The US-Israel war on Iran, which erupted on February 28, 2026, has evolved from an anticipated rapid military campaign into a protracted war of attrition, with its duration and ultimate outcome increasingly uncertain. This uncertainty is compounded by a degree of ambiguity in the United States’ articulation of the war’s objectives and timeline. At the same time, a divergence has emerged between the United States and Israel, despite their initial convergence on regime change in Iran — an outcome which has not materialized.
Instead, Iran has managed, to a certain extent, to absorb the initial shock and establish a measure of balance and counterpressure through various means. This has complicated the strategic calculations of both the United States and Israel, compelling both to adjust their tactical approach. Nevertheless, Iran has sustained significant strategic losses, particularly the loss of political and military leaders and degrading of military capabilities, as well as the destruction of key assets and infrastructure, resulting in the country facing serious challenges.
These developments do not negate the possibility of regime change, especially if the US-Israel campaign continues in its intensity. Indeed, the current moment represents an unprecedented challenge, arguably unmatched since the 1979 revolution. Against this backdrop, this paper examines the trajectories of the conflict by analyzing the evolution of the parties’ objectives, the conduct of operations and the instruments of mutual influence. It further anticipates prospective scenarios, shaped by the interplay between the logic of power and legitimacy, as well as between the imperatives of survival and the constraints of transformation.
Ambiguity in the United States’ War Objectives
Three principal issues have long defined the trajectory of US-Iran relations: Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and its regional behavior. However, following the outbreak of the US-Israel war against Iran, the declared military objectives have shifted. Regime change emerged as a central aim alongside others. At the outset, US President Donald Trump described the “large-scale and sustained” war as explicitly directed at achieving regime change.
On this basis, the United States and Israel initiated their offensive, gambling that Iran would prove susceptible to military pressure, technological superiority, overwhelming force and sustained air dominance, as well as to the intensity of air strikes. The United States further anticipated that military action would catalyze internal unrest, encouraging protesters and opposition groups to rise against the Iranian regime.
Over time, however, the difficulty of dismantling the political system through rapid air strikes designed to trigger internal revolt became evident. No broad-based domestic uprising happened; instead, the ruling establishment displayed resilience and quickly filled the power vacuum left by the assassination of the supreme leader and senior commanders. Concurrently, Trump’s statements grew increasingly inconsistent in both objectives and timelines, prompting debate over whether this shift in approach reflected deliberate strategic ambiguity or was driven by evolving battlefield realities. This ambiguity extended to the domestic arena, where US public opinion appeared unsettled. Polls conducted two weeks after the outbreak of the war indicated that 62% of Americans believed that the Trump administration had failed to clearly define its objectives.
Nearly four weeks into the war, Trump appeared to recalibrate his administration’s position by articulating six objectives, including the complete degradation of Iran’s missile capabilities, the destruction of its defense industrial base, the elimination of its naval and air forces, the prevention of any Iranian proximity to nuclear weapons and the protection of US allies in the Middle East.
This recalibration exposed an expanding divergence between Israel’s stated objective — centered on regime change — and Trump’s apparent effort to preserve greater strategic flexibility. In this context, he retreated from targeting energy infrastructure and moved to restrain Israel from continuing such strikes. Simultaneously, he signaled openness to diplomacy, accepting mediation efforts from regional actors such as Pakistan and calling on Iran to accept US terms.
The turn toward diplomacy may suggest an adjustment in the US approach, which had initially emphasized the decisive role of military force in reshaping the strategic landscape. Yet, continued US military escalation and indications of preparedness for a protracted conflict risk reinforcing uncertainty over both the direction of the war and its ultimate objectives. It remains unclear whether Washington is inclined toward prolonging the conflict or pivoting to negotiations, and whether it considers Iran to have been strategically defeated or continues to pursue regime change.
The Hormuz Strait has undoubtedly played a pivotal role in reshaping Trump’s objectives and overall approach. The economic consequences stemming from Iran’s exploitation of the waterway — one of the world’s most critical energy transit chokepoints through which roughly a fifth of the global oil supply passes — elevated the security of maritime navigation to a primary US priority. This dynamic likely contributed to Trump’s acceptance of regional mediation led by Pakistan, particularly in light of Washington’s inability to secure allied participation in a military effort to guarantee passage.
