At a critical juncture in the history of Iran’s ruling system, facing mounting internal challenges and intensifying external pressure to make concessions on disputed issues, a new wave of popular protests erupted at the end of December 2025 and continues to gain momentum. The unrest unfolded amid a sharp deterioration in socio-economic conditions, driven by the authorities’ failure to pursue credible avenues for sanctions relief. Ordinary citizens have long borne the heaviest costs of failed policies and revolutionary orientations, which have resulted in external isolation and recurring domestic crises.
The current protests exhibit characteristics that set them apart from earlier rounds. Initially led by bazaar merchants, they have expanded to include wider segments of society. This report addresses several central questions: what distinguishes these protests in terms of geographical reach, demands, motivations, slogans, objectives and the ruling establishment’s management strategy; why their intensity appears greater than in previous episodes; how they are affecting domestic conditions and policy choices; and what paths they may follow. It also examines the factors shaping their escalation or containment, the evolving regional and international responses and whether Middle Eastern states favor a broader protest surge that could enable radical regime change or instead prefer calibrated pressure that alters the leadership’s behavior while preserving its role as a regional balancer.
Dimensions of the Protests
The current wave of popular protests is marked by its outbreak in the capital, Tehran, on December 28, 2025, followed by its rapid expansion into major urban centers and border regions, with the participation of varied social segments. These demonstrations have moved beyond narrow economic grievances to encompass broader questions about governance and the country’s political and economic trajectory. Interpreting their significance requires attention to three interlinked dimensions.
Geography of the Protests
The unrest began in Tehran, where key commercial hubs — including the Grand Bazaar and mobile phone markets — saw widespread shutdowns, signaling deepening trader frustration. It then spread to other major cities such as Isfahan, Shiraz, Mashhad, Tabriz, Rasht, Kermanshah and Hamadan (see Table 1). Although more limited in scale, the protests also reached ethnically and sectarian diverse regions, from Kurdistan in the west to Sistan and Balochistan in the southeast. This pattern confirms that the movement did not remain confined to the capital or a handful of large cities, but extended into provinces suffering acute economic and social strain. Some platforms estimate that protests occurred in at least 60 cities across 25 provinces, underscoring the widening scope of popular discontent and resentment.
Table 1: Iranian Provinces and Cities Hit by Protests
| Province | Town |
| Tehran | Tehran (especially the Grand Bazaar) and its suburbs, such as Tehran Pars and Nazi Abad |
| Loristan | Kuhdasht, Azna |
| Isfahan | Isfahan, Fooladshahr |
| Kermanshah | Kermanshah |
| Hamadan | Hamadan |
| Markazi province | Arak |
| Ilam | Malekshahi, the city of Ilam |
| East Azerbaijan | Tabriz |
| Razavi Khorasan | Mashhad |
Table created by Rasanah IIIS.
This pattern of rapid diffusion holds clear strategic implications. The protests erupted at the heart of political and economic power and then spread to major cities that function as key economic, religious and demographic centers. This trajectory confronts the establishment with the challenge of containing unrest in the capital while simultaneously managing instability across other vital hubs. The reach of protests into cities such as Tehran, Isfahan and Mashhad signals a relative erosion of the establishment’s ability to protect its symbolic strongholds and undermines official narratives that cast the unrest as marginal or geographically isolated.
Moreover, the movement’s expansion from the center toward the periphery — particularly into border provinces marked by heightened security sensitivities and longstanding social grievances — further constrains the government’s options. It forces the authorities to divide security resources between suppressing protests in major urban centers and preventing escalation in peripheral regions that have long suffered from economic marginalization or ethnic tension. Strategically, this breadth of spread indicates a shift from a contained protest wave to a self-sustaining popular movement, intensifying pressure on the establishment’s legitimacy and its capacity to impose control and stability.
