Disputes occasionally surface within the marjaya in Najaf, involving either the marjas themselves or their followers. While these disagreements are often framed as scholarly in nature, they frequently stem from a complex interplay of factors that extend beyond purely religious or academic considerations. In recent years, Najaf has witnessed a series of such disputes: first between Muqtada al-Sadr and Kamal al-Haidari, then between Sadr and Kazem al-Haeri, followed by tensions between Sadr and Munir al-Khabbaz, and more recently between Grand Ayatollah Mohammad al-Yaqoubi and supporters of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. Sadr subsequently intervened in this latest conflict to align himself with Yaqoubi. This dynamic, in essence, reflects a broader and more significant issue — the positioning of religious leadership in the post-Sistani era. Consequently, these tensions are not merely circumstantial but rather part of a protracted struggle that will persist beyond Sistani’s tenure, as marjas and their circles engage in intense competition to consolidate influence and secure a broad base of support among the public, seminary students and clerics.
As part of this ongoing series of conflicts and rivalries, Najaf witnessed a significant dispute at the beginning of March 2025 between the followers of Sistani, the most prominent and influential marja in the Shiite world, and Yaqoubi, who regards himself as a disciple of both Sistani and Muhammad al-Sadr, the father of Muqtada al-Sadr. This analysis will explore the underlying causes of this dispute, its impact on the hawza and its broader consequences.
First: The Root Causes and Significations of the Disagreement
The dispute between the two marjas, Sistani and Yaqoubi, began when a follower submitted a question to Sistani’s website inquiring about the authenticity of his alleged praise of Yaqoubi. The essence of the matter lies in the claim that Yaqoubi attended Sistani’s classes and, during the early years of his studies in 1415 AH, submitted a graduation thesis. According to this account, Sistani reviewed the thesis and offered his assessment, stating, “If you were not a beginner and praise would not harm you, I would have commended the thesis as it deserves. But I will say this — if you continue on this path, you will become like Sheikh al-Ansari!” Ansari is widely regarded as the most distinguished jurist and theologian in Shiite history, earning the title “the Greatest Sheikh.” Thus, likening Yaqoubi to Ansari is an extraordinary commendation that elevates his standing as a marja and strengthens his appeal within the Shiite community. Such recognition fosters a sense of affiliation, a prerequisite for leadership within the hawza, as is well established in its traditions. However, Sistani’s office swiftly refuted this claim, asserting that it is entirely unfounded and cautioning believers against being misled by such statements.
Yaqoubi swiftly responded, affirming that he is not one to engage in trading words of praise or flattery. He asserted that had he not been certain of the truth, he would not have recounted this account, as he has no need for it, given the countless blessings bestowed upon him by God Almighty. He then expressed his astonishment at the reaction of Sistani’s entourage, stating, “We were surprised by the haste of those affiliated with the Sayyid’s office to deny it, even though none of them were present. Justice and fairness require that they allow witnesses whom we trust to question His Eminence the Sayyid himself, rather than allowing the opponent to act as the judge.” Here, Yaqoubi directly characterizes Sistani’s entourage as his adversaries while simultaneously attributing statements to Sistani that he did not personally express. This suggests an implicit admission of apprehension regarding his leadership and influence, particularly in the post-Sistani era — a period which will undoubtedly be marked by intense competition among various figures seeking to establish their legitimacy. In this context, they strive to assert their “jurisprudence,” “presence,” “following” and “knowledge”— all of which constitute the recognized qualifications for marja status according to the traditions of the hawza.
