In what appears to mark a major shift in Israel’s military campaign against the Houthis in Yemen, the Israeli air force has moved from striking military infrastructure to targeting senior figures within the Houthi civilian leadership. On Thursday, August 28, 2025, Israeli warplanes carried out nearly 10 heavy air raids in Yemen’s capital Sana’a, including a strike on a building where members of the unrecognized Houthi government were gathered, killing Prime Minister Ahmed al-Rahwi along with several cabinet ministers, while others sustained injuries.
This development underscores a recalibration of Israel’s strategy, raising pressing questions about its timing and intent. Why has Israel chosen this time to expand the scope of its campaign against the Houthis? How deep are the losses suffered by the group, both politically and operationally, at home and abroad? And crucially, how will the Houthis respond — by retreating and consolidating internally, or by intensifying their confrontation with Israel?
Israel’s Motivations for Eliminating Senior Houthi Officials
Several factors emboldened Israel to subvert the rules of engagement with the Houthis, including the following:
The Houthis Continuing as an Active Component Within the “Axis of Resistance” Against Israel
The Houthi group remains the sole active front confronting Israel and the only entity that has not declared disengagement from the Gaza war. By contrast, Lebanese Hezbollah hastily accepted separation from the Gaza front and a ceasefire after sustaining heavy blows, including the elimination of much of its leadership and the destruction of large segments of its military infrastructure. Meanwhile, post-Assad Syria is entirely detached from Iran’s regional project, with no pro-Iran militias left on its soil. In Iraq, Tehran-aligned militias have adopted a defensive posture, wary of suffering Hezbollah’s fate.
Amid this regional retreat, the Houthis continued with their campaign, firing ballistic missiles and drones toward Israel — most of which were intercepted — and carrying out dozens of attacks on commercial vessels that they alleged were associated with Israel. In response, Israel moved to weaken the Houthis militarily and pressure the group to sever their operational link with Gaza.
The Heavy Toll of Houthi Operations on Israel’s Economy
The Houthis’ ongoing targeting of Israeli-linked commercial vessels, along with foreign ships heading to Israel, has placed additional strain on Israel’s economy — already under pressure from nearly two years of multifront wars. Against this backdrop, Israeli decision-makers concluded that strikes limited to targeting Houthi infrastructure no longer served as an effective deterrent. Hence, Israel has escalated by expanding its targets to include the Houthi political leadership and command structure. The strategy is designed to unsettle and confuse the group’s senior ranks, forcing them to reconsider the costs of continuing their campaign against Israel.
Asserting the Upper Hand
For years, Israeli officials have emphasized that Israel possesses a “long arm” in the Middle East, capable of neutralizing any threat to its national security in pursuit of what it terms “absolute victory.” This was evident in the army’s statement after striking the Houthis, “We are operating forcefully against the Houthis, alongside intensifying operations in Gaza, and we will continue to work to eliminate all threats.” By launching its Gaza offensive, maintaining pressure on Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and now extending strikes to the Houthis, Israel aims to convey a broader message to Iran, its regional allies and perhaps the wider Middle East: that it remains resilient and capable of advancing its vision to reconfigure the regional order.
Israel’s Vaulting Ambition for Regional Dominion
Israel currently believes that it is in a position of ascendancy in the Middle East. This has emboldened it to imagine acting as the region’s policeman or even its sole hegemon. While the Middle East remains too complex for any single power to dominate, given the presence of rival actors capable of maintaining regional balance, Israel views itself as edging closer to a hegemonic role in the region. This confidence stems from what it considers historic setbacks for Iran and the “Axis of Resistance.” Reflecting this mindset, Israel rejected a mediation initiative to halt the Gaza war — even though Hamas had accepted — insisting that such concessions would not stop its military drive to seize full control of the Gaza Strip.