Accordingly, the shifts in US positions, the ambiguity surrounding declared objectives and the continuation of the war appear to have been shaped by developments on the ground, the disconnect between military strategy and intended outcomes as well as possible US miscalculations in strategic assessment. Iran’s demonstrated capacity to leverage multiple pressure points further complicated Washington’s position and disrupted Trump’s calculations.
At the same time, additional factors influenced the trajectory of the conflict and the evolution of US objectives. Notably, US policy during this period appeared highly personalized, revolving around Trump himself. This was reflected in the conduct of what constituted the first major war under his presidency, as well as in the inconsistency of official US statements. His approach may also have been shaped by prior experience, particularly the perceived success of the operation in Venezuela, where a rapid military intervention resulted in the kidnapping and arrest of President Nicolás Maduro and the swift subjugation of the government.
Conversely, the persistence of ambiguity in Trump’s statements regarding both the timeline and ultimate aims of the war may reflect a deliberate strategic choice. Such ambiguity allows for the preservation of flexibility, enabling the US administration either to sustain military operations or to disengage and pivot toward ending the conflict at a time of its choosing.
Conversely, explicitly declaring regime change as the ultimate objective of the war would likely compel Trump to define a clear timeframe — something he has been reluctant to do. Such reluctance appears tied to concerns that the objective may not be achieved swiftly, potentially undermining his personal standing among his support base or affecting his party’s prospects ahead of the midterm elections. Maintaining flexibility enables Trump to retain the option of de-escalation at any stage without incurring direct political costs or criticism. At the same time, this posture may serve to keep ongoing regional negotiations or mediation efforts under sustained pressure, with the aim of extracting the maximum possible concessions from Iran in any prospective agreement.
More broadly, and in light of the conflict’s trajectory, the United States has effectively pursued a campaign directed at the Iranian establishment on the grounds that coexistence with it is untenable. While Trump has avoided explicitly reaffirming regime change as the immediate operational objective, the scale and intensity of the campaign have placed the establishment in a fragile strategic position and contributed to its weakening. Simultaneously, this approach has afforded the US administration greater room for maneuver, as the cumulative effect of sustained losses inflicted on the establishment may, over time, align with Washington’s ultimate objective.
Assessing the Outcomes of the US Campaign After One Month
The US-Israel axis has succeeded in achieving a number of strategic objectives long deemed unattainable, by effectively integrating advanced technological capabilities with sustained military momentum.
Assassinating Leaders and Paralyzing Decision-making
Over the course of a month, sustained US and Israeli strikes have resulted in the killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei alongside dozens of prominent Iranian figures, generating a leadership vacuum and deepening disarray within the country’s power structure. These targeted operations extended beyond military and political officials to include scientists and specialists associated with Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs.
The removal of these figures has produced a significant political void, adversely affecting decision-making processes, particularly amid ongoing uncertainty surrounding the health of the new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, and his reported difficulty in maintaining communication with political and military leaders following assassination threats. The cumulative impact of the campaign has resulted in extensive disruption within the establishment’s internal structure, placing it under unprecedented security pressure.
In this context, no political or military figure appears beyond the reach of targeting. The scope of operations has not been confined to the Office of the Supreme Leader — widely regarded as the state’s central authority — but has also encompassed influential actors such as Ali Larijani, who had been relied upon to play a key role in preserving institutional continuity. This dynamic has underscored the ascendancy of military imperatives, raising the prospect of severe consequences for the state amid its rigid approach to managing the crisis.
Diminishing Strategic Capabilities
The combined air campaigns achieved notable success in striking fortified targets, concentrating on the destruction of critical facilities, including nuclear reactors as well as steel and power plants. Operations also targeted the infrastructure underpinning the ballistic missile program, while degrading the capabilities of the air force and navy. The stated objective, as articulated by US Vice President J.D. Vance, was to ensure that Iran would be unable to threaten its regional neighbors or pursue the acquisition of a nuclear weapon in the foreseeable future.
In practice, however, the expansion of targeting to encompass critical infrastructure, oil facilities, industrial centers and security and police installations appears to have been aimed at eroding the establishment’s domestic legitimacy and impairing its capacity to perform core state functions. Such a strategy would, in turn, create conditions conducive to a potential popular uprising or, at a minimum, significantly weaken the establishment and compel it to turn inward.