The disagreements between the two sides are numerous and extend beyond the competition over the marjaya or the succession arrangements for the post-Sistani era. It is important to examine some of these differences to gain a clearer understanding of the situation. Among the most significant are:
– Wilayat al-Faqih: Yaqoubi holds that the Islamic system of governance is based on the principle of Wilayat al-Faqih (Guardianship of the Jurist), wherein legitimacy is derived from the jurist’s representation of the Infallible Imam rather than from the people. However, he maintains that this system is not currently suitable for Iraq alone at this stage and can only be implemented after removing obstacles and creating the necessary conditions. In his view, Najaf itself is one of the primary barriers to the implementation of Wilayat al-Faqih, as the marjas of Najaf have historically opposed this doctrine. By contrast, Sistani does not subscribe to the concept of Wilayat al-Faqih. Instead, he advocates for a constitutional civil state, a stance that aligns with Najaf’s longstanding political tradition, which can be traced back to figures such as Mirza al-Naini, Mohsen al-Hakim and later Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei, before continuing with Sistani himself. Accordingly, he does not endorse the general or absolute form of Wilayat al-Faqih as espoused by Khomeini or Yaqoubi. This position has led Sistani to maintain a distance from direct political involvement, assuming a role of guidance and detached oversight. In contrast, Yaqoubi actively engaged in politics, going so far as to establish the Virtue Party (Hizb al-Fadhila).
The exceptionality of elections: In line with his belief in the centrality of Wilayat al-Faqih in the Islamic political system, Yaqoubi considers elections to be exceptional rather than fundamental. He reinforces this view by stating, “Elections are the exception resorted to when there is an obstacle to implementing the rule, similar to the permissibility of consuming carrion in cases of necessity. This permissibility does not mean that the ruling on carrion is the primary ruling, but rather a secondary one. Understanding this fact is crucial — both theoretically and practically — so that we do not confuse matters and lose sight of our great Islamic character and identity, whose pillars were established by the Ahl al-Bayt (peace be upon them), only to be swayed by dazzling Western arguments. It is also necessary so that we remain committed to the principle that political action is an act of obedience to the marja, not a matter of party decisions.” By contrast, Sistani — following the political tradition of Najaf since Naini —maintains that elections are the fundamental mechanism for determining the will of the nation in the absence of the Infallible Imam. From this perspective, elections remain necessary until the Imam’s reappearance, rather than until the establishment and dominance of Wilayat al-Faqih. This marks a fundamental divergence between the two approaches.
This dispute is longstanding and did not originate with the US invasion and the subsequent rise of the marjaya as a central political force. Rather, its origins can be traced back to the Constitutional Revolution of 1905, when two opposing currents emerged. One group, advocating for democracy and elections in the absence of the Infallible Imam, saw these mechanisms as necessary for governance. In contrast, another group rejected them outright, viewing them as blasphemous innovations and Western constructs that should neither be implemented nor legitimized.
Second: Seeking Marja Status: Sadr’s Support of Yaqoubi
Sadr entered the crisis, aligning himself with Yaqoubi in his dispute over the denial of Sistani’s endorsement. Sadr bolstered Yaqoubi’s position by praising him and drawing a parallel between him and Ansari. On February 25, 2025, the Facebook account of Muslih al-Iraqi — widely recognized as Sadr’s minister — published a message in which Grand Ayatollah Muhammad al-Sadr (Muqtada’s father) praised his student, Yaqoubi. What is particularly striking about this development is that Sadr’s intervention in the dispute between Yaqoubi and the followers of Sistani serves as a de facto declaration of support for Yaqoubi against Sistani’s followers. These followers, for their part, reject Yaqoubi’s claim to religious leadership, believing that others are more suited to succeed Sistani based on their scholarly credentials and legitimacy. This raises an essential question: What exactly is Sadr seeking to achieve by siding with Yaqoubi in his battle against the preeminent marja in Najaf, especially given the longstanding tensions between Sadr and Yaqoubi?
-The disagreement between Sadr and Yaqoubi: Sadr and the Sadrist Movement were never followers of Yacoubi; rather, their early disagreements led to a rift, which resulted in Yacoubi founding the Virtue Party and attempting to challenge the Sadrist bloc, ultimately positioning himself behind the religious authority of Haeri. Thus, it may come as a surprise that Sadr currently supports Yacoubi in opposing the highest religious authority in Najaf.
