Following the signing of a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement with Iran, Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized the necessity of ensuring peace and stability in the Middle East “to serve the interests of […] both countries.” This agreement raises questions about the impact of the growing Russian-Iranian cooperation on regional security and the interests of regional countries, especially the Gulf states, which have relations with both Russia and Iran.
In addition to the partnership agreement, there are indications of a deal for the export of Russian gas to Iran, which may start at 2 billion cubic meters and rise to 55 billion cubic meters annually. This could aid energy coordination between the two sides and perhaps even result in the use of energy as a political tool by the Russians as previously energy issues were a means of competition between them. The signing of the agreement occurred three years after preparation and review, and just three days before US President Donald Trump reentered the White House. This led some to describe it as a “gift to Trump” against the backdrop of the rapid development of relations between the two countries because of Iranian support to Russian military efforts in Ukraine , as well as expertise and help provided to Moscow to help it evade international sanctions. In return, Tehran hoped to receive economic, political, technological and military support from Russia.
Previously, despite their unstable relationship, the two countries cooperated in the security and military sectors through a joint air defense agreement signed in 2007, under which Moscow supplied Tehran with S-300 air defense missile systems. Additionally, six Su-25 ground attack aircraft were provided in 2000. In March 2024, they announced the completion of a deal for SU-35 fighter jets, likely including attack helicopters such as the Mi-28 and Ka-52, as well as Yak-130 training aircraft. According to a report by the International Institute for Iranian Studies (Rasanah), Iran announced through its media that it had recently received the Russian SU-35 fighter jets.
The two sides also signed a specific agreement in 2005 related to the nuclear sector, with Russia agreeing to supply Iran with the necessary fuel for the Bushehr reactor, while the latter committed to return the spent nuclear fuel rods from the reactor to Moscow. Additionally, Moscow agreed to the construction of the second and third phases of the Bushehr reactor, including the establishment of reactor containment walls for the second unit in phase two and the construction of main pumping stations and auxiliary buildings, as well as groundwater enhancement.
During the Caucasus-2020 exercise, Tehran offered Moscow three naval bases in Chabahar, Bandar Abbas, and Bandar Bushehr in the Arabian Gulf, in return for the transfer of Russian nuclear and space technologies, including the deployment of air defense systems and long-range ballistic missiles in Iran. This was favorably received in Moscow, which dreams of reaching the warm shores of the Gulf.
Russia also contributed to the launch of the Iranian satellite “Khayyam” into orbit, which raised suspicions regarding its purpose and relevance to the militarization of the Iranian nuclear program, and it was used by Russia to monitor its military operations in Ukraine. Additionally, the agreement to purchase satellites from Russia was transformed into an “agreement for the transfer of space technology” to Iran, under which the two countries collaborated in manufacturing Khayyam satellites (2-3-4).
However, Moscow previously attempted to impede the nuclear agreement with Iran in 2015, according to a leaked audio recording of then-Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. This is consistent with a persistent Russian approach to keep Iran as a pawn in the Russian chess game by obstructing any Western accord with Tehran, even regarding the nuclear issue which is a cause of concern among regional and international states.
In this context, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov rejected a request from the former Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian to assign Moscow’s role in coordinating nuclear talks to Beijing, following Russia’s international isolation due to its invasion of Ukraine. This rejection was not surprising, according to Rajab Safarov, a senior Russian expert on Iranian affairs, as “A Western-oriented Iran would be worse for Russia than a nuclear-armed Iran, and would lead to Russia’s collapse.”
From Deterrence to Intimidation
Recently, several officials and close aides of the Iranian supreme leader indicated the possibility of militarizing the country’s nuclear program due to external pressures and the negative repercussions of Operation Al-Aqsa Flood on Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Assad regime, among other Iranian regional proxies. These negative repercussions weakened Iran’s “forward defense” doctrine and dismantled the barrier against direct attacks between Iran and Israel. Additionally, Trump’s return and his steadfast support for Israel, alongside the re-imposition of his administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign against Tehran, all contributed to Iranian hardliner officials calling for a revision of Iran’s nuclear doctrine with a clear emphasis on its militarization.