A month into the campaign, it became evident that US and Israeli strikes had moved beyond an initial phase of opening blows, evolving instead into a sustained pressure strategy aimed at progressively degrading Iran’s capabilities —particularly its drone and missile systems, as well as their supporting logistical infrastructure. This persistent tempo of operations enabled Washington and Tel Aviv to reduce the frequency of certain Iranian attacks compared to the early stages of the war, while compelling Iran to redeploy both its defensive and offensive assets.
However, these gains remained limited in scope. They did not result in the collapse of Iran’s capacity to retaliate, indicating that the outcome thus far has been one of incremental attrition rather than comprehensive neutralization.
Relatively Limiting Iran’s Regional Margin of Maneuverability
As the strikes persisted for a full month, Iran’s capacity to manage its regional networks with prior flexibility appeared to diminish under the weight of direct pressure on its command structures, financial networks and communication channels. This development does not indicate that Iran has lost its regional tools altogether, but rather that its ability to deploy them simultaneously and on a broad scale has been constrained.
The response unfolded in a phased and staggered manner across multiple arenas, including Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen. In this context, the Houthi response emerged relatively late — after the first month — and remained limited in scope and sustainability. Hezbollah’s activity likewise remained restrained and intermittent, while the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in Iraq did not escalate into an overt front during this period. This pattern suggests a deliberate and sequenced management of Iran’s regional tools, reflecting reduced operational flexibility without amounting to a complete loss of retaliatory capacity. Accordingly, it may be argued that Washington and Tel Aviv succeeded in narrowing Iran’s room for maneuver, even if they were unable to fully dismantle these proxy networks.
Beyond these operational dimensions, the war has also contributed to Iran’s renewed isolation within its Gulf environment, reversing its recent progress in overcoming regional isolation. Relations with Gulf states have again entered a phase of tension, following Iranian actions perceived as unprovoked attacks against them.
Diplomacy Under Military Pressure and the Potential for a Ground Operation
Despite ongoing peace talks led by Islamabad, the option of a military solution in the Hormuz Strait, including a potential operation targeting Kharg Island, reportedly remains under consideration. In this framing, the Islamabad talks appear to function as a convenient cover for a broader, unrestricted strike campaign that could target Iranian naval bases, communications facilities, energy infrastructure and oil installations on Kharg Island.
Unlike earlier scenarios, the prospect of a decisive strike against Iran may now originate from the White House rather than Tel Aviv. The urgency and political importance of the “No Kings” protests that spread across multiple US cities on March 28 appear to have reinforced Trump’s strategic calculations. At the same time, certain targets are viewed as more sensitive or less likely to be struck, including nuclear facilities and deeply buried sites such as those at Natanz and Pickaxe Mountain.
In parallel, a shift in operational logic suggests that if the United States conducted rapid and precise strikes against coastal and underground installations, it might defer targeting Iran’s energy hub on Kharg Island. This restraint is linked to the assessment that sustained control or occupation of foreign territory — even with limited losses — offers limited domestic political benefit for Trump, particularly as his political base remains divided over the war. Moreover, efforts to seize or control Kharg Island may also face constraints stemming from lack of support among the United States’ Arab allies.
Multidimensional Strategic Costs
As the month progressed, the effects of the war became visible as multidimensional pressure on Iran escalated, extending across both its military and economic infrastructure. This accumulation of costs constitutes a tangible gain for the United States and Israel, insofar as it strengthens the logic of a prolonged war of attrition and raises the burden of continued confrontation for Tehran.
Nevertheless, this gain remains constrained as long as Iran retains the capacity to absorb sustained pressure while continuing to mount retaliatory actions. It is becoming increasingly evident that political, economic and military pressures are growing in Iran, and also within the center of power itself. Reports indicate a growing divergence between President Masoud Pezeshkian and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Commander Ahmad Vahidi regarding the management of the war and its broader economic and social repercussions.
According to these reports, Pezeshkian criticized the IRGC’s approach of escalating tensions and continues to advocate for the restoration of executive authority to the civilian government. In contrast, Vahidi rejected these demands, arguing that the current situation stems from government shortcomings prior to the outbreak of the conflict.