Widespread Support for the Protests
The protests initially emerged around economic grievances, led by merchants and shop owners in Tehran, before spreading to include traders in other Iranian cities. Soon, the demands evolved beyond economic concerns to encompass broader political and social objectives. Although the movement lacks centralized leadership, it has drawn support from activists who were previously involved in the 2022 Mahsa Amini protests. Among the most prominent figures to voice support was Reza Pahlavi, who publicly urged security forces to refrain from confronting demonstrators.
In addition, 17 civil society activists and political figures issued a joint statement backing the protests and underscoring the necessity of a peaceful transition away from the Iranian republic, describing this outcome as unavoidable. Signatories such as Abolfazl Ghadiani, Jafar Panahi, Mostafa Tajzadeh, Narges Mohammadi and Mostafa Malekian characterized the protests as a “major civil resistance movement” expressing the Iranian people’s collective will to end the ruling system. They emphasized demands centered on freedom, justice, human dignity and self-determination. While evidence suggests limited direct mobilization by opposition groups abroad, figures like Pahlavi have contributed symbolically by amplifying protest messages, circulating videos from inside Iran and maintaining an active presence on social media platforms.
Socially Diverse
The protests have been marked by wide participation across diverse social groups, including merchants and shop owners in Tehran, workers and public- and private-sector employees in major cities, students and teachers and residents of border and rural areas. This broad social base complicates efforts to contain the movement, as it brings together acute economic grievances with wider political and social dissatisfaction such as corruption, poor governance as well as inadequate education and healthcare, alongside cultural and ethnic demands in some border provinces.
The participation of such varied constituencies makes the protests a cross-cutting national phenomenon that extends beyond traditional protest groups and intensifies political and social pressure on the establishment, particularly as the unrest reaches major urban, economic and religious centers. At the same time, this social composition enhances the movement’s capacity to endure and reproduce itself, reducing the effectiveness of isolation or rapid security-based containment, without necessarily indicating that the protests have yet evolved into an immediate existential threat to the Iranian establishment.
Protestor Demands
Deteriorating living conditions caused by the continued collapse of the national currency under the weight of sanctions pushed many Iranians into the streets, demanding immediate solutions to their mounting problems. The bazaar emerged as the focal point of the protests, as merchants in central Tehran shut their shops to protest their inability to conduct business amid the rial’s sharp depreciation against the dollar. This decline was driven by shrinking foreign currency reserves and the limited returns of the government’s “Look East” policy, which in turn generated new problems through reliance on illicit frameworks for oil exports. These arrangements opened loopholes in the management of public finances and contributed to the spread of a complex system of corruption.
Over time, the protests expanded, moving beyond a merchants’ strike into smaller demonstrations across different parts of the country and increasingly incorporating demands for political change. This expansion has unfolded amid growing internal and external pressure on the establishment, with a critical turning point following the 12-Day War in June 2025. Iran was subjected to Israeli-US strikes targeting key centers of power, followed by intensified sanctions and ongoing US and Israeli threats of renewed war should Tehran fail to meet demands related to its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Against this backdrop, foreign exchange rates surged from mid-December, with the dollar surpassing 143,000 tomans, representing an increase of about 20% compared to the previous month. This rise coincided with heightened demand for foreign currency and gold as hedges against inflation and future uncertainty.
All social segments have been affected by the relentless rise in prices, particularly basic food items such as bread, whose annual price increase has exceeded 70%, in addition to other essentials including education, medicine and housing. Overall, Iran’s economic conditions have worsened since the recent Israeli strikes. Financial and economic crises deepened further after the reimposition of UN and European sanctions in the final quarter of the year, compelling the government to implement austerity measures, remove foreign currency subsidies and cut public spending. These steps contributed to higher exchange rates and inflation, further raising the cost of living for ordinary Iranians.
