The Iran-backed “Axis of Resistance,” conceived as a transnational network comprising state and quasi-state actors, has functioned not merely as a convergence of geopolitical interests, but as a structure of allegiance oriented toward a central authority that transcends the nation-state framework and gravitates toward the concept of supreme religious-political leadership. Within this configuration, the death of its founding figure — the guardian of its institutional architecture and the protector of its doctrinal foundation in the paradigm of loyalty — constitutes a dual test: institutional continuity within Iran and the durability of allegiance beyond its borders.
Accordingly, the death of Ali Khamenei should not be regarded as a fleeting political episode or a routine redistribution of authority. Rather, it represents a foundational moment that reopens the core question of legitimacy: who possesses the rightful claim to guardianship? Moreover, how will the relationship among constitutional authority, charismatic legitimacy, the security-military apparatus and the regional networks cultivated under the previous leadership — networks that have since become active and influential across the region — be redefined?
This assessment addresses a central question concerning the position of the Iran-bolstered “Axis of Resistance” amid the ongoing confrontation between Iran on one side and the United States and Israel on the other, particularly in the aftermath of Khamenei’s demise as the principal architect of this proxy network. It does so by examining the influence of the ideological standard that binds the “Axis of Resistance” to Iran as a central state and to the supreme leader by virtue of a religious authority that transcends borders, while also taking into account the standard of interests tied to the strategic calculations of the axis’ constituent elements. In this way, the report anticipates the future trajectory of the axis, its connections and its regional role.
The Ideological Underpinnings of the “Axis of Resistance”
In Shiite thought, loyalty is not confined to political allegiance; it is a doctrinal construct tied to the dual principles of al-walaa wal-baraa (disavowal of disbelievers and allegiance to believers). Accordingly, the “Axis of Resistance” was not founded solely on pragmatic coordination, but on a religious, sectarian and historical narrative centered on resisting injustice, defending the oppressed and invoking the legacy of Husayn ibn Ali.
Yet the demise of the supreme leader confronts these actors with a pivotal question: is loyalty directed to the leader, to the principle of allegiance itself or to Iran as the sustaining center? This transition reshapes the relationship between the core — Qom and Tehran — and the peripheries — Baghdad, Beirut, Sana’a and Damascus. Within this framework, the concept of the Guardian of the Islamic Jurist (Wilayat al-Faqih) remains indispensable to understanding the moves of the Iranian axis across the region. The Iranian supreme leader is not merely a political or military head of state; he embodies a comprehensive ideological project and constitutes the locus of operative authority. These actors do not operate beyond his directives; rather, they pursue strategies of deterrence and power consolidation in accordance with assessments determined or endorsed by him.
Under the Iranian Constitution and the doctrine of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist, the supreme leader presides over both the political and religious establishments and stands above all other authorities. He retains final authority over war and peace, foreign relations, the armed forces and policies related to exporting the revolution. He is likewise the source of intellectual legitimacy. The principle of “supporting the resistance” against the West and Israel is therefore not a temporary political instrument, but an integral component of the Iranian revolution project proclaimed by Tehran after 1979.
Alongside this ideological and doctrinal dimension shaping the positions of Iran-affiliated factions and groups in the region, there is undeniably a calculus of self-interest and specific strategic considerations influencing their approach to the current conflict. Foremost among these is the anticipated US and Israeli response to their participation, which could escalate into an intensive campaign inflicting severe damage upon them. Israel has already demonstrated its preparedness in this regard through its forceful reaction to Hezbollah’s entry into the confrontation, seeking to contain it at an early stage to prevent further expansion.
These groups also face mounting domestic pressure to integrate and disarm, amid concerns that engagement in the conflict could trigger internal campaigns and confrontations that would erode their standing internationally. At the same time, acquiescing to such pressures carries its own calculations. Yet, refraining from engaging in the conflict would not necessarily avert the anticipated targeting scenario or the coordinated effort to eliminate manifestations of “resistance” in the region, thereby paving the way for what is envisioned as a new Middle East — one perceived by these factions as aligned with the strategic interests of Israel and the United States. In their assessment, this campaign of reconfiguration has already commenced and will persist until Israeli and US objectives are achieved. Such a reading may compel the conclusion that postponing the next confrontation is untenable, for what can be confronted collectively today may not be manageable tomorrow by each faction in isolation.
The Response of the “Axis of Resistance” to the War: Between Ideology and Expedience
In Iran, Khamenei had been mobilizing for the anticipated confrontation with the United States, casting it as a sacred obligation. This rhetoric was directed not only at the Iranian public, but at all who pledge allegiance to the supreme leader, inside and beyond Iran’s borders.
