A new development highlights the growing contrast between Iran under the elder Khamenei, when the supreme leader’s dominance over the political landscape was often tempered by his ability to maintain a flexible balance among competing centers of power, and Iran under his son, where the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the “hardliner” camp appear to be tightening their grip over the state’s key institutions, security and military apparatus and strategic decision-making. Mojtaba Khamenei, in his capacity as supreme commander of the Armed Forces, has issued a sweeping package of decisions described as revolutionary, appointing six senior military commanders to key positions at the top of the country’s security and military establishment, including the General Staff of the Armed Forces, the IRGC, the Basij Resistance Force and the Artesh Navy. The appointments came just 24 hours after Major General Mohsen Rezaei was named secretary of the Supreme National Security Council. The moves represent the first comprehensive restructuring of Iran’s security and military leadership hierarchy since Ali Khamenei’s son assumed power. They also come at a particularly precarious moment for Tehran, as Iran confronts a complex array of challenges amid mounting regional tensions, renewed fears of war and intensifying pressure on both the Iranian state and its network of regional allies and proxies.
Six of the seven newly appointed leaders are affiliated with the IRGC, underscoring the extent to which it is consolidating its position at the center of Iran’s military and security establishment. The appointments include the new secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, who replaces Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr; Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi, who was promoted to major general and appointed commander-in-chief of the IRGC succeeding General Mohammad Pakpour. Vahidi has unofficially been performing Pakpour’s duties since his assassination. The appointments also include his deputy, Major General Mostafa Izadi. Major General Ali Abdollahi was appointed chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces after serving as commander of the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters — the main operational command center of Iran’s military, replacing General Abdolrahim Mousavi. Brigadier General Ali Azmaei was named commander of the IRGC Navy, succeeding Ali Tangsiri, while cleric Hossein Taeb was appointed head of the Basij Resistance Force, replacing Gholam Reza Soleimani.
The seventh appointee, unlike the others, comes from the regular army rather than the IRGC: Brigadier General Kioumars Heydari was named as Abdollahi’s deputy. The appointments appear designed to reshape the operational command structure of Iran’s armed forces, the IRGC and the Basij, while bringing these formations into a more unified command framework centered on the IRGC. Most of the newly appointed commanders also bring extensive battlefield experience, dating back to the eight-year Iran-Iraq War as well as their involvement in more recent conflicts. The new appointments, which further consolidate the IRGC’s dominance over Iran’s decision-making process, signify Iran’s trajectory in the next phase, both domestically and abroad.
At home, Iran may be heading toward a new phase of intensified security controls to contain potential reform initiatives and prevent renewed protests once the war comes to an end. The reshuffling suggests that the leadership is already anticipating the challenges of the post-war period — and, in particular, the possibility of a broad popular uprising fueled by mounting socioeconomic grievances which have been compounded by the war and failed state policies. The leadership’s concern about the population’s readiness to return to the streets appears to be growing. From the establishment’s perspective, the prospect of renewed mass unrest may pose a greater threat to its long-term survival than the war. Yet the leadership continues to mobilize the state’s resources and the population around the war effort, viewing the preservation of the political system and its continuity as inseparable from its ability to withstand the external confrontation.
Taeb’s appointment as head of the Basij can be viewed as a preemptive move to prepare for the internal instability that could emerge in the next phase. He is a powerful figure with close ties to Mojtaba Khamenei and has extensive experience in suppressing protests, including the 2009 post-election unrest. His appointment therefore sends a clear message domestically: any attempt to revive mass protests is likely to be met with a highly forceful response, particularly as Iranian authorities face what they perceive as Israeli and US efforts to mobilize public opposition against the state. The supreme leader’s decree accompanying Taeb’s appointment is equally significant. By calling for the deepening of the Basij’s culture of mobilization and resistance and for the realization of the slogan “Every Iranian is a Basij,” the decree points to an effort to expand the organization’s ideological and security influence throughout Iranian society. This indicates that the Basij could undergo extensive structural and organizational changes in the next phase, with a renewed emphasis on domestic security and social control. The objective would be to transform the Basij from what has increasingly become a bureaucratic organizational structure back into one of the country’s principal instruments of internal power and resistance. Taeb’s intelligence background and experience in managing domestic unrest could prove particularly valuable in driving that transformation.
