The United States and Iran have entered a double impasse in which negotiations cannot reconcile incompatible political objectives, while military action cannot achieve the strategic outcomes that Washington seeks. This explains why periods of diplomatic optimism are repeatedly followed by renewed threats of escalation, creating the impression of movement without genuine progress. President Donald Trump’s latest remarks that the United States and Iran are engaged in “very deep talks,” while warning that failure would result in “very strong military action,” perfectly capture the strategic paradox that has emerged in the aftermath of the latest confrontation between Washington and Tehran. On the one hand, both governments appear eager to project confidence that diplomacy remains alive. On the other hand, every public statement continues to be accompanied by explicit military threats, suggesting that neither side believes negotiations alone will produce an acceptable outcome. Yet the real obstacle is not the absence of diplomatic engagement. Rather, it is that both diplomacy and military coercion have reached their structural limits.
The optimism surrounding recent diplomatic efforts illustrates this contradiction. Trump suggested that the two countries are close to an agreement, insisting that negotiations are advancing rapidly and that “Either it goes fast or not at all.” However, there is remarkably little evidence that either side has fundamentally altered its negotiating position. Iran continues to insist upon recognition of its authority over the Strait of Hormuz, while the United States continues to reject any modification of the pre-war status quo. Anonymous regional officials have described the latest Omani mediation as producing “progress,” yet the compromise formulas reportedly under discussion appear identical to those proposed several weeks earlier. If neither side has moved, and if the compromises remain unchanged, then the apparent diplomatic momentum reflects political messaging rather than a genuine convergence of positions.
The reason negotiations have become so difficult is that the dispute itself has fundamentally changed. During previous rounds of diplomacy, discussions focused primarily on sanctions, uranium enrichment, nuclear inspections and verification mechanisms. Today, these issues remain important, but they no longer define the central strategic disagreement. Iran has increasingly shifted its focus away from economic incentives toward a broader geopolitical objective: securing permanent recognition of its influence over the Strait of Hormuz, allowing all maritime traffic to coordinate with Iranian authorities and potentially creating the basis for future transit fees. This objective has become more valuable for Tehran than the financial benefits previously associated with sanctions relief.
This evolution fundamentally changes the diplomatic equation because the issue is no longer technical but political. Iran now views Hormuz not simply as a military theater but as a strategic asset capable of permanently reshaping the regional balance of power. The Iranian leadership appears convinced that recent military operations have created an opportunity to establish a new status quo that strengthens Iran’s long-term regional influence. Having invested considerable political capital in presenting this objective domestically as a strategic success, retreating from this position would carry significant internal political costs. Accepting a return to the previous situation would effectively mean admitting that months of confrontation produced no lasting geopolitical gains.
The United States faces an equally difficult political and legal constraint. Washington cannot publicly acknowledge Iranian authority over one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints without undermining decades of US policy regarding freedom of navigation and the principles of international maritime law. Iran’s claim to exercise sovereign control over the Strait of Hormuz beyond the rights granted to littoral states under international law runs counter to the prevailing interpretation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and has been widely rejected by the international community. There is a broad international consensus in favor of preserving the strait as an international waterway open to transit passage. Any US recognition of Tehran’s position would therefore not only contradict longstanding US policy but also challenge the existing international legal order, alarm Gulf partners and risk encouraging other revisionist powers to employ similar coercive strategies elsewhere. Consequently, the White House remains committed to restoring the pre-conflict legal and navigational status quo. The difficulty lies less in the legitimacy of this objective, which is consistent with the prevailing interpretation of international law and supported by a broad international consensus, than in finding a negotiated formula that enables both parties to reconcile their incompatible public positions. The diplomatic deadlock therefore reflects not a lack of communication but the incompatibility of the political objectives themselves. Both governments have domestic and regional reasons preventing them from making the concessions required for a comprehensive settlement.
This diplomatic impasse naturally raises the question of whether military force could succeed where negotiations have failed. Trump has repeatedly suggested that renewed military action remains available should diplomacy collapse. However, the military option suffers from limitations that are no less significant than those constraining diplomacy. Although the United States possesses overwhelming military superiority, reopening the Strait of Hormuz through force alone would face major operational and political obstacles. Previous strikes against Iranian coastal infrastructure have reduced some military capabilities but have proven only marginally effective in preventing Iran from threatening maritime traffic. A sustained campaign capable of permanently securing the strait would require far greater military commitment than Washington is likely to authorize, even under a more risk-tolerant administration.