At the economic level, the US-Israel war on Iran has reportedly targeted three core strategic pillars of the economy: energy (oil, gas and electricity), strategic industries (notably steel and petrochemicals) and essential domestic services, including banking, internet infrastructure, markets, ports and airports. These pillars affect not only the state’s financial resources but also the daily living conditions and standards of ordinary Iranians.
Although Iran is said to have partially benefited from rising oil prices exceeding $110 per barrel, alongside an increase in exports to around 1.6 million barrels per day — raising daily revenues from approximately $100 million to $180 million — these gains remain limited when compared to the scale of losses incurred.
The energy sector has been the most heavily affected. Fuel depots in Tehran, a metropolis of roughly 15 million residents, were reportedly struck, along with the South Pars gas field, which supplies more than 85% of Iran’s power plants. Kharg Island, which handles around 90% of Iran’s oil exports, was also targeted. Strategic industries were similarly impacted, including major steel complexes such as the Mobarakeh Steel Company in Isfahan. The steel sector accounts for roughly 4.5% of GDP and 16.5% of non-oil exports, with export value previously estimated at $8 billion, and Iran ranking among the world’s top 10 steel producers. The disruption of this sector therefore affects not only state revenues and defense-related capacities but also downstream domestic industries such as construction and automotive manufacturing, which together employ a significant share of the workforce.
The services sector, which constitutes more than half of Iran’s GDP, has also been severely affected. Bank Sepah, with approximately 1,800 branches, was reportedly targeted, while Bank Melli experienced cyberattacks that disrupted salary payments and ATM operations. Commercial activity in Tehran’s bazaar is said to have fallen by 50%-70%, and the Tehran Stock Exchange was closed during the initial days of the conflict. Additionally, strikes on key airports, ports and logistical hubs in both the north and south disrupted supply chains and domestic trade, prompting authorities to rely on alternative routes through neighboring countries and free zones such as Jask and Chabahar.
Finally, at the level of daily life, the consequences of targeting the aforementioned three pillars have become increasingly visible. Food prices reportedly rose by more than 105% in March, with staples such as rice, lentils and cooking oil experiencing sharp increases, in some cases tripling, alongside significant price hikes in meat, poultry and eggs. This occurred despite announcements by Iran’s Ministry of Agriculture, at the onset of the war, imposing a ban on the export of Iranian food and agricultural goods.
At the same time, reports point to shortages affecting around 150 types of medicines, as well as a lack of essential supplies for infants and children. These developments are unfolding against the backdrop of an economy already under strain prior to the conflict, with inflation exceeding 40%. Taken together, these pressures suggest a deteriorating socioeconomic outlook for the country in the near term.
Iranian Countermeasures and Potential Levers of Influence
It appears that Iran had developed a set of preparatory measures designed to counter the anticipated US-Israel campaign, with several key components of its confrontation strategy aimed at shaping and influencing the course of the conflict.
Filling the Void and Preparing for the Face-off
Since the end of the 12-Day War, the Iranian military is reported to have developed contingency plans and procedures designed to prevent a range of scenarios, from targeted attacks on the supreme leader to the potential collapse of the state. It has also reportedly undertaken counterintelligence operations aimed at neutralizing foreign infiltration within its ranks. Despite the losses incurred, Iran’s prior anticipation and wartime preparedness are presented as key factors that prevented state collapse in the face of the large-scale preemptive strikes launched by the United States and Israel.
Beyond the military and security dimensions, this preparation is also described as intellectual, ideological and seminary-based, evolving over a period of years prior to the outbreak of the conflict. Within this framework, Mojtaba Khamenei is portrayed not only as the former supreme leader’s son, but also as a connective figure between the Office of the Supreme Leader, the IRGC and conservative seminary networks in Qom. For years, he is said to have operated behind the scenes while maintaining close ties with the IRGC.
His rise to power in March 2026 is described as having been facilitated by the IRGC, alongside pressure exerted on hesitant clerics within the Assembly of Experts. His selection is framed as a continuation of the “resistance” line rather than a mere transfer of personal authority. In this reading, the underlying transformation lies in a redefinition of the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih, shifting it from a jurisprudential and scholarly position grounded in seminary authority and religious learning to a functional mechanism centered on political preservation through control of security, ideological and mobilizational instruments.