Assessing the Scope of Losses and Consequences
Israel’s aerial assault that killed several Houthi leaders holds both symbolic and strategic weight. The impact is twofold: domestically, it impacts the Houthis internally and Yemen’s fragile balance of power; regionally, it projects wider consequences:
The Expected Implications for the Houthis’ Internal Structure
The Israeli airstrikes claimed the lives of the Houthi prime minister and several ministers, effectively paralyzing the militia’s administrative apparatus at a sensitive juncture — the first anniversary of its establishment in August 2024. The blow came as a shock to the group, as these figures had been carefully chosen by the Houthi leadership for their absolute personal loyalty, making their replacement far more difficult. Yet the losses prove to be much more symbolic and administrative, rending the strikes not decisive in strategic, security and military terms.
In the days following the assassinations, signs of confusion in terms of crisis management were apparent, exposing the Houthis’ limited contingency planning and weak mechanisms for handling such setbacks. This was reflected in their media narrative, as they sought to frame the Israeli strikes as a “failure.” The Houthi narrative itself reflects internal confusion: the Houthis acknowledge that Rahwi’s death was not a true strategic loss, yet they could not concede that a serious security breach had enabled Israel to infiltrate the heart of Sana’a and locate multiple officials. To address this confusion, the Houthis adopted a dual discourse — denying the fall of significant leaders while indirectly insisting that vital centers remained unaffected.
It is important to note that the decision-making structure within the Houthi militia does not revolve around the government itself, but rather around the Supreme Political Council and the Executive Office, which have prevented a complete institutional paralysis. It was anticipated that the leadership vacuum would be filled by quickly appointing a successor, with the added possibility of bolstering Mahdi al-Mashat’s position as the head of the political leadership, thereby maintaining at least a minimum level of organizational cohesion within the group.
Consequences for the Houthis at the Domestic Level
In relation to the Houthis’ domestic response, the strike is expected to heighten their fears of infiltration. In response, they are likely to intensify security measures across Sana’a and other territories under their control, launching wide-scale search and arrest campaigns along with continuous investigations. These efforts will target political and social figures already under Houthi suspicion in recent months, including members of the Islah Party, the General People’s Congress (GPC) and certain tribes.
While this may consolidate the Houthis’ security grip, it risks deepening social and political mistrust and tension. At the same time, the group is likely to exploit the assassinations as a mobilization strategy — framing the strike as part of an “existential battle.” This narrative will be used to justify expanded recruitment efforts and calls for revenge among supporters.
The Houthis’ longstanding practice of converting battlefield losses into symbolic propaganda — elevating fallen leaders to the status of “martyrs” through media portrayals — ensures that such incidents often reinforce, rather than diminish, their legitimacy in the eyes of their support base. As a result, the assassinations may renew the group’s militant discourse, escalating aggression against civilians in Houthi-held areas while further targeting local communities through propaganda, intimidation and accusations of espionage or collaboration.
On the political front, the fallout appears relatively limited. The Supreme Political Council and the security apparatuses remain intact, while the prime minister’s role is more executive and administrative than decisive in terms of decision-making. This reduces the operational impact of the strike on the group’s internal structure. Put differently, Israel’s devastating aerial offensive amounts to a symbolic and moral blow rather than harming the group at a political and organizational level.
Impact on the Houthi-Israel Confrontation
The Houthis pledged to retaliate for the Israeli strike that killed members of their political leadership and reaffirmed their commitment to supporting Gaza. Yet the attack left the group’s strategic assets untouched, sparing its missile and drone systems as well as its intelligence and military apparatuses. This makes it highly likely that the Houthis will continue to launch operations against Israel and Red Sea shipping lanes, both to escalate the confrontation and to counter any perception of weakness created by the recent Israeli assault. Anticipating possible reprisals, the Israeli government convened its August 31 meeting at an alternative secure site. Still, new Houthi strikes are unlikely to alter the broader equation, particularly missile launches against Israel, given the disparity between the Houthis’ limited capabilities and Israel’s sophisticated air defenses. The impact is likely to be largely symbolic, seen in temporary disruptions such as grounded flights at Ben Gurion Airport or air raid sirens interrupting daily life — even when the missiles themselves fall short of their intended targets.