While protesters from different backgrounds largely agree on the need for solutions to their economic hardships, clear divisions exist over political demands. Some argue that demands should remain within the framework of the existing system, seeking remedies through state institutions while adhering to current orientations. Others contend that meaningful solutions require a fundamental shift in the establishment’s orientations, particularly its relations with the West, arguing that sanctions leave no viable alternative. A segment of protesters has gone further, calling for the overthrow of the entire system, chanting slogans such as “Death to the dictator,” “Down with Sayyid Ali,” “Death to Khamenei,” “We don’t want the Islamic Republic,” and “The mullahs must go.” According to media reports, some have even called for the return of the monarchy by invoking the former Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, through slogans such as “This is the final battle, Pahlavi will return,” “Reza Shah, may your soul rest in peace,” and “Long live the shah.”
State Measures to Contain the Protests
The government adopted a more calibrated and less overtly confrontational approach to managing the protests, one that sought to balance internal considerations with external pressures. This approach enabled the authorities to contain the demonstrations while preserving a rationale for repression should the protests evolve into a direct threat. Officials acknowledged the legitimacy of demands arising from deteriorating economic conditions and declining living standards, yet they did not abandon references to an external dimension. Rather than denying the domestic roots of the unrest or attributing it entirely to foreign orchestration, the establishment advanced a narrative in which external actors were portrayed as exploiting legitimate protests as part of an ongoing US and Israeli campaign against Iran. On this basis, protest management combined elements of accommodation with selective confrontation.
This line was reflected in statements by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who recognized citizens’ right to protest and conceded the existence of economic stagnation and worsening living conditions. President Masoud Pezeshkian and other senior officials echoed this position. In parallel, the government initiated dialogue with protesters and announced a series of measures, most notably the replacement of the Central Bank governor. Economist Abdolnasser Hemmati was appointed to succeed Mohammad Reza Farzin, pledging to restore economic stability and curb rent-seeking practices generated by the country’s multiple exchange-rate system. At the same time, two banks deemed responsible for disruption and inflation were dissolved, while the government promised wage increases, selective tax exemptions and higher subsidies.
On the security level, the response included the extensive deployment of police and riot-control units, efforts to contain certain protests by preventing access to sensitive locations and the dispersal of crowds using tear gas and similar methods in cases where some demonstrators resorted to violence. Internet access was restricted, security personnel at three major universities were dismissed and detained students were released in an effort to placate the academic community. In some institutions, distance learning was introduced under the justification of exceptional circumstances.
Concurrently, the authorities linked the prospect of foreign intervention in support of the protesters to the adoption of restrictive measures, framing these as necessary to neutralize external influence. This approach involved distinguishing protesters from those labeled “rioters,” “troublemakers” and “infiltrators,” terms frequently used in official discourse. The prevailing stance toward current and potential future demonstrations — particularly if they expand in ways perceived as threatening to the establishment — is centered on reasserting control. This rationale has been used to justify arrests and fatalities, with officials claiming that those involved were acting on a foreign agenda directed by monarchist and other opposition groups abroad. Weapons reportedly found in the possession of some detainees were also seized.
Regional and Global Responses
Compared with previous rounds of protests, the current wave shows a marked shift in positions, particularly in the United States, moving from cautious or modest stances to overtly supportive positions under the Trump administration. This external backing is a defining feature of the current round, reinforcing the protests’ continuation and potentially contributing to a scenario of widespread unrest that could justify foreign intervention and, ultimately, the establishment’s overthrow. The following outlines the key positions on the protests.
The US Threat
US President Donald Trump issued a strong message supporting the protesters, urging hesitant citizens to take to the streets. He drew red lines for the Iranian establishment, warning of direct intervention if the authorities used violence against demonstrators. On Truth Social, he stated, “If Iran shoots and violently kills peaceful protesters, which is their custom, the United States of America will come to their rescue.”
Israeli Obfuscation
Israel adopted an unclear stance. Officially, the government refrained from commenting on the protests, with reports suggesting the prime minister instructed ministers to let events unfold. Mossad, however, published a message in Persian expressing support for the protesters, while former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett encouraged Iranians to protest. Analysts like Ron Ben-Yishai downplayed the protests’ size and intensity, noting that the establishment retains an effective security apparatus capable of crushing uprisings. The Jerusalem Post warned that overt support could backfire, effectively strengthening the establishment. Israel’s ambiguous stance appears designed to deny Tehran a foreign conspiracy narrative and emphasize that the establishment’s internal weaknesses, rather than war, should dominate the moment.