In this sense, Wilayat al-Faqih is no longer based on identifying the most learned or qualified jurist, but rather on ensuring the continuity of the ideological state under conditions of war and potential fragmentation.
However, this shift exposes a deeper crisis within the structure of Shiite political legitimacy itself. The moment of war and assassination has pushed the establishment toward privileging survival over entitlement. Legitimacy is increasingly generated not through traditional seminary authority or broad religious consensus, but through mass mobilization, security control and the deployment of narratives centered on victimhood and resistance.
From this perspective, support for Mojtaba Khamenei appears not merely as a process of succession, but as an effort to consolidate the official Shiite political-religious sphere around the figure of the “wounded” or “targeted” leader, cast as continuing the path of his “grandfather Hussein” in confronting “oppressive tyrants,” even as questions persist regarding his seminary credentials and religious authority — similar to those previously raised about his father.
Yet this does not resolve the underlying dilemma. The war may temporarily defer internal power struggles within the religious establishment, but it does not end them. The more Wilayat al-Faqih becomes dependent on the IRGC and its mechanisms of coercion, mobilization and force, the more it risks transforming from a theory of religious sovereignty into a form of state-centered political guardianship. In such a configuration, the military establishment — particularly the IRGC — emerges as the de facto bearer of legitimacy, while the jurist is reduced to a largely symbolic role.
This constitutes the core dilemma facing Mojtaba Khamenei: he may inherit the formal position of authority, but he also inherits a gradual erosion of the theological foundation that once endowed that position with its symbolic weight and the original conceptual meaning articulated by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.
Parties Drawn Into a War of Attrition
Despite extensive damage inflicted on Iranian military installations and facilities, Iran has reportedly demonstrated a sophisticated capacity to conceal missile stockpiles and launch systems, relying on an interconnected network of underground bases equipped with drilling machinery, food reserves, medical supplies and other essential provisions. According to reports, some of these facilities were restored to operational status within hours of sustaining heavy strikes.
One month into the war, the full extent of these stockpiles remains uncertain. The strikes are said to have disrupted efforts to replenish weapons and critical materials. While the frequency of Iranian missile and drone attacks has declined, their continued occurrence sustains a degree of uncertainty for the United States and Israel, as well as concern among the Gulf states, which face near daily Iranian attacks.
Reuters, citing US officials, reported that only one-third of Iran’s missile stockpiles was destroyed, while another third was damaged and the last third was buried underground. This assessment highlights the persistence of the threat amid the reduced effectiveness of opposing air defense systems. The decline in Iranian offensive operations is interpreted as a form of missile rationing, extending operational endurance while simultaneously maintaining pressure and uncertainty on the United States and Israel.
Weaponizing the Hormuz Strait
Iran has not expanded its mine-laying operations beyond the reported deployment of approximately 12 mines in mid-March. Following its announcement regarding the closure of the Hormuz Strait and the imposition of transit tolls, Tehran is reported to have established effective control over this approximately 30-kilometer-wide waterway. In this context, any attempt to reopen the strait would necessitate a rapid, simultaneous and highly destructive military operation.
Nevertheless, the threat posed by missile and drone attacks against maritime traffic remains present. The inherently slow and complex nature of mine-clearance operations has, in turn, encouraged a degree of restraint on the part of the United States, thereby contributing to the prolongation of the current stalemate surrounding the strait’s status.
Leveraging Paramilitaries to Create a Balance of Deterrence
Iran has relied primarily on the PMF in Iraq. Although this militia has not succeeded in drawing US and Israeli firepower away from Iran, it continues to function as a tactical irritant. Hezbollah’s missile strategy has, in turn, contributed to Israel’s decision to launch a ground invasion into Lebanon, a development that could carry political consequences for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who is reportedly attempting to persuade Trump to delay ceasefire negotiations with Iran. Hezbollah’s defensive posture could potentially draw Israel deeper into a prolonged Lebanese engagement, which may ultimately serve Iranian interests, although definitive conclusions remain premature.
At the same time, Iran’s degree of operational influence over the Yemeni militia remains uncertain. The Houthis are widely believed to have become more pragmatic in their role as the de facto authority in northern Yemen. According to informed Yemeni observers, their capacity to launch missiles and drones has been reduced due to losses sustained from Israeli and US strikes. Rather than functioning as a fully integrated military force, the Houthis are increasingly described as resembling a Taliban-like ground-based formation, with limited or rudimentary air capabilities and minimal radar-guided systems.