Hezbollah had already made its position clear: it would not remain neutral. As a prominent paramilitary and political organization with substantial combat capabilities, reliant on Iranian financial and military backing, Hezbollah is regarded as one of Tehran’s principal instruments in its direct confrontation with Israel. It soon entered the conflict, resuming rocket fire toward northern Israeli territory, reaching as far as Haifa. The group appears prepared to engage in what it views as a decisive battle — one tied not only to Iran’s survival but to its own. Since October 7, 2023, Hezbollah has faced mounting internal pressure, reinforced by Israeli and US support, to disarm and curtail its domestic role. Thus, loyalty alone no longer determines its involvement. The collapse or strategic weakening of the Iranian regime would likely expose the group to acute vulnerability, potentially further eroding its influence in Lebanon and the wider region.
A similar dynamic applies to armed factions in Iraq, including Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and Kata’ib Hezbollah, which joined the confrontation early on, launching attacks on US bases in Erbil. These groups emerged in opposition to US forces following the invasion of Iraq and maintain direct ties to Iranian leadership. They retain the capacity to strike US targets and Tehran has historically relied on them to intensify pressure on Washington without deploying regular forces. Like Hezbollah, however, they confront existential questions amid growing internal and external demands to sever ties with Iran and integrate militarily and politically within their respective states.
In the case of Ansarallah, however, the contrast between ideological loyalty and strategic calculation is evident. Although the group condemned what it described as US-Israeli aggression against Iran, asserting that the attack seeks to dismantle the deterrence equation and pave the way for targeting other states, it has not yet directly entered the confrontation. This is notable given its strategic leverage, including the potential to disrupt navigation through the Bab al-Mandab Strait. The comparatively weaker doctrinal connection to the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist may have delayed its engagement. Nevertheless, strategic considerations could still draw it into the conflict at any stage, particularly if the prevailing assessment holds that the campaign extends beyond Iran and aims to dismantle the entire “Axis of Resistance” and any forces opposed to Israel and the United States in the region.
The Political, Religious Conundrum Facing Iran’s Loyalist Factions
If loyalty during the revolutionary transformation and the formation of Iran’s transnational groups was partly grounded in personal trust, the current phase demands a reconceptualization of loyalty within institutional structures, a reformulated political ideology and a redefined distribution of power within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and religious institutions. This transition is far from straightforward; tensions may surface between competing religious authorities or between elected political currents and the security establishment, with these strains inevitably reflected in loyalist factions abroad.
An additional layer stems from the intersection of jurisprudential and political tradition. The demise of Khamenei represents an existential test for Iraqi armed factions aligned with Tehran, as well as for Hezbollah in Lebanon. Their legitimacy is rooted not in transient political arrangements as mentioned earlier but in a doctrinal framework that positions the supreme leader as the ultimate authority and the source of final legitimacy for armed action. Here, the dilemma of jurisprudential tradition becomes acute: tradition is not limited to ritual practice, but extends to a political and jihadist mandate linking military engagement and political choice to the will of a specific jurist.
With the absence of the figure around whom leadership charisma coalesced for decades, a critical question arises: can the constitutional mechanisms in Tehran generate a new charismatic leader capable of sustaining obedience beyond Iran’s borders? Or is charismatic legitimacy, cultivated over decades of revolutionary symbolism, not easily transferable through institutional decision-making? If the latter holds, an implicit plurality of loyalties could emerge, or a reevaluation of the relationship between religious authority and external actors could occur, potentially fragmenting the longstanding unified discourse of allegiance. Nevertheless, obedience may continue smoothly if Iran maintains its financial and logistical support for loyalist factions abroad.
At the political and strategic level, the challenge becomes even more intricate. These factions emerged within a regional system centered on Tehran, where decisions on war and peace are shaped by the transnational project led by the supreme leader. In the absence of the founding central figure for this phase, the logic of the nation-state (e.g., Iraq, Lebanon) could assert itself, emphasizing pragmatism. More likely, however, religious and field leaders may adopt an ideological posture to signal loyalty to the resistance movement and avert internal fragmentation. Either scenario entails a shift in legitimacy: from one deriving authority from a figure representing the revolution and the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist, to one potentially framed as an institutional alliance guided by security and military networks. The key question, then, is whether these factions can sustain their ideological discourse of obedience when decisions may increasingly reflect institutional balances and pragmatic interests rather than direct compliance with the supreme leader’s will. The answer will shape not only their relations with Tehran but also their internal orientation between ideology and politics.
It is crucial to recognize that the “Axis of Resistance” is not a conventional military alliance. It is a multilayered network encompassing states such as Iran and Iraq, armed groups like Hezbollah, Iraqi factions and Yemen’s Ansarallah, alongside political, social, media and cultural institutions. Historically, this network has revolved around supreme leadership; thus, the supreme leader’s demise raises a central question: will the network evolve toward greater independence, or will decision-making be recentralized?