European Pressure
European countries avoided the direct threats seen from the United States, adopting a diplomatic approach. The EU called on Iran to respect peaceful demonstrations and refrain from repression or violence.
China and Russia
They largely remained absent. This may reflect an intention to limit the protests’ momentum, reducing pressure on the establishment, which is broadly aligned with the Eastern camp. The absence of public support from these powers could strengthen Iran’s resilience, especially given Beijing and Moscow’s awareness of Western attempts to exploit the unrest to challenge the government.
Distinguishing Features of the Latest Protests
Although the protests have not expanded beyond the geographical, ethnic and sectarian scope reached by some major previous waves since the 1999 demonstrations, they nonetheless possess a distinct character compared to earlier rounds, in view of the following factors:
Unfavorable Timing for the Theocratic Establishment
Unlike earlier waves of protest, the current wave began at a particularly critical and disadvantageous moment for Iranian authorities. First, the leadership has been facing a strategic predicament following debilitating Israeli strikes on key centers of gravity and strategic pillars, including efforts to weaken what has been referred to as the “Axis of Resistance.”
Second, this political predicament coincides with rising public resentment and widespread discontent over the establishment’s perceived squandering of national wealth on ventures that have yielded little benefit for ordinary citizens. Third, the protests have unfolded against a backdrop of widespread talk about the threat of a new war, leaving the establishment preoccupied with how to confront such a scenario while trying to preserve what remains of its power structures. Finally, Tehran may be wary of a Venezuela-like scenario in the event of widespread chaos.
As a result, compared with previous rounds, the establishment today has far less maneuvering space and fewer temporal resources to manage protests that deepen internal confusion, provide openings for foreign narratives and complicate its capacity to confront external challenges effectively.
Plain US Red Lines
Compared with previous rounds of protests, one of the most notable features of the current wave is the level and sources of external support. The United States, as the world’s foremost power, has for the first time drawn explicit red lines for the Iranian government in its handling of demonstrators. This development is likely to sustain protest momentum, particularly given the near-strategic conviction within Iran’s ruling circle — and among other governments — that the Trump administration is serious about enforcing these warnings. Trump may see the protests as an opportunity to advance US objectives, leaving the possibility of intervention alive.
However, debate exists over whether explicit US backing will strengthen the protests or give the establishment a pretext to suppress them. Analysts are divided: one camp argues that such support could mobilize silent or hesitant citizens to join, while the other contends it may backfire, bolstering the establishment’s rationale for tighter security measures or discouraging some protesters who perceive foreign backing as serving external agendas rather than addressing their grievances.
The Symbolism of the Bazaar as the Protests’ Focal Point
The protests’ origin in the bazaar carries deep symbolic significance. The 1979 revolution that toppled the shah and brought Khomeini to power also began there, and now the same market is the spark for rising demonstrations against the theocracy that has governed Iran for nearly 50 years. Historically, the bazaar has been more than a commercial hub; it is a key center of political and social influence and an unspoken pillar of state stability, rooted in its reciprocal relationship with the clerical establishment. However, rising inflation, economic hardship and declining purchasing power have strained this relationship, prompting parts of the bazaar to abandon their traditional neutrality. This reflects a disruption in the mutual-benefit equation and limits the establishment’s capacity to use the bazaar as a tool of social control. While the bazaar may not lead politically as the protests expand, its early involvement provided initial momentum, sustained the protests and raised the political and security costs of containment.
Managing the Crisis and Flexible Containment
Facing intense pressure, the state is employing a strategy of flexible containment, differing from previous approaches that relied on lethal force to crush protests. This strategy uses tactical measures that recognize the legitimacy of protesters’ demands while reserving the use of extreme violence if a widespread uprising threatens the establishment’s survival. In such a case, state security services would respond with overwhelming force. While Iranian intellectuals and political elites have welcomed this approach, its ability to contain the crisis is uncertain, given the deep-rooted structural issues, systemic problems within the establishment and limited maneuvering room amid growing external pressures.