The significations of the recent appointments also lie in the return of figures associated with the first generation of revolutionaries, many of whom previously held senior positions within the inner circle surrounding both Ali Khamenei and his son, Mojtaba. Their elevation suggests that the establishment is turning once again to an established cadre of veterans committed to the doctrine of Wilayat al- Faqih (the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist) as it seeks to reinforce the foundations of its authority. The reshuffle also indicates that the “hardliner” faction has consolidated its control over the state, leaving little room for the younger generation to emerge as an alternative center of power. At the same time, it could constrain the political prospects of Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who has sought to position himself as a pragmatic figure potentially more acceptable to the United States. Rezaei’s appointment appears to convey a message aimed primarily at the domestic audience rather than foreign capitals: the IRGC remains the institution that ultimately determines Iran’s most consequential strategic decisions, particularly at a highly sensitive moment for the region. The longstanding ties among Vahidi, Rezaei and, to a certain extent, Taeb could also facilitate the emergence of a powerful security and military bloc within the new leadership structure. Such coordination may, among other objectives, be intended to strengthen the establishment’s ability to detect and counter intelligence penetrations at a time when its security vulnerabilities have come under heightened scrutiny.
Externally, the implications of the appointments are even more consequential given the prevailing wartime environment. The reshuffle points to the emergence of a new phase in which Tehran is preparing for the worst-case scenario and seeking to ensure that its military and security establishment is capable of responding rapidly should hostilities resume. The new leadership structure suggests that Iran is moving toward a strategy of maximum deterrence, combining stronger defensive preparations with a broader offensive posture across the region. The objective is to deter what Tehran views as potential US-Israeli military adventurism by ensuring that any attack on Iran would trigger a rapid and disproportionate response. The supreme leader’s instructions to the newly appointed commanders to maintain a high level of defensive readiness while securing an effective retaliatory capability — defined by faster and more substantial offensive preparedness — appear to reflect this approach.
This posture suggests that Tehran increasingly sees negotiations and military action as complementary rather than mutually exclusive tools. Iran may seek to remain at the negotiating table while simultaneously retaining, and potentially demonstrating, its ability to launch offensive operations, including preemptive or retaliatory strikes against US and Israeli interests and military positions across the region. Tehran’s attacks on US bases in Jordan is a clear example. Such a strategy intends to raise the costs of further attacks by the United States and diminish prospects for major Iranian concessions on outstanding negotiating issues. Tehran may also seek to establish a more balanced negotiating position in which its military capabilities and wartime gains provide leverage at the negotiating table, including preserving the gains secured under the memorandum of understanding. The leadership appears increasingly prepared to accept a return to open conflict rather than enter negotiations from a position of weakness, particularly amid persistent US and Israeli threats of a potentially unprecedented strike against Iran. This approach reflects Tehran’s calculation that regional pressure and diplomatic efforts to prevent another major war may ultimately constrain Washington and Tel Aviv more effectively than unilateral Iranian concessions, given the potentially catastrophic consequences of a wider conflict across the Middle East.
In other words, the new appointments suggest that Iran may no longer wait for the United States to mobilize its forces and launch an attack before responding, as was more characteristic of the approach under the elder Khamenei. Instead, Tehran appears to be moving toward a more proactive doctrine in which it could respond to indications of military buildups or preparations for an attack before an offensive is actually launched, particularly as the possibility of a broader regional war grows over the coming weeks and months. This shift toward preemptive action is particularly evident in the appointment of Vahidi. The supreme leader promoted Vahidi to the rank of major general and instructed him to maintain a high level of vigilance and readiness to conduct powerful offensive operations against the country’s adversaries. Vahidi’s formal elevation also appears to reflect the supreme leader’s confidence in the way Iran’s military operations were managed during the war, prompting the leadership to prepare for the possibility of a prolonged confrontation in which, according to its calculations, Iran would not be the only party to suffer significant losses. The new approach could therefore broaden Iran’s willingness to consider preemptive operations and expand the range of military options available to it, with the aim of raising the costs of any renewed confrontation for the Trump administration, particularly as the US midterm elections approach. Azmaei’s appointment also fits into this broader strategy. His extensive experience commanding the IRGC’s Fifth Naval Region, which covers the waters of the Arabian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, makes him particularly suited to maintaining and potentially expanding the IRGC’s aggressive maritime posture toward oil vessels and tankers. His elevation could lead to intensified Iranian activity around the Strait of Hormuz, which has emerged as one of the most contentious fronts in the confrontation between Washington and Tehran. For Iran, control and leverage over the waterway increasingly appear to constitute a long-term strategic objective rather than a temporary bargaining tool designed merely to improve its position at the negotiating table.