Even if the Houthis were to seek closure of the Bab al-Mandab Strait, their ability to achieve such an objective on Iran’s behalf appears limited, given the lack of naval and reconnaissance capabilities available to the IRGC in the Hormuz Strait, as well as their absence of full and direct control over the Bab al-Mandab Strait. Their reduced capacity to withstand sustained US and Israeli strikes may further discourage any attempt at full-scale closure. Nonetheless, they retain the ability to threaten maritime traffic through short-range missile and rocket fire in the vicinity of the strait, as well as through the interception, boarding and seizure of commercial and oil vessels.
Challenges Facing the United States and Israel
Despite the aforesaid military gains, the United States and Israel continue to face a set of challenges that may risk transforming tactical successes into broader strategic setbacks.
Military Resilience and the Widening of the Conflict
Despite the ongoing strikes, Iran has retained a degree of offensive capability, whether through missile launches, drone operations or indirect actions. This continued resilience after a month of warfare may suggest that the Iranian military structure still preserves sufficient flexibility to prevent a swift resolution, thereby complicating Washington and Tel Aviv’s objective of establishing clear deterrence against Tehran and instead contributing to a prolonged war of attrition.
Unlike Israel, the United States is reported to have incurred notable losses in military equipment, infrastructure and personnel. These include the destruction of radar systems in Bahrain and Qatar, an accidental collision between two KC-135 refueling aircraft over Iraq and incidents of friendly fire involving three US Air Force F-15 aircraft in Kuwait. Such developments are said to have adversely affected both morale and operational effectiveness within the US military. The Pentagon reportedly did not anticipate losses of this magnitude during operations against Iran, and the full extent of these losses is expected to become clearer once hostilities subside. At the outset, the United States was also compelled to rely heavily on its aircraft carrier strike group due to constraints on the use of regional Gulf bases which limited operational flexibility.
In addition, one month into the conflict, Iran is described as having shifted the confrontation from a strictly bilateral engagement toward a wider regional theater by activating multiple fronts. The involvement of additional actors and continued attacks on US bases indicate that mutual deterrence has yet to be established. As a result, the United States and Israel are increasingly required to disperse their military efforts across a broader geographical space, reducing force concentration while raising operational costs, thereby presenting a clear strategic challenge to both Washington and Tel Aviv.
Closing the Hormuz Strait and Raising the Conflict’s Cost
Iran has expanded the scope of the conflict to include economic and maritime dimensions, targeting shipping lanes, trade routes and energy infrastructure. The most significant of these dimensions is the reported closure of the Hormuz Strait, which has disrupted a substantial share of global oil flows, resulting in soaring energy prices as well as adversely impacting international trade. In parallel, the Bab al-Mandab Strait has emerged as another critical flashpoint, where any escalation risks further disruption to commercial shipping and an increase in the cost of naval operations for the United States and Israel.
As a result, the war is no longer confined to the military domain but has become increasingly multidimensional, extending into economic and maritime spheres. This development heightens the operational and strategic challenges facing the United States and Israel and further complicates the management of the conflict.
In this context, the reopening of the strait becomes politically and strategically significant, as the absence of such an outcome could undermine any perception of victory. Accordingly, military planners in the United States and Israel are reportedly focused on developing operational concepts aimed at neutralizing the IRGC’s naval capabilities, thereby reducing Iran’s capacity to control or disrupt the strait. This effort is taking place alongside continued Israeli air operations targeting Iranian missile launch platforms and drone bases.
Costs and Economic Burdens of the Conflict
The war has generated severe and far-reaching economic consequences, with losses extending across most global economies. It has led to the closure of the Hormuz Strait and the disruption of approximately 20% of global oil supplies, as well as the suspension of significant volumes of liquefied natural gas exports from the Gulf. Brent crude prices rose above $112 per barrel — an increase of more than 50% compared to pre-war levels — while insurance premiums for oil tankers reportedly surged by as much as 1,000%. The repercussions extended further into international trade, tourism, global financial markets and precious metals, with the conflict emerging as a serious threat to food prices and overall global economic growth.