The Relatively Limited Scope of the Current Round
Compared with previous rounds of protests — particularly those in 2017, 2021 and 2022 (see Table 2) — the current wave remains moderate in geographical spread, social and ethnic diversity and overall participation. Yet no strategic signs suggest a decline, reflecting the establishment’s loss of public credibility and the perception that its responses are merely tactical attempts to quell the protests. In Iran, economic protests rarely remain purely economic, quickly evolving into political movements due to the deep link between politics and economic crises. Protesters widely believe meaningful reform requires tangible political change and a restructuring of foreign relations. Unlike the 2022 Mahsa Amini protests, minority regions such as Balochistan, Kurdistan and Khuzestan have seen limited involvement, partly due to Pahlavi’s active symbolic presence abroad, which provokes political and intellectual opposition among Arab and Kurdish groups.
Table 2: Iranian Protests Over the Years
| Start date | 1999 protests | 2009 protests | 2017 protests | 2019 protests | 2021 protests | 2022 protests | 2026 protests |
| July 8 | June 13 | December 28 | November 15 | July 15 | September 16 | December 28 | |
| Duration | 7 days | 3 days | 11 days | 6 days | 11 days | 11 days (until the time of preparing this report; lasted several days thereafter) | 12 days; still ongoing |
| Geography | Affected 5 major cities (Tehran, Tabriz, Mashhad, Shiraz, Isfahan) | Reached 4 major cities (Tehran, Tabriz, Isfahan, Shiraz). | Included around 64 cities, including Tehran, Qom, Qazvin, Hamadan, Isfahan, Kermanshah, Bandar Abbas, Kerman, Khorramabad, Zahedan, Mashhad, and Shahroud | Spread to 29 out of 31 provinces, making it the most extensive, starting from Arab Ahwaz region, then moving to the capital Tehran, followed by Isfahan, Fars, Mashhad, Kermanshah and so on | Reached about 36 cities, including Tehran, Mashhad, and Kermanshah, even though it originated in the city of Ahvaz, the capital of Khuzestan province | During this period, it affected approximately 83 cities according to Iranian sources. Although it started in the city of Saqqez in Iranian Kurdistan, it then moved to the capital, Tehran, and subsequently to other Iranian cities. | Began in the bazaar and then spread to a number of markets and shops in Tehran. Its geographical reach later expanded to 60 cities across 25 provinces out of a total of 31, the most important being Tehran, Isfahan, Shiraz, Mashhad, Tabriz, Rasht, Kermanshah, Hamadan, Kurdistan, and Sistan-Balochistan |
| Segments engaged | Students took part, later joined by other social classes | The middle class, political figures, elites, intellectuals and activists participated | The poor were first involved, followed to a limited extent by other social classes | The poor, youth, students, and women were involved, later joined by segments of the lower middle class | It included citizens dissatisfied with government policies, with participation from political activists | It ranged from university students and young people dissatisfied with the government’s policies, to political groups including activists, the elite, and then intellectuals | It involved multiple social groups, including merchants and shop owners in Tehran, workers and employees in major cities, in addition to students, teachers, and residents of border and rural areas |
| Mobilization tactics | Student posts | Opposition satellite channels and student posts | Social media (Telegram) | Social media via the Internet, before authorities cut it off | Social media and posts, before the regime restricted its use | Social media usage just before a near-total restriction on Internet access in some strategic provinces | Social media and opposition satellite TV channels abroad. To prevent further geographic spread, authorities blocked access to the Internet, causing Internet usage in Iran to drop by 97% |
| Leadership | No formal leadership; organized by students | Mir Hosseini Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi | Appears spontaneous and without leadership | Leaderless | Leaderless | Leaderless | Leaderless (in the early days, it was under the leadership of a large group of merchants, but it quickly slipped from their control) |
| Motives and causes | Issuance of the Press Law restricting freedom of the press and the closure of Salam newspaper | Election fraud, policies of exclusion and marginalization, and the arrest and torture of opponents | Economic and livelihood reasons stemming from high prices, inflation among the abject poor | Raising fuel prices in a country that supposedly has the fourth-largest oil reserves in the world, reflecting widespread popular anger | Water scarcity and projects diverting the Karun River in Khuzestan province, which quickly drew many protesters concerned with living conditions and repressive policies | The killing of Mahsa by the morality police, amid an environment ripe for protests due to widespread popular discontent and frustration | Deteriorating living conditions, declining purchasing power, continued currency collapse, and inflation |
