The delegations of the Board of Peace (BoP) recently convened in Washington for their inaugural meeting following its creation, bringing together representatives from over 50 countries. This, perhaps, is one of the most consequential diplomatic initiatives of President Donald Trump’s second term. The primary objective of the BoP is to oversee and coordinate reconstruction programs in accordance with the 20-point Gaza peace plan. The BoP currently operates under a limited mandate recognized by the UN Security Council (UNSC), which endorsed it as a temporary coordination body for Gaza reconstruction and potential stabilization efforts under UNSC oversight until 2027.
For Arab and Islamic countries, engagement with the BoP reflects a pragmatic calculation grounded in the urgency of addressing the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza. During the inaugural meeting, Saudi Arabia’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Adel al-Jubeir framed Saudi Arabia’s participation within the lineage of the 1981 Fahd Plan and the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, signaling continuity with longstanding diplomatic commitments. Qatar’s Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani reiterated support for the full implementation of the 20-point plan. Türkiye’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan underscored that sustainable peace rests on a two-state solution. Morocco’s Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita offered financial assistance and deradicalization initiatives aimed at promoting tolerance and coexistence. Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif reiterated support and commended Trump’s efforts in mediating conflicts and bringing peace. These endorsements essentially reflect a calculated optimism and a pragmatic approach to strategically maximize leverage within the given context of the formation of the BoP.
During the meeting, the Chief Commissioner of the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza Dr. Ali Shaath emphasized four key priorities: unifying security forces into a single structure, reviving economic activity and employment, ensuring sustainable emergency relief and restoring basic services. These components are especially vital given the present context and the extensive damage and destruction caused by the war. Beyond material rebuilding, the effectiveness of these measures will depend on institutional coordination and sustained political commitment.
As per UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reports, the Occupied Palestinian Territory is experiencing its worst economic collapse on record. Gaza’s GDP contracted by 83% in 2024, GDP per capita fell to $161 and about 70% of total buildings have been damaged or destroyed. Fiscal pressures have deepened the crisis, with $1.76 billion in Palestinian revenues withheld since 2019 (equal to 12.8% of 2024 GDP), leaving reconstruction needs in Gaza alone exceeding $70 billion and recovery projected to take decades even with substantial international support. Gaza’s recovery will require coordinated and sustained aid and support from the international community. The mechanism for allocation and auditing remains crucial. If disbursement appears politicized or opaque, credibility could quickly erode. For now, Trump has leveraged US diplomatic influence to encourage allies and partners to commit greater financial and technical support. Trump announced that more than $7 billion had been pledged by partner states, with the United States committing an additional $10 billion. Gulf countries alone pledged over $4 billion in support.
According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, over 70,000 Palestinians have been killed since October 7, 2023, with 94% of hospitals in Gaza damaged or destroyed, severely impacting maternal and neonatal care. Maternal deaths and miscarriages have reportedly tripled, while strikes on medical facilities and a blockade restricting essential supplies have worsened living conditions. As per UNICEF, there has also been an increase in malnutrition and disease outbreaks. Rebuilding healthcare facilities and ensuring continued access to medicine and medical aid will be critical for restoring basic public health services and enabling everyday life for the affected population. This has been prioritized in the BoP initiatives, with participating countries committing to allocating resources for reconstruction and rehabilitation.
Security stabilization remains another key pillar of the BoP’s strategy. Several participating states have signaled readiness to contribute personnel to a proposed International Stabilization Force (ISF) comprising 12,000 police and 20,000 soldiers. Morocco has offered to assign high-ranking military officers to the joint command, deploy police trainers and establish a field hospital. Türkiye has committed to supporting security, health, rehabilitation and education sectors, while also contributing to stabilization efforts. Countries such as Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kosovo and Albania have also expressed willingness to deploy personnel. Last year, Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty announced that around 5,000 Palestinian police officers would be trained in Egypt and Jordan. The involvement of neighboring and regional states will be particularly critical, as their familiarity with the regional sociopolitical dynamics and security situation places them in a stronger position to calibrate stabilization efforts and prevent possibilities of a prolonged security vacuum.
Despite the commitments and financial donations, the tangible viability of all these initiatives will depend on building trust and accountability. If Israeli military operations continue intermittently despite the ceasefire, stabilization forces could face operational ambiguity and reputational risk. Hence, ensuring Israel does not violate the agreement and refrains from taking aggressive measures will be a major challenge. Furthermore, security reform inside Gaza requires integration, which will need continuous commitment and coordination along with a credible local partnership. Achieving consensus and building trust will be essential to sustaining these efforts, particularly in a volatile environment that could easily be exploited. Also, the Palestinian political dimension, though often underemphasized in institutional design discussions, remains indispensable. In the case of Gaza, security and political arrangements are deeply interlinked, and governance structures shape security outcomes just as security dynamics influence political legitimacy. Under the proposed 20-point plan, Gaza would be administered through a temporary transitional authority led by a technocratic and apolitical Palestinian committee tasked with overseeing day-to-day public services and municipal functions. While the inclusion of qualified Palestinians alongside international experts may enhance administrative efficiency and technical capacity, the durability of this arrangement will ultimately depend on whether it commands local legitimacy and ensures transparency and accountability. Regional countries have repeatedly underscored the importance of Palestinian consensus, as evident in the Saudi-French initiative.
Another major challenge in the current context is the response from European countries. European powers, including the UK, France and Germany, have refrained from full participation, with some opting for observer status or limited engagement. Their skepticism stems less from opposition to reconstruction than from concerns over institutional balance. European governments remain committed to the UN-centered framework and are wary of highly centralized structures chaired indefinitely by a single leader with broad executive authority. Partly, these concerns also stem from political and normative differences with Trump and his style of diplomacy.
From Washington’s perspective, the initiative serves its regional approach. It reinforces US centrality in Middle Eastern diplomacy and projects coalition-building capacity. At the same time, it reflects a broader pattern in which the United States experiments with parallel frameworks rather than relying exclusively on established institutions.
The BoP, as of now, can be seen as an experiment. It offers a vehicle for coordinated reconstruction anchored by substantial funding and broad regional participation. Its credibility will ultimately hinge on tangible improvements on the ground in Gaza. If it delivers stabilization, employment and restored services, it may emerge as a model of hybrid multilateralism operating alongside the UN framework. In this sense, the BoP can be seen as less a rupture in the international order than a litmus test of the emerging multilateral order. In a lot of ways, it probes whether pragmatic engagement and coalition-building can be successful with traditional multilateral oversight. Its success or failure will shape not only Gaza’s reconstruction trajectory but also perceptions of US leadership and the adaptability of global governance in an era of strategic uncertainty. Arab and Islamic countries participating in the process recognize that constructive engagement is the most pragmatic course of action in the current geopolitical context. It provides them with institutional avenues and practical mechanisms to advance reforms and initiatives necessary to urgently address the catastrophic humanitarian crisis. Given their geographical proximity and political stakes, regional actors acutely feel the consequences of continued instability and therefore bear both a greater responsibility and a stronger incentive to be directly involved. Rather than staying out and forfeiting any kind of influence over the process, participation provides them with the leverage to shape outcomes from within the framework. This allows them to utilize mechanisms to ensure that Palestinian interests are protected, which has been an objective that has consistently remained a central priority.
