On July 25, 2025, Iran and the E3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom) held deputy‑level talks in Istanbul, their first direct exchange since the June conflict between Israel and Iran. That confrontation, which included US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities and Tehran’s subsequent expulsion of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors, sharply increased regional tensions and placed the nuclear file back at the center of international diplomacy.
The Istanbul meeting, described by Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi as “serious, frank and detailed,” concluded with an agreement to resume talks in the coming weeks. Both sides signaled a willingness to keep diplomatic channels open despite deep disagreements. Tehran continues to demand recognition of its right to enrich uranium and confidence‑building measures from Washington, particularly regarding sanctions relief and military posture. The E3 insists on the urgent restoration of IAEA monitoring and a freeze on uranium enrichment above Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) thresholds as conditions for avoiding sanctions reimposition.
Time pressure is shaping the negotiations. The E3 has warned that, in the absence of tangible progress by early September, it is prepared to trigger the snapback mechanism under UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which would restore pre‑JCPOA international sanctions by October 2025. This deadline is reinforced by the legal expiry of the snapback provision itself on October 18, 10 years after the JCPOA’s adoption. Although the United States cannot invoke the snapback mechanism after its 2018 withdrawal from the agreement, it has endorsed the European position and increased both diplomatic and military pressure on Tehran.
The stakes are significant. A failure to reach an understanding risks accelerating regional instability following the Israel–Iran confrontation, fueling proxy conflicts in Lebanon, Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Strategically, the collapse of even limited JCPOA monitoring would leave Iran’s nuclear activities largely opaque, heightening global non‑proliferation concerns. Economically, the reimposition of UN sanctions would significantly constrain Iranian oil exports at a moment of pronounced volatility in global energy markets, potentially amplifying price instability. However, the actual impact of a full snapback will hinge on the positions taken by China and Russia. While neither Beijing nor Moscow can formally block the snapback process, both possess the capacity to ignore the reimposed measures in their bilateral trade and energy cooperation with Tehran. Their willingness — or refusal — to enforce UN restrictions will be a key determinant of whether the sanctions effectively isolate Iran or merely shift its oil exports toward non‑Western markets, blunting the intended economic pressure.
The agreement to meet again offers a narrow opening for diplomacy, but the window is closing fast. For the E3, the challenge lies in using the credible threat of sanctions restoration to generate concessions while keeping the talks alive. For Iran, the choice is between continued nuclear escalation with the risk of economic isolation or engagement that could open a path to de‑escalation and partial sanctions relief.
Two broad scenarios are emerging from the current diplomatic track. The first is a negotiated compromise under which Iran agrees to readmit IAEA inspectors, enabling verification of its nuclear activities, in exchange for the E3 delaying or suspending the activation of snapback sanctions. The second scenario is the triggering of snapback sanctions, with significant geopolitical consequences. Such an outcome would not only deepen Iran’s economic isolation but also prompt critical responses from external actors, notably Russia and China — whose level of compliance with UN measures remains uncertain — and Israel, which could escalate its own security posture in response to Iran’s nuclear trajectory.
Iran, while rejecting the legality of snapback, has expressed openness to “mutual solutions” and technical engagement with the IAEA. Readmitting inspectors to sites like Isfahan, Fordow and Natanz would signal partial compliance and could persuade the E3 to delay triggering the snapback mechanism. Such a gesture would prevent the immediate collapse of the monitoring regime, create space for broader US-Iran engagement on related issues such as ballistic missiles and regional tensions, and reduce the risk of further escalation following the Israel-Iran confrontation. However, compromises carry risks. Iran could offer only partial or temporary cooperation, using inspectors as a bargaining chip rather than as a commitment to transparency. European governments might be criticized domestically for appeasement, while Israel and the United States could interpret any delay as weakness, potentially encouraging unilateral action.
If talks fail, the E3 is expected to proceed with the snapback mechanism by October 2025, reimposing all pre-2015 UN sanctions on Iran, including arms embargoes and restrictions on missile-related technologies. Economically, Iran’s fragile economy — already battered by US sanctions and post-war reconstruction costs — would face deeper isolation. The oil export sector, which had partially recovered through gray-market sales to China, would face renewed pressure. Domestically, “hardliners” could exploit the return of sanctions to consolidate power, portraying Europe as aligned with US and Israeli hostility, while nuclear escalation risks would increase.
Implementation presents its own challenges. Russia and China have consistently criticized Western sanctions as politically motivated and illegal. While the snapback measures would technically restore UN mandates, Moscow and Beijing are unlikely to fully comply. Instead, both may expand economic and technological cooperation with Tehran, viewing Iran as a tactical partner against Western influence. Iran, for its part, has adapted to sanctions through alternative banking systems, barter arrangements and the use of cryptocurrencies.
The reimposition of sanctions could influence Israel’s strategic outlook. Historically, Israel has used diplomatic turning points as justifications for military operations, arguing that sanctions and diplomacy alone cannot prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. With Iran potentially accelerating its nuclear program in retaliation for renewed sanctions, Israel may consider military options ranging from overt preemptive strikes on nuclear facilities to covert operations, including cyberattacks, sabotage and targeted assassinations designed to delay Iran’s nuclear advancements. The success of its recent military operations during the 12 day war may embolden hawkish policymakers in Tel Aviv, who could present military action as a necessary complement to Western diplomatic efforts.
Such actions carry risks of significant escalation. A direct Israeli strike could trigger Iranian retaliation through regional proxies, leading to a wider regional conflict. Moreover, if snapback sanctions are perceived as coordinated with military threats, Tehran might abandon all JCPOA-related commitments, including IAEA monitoring, further accelerating nuclear tensions.
To manage these challenges, the E3 should prioritize restoring IAEA monitoring as a trust-building measure, avoiding early snapback activation unless Iran fully rejects oversight. Engaging Russia and China proactively is also essential to prevent complete fragmentation of sanctions enforcement. Western diplomacy should seek limited agreements with Moscow and Beijing, particularly on missile proliferation, while ensuring that sanctions are framed as tools for diplomacy, not as precursors to military action.
The July 25 talks mark a pivotal moment in the trajectory of Iran-E3 relations. A narrow window exists to avoid the snapback mechanism through limited Iranian concessions and the restoration of IAEA monitoring. If that window closes, sanctions will return by October 2025, with uncertain enforcement and a heightened risk of military escalation.
Opinions in this article reflect the writer’s point of view, not necessarily the view of Rasanah
