The Strait of Hormuz, a narrow corridor only 21 miles wide at its narrowest point, emerged as the epicenter of maritime disruption during the 40-day Iranian conflict in 2026. Following the launch of Operation Epic Fury on February 28, in which US and Israeli forces struck Iranian nuclear and military infrastructure and killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Tehran retaliated by effectively sealing the strait. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) deployed fast-attack craft, drones, missiles and naval mines across key shipping lanes, targeting commercial vessels and transforming one of the world’s most vital energy arteries into a contested battlespace.
Within days, tanker traffic collapsed. More than a dozen vessels were damaged or abandoned, seafarers were killed or went missing, and global oil prices surged beyond $120 per barrel. Even after a fragile ceasefire on April 8, maritime flows failed to recover. Iran reportedly imposed transit tolls exceeding $1 million per vessel and selectively granted passage to preferred partners. The crisis revealed, with unprecedented clarity, the structural vulnerability of Hormuz: a single regional actor, leveraging asymmetric capabilities, could hold a significant share of global energy trade at risk. Indeed, during the 40-day war, Iran was able to strengthen its strategic position by leveraging its capacity to disrupt traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. By threatening global energy flows, Tehran used control over this chokepoint as an instrument of coercion, shaping the conflict dynamics and pushing Washington toward de-escalation. However, the ceasefire marked a reversal of this dynamic. Rather than freezing the balance of power, it created conditions for the United States to consolidate its position. Through the establishment of a de facto naval blockade, Washington has asserted operational control over the strait, thereby neutralizing one of Iran’s main strategic levers. This approach, while avoiding a direct military seizure of key infrastructure such as Kharg Island, produces similar strategic effects by increasing economic and military pressure on Iran. It has allowed the United States to transform a position of relative constraint during the conflict into one of advantage in this tenuous ceasefire phase. In this sense, while Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz reinforced its leverage during the war, the ceasefire has enabled the United States to regain functional control over the maritime space and shift the strategic balance in its favor.
This episode underscores a central analytical insight: Iran’s leverage over Hormuz is greatest in wartime conditions, where uncertainty, escalation risk and market sensitivity amplify the effects of disruption. Tehran does not need to permanently close the strait to achieve strategic impact. The credible threat of instability alone is sufficient to reshape global expectations, impose economic costs and compel international attention. In this sense, Hormuz functions less as a space Iran must control than as a system it can destabilize at relatively low cost. Wartime conditions thus magnify Iranian leverage, enabling Tehran to offset conventional military asymmetries vis-à-vis the United States.
Yet the crisis also exposed a second, equally important dynamic: the international community’s limited cohesion in responding to such disruption. Despite the rapid formation of a multinational coalition of over 40 countries in early April, the response remained fragmented, reactive and ultimately ineffective. Convened under British leadership, the coalition emphasized diplomatic pressure, sanctions and future demining operations, but failed to produce a unified operational framework. European powers, including France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, supported defensive maritime security initiatives but explicitly rejected offensive naval engagement. President Emmanuel Macron characterized any attempt to forcibly secure the strait as “unrealistic,” citing the risks posed by Iranian missiles and drones in confined waters. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, called for more decisive action, while carefully calibrating their limited military involvement to avoid triggering a broader escalation. Other key actors adopted similarly cautious positions. Japan, Australia and Spain declined to deploy naval assets, prioritizing commercial risk management and personnel safety.
Asian energy importers such as China, India and South Korea, despite bearing the greatest economic costs, avoided confrontation. Beijing, in particular, combined criticism of Iranian actions with quiet negotiations to secure selective passage for its tankers, reflecting its broader strategic balancing.
At the multilateral level, great-power rivalry further constrained collective action. Russia and China vetoed a UN Security Council resolution aimed at authorizing safe transit measures, framing it as a step toward escalation. The result was a familiar pattern: rhetorical alignment without operational unity. Unlike earlier cases of maritime cooperation, such as anti-piracy missions off Somalia, the Hormuz crisis revealed how divergent threat perceptions and geopolitical alignments undermine coordinated responses when a state actor, rather than non-state actors, is the source of disruption.
This fragmentation reinforced Iran’s wartime leverage. In the absence of a unified international enforcement mechanism, the reopening of the strait depended less on collective action than on Tehran’s own calculations. The United States, under President Donald Trump, adopted a more assertive posture, deploying naval assets, threatening strikes and exploring convoy systems, but even Washington struggled to mobilize consistent allied support. The result was a patchwork approach that left Hormuz effectively under Iranian influence, at least in the short-term.
However, this wartime leverage is inherently constrained and difficult to sustain. As the immediate crisis subsides and diplomatic engagement resumes, the structural foundations of Iran’s advantage begin to erode. The transition from conflict to negotiation fundamentally alters the strategic environment. Stability, predictability and the secure flow of energy become shared priorities, not only for external actors, but for Iran itself. Under these conditions, the continued use of disruption as a bargaining tool becomes increasingly costly and counterproductive.
This is the core paradox of Hormuz: Iran’s ability to generate leverage through disruption is strongest at the peak of crisis, yet weakest when it seeks to convert that leverage into durable political gains. As ceasefire conditions take hold and negotiations emerge — as seen in the US-Iran talks hosted in Islamabad — the urgency that underpinned Tehran’s coercive advantage begins to fade. International actors shift from crisis management to institutional stabilization, reducing the effectiveness of unilateral threats.
In these negotiations, Hormuz has quickly become a central issue. For the United States, ensuring permanent, toll-free and secure access to the strait constitutes a baseline demand. The Trump administration has linked sanctions relief and economic incentives to verifiable guarantees of maritime security, including restrictions on IRGC naval activities and potential monitoring mechanisms. For Iran, by contrast, Hormuz represents its most tangible bargaining chip. Iranian officials have entered talks claiming strategic resilience, arguing that their control over the strait during wartime demonstrates their indispensability.
Yet Iran’s negotiating position is weaker than wartime dynamics might suggest. First, a prolonged disruption of the Strait of Hormuz would directly undermine Iran’s economic prospects, particularly at a time when sanctions relief remains a central objective. This is even more critical in the wake of Trump’s decision to implement a naval blockade aimed at preventing Iranian oil exports, revenues that are essential for the ruling establishment’s economic survival. Second, overt reliance on coercion risks reinforcing Iran’s isolation and undermining its diplomatic credibility. Third, the asymmetry that benefits Iran in crisis, its ability to create uncertainty, loses value in negotiation, where predictability and compliance are paramount. “We leave here with a very simple proposal — a method of understanding that is our final and best offer. We will see if the Iranians accept it,” JD Vance said in his concluding remarks after the Islamabad talks. Against this backdrop, a key question is whether mounting concerns in Washington over risks to the global economy, combined with fears of renewed escalation by Iran, could ultimately create the conditions for reopening the Strait of Hormuz under the terms set by the Trump administration in the coming days.
