Since February 28, Iran attacked the UAE with 2,843 projectiles, predominantly using drones, but also ballistic and cruise missiles were used. Though the interception was extremely high, the hits or the falling debris led to 13 fatalities including three victims described as “military-related personnel,” while the 230 injured belonged to 27 nationalities. The UAE’s corporate, tourism, real estate and energy sector almost ground to a halt. Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin and Salman called his Emirati counterpart thrice to express solidarity and extend cooperation against the shared Iranian threat. Abu Dhabi took a different path in countering Tehran’s aggression and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. While Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Oman, which were also attacked by Iranian projectiles, support the mediation process, the UAE is more inclined toward forcibly opening the strait besides using the right to retaliate.
Though the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states earned global solidarity for enduring Iran’s relentless barrages of drones and missiles, the UAE remained far from impressed. As much as Tehran promoted the narrative of the Gulf state’s nexus with Washington and Tel Aviv, Abu Dhabi perpetuated the alliance further. It was far from impressed with the mediatory efforts of Islamabad, Riyadh, Cairo and Ankara.
On March 17, Adviser to the UAE President Anwar Gargash said Iranian attacks on its Arab neighbors would serve to strengthen relations between Israel and states that have diplomatic ties with Israel.
Israeli media reported that Mossad and Shin Bet chiefs visited the Gulf partner twice during the war but also the director general of the Israeli Ministry of Defense held delegation-level talks. More startlingly, Israeli Premier Benjamin Netanyahu also flew to Abu Dhabi during the war, which reportedly led to “a historic breakthrough in bilateral relations.” It is anybody’s guess if the breakthrough is similar to the Saudi Arabia-Pakistan joint defense pact or the deployment of Iron Dome batteries along with dozens of military personnel.
“Israel just sent (the UAE) Iron Dome batteries and personnel to help them operate them. How come? Because there’s an extraordinary relationship between the UAE and Israel based on the Abraham Accords,” US Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee said at an event in Tel Aviv on May 12. Alongside the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco also recognized Israel six years ago by signing the Abraham Accords in the White House.
While strengthening its strategic alliance with Israel, the UAE withdrew from OPEC and OPEC +. UAE Energy Minister Suhail Al Mazrouei justified the move, saying, “[the] UAE wanted to be unconstrained by any groups,” adding that the quota system limits their ability to increase revenues. However, the timing of the decision to exit from the organization raised eyebrows and speculation.
While other Gulf states reserved their right to respond to Iranian aggression, the UAE chose to exercise it. In early March, Emirati fighter jets struck a water desalination facility in Iran’s Qeshm Island. However, Ali al-Nuaimi, a senior UAE official, rejected the Israeli media report, “When we do something, we have the courage to announce it.” After Iran’s attack on the Fujairah oil terminal on May 4, IRGC Telegram channels and media outlets circulated images purporting to show a UAE Air Force (UAEAF) Mirage 2000-9 over southern Iran. Emirati air force jets not only wear distinct livery but also prominently display manifest markings and serial numbers; the Mirage jet was unmarked. The fact that UAEAF F-16s escorting Syria’s President Ahmed al-Sharaa were devoid of national markings and tail numbers further fueled speculation of UAE involvement in retaliatory attacks against Iran. Interestingly, Iranian officials have not claimed that the UAE successfully carried out retaliatory attacks.
If the herculean task of reaching a compromise between the United States and Iran is reached anytime soon, the UAE will no longer be a haven for the IRGC-linked Iranian elite, which typically used the banking and import system to evade financial and technological sanctions. Israel’s forceful intervention during the war has left a solid impression on the petro state. The over half a century-old dispute with Iran over the islands of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa – courtesy the UK – is separate from smoothing commerce in the Strait of Hormuz. Israel and the UAE have dug in their heels for the ouster of the clerical regime in Iran. Will the Gulf state regain control over the islands? The chances are slim. As of today, the Iranian revolutionary government is holding on to power, hence tensions between Tehran and Abu Dhabi are set to continue, even if a deal is reached between the United States and Iran, which also appears wishful. For Saudi Arabia, its allies and other Gulf states, a defiant UAE hand-in-glove with Israel, poses a different set of undertakings. The foresight of Saudi Arabia’s pragmatic restraint during the war is revealed in Prince Turki Al Faisal’s latest remarks: “Had the Israeli plan to ignite war between us and Iran succeeded, the region would have been plunged into ruin and destruction.” And last but not least, Washington would probably lose the luxury of dealing with the GCC member states as a bloc. After all, the United States cannot disentangle itself from the Middle East, even though its military might be asked to.