Conversely, targeting the Houthi leadership serves as an added layer of deterrence for Iran’s regional allies. Lebanese Hezbollah is expected to factor this into its calculations when shaping its stance toward Israel, particularly in relation to the sensitive issue of disarmament. There is also a real possibility that Israel could expand its list of potential targets in Lebanon to include Hezbollah’s political leadership and even the Amal Movement, which continues to defend the group’s arsenal — especially if military clashes flare up again. A similar scenario applies to Iraq, where pro-Iran Shiite factions are likely to maintain their retreat to safeguard internal privileges and avoid elimination.
Regional and International Responses
Iran Issues Condemnation
Iran strongly condemned the strike that targeted the prime minister of Yemen’s unrecognized Houthi government along with several ministers. In a statement, the Iranian Foreign Ministry denounced the attack as a “Zionist crime,” casting it as retaliation against the Yemeni people for their backing of Gaza. The reaction underscores the depth of Tehran’s ties with the Houthis, who are regarded as a key component of the “Axis of Resistance.” Tehran is increasingly concerned that this incident could pave the way for broader strikes against both the political and military leadership of the group — an outcome that would risk isolating one of Iran’s most crucial allies within its regional network, particularly after the setbacks suffered by affiliated militias in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq.
Resistance Factions Declare Solidarity
Hamas denounced the Israeli strike, issuing an official statement that mourned the slain leaders and highlighted the shared sacrifices binding the two sides in their confrontation against Israel. Hamas stressed that the incident illustrates the broader danger Israel poses to the entire region — a stance that underlines the close ties and reciprocal support between the two groups in their struggle against Israel. Hezbollah also voiced condemnation, with Deputy Secretary-General Naim Qassem releasing a telegram message that described Israeli actions as brutal and lawless killings. He declared full solidarity with the Yemeni side, framing their fight as part of a collective resistance against Israel.
The Wider Region Holds Back
Arab governments refrained from issuing official statements on the multiple assassinations, despite the extensive media attention it attracted. This silence reflects the Houthis’ lack of formal recognition and their strained relations with most Arab states, especially in the Gulf. Broadly, the Houthis are perceived as part of Iran’s regional axis, which further explains the reluctance of Arab capitals to engage. The Gulf states, in particular, have remained committed to their recent understandings with both Iran and the Houthis, preferring to pursue regional stability through policies that avoid entanglement in conflicts and power struggles. Their stance is consistent with ongoing efforts to secure a political settlement in Yemen and promote broader regional calm. Saudi Arabia, which is leading attempts to resolve Yemen’s internal crisis, views any escalation as a threat to its initiatives. Notably, Riyadh had previously condemned the 2024 Israeli strikes on Hodeidah port and other Yemeni sites.
The West Remains Silent
Western governments, for their part, refrained from issuing official statements on the Israeli strike that killed the Houthi prime minister and other Houthi officials, in line with their longstanding position toward the Houthis, with both Washington and its allies regarding the group as illegitimate. Some Western states have designated the group as a terrorist outfit. Given that Israel itself enjoys backing from Western governments, the latter are wary of provoking Houthi retaliation in critical maritime waterways such as the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Gulf of Aden. Such caution reflects the broader regional equation of alliances and rivalries, especially the role of the Iranian axis, which interprets the confrontation as part of a larger effort to dismantle its influence and networks across the region. Despite their general alignment with Israeli policies, Western capitals have avoided overtly supporting Israel’s latest strikes on Yemen, concerned that doing so would trigger Houthi escalation. The United States, in particular, fears that any explicit show of support for Israel could unravel recent understandings with the Houthis and reignite attacks on US interests, naval assets and commercial shipping in the area.
Options for a Potential Houthi Response
The recent Israeli assassination campaign inside Yemen, which claimed the lives of the Houthi prime minister along with several ministers, has left the group with three potential courses of action against Israel:
Escalation
The Israeli assassinations could mark a turning point in the confrontation with the Houthis. Retaliatory Houthi operations against Israeli-owned or Israeli-linked commercial vessels may intensify, potentially escalating to the sinking of ships in the Red Sea. Drawing on their extensive arsenal of anti-ship missiles, naval mines, medium-range cruise missiles and ballistic missiles, the Houthis could also extend their campaign by targeting sites inside the occupied Palestinian territories. Another possibility is the staging of attacks against Israeli embassies in Africa and Asia, using operatives they have recruited or sympathizers acting on their behalf.