At the same time, major industrial economies experienced energy cost increases of around 50%. Europe activated emergency response plans, while Japan, South Korea and India were compelled to adopt austerity measures and rely more heavily on coal-fired power generation. China benefited in the short term from strategic reserves estimated at roughly four months of supply, though its heavy dependence on Gulf energy imports could pose significant risks if the conflict continues. Russia, by contrast, benefited from higher global energy prices. The Gulf states and Iraq are reported to have suffered losses approaching $1 billion per day due to the suspension of exports through the Hormuz Strait. While Saudi Arabia and the UAE were able to partially redirect exports through alternative routes, the cost of repairing damaged energy infrastructure is estimated at around $25 billion, according to Rystad Energy. Several regional economies, including Egypt, Jordan and Türkiye, were also affected by rising energy costs and were forced to implement austerity measures. Israel’s direct military and economic losses were estimated at approximately $9 billion during the first month.
The global aviation and tourism sectors were likewise significantly affected, with ticket prices on some international routes reportedly increasing by up to 560%, according to Bloomberg, and summer travel bookings from Europe to the United States declining by around 15%.
Particularly concerning is the broader global food security dimension of the conflict. The Food and Agriculture Organization has warned that the Hormuz Strait accounts for around 30% of global fertilizer trade, raising the risk of sharp increases in food prices that could deepen poverty and destabilize vulnerable economies. Asian, European and Gulf stock markets have also incurred substantial losses, while gold prices have fallen by approximately 13% since the outbreak of the war, contrary to typical safe-haven expectations, alongside a sudden strengthening of the US dollar against other currencies.
Dilemma of a Potential Ground Operation and Its Human Toll
Trump’s plan for a ground invasion of Iran raises serious questions regarding the war’s ultimate objectives. While Washington seeks to alter Iranian behavior, analysts argue that any shift toward territorial occupation or a ground incursion would likely encounter strong resistance and risk evolving into a prolonged war of attrition. Such an outcome, they contend, would place significant strain on the US budget and political system, particularly given the potential for substantial US casualties.
Diplomatic Confusion and Disagreements With NATO
The Trump administration is facing widespread international criticism over its unilateral decision-making, which has contributed to the paralysis of NATO and hindered European summits from reaching a unified position on military support. Washington’s move to lift sanctions on Russian oil to stabilize markets, while simultaneously continuing military operations against Iran, has generated uncertainty and concern among European allies.
The Rise of the IRGC as an Inflexible Actor
The IRGC is no longer presented merely as a conventional military arm within the state structure. In the context of war, it has instead evolved into a parallel, quasi-sovereign actor with its own strategic decision-making capacity, the ability to shape escalation dynamics and the operational reach to manage regional networks of influence. This evolution complicates US calculations on two interconnected levels.
First, at the military-operational level, it renders the identification of a clear “center of gravity” increasingly difficult, since any attempt to strike it risks causing widespread paralysis given the IRGC’s networked and decentralized mode of managing the conflict. Second, at the political-strategic level, the IRGC’s ascent reshapes the nature of the adversary — from a state engaged in conventional deterrence and negotiation to a flexible ideological-military system that does not fully conform to traditional state logic. In this configuration, Washington is confronted with a model in which ideology and security, as well as economics and warfare, are deeply intertwined, limiting the extent to which tactical military gains can translate into a stable political settlement.
From a broader theoretical perspective, this reflects a shift from a normative legitimacy structure grounded in jurisprudence and scholarly authority toward a more pragmatic legitimacy model rooted in power and control. In the medium term, this transformation may contribute to the hollowing out of the doctrinal substance of Wilayat al-Faqih, reducing it to a formal framework that legitimizes a military-security order increasingly shaped by the IRGC.
Potential Scenarios
The Middle East is undergoing a historic phase that is testing the effectiveness of military force in reshaping political systems and the broader strategic environment. The current war, which began as rapid strikes with clearly defined objectives, now appears to have evolved into a complex pattern of prolonged attrition, where military calculations intersect with questions of legitimacy and deterrence dynamics overlap with issues of survival.
In light of the ambiguity surrounding US objectives, the implications for ongoing military operations, the relative gains achieved by the United States and Israel alongside the challenges posed by Iran, and the internal pressures faced by all parties, it is possible to outline several scenarios for the trajectory of the war.
