Just a few years ago, it was unimaginable that Iranian women could walk through the streets, shops and markets without covering their heads under the current Iranian establishment. However, the defiance against Hijab has now reached unprecedented levels, rendering the establishment’s intimidation measures, laws and legislation to impose the hijab ineffective. On the Iranian streets, a new sense of freedom has been noticed; many Iranian women no longer wear the hijab, and morality police patrols have vanished. The establishment’s restrictions and the previous punitive measures such as fines, car confiscation and imprisonment have been suspended.
In spite of the Iranian intelligence’s recent report on the state of hijab in the country — which Khamenei described as shocking, he has so far refrained from enforcing punitive measures. This is deemed to be an effort to restore national cohesion, regain the trust of a war-torn society, reassert internal control without relying on coercion and violence in addressing the hijab issue. It can be seen as a proactive step to prevent renewed confrontations and protests which could escalate into a popular uprising and further compound the leadership’s crisis as it has been struggling with domestic and international fallout because of the war. The recent survey by the ISPA Center in Tehran revealed that public discontent over the country’s conditions reached about 92%, figures that are deeply alarming for the Iranian establishment, especially amid the emergence of explicit calls during and after the war with Israel to take to the streets and overthrow the establishment.
The newly-adopted containment approach has split Iranian society between supporters and opponents with critics warning that it could intensify internal tensions and undermine social cohesion as well as threaten the prevailing cultural norms of Iranian society. In response, the secretary of the commission for the Headquarters for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice announced a “chastity and Hijab Situation Room” and the training, organization and deployment of more than 80,000 morality enforcers, 4,575 trainers and judicial officers. It is designed to counter the growing rejection of the hijab in Iranian society and to develop cultural, media and legal measures which will be communicated to the relevant authorities to help develop possible solutions aimed at curbing the spread of this phenomenon. However, this initiative has been criticized by some parliamentarians and sociologists, because it will reactivate failed policies and practices, such as the morality police, whose policies sparked the 2022 protests following the death of the Kurdish young woman Mahsa Amini in custody. It also exposed legal and contradictions in laws and regulations in the country. The Headquarters for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice operates as an independent body under the authority of the supreme leader. This diminishes the status and authority of President Masoud Pezeshkian and places him in a sensitive and critical position, given his failure to fulfill his promises, especially those regarding social and cultural issues, and could further inflame public anger amid all the existing factors necessary for an anti-government uprising.
Currently, it appears that the factions of the Iranian establishment are seeking to exploit the hijab issue in their internal power struggle, aiming to oust certain officials, tarnish their reputation or incite public demand for reforms within the system. This analysis is evident in the circulated video of the wedding of Ali Shamkhani’s daughter, adviser to the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, held in one of Tehran’s most luxurious hotels. The event drew widespread criticism at the time due to the extravagance of the wedding, Shamkhani’s status and his associations with “hardliners” who insist on strict enforcement of mandatory hijab. Observers highlighted the contrast between the bride’s gown and the restrictions imposed on the dress code of Iranian women. The opponents of the mandatory hijab widely shared the video even though the wedding took place in 2024 and was not mixed. This appears to have been an attempt to provoke Iran’s public anger, underscore the selective enforcement of societal norms and laws and draw attention to the cost of the wedding, especially at a time when the country is suffering from an economic crisis, and agitate women in a way that might encourage them to disregard hijab rules. The participation of hundreds of unveiled women in a marathon on Kish Island further fueled controversy in Iran amid accusations that the government is being lenient in applying the supreme leader’s directives regarding strict hijab compliance. However, Pezeshkian stepped in and addressed these accusations, saying that people should neither be restricted nor pressured on this issue. He also noted in the broader context of his response that any measure that causes public resentment is a direct aid to Israel. His remarks reveal deep concern about the possible return of popular protests, since the resurgence of public anger under the current circumstances in Iran could accelerate Netanyahu’s return to the option of war, in pursuit of the goal he declared during the 12‑Day War: toppling the Iranian establishment through a popular uprising.
In conclusion, it appears that the Iranian establishment has been unable to resolve the hijab issue, as it has become a ticking time bomb capable of reigniting violence and protests, especially under the new conditions created by 12-Day War on Iran, whose repercussions the country continues to endure. The division within Iran’s institutions over this sensitive issue reveals that the establishment is attempting to strike a balance between the legal obligations imposed on women regarding hijab and the new realities brought about by the war. The first signs of this balance have emerged in the form of two contrasting discourses on the hijab: one emphasizing the mandatory nature of the hijab while the other not opposing the hijab but rejecting its enforcement through coercion.
Opinions in this article reflect the writer’s point of view, not necessarily the view of Rasanah
