The United States and Iran are conducting negotiations marked by deep mistrust, taking place under what can be described as unprecedented US pressure. Washington is pursuing a coercive diplomatic approach aimed at extracting far-reaching concessions beyond halting uranium enrichment on Iranian territory. Its demands extend to curbing Iran’s missile capabilities and reshaping its regional posture and ambitions. To reinforce its leverage, the United States continues military deployments and maneuvers in the region, keeping the prospect of armed confrontation present in order to sustain pressure and compel compliance. Some observers argue that President Donald Trump is using displays of force to secure an agreement that advances both US strategic interests and his own political standing, consistent with his stated belief in achieving peace through strength.
At the same time, the Iranian leadership appears constrained, with limited room for maneuver. Trump has signaled a willingness to escalate, even unpredictably, and the possibility of military action — potentially aimed at regime change — remains part of the discussion. Certain segments within Iran view external intervention as a catalyst for domestic upheaval. Israel, for its part, openly favors military measures and signals readiness to contribute to or directly participate in such action. Meanwhile, the longstanding framework through which Tehran managed tensions with Washington and Israel appears to have eroded. The strategy of calibrated escalation without significant repercussions has lost effectiveness amid widening power asymmetries and weakened deterrence. Iran has also seen parts of its regional network and defensive depth diminish, alongside the reduced utility of nuclear ambiguity as leverage following US strikes on nuclear facilities in June 2025. Additionally, support from China and Russia shows signs of limitation as this would entail open defiance of the United States, while internal economic deterioration and renewed protest movements point to mounting domestic pressures and questions of legitimacy.
Accepting US conditions in full, however, would amount to a severe strategic setback for the Iranian establishment. Such an outcome could prove more consequential than a direct military strike, insofar as compliance with Washington’s demands might threaten the establishment’s survival more deeply than an external attack. Meeting these conditions would erode Iran’s remaining sources of leverage and deterrence, leaving it increasingly exposed to pressure from the United States and Israel. It would also curtail its autonomy and sovereignty, and, above all, undermine the uncompromising ideological stance that has long sustained its nuclear and missile programs as well as its regional posture. In effect, this would mean dismantling the core pillars of the Wilayat al-Faqih project and opening the way to an Iran fundamentally different from the one the region has known.
The current diplomatic opening may therefore represent a decisive juncture for the establishment’s trajectory. Reopened with difficulty and under intense pressure, this channel offers limited latitude. Tehran appears intent on reframing coercive diplomacy as constructive engagement, presenting concessions it describes as proportionate and measured — what President Masoud Pezeshkian has termed “not excessive,” and what Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has described as an instance of “heroic flexibility,” or, alternatively, a tactical recalibration.
In this context, Iran entered negotiations in Muscat aware that it possessed bargaining chips of interest to Washington. Given that the nuclear file remains President Trump’s principal concern, Tehran showed readiness to contemplate significant concessions, potentially exceeding those embodied in the 2015 agreement. These could include lowering enrichment levels, reducing or eliminating stockpiles, possibly committing to zero enrichment for a defined or open-ended period and accepting more stringent oversight of nuclear facilities — steps seemingly designed to secure a political breakthrough that Trump could frame as a major achievement.
Yet Trump’s firm posture, coupled with Iran’s decision to negotiate under pronounced pressure, has prompted questions about whether Tehran might widen the scope of talks to encompass additional issues and offer further compromises. In recent months following the 12-Day War, the Iranian leadership has sought to delineate its red lines while maintaining a degree of tactical flexibility, aiming to avoid a zero-sum dynamic and preserve some space for negotiated adjustment.
Within this framework, the Iranian leadership has reiterated that relinquishing the right to uranium enrichment constitutes a principal red line. At the same time, indications suggest a willingness to contemplate meaningful adjustments on this file, as previously outlined. Concerning the second red line — the preservation of its regional axis — Tehran may resist dismantling that network altogether, yet appear open to recalibrating the manner in which it exercises its influence. The third red line remains the missile program. On this issue, Iran is expected to maintain a firm refusal to engage in negotiations, viewing the program as its core instrument of deterrence and national defense. Concurrently, it seems to be exploring alternative avenues to persuade Trump, including concessions in other domains and the prospect of economic or investment opportunities, in exchange for softening demands related to missile capabilities. An Iranian official indicated to Reuters that oil and gas formed part of the negotiation terms, suggesting an effort to ensure that Washington would derive tangible benefits from any prospective agreement — unlike the 2015 accord, from which China and Russia were seen as principal beneficiaries — thereby enhancing the durability of a future settlement.
At the same time, Tehran is notably energizing the diplomatic track by underscoring readiness for military confrontation and a capacity to impose costs. While the establishment retains the ability to disrupt the regional landscape, escalate instability and potentially draw the United States into an extended conflict reminiscent of the Iraq invasion, its underlying objective seems less about provoking such an outcome than about strengthening its negotiating position. In essence, these signals function as leverage designed to avert a disadvantageous settlement and to mitigate the scale of anticipated concessions at the bargaining table.
Given this evident asymmetry, the decisive variable remains the extent to which Washington is prepared to accept Iranian concessions. In that light, dismantling Iran’s nuclear program and removing it from the catalogue of unconventional threats identified by the United States could be framed as a success for Trump’s “peace through strength” doctrine — perhaps even as a personal accomplishment exceeding those of his predecessors. There may also be scope for the US president to secure additional gains by incorporating into a new accord, or into parallel understandings, provisions that regulate Iran’s ties with its regional proxies and yield economic advantages within the Iranian market, particularly in the oil and gas sectors — without bearing the costs of war or risking renewed military entanglement in the region. It is also noteworthy that even Washington’s closest regional allies do not favor a military course.
Yet, within this same imbalance, the central question remains how far Washington is willing to moderate its expectations. Trump may judge nuclear concessions alone insufficient, especially after elevating his demands to include issues related to Iran’s missile program. He could be encouraged by Iran’s apparent flexibility on certain files, alongside the visible US military presence, to press for the full implementation of his agenda. This dynamic may be reinforced by Israeli pressure, as Tel Aviv increasingly regards Iran’s missile capabilities as a threat comparable to its nuclear program and seeks to elevate the missile file to equal prominence in US priorities. In this context, there remains the possibility that escalation could be pursued in an effort to render the military option the prevailing course of action.
To conclude, relations between the United States and Iran resemble a protracted contest of endurance. Despite the intensity of US pressure, it remains unlikely that Tehran would acquiesce to the entirety of Washington’s demands. It may, however, advance significant concessions on the nuclear file and adopt flexible formulations on other contentious issues in an effort to persuade Trump to forgo military action in favor of a far-reaching agreement. In this context, Iran could contemplate unprecedented nuclear steps, potentially including the temporary or even permanent reduction of uranium enrichment to zero, alongside partial adjustments in the management of its ties with its regional axis. Such adjustments would more likely entail reorganization than outright dismantlement. In return, Tehran’s principal objective would be to secure Washington’s retreat from demands to dismantle the missile program. If confronted with a binary choice between opening the missile file to negotiation or facing military confrontation — particularly under mounting Israeli pressure — Iran would be expected to resist elimination of its capabilities, perhaps considering at most a freeze rather than disarmament. Should Trump nonetheless insist on maximal terms amounting to full capitulation at the negotiating table, the outcome would hinge on whether both he and Supreme Leader Khamenei are prepared to pursue their respective objectives through open conflict rather than compromise.