The central problem is that the military balance and the strategic balance are not identical. US air power can destroy infrastructure, eliminate commanders, damage missile facilities and strike nuclear installations with extraordinary precision. None of these capabilities are in doubt. Yet the ability to destroy targets does not automatically translate into the ability to impose political outcomes. Iran’s strategy has never depended upon matching US conventional military capabilities. Instead, it relies upon asymmetric methods designed to impose persistent costs on superior military powers through maritime disruption, missile attacks, proxy networks and gradual escalation. This asymmetry means that preventing disruption in Hormuz requires continuous US military protection, whereas creating disruption requires only limited and intermittent Iranian action. Maintaining secure shipping lanes therefore imposes far greater operational demands upon the United States than upon Iran.
This explains why even a highly successful US air campaign would struggle to achieve Washington’s political objectives. A renewed offensive would most likely target Iran’s remaining nuclear infrastructure, enriched uranium stockpiles and deeply buried ballistic missile facilities using Massive Ordnance Penetrators and other advanced capabilities. Such strikes could significantly weaken Iranian strategic assets while allowing the Trump administration to claim an important military victory. Nevertheless, degrading capabilities does not necessarily alter political intentions. Tehran could lose nuclear facilities while remaining fully committed to its objective of reshaping the security architecture of the Gulf. Indeed, additional strikes might reinforce the Iranian leadership’s belief that sustained pressure around Hormuz remains the only effective means of compelling Washington to negotiate seriously.
Another important constraint concerns time. Neither side possesses unlimited strategic endurance. For Washington, prolonged military operations would increasingly generate economic and political pressures through higher energy prices, growing concerns about the availability of precision-guided munitions and mounting domestic opposition to another open-ended Middle Eastern conflict. These constraints would probably limit any sustained US offensive to approximately one or two months before pressure for managed de-escalation became overwhelming. Iran also faces severe structural constraints. Years of sanctions, economic mismanagement, high inflation, currency depreciation and chronic underinvestment have left the country ill-equipped to sustain a prolonged confrontation. Continued tensions further deter foreign investment, disrupt trade and exacerbate public dissatisfaction, increasing the economic and political costs for the Iranian establishment. Nevertheless, Iranian leaders appear to believe that their ideological system and their experience in managing sanctions enable them to absorb these hardships more effectively than other governments can withstand the political costs of an extended conflict. This assumption underpins Tehran’s strategy of gradual pressure rather than rapid escalation. Yet it also rests on a questionable premise: that Iran’s increasingly fragile economy and mounting domestic grievances will remain manageable over the long term.
The resulting strategic dynamic resembles a classic contest of political endurance rather than military superiority. Washington hopes that additional military pressure will convince Iran that its ambitions regarding the Strait of Hormuz are unattainable. Tehran believes that continued disruption of maritime commerce will eventually force the United States and its regional partners to accept some form of Iranian influence over the strait. Both governments therefore continue negotiating while simultaneously preparing for renewed confrontation because neither possesses a credible path toward decisive victory. Diplomacy remains necessary because military action cannot solve the underlying political dispute, while military pressure remains attractive because diplomacy alone cannot bridge fundamentally incompatible objectives.
The most plausible outcome is therefore unlikely to resemble either a comprehensive diplomatic agreement or a decisive military victory. Instead, the conflict appears increasingly likely to produce an ambiguous compromise in which both sides publicly maintain their official positions while privately adapting to a modified regional reality. The United States has discovered that overwhelming air power cannot by itself compel political submission, while Iran has learned that coercive leverage alone cannot secure international acceptance of claims that run counter to established principles of international law and freedom of navigation. Tehran’s strategy may succeed in raising the costs of confrontation, but it is unlikely to generate broad international legitimacy for its regional ambitions. If the Iranian leadership continues to rely on coercion to pursue objectives rejected by most of the international community, any diplomatic breakthrough will remain inherently fragile. Until one side fundamentally revises its strategic objectives, above all Iran’s insistence on seeking recognition of claims that lack international legal support, the US-Iran confrontation will remain trapped in this double impasse, where diplomacy cannot resolve the conflict and military force cannot decide it.
Opinions in this article reflect the writer’s point of view, not necessarily the view of Rasanah
