The US midterms changed everything and solved nothing. On election night, US voters delivered a verdict that surprised few people, but the substance of the verdict mattered more than its arithmetic: the Democrats won both chambers on a tide of popular anger over the cost of living and the war with Iran. These key factors were acknowledged by the vice president who plainly stated that the costly war and energy prices had cost the Republicans the Congress.
Consequently, US President Donald Trump begins the second half of his term with his authority intact but his domestic leverage eroded. He can still order strikes, still negotiate, still declare war but every option now carries a price tag. The Congressional Budget Office puts the war’s cost near $38 billion; the Pentagon’s own accounting suggests roughly two-thirds of US missile interceptors are spent. The new Congress will convene on January 3, 2027, and will not be compliant regarding the appropriations process. The $88 billion supplemental funding request put forward by the Trump administration in June sits before a chamber that does not want to fund the war. The incoming House leadership — Hakeem Jeffries, at 94.5% on the prediction markets for the speakership — has promised three priorities: lower costs, check Trump and stop the war with Iran. The first big bills of the new Congress will carry war powers riders, carefully drafted to bar funding for offensive operations while leaving defensive interception untouched.
The president’s own advisers are pressing him, in public and in private, to make the choice he has spent months refusing to make. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on November 11 that Vice President JD Vance has emerged as the lead negotiator on Iran and is weighing face-to-face talks with Mohsen Rezaei, the secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and once the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) longest-serving commander, through a letter Vance sent in late October. Trump told top aides and foreign counterparts he is open to Vance restarting the talks and has empowered him to negotiate. Officials stress the discussions remain preliminary but the WSJ’s framing is blunt about the motive: the war is seen inside the West Wing as a drag on the Republican Party, and before the election Vance told the president personally that he intended to blame any defeat in the midterms on it. Now he has done so, publicly, and the midterms have vindicated him.
Against that stands the other half of the US administration. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Chief of Staff Stephen Miller want the pressure maintained until Tehran concedes; Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent runs Operation Economic Outcast with an openly declared ambition to bring about state collapse; and Secretary of War Pete Hegseth argues the military strikes degraded Iran only partially and the remaining targets should be finished. The same reporting shows Trump keeping both doors open: threatening to strike Iran again while demanding “total victory” in any settlement with Iran. This is not a policy so much as a wager: the president is letting both camps court him, telling each what it wants to hear and pricing the offers as they arrive.
The dilemma, in its cleanest form, is this: Trump can make a deal or he can continue the war, which has just been voted against. Everything else follows from whether he accepts one option or the other. The aid cut, announced on midterm day, ends roughly $3.8 billion in annual assistance to Israel, characterized by AIPAC as a reshuffle and by Israeli analysts as giving up what could not have been renewed anyway. The strain with caretaker Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is evident. The Israeli press described a phone call over whether to resume the strikes as a shouting match; Netanyahu’s office disputes that framing but the disagreement itself is undisputed. Netanyahu wants the ruling establishment in Tehran to fall. Trump wants an agreement with whoever runs it.
Israel’s own election has compounded the problem.
October’s vote produced a Knesset in which Netanyahu’s bloc holds 53 seats but commands the recommendation of only 46 members, after United Torah Judaism ended 17 years of partnership and declined to back him. The Israeli president gave Gadi Eisenkot, the former chief of staff, the mandate; 67 members recommended him, but 19 of those are Arab-led lists whom the Jewish opposition parties are reluctant to bring inside any formal coalition. Eisenkot can therefore build a narrow, fragile government, or one that leans indefinitely on votes from beyond his camp, and if he fails, the mandate returns, and a third election beckons. Until then Netanyahu governs as caretaker, insisting publicly that Arab parties “stole” the election, a claim the election commission and the police have discounted, and Shin Bet is investigating. His ambition survives the arithmetic: regime change in Tehran, the annexationists of the far-right bloc parked just outside government and his own survival fused to maximalism on Iran. An Eisenkot government would pull the other way — consolidation over new fronts, accepting quietly what it could never endorse loudly. Either way, the Begin Doctrine — the institutional conviction, held since 1981, that Israel acts alone against existential threats — resides in the security establishment, not in any particular cabinet, which means Jerusalem’s paralysis does not remove the capacity to scuttle a deal by unilateral action. It only removes the capacity to bless one.
Which brings the focus to Tehran, where the intransigence is loud, the position is weak; and the gap between the two is the whole story. The rhetoric is maximal: the new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei has ordered retaliation “without geographic limits;” “hardliner” newspapers publish target lists running from Cyprus to Diego Garcia. The economics are quite another matter. Several consecutive weeks of blockade have driven oil exports to historic lows, with one estimate at near $276 million a day. The rial trades at around 2 million to the dollar; the IMF projects inflation near 70%; the oil minister has resigned. Rezaei, the man who carried Mojtaba Khamenei’s instruction that the state of “no war, no peace” must now end, has admitted internally that the economy faces one of its most difficult periods in the country’s history. Yet when the WSJ’s report surfaced, it was Rezaei who dismissed the prospect of talks as “imaginary,” vowing Iran would not remove “even a single particle of enriched nuclear material from the country,” while other officials branded reports of meetings as lies aimed at easing economic pressure and lowering oil prices.
Iran can afford to take this stance because its defiance has a logistics backbone. A Reuters investigation counted at least $2 billion in military imports since early 2025, moving through some 5,000 procurement agencies — detonators, propellant ingredients, 93 tonnes of Chinese titanium delivered weeks before the February campaign. Russia has supplied upgraded drones and, reportedly, satellite targeting linked to the destruction of a US airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft; 90 Russian missiles are said to be on order. The pattern is legible: the patrons supply enough for Iran to survive, never enough for it to prevail — which is why its ambitions have narrowed from resistance to endurance, and why negotiations remain the sequencing trap in a new costume: no suspension of enrichment before relief, up-front access to the $8 billion in frozen assets, flexibility on timelines, rigidity on missiles. It is not intransigence out of confidence; it is a weakened establishment pricing its humiliation to the minimum its domestic audience will bear. Meanwhile the IRGC, whose revenues still flow, holds the veto that can detonate any arrangement with a single deniable strike. Taken together, the three positions define Trump’s dilemma going forward. Every party is constrained, and every capital needs the same thing: an arrangement each can call a victory. The Vance letter is the clearest sign yet that Washington intends to chase it. Preliminary or not, a vice president of the United States corresponding with a former IRGC commander is a testament that the war’s opponents are winning the internal argument for now, one memo at a time. But nobody can move first while nobody controls their own flank: Trump cannot influence Congress, Mojtaba Khamenei does not exert full control over the IRGC and no Israeli government yet exists to enforce anything. Attrition is the default, and the default is unstable at both ends: Iran’s economy may not be able to sustain it and Congress will not fund it. Escalation is the tail risk, while Rubio’s faction can still argue the window is open. Watch three signals: whether the Vance-Rezaei channel results in a meeting; whether Eisenkot forms a government before Washington determines a framework; and whether Tehran’s “no war, no peace” narrows to “no war” alone, the indicator that the IRGC has priced the collapse and is ready to accept terms.