Scenario One: The War Spiraling Out of Control
Key indicators of this scenario include reported US threats to target Iranian civilian infrastructure and warnings from the IRGC that it would respond by striking infrastructure across the region. Also notable are discussions of US plans for a limited ground incursion aimed at seizing control of Kharg Island, primarily to reopen the Hormuz Strait.
While such an operation may initially appear constrained in scope, Iranian resistance and efforts to retain control of the island could gradually expand the conflict. At the same time, Iranian leadership appears to view the war as a critical opportunity to break out of a longstanding strategic deadlock defined by sanctions. As a result, even if Trump was to declare a unilateral end to hostilities after claiming limited objectives had been achieved, this would not necessarily halt Iranian military activity, particularly if core demands — most notably sanctions relief — remain unmet. This dynamic is further reinforced by the expanding influence of the IRGC within the political system, especially following Mojtaba Khamenei’s appointment as supreme leader.
Under such conditions, the United States could find itself drawn back into escalation to compel compliance from Tehran. This scenario also raises the possibility that regional and international actors may be pulled into the conflict if they incur significant losses and perceive direct threats to their national security and strategic interests. Israel, in particular, could accelerate escalation dynamics by intensifying its strikes if it perceives US attempts to de-escalate or terminate the war prematurely.
Scenario Two: Reaching a Deal to End the War
Trump has consistently opposed prolonged wars, frequently criticizing previous administrations for their interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. His preference has been for short, limited operations that deliver significant strategic gains at minimal cost, a logic sometimes likened to a “Venezuela-style” model of limited engagement. The initial design of the strikes on Iran reflected this approach, although it appears to have been influenced by overly optimistic assumptions that underestimated the complexity of the regional balance.
As the risk of escalation becomes more evident — something Trump now appears to acknowledge more clearly than before the war, as suggested by extended deadlines for Iran and renewed emphasis on potential negotiations — the feasibility of achieving regime change in Iran has come into question. This is particularly true given the absence of any meaningful internal uprising, the limited effectiveness of opposition groups abroad and the entry of the Houthis into the conflict, albeit in a largely symbolic and geographically constrained manner focused on Israel. Nevertheless, their involvement aligns with Iran’s broader strategy of leveraging both the Bab al-Mandab Strait and Hormuz Strait to raise the economic costs of escalation and increase pressure on the United States and its regional partners to de-escalate.
At the same time, the economic repercussions within the United States could generate domestic pressure to end the conflict, potentially pushing Trump toward a decision to halt military operations and encourage Israel to follow suit. Such a de-escalation pathway could, however, be preceded by major military exchanges designed to force the Iranian leadership — already under significant internal strain — to accept a settlement and move toward ending hostilities, particularly if signs of domestic unrest begin to emerge in response to worsening socioeconomic conditions.
Scenario Three: Continuation of Measured Escalation
The risks of escalation, on the one hand, and the difficulty of reaching an agreement on the other — both driven by a zero-sum logic that increasingly shapes relations among the parties to the conflict — could result in the continuation of the current status quo. In this scenario, each side would maintain its core positions and demands while prioritizing the protection of key military assets, alongside offering limited and calculated concessions where necessary. For instance, Iran might permit the passage of oil tankers through the Hormuz Strait to prevent a further deterioration in the global economic situation caused by sustained increases in oil and gas prices.
At the same time, the gradual depletion of military capabilities on all sides reinforces this trajectory. The need to manage finite weapons stockpiles would naturally encourage a reduction in the intensity of operations. Iran’s missile arsenal, for example, is believed to have been significantly weakened by sustained strikes, while assessments also point to a reduction in the Pentagon’s missile inventory and damage to certain air assets. Similarly, Israeli air defense systems are reportedly experiencing growing strain, reflected in the increasing effectiveness of Iranian missile strikes in reaching their targets.
Conclusion
Rational calculations suggest that a prolonged status quo — characterized by sustained military confrontation combined with intermittent, calibrated escalation designed to extract concessions in indirect negotiations — is the most likely outcome. While the overall trajectory still appears to favor a political resolution to end the war, the unpredictability associated with the US president’s decision-making style introduces a persistent risk that escalation could expand beyond current limits.
