countries have become key hubs for circumventing Western sanctions, particularly facilitating the export of Russian oil and gas products to Western markets.
Moreover, Putin congratulated the new US president and expressed Russia’s openness to dialogue, though emphasizing that talks are not an end in themselves — the root causes of the conflict must be addressed. The pressing question now is when a direct phone call between Trump and Putin will occur. Meanwhile, European and Ukrainian delegations at Davos were apprehensive about the prospect of direct US-Russia discussions. From the perspectives of the EU and Ukraine, there is a risk of being sidelined if their representatives are excluded from any new Trump-led diplomatic efforts to end the war in Ukraine.
The new Trump administration is now prioritizing a “deal” to end the fighting in Ukraine. Trump is expected to withhold or threaten to cut US support to pressure Kyiv into accepting such a deal. This would almost certainly involve territorial concessions and could also include demands for neutrality and the prohibition of NATO membership (as suggested by Vice President JD Vance). However, Trump has also indicated he might increase support for Ukraine if Putin refuses to negotiate. Despite this, he is likely to be sympathetic to Russia’s perspective on proposals and more focused on achieving a quick resolution rather than securing a better outcome for Kyiv. That said, the Trump administration would want a deal that could be framed as a success, meaning Kyiv would retain some leverage in negotiations.
Trump’s rhetoric suggests a sharp departure from the Biden administration’s strategy of unwavering military and financial support for Ukraine. Instead, he has signaled a more transactional and pragmatic approach, emphasizing dialogue with both Kyiv and Moscow. He has not offered detailed plans, but his statements indicate a potential willingness to pressure Ukraine into territorial concessions to achieve a ceasefire. He has also implied that reducing US commitments to NATO and scaling back US involvement in Europe’s security architecture could be on the table.
This approach aligns with his broader foreign policy ethos of prioritizing US interests over multilateral commitments. While he has criticized Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine, he has also refrained from labeling Putin as a war criminal and has suggested that improved US-Russia relations could be beneficial.
Trump’s strategy toward Russia is a test for the cohesion of NATO, particularly if he conditions US support for Ukraine on European countries shouldering a larger share of the burden. During his first term, he frequently criticized NATO allies for failing to meet defense spending commitments, and a renewed focus on burden-sharing could exacerbate tensions. A reduction in US military support for Ukraine might force European countries to either step up their contributions or face the prospect of a weakened collective response to Russian military intervention in Ukraine.
European allies may view his approach as undermining the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, which are central to the Western response to the Ukraine crisis. If he pursues a strategy perceived as favoring Russia or compromising Ukraine’s territorial claims, it could lead to a loss of trust between the United States and its European partners. This erosion of trust could have long-term consequences for US-EU relations and transatlantic cooperation on other critical issues, such as trade, climate change and global security.
Trump-led negotiations that combine significant concessions and pressures against Russia could set a precedent for addressing conflicts through coercion. This could alarm Eastern European countries, whose definition of a “Ukrainian victory” may differ from that of the Trump administration. This is particularly true for European countries bordering Russia, and could prompt them to seek alternative security arrangements, potentially fracturing the current transatlantic alliance.
Faced with the possibility of diminished US involvement, European countries might accelerate efforts to enhance their strategic autonomy. Initiatives such as the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) could gain momentum as Europe strives to reduce its dependence on US military support. While greater European self-reliance could strengthen regional security in the long term, it might also lead to a more fragmented Western alliance if transatlantic priorities diverge. Globally, Trump’s proposed policies could redraw geopolitical alignments. Eventually, countries in the Global South, many of which have adopted neutral stances on the Ukraine crisis, might welcome a de-escalation of US-Russia tensions. However, traditional US allies in Europe and Asia could see such moves as a retreat from the United States’ role as a global leader. Even if there is cautious optimism among some European allies about Trump’s direct approach to ending the conflict, but there is also significant apprehension about the long-term implications for European security if Ukraine is pressured into territorial concessions. Navigating this complex scenario requires Trump to balance his “peace through strength” rhetoric with the realities of international diplomacy. His plans could either lead to a swift cessation of hostilities or precipitate a reconfiguration of power dynamics in Eastern Europe and beyond.
The immediate future of transatlantic relations is marked by uncertainty. Europe may either unite to offset reduced US involvement or clash with the United States over its approach to Ukraine. To mitigate this risk, the EU is intensifying its engagement with key partners such as the UK, Japan and South Korea, aiming to secure their support for Ukraine and help fill the gap left by diminished US commitment.