When Yacoubi split from Sadr in 2003 and subsequently established the Virtue Party in 2004, he sought to claim religious authority based on the legacy of Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr. He aimed to take control of the financial and social networks and the traditional circles of influence, capitalizing on the absence of a clear and significant religious authority for the Sadrist Movement following the assassination of Muhammad al-Sadr. This was particularly important as tensions between Haeri and Muhammad al-Sadr had not been forgotten. However, a strong alliance formed between Muqtada al-Sadr and Haeri dashed Yacoubi’s hopes of competing with the major figures during the first decade of the 21st century.
Yet, Yacoubi has returned to assert his authority as a cleric, claiming to be the most knowledgeable, and even sought praise from Sistani in an effort to establish legitimacy within the seminary and influence the major circles of religious authority. However, the religious authority, or its entourage, prevented this by repudiating Yacoubi’s claims of recognition or scholarly endorsement. Yacoubi rejected the notion that this disavowal came from the marja itself, insisting it originated from the entourage and those around him, arguing that it was necessary to consult the marja directly. This was an attempt to generate controversy to counteract the authority’s denial and to convey a message to the grassroots and followers of his teachings that there are individuals attempting to block his ascent to religious leadership in the post-Sistani era for their own interests, unrelated to knowledge or the traditions of the seminary.
-The Sadr-Haeri alliance: Around the same time that Yacoubi split from the Sadrist Movement, a coalition formed between Sadr and Haeri when the latter appointed Sadr as his representative in Iraq in April 2003. This role involved collecting the khoms (religious tax) and issuing religious rulings or expressing the marja’s views. This was a clever move at the time to connect with the legacy of Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, Muqtada’s father, and to control social, political and economic networks amid competition with Yacoubi and others looking to benefit from Muhammad al-Sadr’s rich legacy and connections.
Additionally, given Muqtada al-Sadr’s young age —and his nominal religious influence within the seminary — he faced challenges in stepping into a religious authority role and determining the successor to his father among the marjas. Thus, this situation was mutually beneficial: Sadr sought an active role within the Sadrist Movement as his father’s legitimate heir, but prevailing circumstances hindered his installation and religious influence due to theological customs and historical norms, while Haeri sought to leverage Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr’s networks and gain recognition from the Sadr family for his own religious authority.
Ironically, after a rift developed between Sadr and Haeri, reaching its peak in 2022 when Haeri resigned from his position as marja and criticized the Sadrist Movement, Sadr has now returned to support Yacoubi — whom Haeri labeled as non-scholarly — in opposing the Najaf authority from which Sadr once sought refuge against Haeri’s influence. Sadr had previously referred to Najaf as the origin and center of authority, particularly after Haeri’s resignation, which aimed to strip the Sadrist Movement of its religious cover. However, today, that authority and centrality no longer hold significance for Sadr.
Third: Sadr’s Objectives With Regard to the Hawza
The reality is that Sadr’s religious and political alliances are fluid, diverse and subject to rapid change. These shifts expose his true stance toward the supreme marjaya in Najaf and other religious authorities, as he navigates these relationships in ways that serve both his seminary ambitions and the strategic interests of his movement. His alliances generate complex and evolving scenarios, which can be summarized in the following points:
Sadr may be looking to support Yacoubi after Sistani’s passing to position himself as a religious authority against the natural successors of Sistani, such as Sheikh Muhammad Baqir al-Irwani (who currently has the largest religious class in Najaf), Ayatollah Hadi al-Radi, Ayatollah Ali al-Sabzwari and others who are close to the current religious authority. In this context, Sadr is backing Yacoubi to undermine his opponents in Najaf and facilitate the emergence of a Sadrist religious authority reminiscent of the first and second generations of the Sadr family, as suggested by leaders within the Sadrist Movement.
If this scenario holds true, Sadr aims to strengthen Yacoubi while undermining or constraining his rivals. This is because Yacoubi’s religious base does not possess the same strength as the current apparatus of Sistani, which is the formal continuation of the Khoei authority and, before that, Hakim, along with their extensive networks, resources and representatives.