| Demands | Political, demanding the repeal of the Press Law and the return of Salam newspaper, later developing into calls for the overthrow of the regime | Political, demanding government accountability for election fraud, the enactment of a new election law, and the release of prisoners | Economic, demanding bread and jobs; political, opposing the government entirely, with calls for freedoms and an end to Iranian interference in Arab countries | Economic, centered on reversing the fuel price increase | Economic, related to solving water shortages and diversion projects to address the drought crisis | It began with demands to reduce the powers of the morality police and to assert MahsaAmini’s rights, then quickly moved to economic demands reflecting widespread public discontent due to deteriorating living conditions, and later to political demands calling for regime change. | It began as economic, with protesters of various orientations demanding solutions to the economic problems they faced, then shifted to political demands calling for a fundamental change in the regime’s policies, particularly its relationship with the West, as there seemed no way out under the sanctions. |
| Supporters | None | Khatami, Rafsanjani, Ayatollah Montazeri, Abdul Karim Mousavi, Bayat Zanjani | None | None, except for reformist voices calling for protesters’ rights and opposing repression; Khatami took a less severe stance than during the 2017 protests | None | Former Iranian Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, many Iranian Kurdish parties, and also numerous activists and opposition parties abroad, such as the Iranian Democratic Secular Party, the Iranian National Party, etc. | Some political prisoners, former Iranian Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, and many activists and opposition parties both inside and outside the country |
| Slogans | “Khamenei, shame on you”; “Leadership is not yours”; “Shame on the police.” | “Where did my vote go?”; “Elections are rigged”; “Freedom for detainees”; “Neither Gaza nor Lebanon, my soul is for Iran.” | “Khamenei is a killer and his rule is illegitimate”; “Death to Khamenei”; “The Iranian dies but does not accept humiliation”; “Leave Syria—think about us”; “Soleimani is a criminal, Soleimani is a killer” | “Death to the dictator, death to Khamenei”; “Leave, Rouhani”; “Oil revenues were lost and spent in Palestine”; “Neither Gaza nor Lebanon… my soul is for Iran” | “Death to the dictator,” referring to Khamenei; “I am thirsty”; “The Iranian dies but does not accept humiliation”; “With soul and blood we sacrifice for you, Karun”; “Water, water—the riverbank is thirsty”; “O shah of Iran, return to Iran” | “Death to the dictator,” referring to Khamenei; “Kill, kill whoever killed my sister”; “Get out of my face, Basiji.” Some female activists cut their hair, while others removed their hijab and burned it. | Some protesters raised slogans calling for a complete change of the regime, such as “Death to the dictator,” “Down with Sayyid Ali,” “Death to Khamenei,” “We do not want the Islamic Republic—we do not want it,” and “The mullahs must go.” According to media reports, some even called for the return of the Shah’s system, invoking the name of the former crown prince Reza Pahlavi, with chants such as “This is the final battle; the Pahlavi will return,” “Reza Shah, may your soul be blessed,” and “Eternal glory to the shah” |
| Regime tactics | Security measures, repression, and restrictions on freedoms | Security measures, repression, and mobilization of supporters | Security measures, mobilization of supporters, and promises of economic remedies | Security measures with Internet shutdowns, repression, arrests, and counter-mobilization | Security measures including Internet cuts, repression, recruitment of loyal militias in areas of influence, and accusations of treason. | Strict security measures with repression, Internet restrictions, counter-mobilization, and the use of excessive force, including the National Army for the first time to suppress protests | A strategy of flexible containment by acknowledging the legitimacy of some demands, implementing certain economic changes, promising salary increases, providing some tax exemptions, and increasing subsidies, alongside widespread security deployment, the use of tear gas to prevent protesters from reaching sensitive locations, and tightening Internet restrictions |
| Death toll | 5 dead and 200 injured | 180 dead and 1,500 arrested, according to estimates | The number of deaths ranges between 40–50 according to the Iranian account | 204 dead and at least 7,000 arrested, according to international organizations | 10 dead, with hundreds injured and arrested. | 41 dead according to the official account, while human rights organizations confirmed about 57 deaths | The number of deaths reached around 36, four of whom were under 18 years old, along with two members of security and police forces |
Table created by Rasanah IIIS.