Material factors also weigh heavily. Iranian financial and military support has been pivotal to the axis’ cohesion. A leadership transition accompanied by economic instability or domestic conflict could however introduce new dynamics: actors may seek to diversify support sources, strengthen political autonomy and recalibrate local priorities. In such circumstances, the “test of loyalty” becomes tangible and practical rather than theoretical.
Finally, there is a moral and political dimension to this test. Loyalty may evolve into a broader moral trial: will the networks continue to champion the rhetoric of the oppressed, or will the axis shift toward a purely pragmatic alliance? Will religious discourse remain central, or will it yield to geopolitical calculations? These questions will shape the trajectory of the “Axis of Resistance” in the post-Khamenei era.
The Center, the Axis and Post-Khamenei Trajectories
Given the current critical circumstances, the Iran-supported axis faces complex scenarios and highly perilous calculations. Within this context, several trajectories can be anticipated:
Maximum Ideological Marshaling
In this scenario, the conflict would be transformed into a unifying religious duty, framing the war within a discourse of “defending Islam, the nation and holy sites” in the Iranian narrative. It would invoke concepts such as “defensive jihad,” “supporting the oppressed” and resistance as a “religious obligation.” Such framing could consolidate support across Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen, legitimizing the full engagement of proxy forces. Here, Iran assumes not only a political leadership role but also a central mobilization authority. However, with the absence of an official fatwa from Khamenei due to his death, the relationship temporarily becomes a strategic political alliance, as observed in Iran’s ties with the Houthis. In this context, a “mobilization text” may substitute for the fatwa, fostering a collective identity in a moment of existential threat. Yet, prolonged conflict and rising human costs could erode mobilization if the rhetoric fails to yield tangible gains.
The Sacred Made Political, the Political Made Religious
This approach shifts focus from sanctifying resistance to sanctifying the state (Iran) itself. The conflict would then evolve into a defense of the “Islamic State,” not merely the resistance. The Iranian establishment would further asserts itself as the guarantor of religious identity, rendering any attack on it an assault on faith. This dynamic transforms a flexible resistance into a besieged, ideologically charged state, complicating negotiations, as retreat is framed as a doctrinal or sectarian concession rather than a political one. Drawing on historical narratives such as the Karbala tragedy and Shiite-Safavid traditions, this trajectory gradually reshapes the connection of loyalist factions abroad, moving it from purely doctrinal allegiance to Khamenei toward a deeper, organic bond with the state, its identity, culture and geography.
Dismantling Religious Legitimacy From Within
Prolonged war and economic collapse may provoke fundamental theological and political questions: was confrontation inevitable? Does the Iranian establishment’s foreign policy reflect a legitimate necessity, or a subjective interpretation subject to critique? In this scenario, the current conflict could spark multiple interpretations of legitimacy within the Shiite community, reviving debate over the limits of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist in managing war. This debate may surface both inside and outside Iran, particularly given Najaf’s longstanding critique that the supreme guardianship has politicized Shiite thought, expanded jurist authority and exerted influence beyond Iran’s borders over the global Shiite community.
Redefining the “Axis of Resistance”
Full-scale war could produce one of two outcomes: either a deepening of the “Axis of Resistance,” redefining it as an existential alliance against Western hegemony, or the exposure of its structural fragility. If the former holds true, the “Axis of Resistance” would evolve from an Iran-led Shiite regional initiative into a comprehensive, anti-hegemonic civilizational project. However, uneven participation among member actors may reveal its limitations, raising the question of whether it constitutes a genuinely ideological axis or merely a network of political interests, potentially leading to fragmentation or collapse.
Reshaping the Concept of the Enemy
The ongoing conflict may alter the regional perception of the United States, shifting it from a political adversary to an existential threat, or from an unassailable hegemonic power to one susceptible to attrition. This transformation could have a lasting impact on future generations, instilling enduring anti-hegemonic sentiment and reinforcing the principles of resistance and jihad, independent of the immediate outcomes of the current conflict.
Conclusion
It can be argued that the death of Khamenei, as both a theological and political focal point, does not automatically signal the disintegration of the “Axis of Resistance.” Yet it underscores the axis’ profound dependence on a singular symbolic center. The critical test lies not merely in selecting a successor, but in the Iranian establishment’s capacity to cultivate theological and institutional legitimacy that resonates with loyalists both within Iran and across its transnational networks. Equally important is the axis’ ability to shift loyalty from an individual to a principle, and the new Iranian leadership’s capacity to recalibrate strategy and the doctrine of supreme guardianship while preserving continuity and identity. In this sense, the current leadership transition could represent a moment of reconstitution, provided the establishment withstands the current US assaults. Should these efforts falter, however, the central decision-making authority over proxy groups may gradually weaken, reducing the axis to a fragmented network of interests with diminished ideological coherence, or, in the event of regime collapse in Tehran, potentially leading to the demise of the entire axis.