It is also important to consider the historically fraught relationship between Sadr and the Najaf authority — specifically Sistani’s religious authority — since the US invasion of Iraq. These are not new disagreements but rather inherited conflicts from his father, Muhammad al-Sadr, who was in perpetual disagreement with the Najaf authorities and often criticized them for their traditionalism and detachment from public affairs, referring to them as the “silent seminary” in contrast to his “speaking seminary.” Meanwhile, the Najaf authorities sought to strip him of his religious authority and recognition. This ongoing dispute persists, albeit with different causes and manifestations.
–Taking aim at Haeri and Iran: By backing Yaqoubi, Sadr is not only challenging Najaf’s dominant marjaya but also targeting Haeri, a key figure in the Iran-backed religious establishment. Haeri has explicitly rejected Yaqoubi’s status as a mujtahid, stating, “It is not permissible to emulate Sheikh Muhammad al-Yaqoubi, nor is it permissible to entrust rights to him as a mujtahid. His fatwas cannot be relied upon because he is not a mujtahid.” Haeri’s resignation in August 2022 was initially seen as a setback for Sadr, as it stripped the Sadrist Movement of its main religious reference. However, by publicizing his father’s praise for Yaqoubi, Muqtada al-Sadr appears to be reaffirming the continuity of his father’s religious school, signaling that it did not end with Haeri’s resignation. This suggests that the Sadrist Movement can turn to an alternative authority — Yaqoubi — whenever necessary. Ironically, in August 2022, after Haeri’s resignation, Sadr emphasized Najaf’s primacy, describing it as “the center and the largest and most important seat of the religious authority.” At that time, this was a defensive move against Haeri’s Iran-backed influence. Today, however, Sadr has reversed his stance, using his father’s statement to fortify himself against Najaf itself by supporting Yaqoubi’s marjaya.
This contradiction underscores how Sadr’s religious and political positions fluctuate depending on the power struggles within the Shiite marjaya, particularly in the context of Najaf’s succession battle after Sistani.
-Preparing a Sadrist Marja to Succeed Sistani: Recently, Sadr has been embroiled in significant disputes with the religious authority Haidari, then with Khabbaz, later with Haeri, and finally with Najaf itself. These religious battles have been interpreted as preparations for the post- Sistani era, with some suggesting that Sadr is positioning himself to become a marja after Sistani. However, one leader within the Sadrist Movement stated in a media interview that the movement is preparing a marja from its ranks, who will be announced soon and will serve as the legal umbrella for the Sadrist Movement.
It is likely that the Sadrist Movement is delaying the announcement of this marja until after Sistani’s passing to effectively compete in the vacuum that will be created. Regardless of who this individual may be, the process of preparing a marja in this manner raises questions about their independence and ability to confront the political or religious currents they belong to, unless they are a party-based marja working for the benefit of a specific group, party or faction rather than the broader Shiite community.
Fourth: The Political Impact of the Competition Over the Marjaya
The ongoing competition and efforts to shape the future of the marjaya in the post-Sistani period appear logical when viewed through the lens of the current regional landscape and the Sadrist Movement’s bid to play an active role in determining alternatives for this phase. Since the absence of the first Sadr (Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr) and the second Sadr (Muhammad al-Sadr), the Sadrists have lacked a religious authority of their own. As a result, they are now striving to alter the course of the post-Sistani succession process, which is currently being steered by other actors. In this context, Sadr has extended his support to Yaqoubi, recognizing him as a disciple of his father, while momentarily setting aside their past disputes. Notably, it was Sadr himself who previously sided with Haeri against Yaqoubi.
Tehran’s stance on this dispute should be examined in light of these dynamics. While Yaqoubi endorses the concept of Wilayat al-Faqih, he diverges from Khomeini on key aspects. Among these differences is Khomeini’s assertion that this guardianship is absolute, irrespective of popular consent, and that it is not confined to a specific geographical area — both of which Yaqoubi disputes. Another point of contention is Khomeini’s claim that the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih extends to control over people’s lives, wealth and honor when deemed necessary for their interests — an idea that Yaqoubi rejects. Instead, he considers the possibility of multiple guardianships, determined by the diversity of nations and the role of ahl al-hall wa-l-‘aqd (which he equates with seminary scholars) in decision-making. In contrast, the supreme religious authority, represented by Sistani and the Najaf tradition tracing back to Naini, Hakim and Khoei, fundamentally opposes the doctrine Wilayat al-Faqih in its absolute form. Instead, it confines the concept to personal religious affairs. Consequently, Najaf remains committed to preserving this doctrinal lineage and ensuring that the marjaya is passed on to figures who uphold a similar school of thought, such as Irawani, Sabzwari and others who align with this approach.