Scenarios and Directions
In light of the current data, the protest movement in Iran faces three main scenarios:
Scenario One: Escalation
This scenario assumes that the protests will continue and expand geographically day by day, similar to the 2022 protests that began in Tehran and then spread to all provinces. The persistence of economic and political crises driving people to the streets, combined with the ineffectiveness of the government’s measures to quell anger, supports this scenario. The leadership’s responses are tactical, insufficient and fail to address the root causes of the crisis. Another factor is external support, particularly from the United States and Israel, applying maximum pressure and threats to force Iranian compliance on nuclear and regional issues. The protests may serve both countries’ interests, offering a less costly alternative to war by either overthrowing the establishment or compelling it to resolve contentious issues that have worsened Iran’s economic crisis.
Scenario Two: Suppression
This scenario suggests that the state retains the necessary tools, including the Basij forces, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and historical experience in managing mass protests. While the establishment has suppressed all previous rounds of protests, it continues to adopt a strategy of flexible containment because of the unique nature of the current protests and the potential for external support under the Trump administration. The ruling elite may resort to lethal force if it senses a widespread popular uprising threatening its foundations and allowing foreign powers to penetrate its centers of power. In such a case, security measures will take precedence over political and economic measures.
However, this scenario remains limited due to the distinct character of the current protests. As the first protests following Israeli strikes that weakened the establishment, these demonstrations represent a challenging test for the authorities, unlike previous rounds where the state relied on crises created by its now-fragmented regional proxies.
Scenario Three: Containment
This scenario assumes that the government succeeds in containing the protests through measures — especially economic responses — that meet the protesters’ minimal acceptable demands. Under this scenario, merchants return to work, confining their actions to sectoral concerns without a broader popular character. Demonstrations would weaken, failing to reach central areas and remaining largely in marginal regions, while participation declines over time until protests cease.
This outcome is facilitated by the presence of President Masoud Pezeshkian in power, whose rhetoric resonates with public sentiment, coupled with support from the supreme leader that restrains radical elements in the “conservative” camp who favor a security-dominated response. Moreover, external pressures — particularly US and Israeli threats of a new war against Iran — compel the establishment to exert greater effort to maintain social cohesion, anticipating the possibility that future conflict could exploit domestic divisions. International developments, especially events in Venezuela and statements by Trump, have sent negative signals to the Iranian public, reducing enthusiasm for protests and discouraging reliance on external support. Even opposition forces fear that the Iranian establishment might reach a settlement with the United States in which they would be the biggest losers.
Conclusion
Given the intractable nature of Iran’s economic problems and their direct link to international sanctions, most government initiatives will only provide temporary relief. If the crisis persists, future sectoral protests are likely, which the leadership will attempt to contain in the least costly manner. The third scenario — containment through partial concessions — remains the most likely to transpire, based on Iran’s accumulated experience in managing protests. However, rapid developments, the entanglement of issues, and the presence of the Trump administration make it difficult to determine which scenario will ultimately prevail.
