The Significance of Abdollahian’s Participation in the Second Baghdad Conference

https://rasanah-iiis.org/english/?p=10951

ByRasanah

Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian recently visited Jordan to attend the second Baghdad Conference for Cooperation and Partnership on December 20, 2022, which also brought together leaders and representatives from across the region, Europe, and Turkey. This conference aimed to build on the outcomes of the first Baghdad conference to support Iraq’s goals of acheiving security, stability, and sovereignty.  Abdollahian’s participation in the conference occurred against the backdrop of ongoing Iranian protests and  the IRGC’s recent cross-border attacks against Kurdish groups in northern Iraq. Iran’s participation  and the meetings held on the sidelines of the conference  reflected Tehran’s desire to project its diplomatic prowess  and protect its longstanding  strategic interests in Iraq.

 During the conference,  the Iraqi delegation shed light on  Iraq’s challenges in light of extensive  water and electricity shortages. Political volatility,  economic crises  and proxy conflicts have complicated the internal situation in Iraq. The  agenda of the conference  focused on promoting  Iraqi interests through cooperation and dialogue and minimizing  the implications of regional rivalry for the country’s sovereignty, stability and security.  Such   conferences are crucial to help in reviving the Iraqi economy, as regional and international support is imperative in improving domestic conditions as well as in healing rifts between domestic actors.

At the conference, there was much speculation about a possible resumption in talks between Iran and Saudi Arabia.  Abdollahian said in a tweet that he had a  “friendly conversation” on the sidelines of the conference  with his Saudi counterpart. In the last 16 months, Iraq has brokered talks to restore diplomatic relations between both countries, however, despite multiple meetings, the talks did not succeed.  The Iranian government recently accused Saudi Arabia of waging a propaganda war against it  and the Commander of the Quds Force  Esmail Qaani recently criticized and warned Saudi Arabia of retaliation.  Furthermore, Iran’s involvement in the war in Yemen further complicates the regional security situation and impedes possibilities for constructive dialogue between Tehran and Riyadh. In addition, strong disagreements, clash of interests, lack of trust, and rhetorical threats and warnings targeting Saudi Arabia cast a dark shadow over a diplomatic breakthrough in the near future.  Iran’s participation in the conference reflects several Iranian considerations.  In the current context, Abdollahian’s visit to  Jordan happened  against the backrop of  some key domestic and regional developments. Firstly, the  new Iraqi government led by Mohammed Shia al-Sudani is likely to improve relations and be on better terms with Tehran than the previous government. Iranian officials were quick to praise the new government, and Tehran’s Ambassador to Baghdad Mohammad Kazem Ale-Sadegh was quick to meet Sudani and offer his country’s full support to his government.  Given the new government’s pro-Iran orientation, Tehran’s  meddling in Iraqi  affairs is set to continue and Iraq’s landscape is likely to see a  mushrooming of further Iranian proxies, hence meaning   that the country will remain in a political and security flux for some time, and the previous government’s trajectory of independence and sovereignty will be completely halted.  Secondly, Iran is keen on protecting its interests and upholding its influence in Iraq and for this end it  realizes that it must  engage diplomatically  with all regional and international stakeholders. The recent conference  gives Iran an avenue to reach out to all stakeholders.  Iran has also in recent months signed several cooperation agreements with Iraq. However, trade relations between both countries have been negatively impacted by  the impediments in payment mechanisms because of sanctions and the economic limitations faced by Baghdad.  Despite this drop in trade, Iran remains Iraq’s main export partner and  it intends to ensure its control of the Iraqi economy, especially as  Baghdad is now expecting economic cooperation with  a wide range of countries. Thirdly, Iran remains wary about the influence of Arab powers in Iraq and is keen on flexing  its diplomatic weight at such conferences.  The larger Iranian aim  at the conference was to make sure  that the outcomes were not harmful to its interests and influence in Iraq. It is important to note that Iran has often exploited  Iraq’s dependency for the sake of its interests.  For example, Iran has pressurized Baghdad on numerous occasions by threatening to cut energy supplies in times of crisis. Fourthly, the protests in Iran have put the Iranian government in the spotlight because of  its oppressive and brutal responses. Iran’s cross-border attacks targeting Kurdish groups in northern Iraq have also been a source of concern for both regional and international powers.  Abdollahian’s meetings on the sidelines of the conference   reflected Tehran’s attempts to reach out to the West amid growing criticism of the Iranian government’s brutal crackdown on the protests and its cross-border attacks in northern Iraq. 

 Abdollahian’s promises and assurances at the conference are not consistent with Iran’s regional behavior and its meddling in Iraq’s domestic affairs.  Certainly, any genuine effort to support Iraq cannot be effective if Iran and its proxies continue to dictate the trajectory and orientations of the new Iraqi government and use Iraqi territories for their own ends.

Rasanah
Rasanah
Editorial Team