Sadr’s objectives remain diverse and adaptable. Despite his longstanding dispute with Yaqoubi, he sided with him in this instance against Najaf. Likewise, despite his historical alignment with Haeri, their relationship deteriorated after Haeri resigned from the religious authority, prompting Sadr to align with Najaf against him. Additionally, after launching a fierce attack on Khabbaz in June 2024 — going so far as to question his Shi’ism, credentials and religious authority —Sadr met with him again just days ago (March 2025) at his residence in Najaf. A statement from Sadr’s office acknowledged their meeting, emphasizing the “necessity of friendly communication and good relations,” while Khabbaz, in turn, expressed gratitude for Sadr’s “warm reception.”
Leaks suggest that Khabbaz may have relayed a message from Sayyid Muhammad Reza al-Sistani (the son of the supreme religious authority) to Sadr. Some reports speculate that the message pertained to Iraq’s broader political process, possibly encouraging Sadr to participate in the upcoming elections with the promise of religious backing. However, this remains unconfirmed.
What is undeniable, however, is that internal dynamics within Najaf are in a state of flux. It is plausible that Sadr, having endorsed Yaqoubi, seeks to exert pressure on the supreme religious authority — either to secure its backing in the elections or to negotiate a political arrangement that ensures his influence in exchange for his support against adversaries. If this hypothesis holds, the situation reflects a relationship of mutual interests and tactical adjustments rather than a long-term strategic alliance.
In any case, Tehran faces significant challenges in this ongoing contest. All the key figures in Najaf hold political and ideological differences with Iran, yet Tehran continues to impose its “loyalist” armed militias as a persistent force on Iraq’s political landscape to compensate for its own weaknesses. This raises a crucial question: Can these militias and their affiliated groups play a decisive role in selecting the next religious authority? The answer is an unequivocal no. The selection process for a cleric is fundamentally tied to jurisprudential expertise, scholarly qualifications and acceptance within the seminary, making it impervious to militia influence. Instead, Iran’s leverage lies in exerting pressure through clerics who are loyal to or aligned with its interests, rather than through armed factions. However, these clerics currently lack the standing to challenge Najaf’s dominant religious leadership. This context helps explain the fluid and shifting alliances between Najaf, Sadr, Yaqoubi and other influential actors.
Conclusion
The ongoing dispute in Najaf can be seen as an intense effort by all parties to shape the post-Sistani phase and secure a decisive role in the seminary. These alliances, however, are not rooted in long-term strategic visions or fixed interests; rather, they are pragmatic and tactical, constantly shifting in response to evolving circumstances. The task of filling the seminary vacuum after Sistani’s departure is far from straightforward — it is a deeply complex and intricate process, especially given the presence of strong potential successors from the same school of thought who command significant influence and popularity within the Shiite community. This competition has already escalated into mutual accusations and conflicts over scholarly credentials, jurisprudential authority and even financial matters. In the absence of a supreme authority to mediate and contain these tensions, the situation could further deteriorate. Each faction will strive to establish dominance over the seminary landscape, exert influence over students of Islamic law and the broader Shiite public, consolidate support among traditionalist circles and control the seminary’s economic networks both within Iraq and internationally. As a result, the post-Sistani period is likely to be the most challenging for the seminary in modern history. Despite these dynamics, Tehran’s ability to reshape the religious landscape after Sistani remains highly limited. The key actors currently at the center of Najaf’s internal power struggle share a common divergence from Tehran, significantly narrowing its prospects of asserting influence over the succession process.