Perhaps the clearest indication emerging from the appointments concerns Iran’s intentions toward its regional network of allies. The growing dominance of the IRGC raises fresh questions about the future of the Saudi-Iranian normalization agreement and the trajectory of Tehran’s relations with the Gulf states, while also complicating efforts to reach arrangements over the future of militia weapons in Iraq.
This may help explain Quds Force Commander Esmail Qaani’s visit to Iraq on August 11, 2026. Reports of an Iranian refusal to support the full disarmament of Iraqi militias have raised concerns that such a position could eventually set a precedent for similar demands concerning Hezbollah in Lebanon. Those concerns have been reinforced by the changing strategic geography along Iraq’s northern borders. Current discussions have reportedly focused on the possibility of transferring only conventional military weapons — such as artillery and tanks — to the Iraqi state while allowing militias to retain missiles and drones, which constitute the core of their military capabilities and their principal leverage in regional conflicts.
The reshuffle also reinforces the impression that activating the “Axis of Resistance” has become a permanent component of Iranian strategy rather than a tactical instrument that can be scaled back according to circumstances. This marks an important departure from the final years of the elder Khamenei’s rule, when the network suffered a series of major setbacks and speculation grew that Tehran might be reconsidering its commitment to the axis.
Under a leadership structure increasingly dominated by the IRGC, however, Iran appears more likely to reactivate the network under the doctrine of “unity of the arenas” whereby pressure on one member or theater is treated as a threat requiring a response elsewhere. This approach is already reflected in Tehran’s insistence on including the future of its regional proxies and allied groups in negotiations with Washington, as well as its demand that any agreement to halt attacks against Iran be accompanied by an end to Israeli military operations across the region.
The principle has reportedly been extended even further, with Iranian officials warning that attacks against southern Lebanon could trigger comparable Iranian or allied strikes elsewhere. Such positions suggest that Tehran increasingly views its regional network not merely as a collection of separate partners and proxies, but as an integrated component of its national security and deterrence strategy.
In conclusion, Iran is seemingly entering a new phase in which the IRGC will exercise greater influence over the country’s strategic decision-making. Tehran appears to be preparing for a prolonged confrontation with the United States and Israel that could unfold across multiple fronts, both inside Iran and throughout the region. The recent reshuffle also suggests that Tehran is moving beyond its previous policy of strategic restraint toward a more explicitly offensive military doctrine. By placing experienced and influential wartime commanders at the highest levels of strategic decision-making, the leadership appears intent on developing the capacity to impose greater costs on the Trump administration while strengthening Iran’s ability to respond before an adversary can fully execute an attack. This emerging doctrine places greater emphasis on preemptive and offensive strikes as a means of deterrence, potentially increasing the risk of further escalation and widening the conflict into a broader regional war — the very scenario that regional and international actors have sought to avoid. The strategic environment has already become considerably more complex, with military, political and proxy fronts increasingly interconnected. Yet the new leadership will face significant constraints. Limited time to rebuild capabilities, the scale of Iran’s unprecedented losses, the potentially enormous costs of a coordinated US-Israeli attack and continued shifts in the Middle East’s strategic landscape could all limit Tehran’s ability to translate its new military doctrine into sustained action. The challenge for Iran’s new security and military leadership will therefore be to balance its growing preference for offensive deterrence against the risks of provoking a confrontation that could exceed its ability to control.
Opinions in this article reflect the writer’s point of view, not necessarily the view of Rasanah