Iran, a key backer of the Houthi group, may view a Houthi escalation against Israel as serving its own strategic interests. For Tehran, increased pressure on Israel during this sensitive juncture helps deflect attention from the looming threat of war and from European warnings about reinstating UN sanctions. It also allows Iran to recalibrate its political and military posture in anticipation of possible confrontations.
Signs of Tehran’s encouragement were visible in a statement issued by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which declared that “the Islamic resistance in the region, especially the resilient Yemeni people, will deliver a harsh response to the Zionists in retaliation for the assassination of Prime Minister Ahmed al-Rahwi and a number of ministers.” The IRGC dismissed the notion that these assassinations would sap the Yemeni people’s jihadist and revolutionary resolve. Instead, they argued, the killings would further inflame anger and deepen what they described as an anti-hegemonic and anti-Zionist awakening across the region.
Retreat
One possible path for the Houthi militia is to suspend its attacks against Israel, at least temporarily, to avoid further escalation, assassinations and potential joint Israeli-US strikes targeting its leadership and positions. This option has acquired salience after statements by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and senior Israeli officials that the recent operation was merely the beginning of a broader, systematic campaign to eliminate Houthi leaders. These remarks suggest that Israel may prioritize Yemen in the coming period, seeking to curb the growing threat posed by the Houthis by replicating its approach toward Lebanese Hezbollah. However, any withdrawal from confrontation and suspension of attacks on Israel and maritime navigation could carry a heavy cost for the Houthis internally. The group faces a severe security breach, the shock of high-profile assassinations and mounting public expectations in Yemen for a strong and immediate response proportionate to the blow inflicted by Israel.
Oscillation
The third option available to the Houthis is to pursue a strategy that alternates between limited withdrawal and calibrated escalation. This approach would allow the group to preserve a degree of deterrence against Israel — particularly through continued threats to Israeli vessels in the Red Sea and sporadic missile launches toward Palestinian territories — while avoiding the kind of all-out escalation that could trigger a devastating Israeli response. Such an escalation would likely include the elimination of senior Houthi leaders and potentially deal a crippling blow to the group’s entire project in Yemen.
For Israel, any Houthi military escalation would be unlikely to inflict serious damage, given the vast disparity in military strength and intelligence capabilities. Nevertheless, for the Houthis, selective escalation holds symbolic value: it helps the group maintain credibility, project resilience and manage the internal shock caused by the loss of key leaders in recent Israeli strikes.
Although some signs of escalation have already emerged — such as the targeting of an Israeli ship in the Red Sea and explicit Houthi warnings of harsh retaliation — the third option remains the most plausible path forward. The Houthis may feel compelled to respond in some way, especially at this sensitive juncture in the region, while being careful not to overextend themselves. Their capacity to do so rests on significant military assets still at their disposal, including a substantial stockpile of anti-ship missiles, naval mines, medium-range cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. In addition, their network of underground tunnels provides strategic mobility and protection, further reinforcing their ability to sustain operations under pressure.
In the end, Israel’s elimination of the Houthis’ top political leadership does not threaten their hold on power in the short term. However, its cumulative effects could reshape the internal balance of power in Yemen. On one side, Israel’s unprecedented assault against the Houthis is likely to harden the group’s authoritarian control and intensify its coercive practices against the local population. On the other, it will impose heavier financial and organizational strains, potentially opening the door to shifts in Yemen’s internal dynamics over time.
The Israeli assault may also push the Houthis toward a broader pattern of escalation — most notably through increased operations in the Red Sea and further attacks targeting Israel. Yet such efforts are unlikely to secure meaningful gains given the overwhelming disparity in military capabilities. The trajectory of this escalation ultimately hinges on how far the Houthis choose to go in responding to the Israeli assassinations.
