The recent military escalation between Hezbollah and Israel, coupled with US-led mediation efforts, has reignited discussions about the future trajectory of the Lebanese Shiite group. Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem’s speech on November 20 emphasized two key demands: a permanent ceasefire and the preservation of Lebanese sovereignty. In his third address as Hezbollah’s leader, Qassem announced that the group had reviewed a US-proposed ceasefire and submitted its response via Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri. Following discussions in Beirut mediated by US envoy Amos Hochstein, who described a potential solution as “within reach,” Qassem pledged to continue fighting until a permanent cessation of hostilities is achieved. He also threatened to target “the center of Tel Aviv” in retaliation for Israeli strikes on Beirut. His remarks were in response to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s statement to the Knesset on November 18, where he declared that Israel would “continue operations against Hezbollah, even after signing an agreement with Lebanon.”
Finally, on November 26, 2024, Israel and Lebanon approved a ceasefire to end the conflict in Lebanon, effective from November 27 at 2:00 AM GMT. After 13 months of fighting between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, the agreement requires Hezbollah to withdraw from southern Lebanon and tasks the LAF with dismantling all non-state military infrastructure, preventing Hezbollah’s rearmament, and assuming primary responsibility for security in the region.
The ceasefire includes a self-defense clause permitting Israel to act against Hezbollah if necessary. US President Joe Biden described the agreement as a framework for a permanent cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel. While only Lebanon and Israel are formal parties to the deal, it places the onus on the Lebanese state to ensure Hezbollah’s compliance. An independent committee, supported by the United States and France and working alongside the existing UN observer force in southern Lebanon, will oversee adherence to the agreement. Before the conclusion of the ceasefire deal, Tel Aviv was no longer opposed to the presence of France on the international committee overseeing implementation of the deal and Resolution 1701. However, the specific structure of the monitoring committee is not detailed in the ceasefire text. The deal also includes a US letter affirming support for any future Israeli operations required to counter Hezbollah violations.
Despite its goals, the ceasefire faces significant implementation challenges. The reliance on the LAF and UN observers to secure southern Lebanon and monitor compliance mirrors the framework established by Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 Lebanon War between Israel and Hezbollah. Neither the LAF nor the UN has historically demonstrated the capability or willingness to prevent Hezbollah from reestablishing a presence in southern Lebanon or constructing new military infrastructure.
Lebanese Foreign Minister Abdallah Bou Habib stated on November 26 that the LAF is prepared to deploy at least 5,000 troops to southern Lebanon. However, LAF units have been present in the area since 2006, yet have consistently failed to prevent Hezbollah from using it as a base for attacks against Israel.
These implementation difficulties mean that Hezbollah and Iran could recover from the setback if the United States and Israel are unable to effectively enforce the terms of the agreement and prevent violations. The ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hezbollah includes an initial two-month ceasefire, during which Israeli forces would withdraw from Lebanon, and Hezbollah would cease its armed presence in the southern border region south of the Litani River. These conditions reflect Hezbollah’s broader strategy to maintain its political relevance while navigating a complex regional and domestic landscape.
Hezbollah operates as both a militant organization and a political entity within Lebanon. Its identity as a resistance group against Israel remains central to its ideology and its appeal among its popular support bases. However, its growing role in Lebanese politics since the 1990s, culminating in significant parliamentary influence, means it must balance its military ambitions with the challenges of governing a deeply divided and economically fragile state. The ongoing conflict with Israel allows Hezbollah to reinforce its resistance narrative, particularly in the face of domestic criticism about its role in regional conflicts, such as in Syria and Yemen. At the same time, the group’s participation in Lebanese politics necessitates a careful approach to avoid exacerbating Lebanon’s instability, which could alienate parts of its domestic constituency.
Lebanon’s ongoing economic crisis further complicates Hezbollah’s position. The group’s financial resources have been strained by US sanctions and the reduced support from its primary backer, Iran, due to the latter’s economic difficulties. Public frustration with Lebanon’s ruling elite, including Hezbollah, has grown amid the country’s worsening economic conditions.
Hezbollah’s future is closely tied to Iran’s regional strategy. As Tehran’s most powerful regional junior partner, Hezbollah plays a critical role in Iran’s confrontation with Israel and its broader influence in the Arab world. However, this dependency on Iran also limits Hezbollah’s autonomy. Any shift in Iran’s regional posture—whether due to internal pressures or changing dynamics in its relationship with global powers—could significantly impact Hezbollah’s strategic decisions.
In the coming months, Hezbollah may focus on reinforcing its resistance narrative to compensate for its military setbacks. According to Israeli sources, some 3,000 Hezbollah operatives have been killed in the conflict. The Israeli military Operation Northern Arrows lasted for 65 days and claimed the lives of 70 soldiers. Given the rising role of the Lebanese army following the ceasefire agreement, Hezbollah might seek to portray itself as a complementary force to the Lebanese army rather than a competitor. By emphasizing its resistance identity, it could argue for maintaining an advisory or specialized role, such as intelligence gathering or irregular defense tactics against perceived threats. Even after a ceasefire, Hezbollah is unlikely to disband or fully disarm, as its core identity is tied to being a resistance movement. Instead, it could reframe its narrative to emphasize defending Lebanon from potential future threats, such as Israel violating the ceasefire or regional instability spilling over.
A more ideologically driven Hezbollah may aim to secure its long-term political survival, despite its waning military significance both domestically and as an anti-Israel deterrent supporting Tehran’s regional power ambitions. It may also redirect its resistance rhetoric toward non-military forms of opposition, such as advocating for Palestinian rights or confronting perceived Western influence in Lebanon. Hezbollah could maintain its military infrastructure but reduce its visibility, operating as a shadow force while nominally allowing the Lebanese Army and international monitors to oversee southern Lebanon. While a ceasefire agreement might limit overt military activities, Hezbollah is unlikely to give up its weapons entirely. Instead, it could shift them to strategic reserve status, citing the need for national security or future contingencies.
Another option could be for Hezbollah to seek a balance between its military role and political responsibilities by supporting the implementation of the ceasefire agreement while avoiding any disarmament or significant concessions. Eventually, another probable possibility is an erosion of the influence of the group in Lebanon and in the region. Prolonged economic hardship in Lebanon, combined with growing domestic discontent and international pressure, could weaken Hezbollah’s influence over time, forcing it to recalibrate its role in Lebanese and regional politics.
A strengthened Lebanese Army, bolstered by international backing, could challenge Hezbollah’s monopoly on military power. This might force Hezbollah to negotiate its role within Lebanon’s security framework, possibly as a paramilitary auxiliary. A robust monitoring framework, especially involving the United States and France, could constrain Hezbollah’s movements and diminish its capacity for cross-border operations. This might incentivize Hezbollah to either adapt covert strategies or increase its focus on domestic issues. Eventually, if Hezbollah is perceived as a destabilizing force hindering Lebanon’s recovery or sovereignty, it could face increased opposition from within Lebanese society, including from its traditional support base.
Hezbollah’s future role will likely evolve into a hybrid model where it retains some military capabilities while expanding its political and social influence. The group will aim to adapt to the post-ceasefire environment by preserving its core identity while navigating the pressures from international monitors, the LAF, and its domestic constituency. Whether this leads to greater integration with the Lebanese state or continued tensions depends on how effectively the ceasefire agreement is enforced and how Hezbollah balances its dual roles as a political actor and a military movement.