Iran views nuclear armament as the ultimate deterrent against any future Israeli aggression. This perception is enhanced by research that asserts that the Ukraine war has once again catapulted nuclear competition to the forefront of great power relations, coinciding with the suspension of the New START Treaty between the United States and Russia, alongside the latter’s modification of its nuclear doctrine and lowering of nuclear use thresholds. According to the Middle East Council on Global Affairs, the issuance n of statements by prominent Iranian officials through state media advocating for nuclear armament was a clear calculated attempt to prepare Iranian public opinion for a potential change in the Iranian nuclear doctrine. Iranian Parliament member Ahmad Bakhshayesh Ardestani, reflected this changing mood among Iranian hardliners when he remarked, “Iran bears the costs of possessing nuclear weapons without actually having them. The nuclear agreement is not revived, and we do not have a nuclear bomb. Yet we are still subjected to sanctions. Is this situation rational?”
Through adjusting its nuclear doctrine with threats of nuclear weapon usage, Moscow is moving toward leveraging coercive nuclear threats to serve its political and strategic objectives by shifting from “deterrence” to “intimidation,” even against non-nuclear states. This shift also entails Belarus’s inclusion under the Russian nuclear umbrella, including the deployment of nuclear weapons on Belarusian soil. Moreover, Russia’s rapprochement with North Korea, driven by its need for the latter in Ukraine, has led to the dismantling of international restrictions on Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile program, including the dissolution of the UN experts’ body focused on North Korea’s nuclear program.
Moscow-Tehran Pact: A Nuclear Shadow Over the Middle East
Moscow’s consolidation of ties with Tehran, through the strategic partnership agreement, may lead to grave consequences for nuclear proliferation and the security of the Middle East, particularly the Arabian Peninsula, according to another report from the Middle East Council. The agreement includes strategic consultations on shared security threats, military exercises, and joint defense industrial cooperation. While the document’s provisions are somewhat vague, they strongly indicate that the rapprochement between the two parties is more than just a marriage of convenience. It reflects a genuine commitment to coordinating their security policies. As described by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi , “This is not just a political document but a roadmap for the future.”
Consequently, the Council warned of the possibility of Russia becoming involved in Iran’s nuclear activities, which would escalate regional tensions. This is underscored by the contradictions in its positions, as despite international concerns regarding Tehran’s intentions, Moscow has supported Iran’s nuclear program. Furthermore, both Washington and London have expressed concerns regarding Moscow sharing nuclear secrets with Tehran in exchange for supplying it with ballistic missiles to strike Ukraine.
Given the imposition of severe Western sanctions on both countries, Moscow is contemplating providing further nuclear support to Iran. During a meeting with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian in January 2025, Putin confirmed that his country is considering constructing additional nuclear units in Iran.
Moscow may also resort to challenging the military balance between Iran and Israel and the United States by supplying Tehran with the S-400 air defense system to counter any potential Israeli or joint attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities, despite Russia’s opposition to Iran’s nuclear ambitions. This possibility raises tensions in the Gulf region, with the Middle East Council on Global Affairs indicating potential threats to Gulf security arising from the Moscow-Tehran rapprochement. While driven by the need to confront Western pressures, the possibility of their cooperation on the Yemeni file and nuclear technology could pose a great risk to Gulf security.
It’s worth noting Russia’s support for Iranian regional proxies, as indicated by some sources, ranging from the former Assad regime in Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, Hamas in Gaza, and Iraqi Shiite militias. This support is not solely for Iran’s benefit but is also a calculation of Russian interests and balances within the context of international competition. According to the Jamestown Foundation, Moscow seeks to leverage its cooperation with the aforesaid militias to increase its bargaining chips with global and regional players, enhancing its geopolitical influence, while using these ties to shape favorable power dynamics in the region, including countering Western adversaries and regional states simultaneously. There is no doubt such Russian ties and dynamics will negatively impact regional security and the ambitions of Gulf states in the region.
This point is highlighted by John Alterman, a Middle East expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, who states, “The Iranians certainly have some worrying capabilities [like nuclear capabilities, etc.], the Russians have certainly demonstrated a willingness to use worrying capabilities.” He notes that “the Russians have a great nose for someone in trouble,” suggesting that “we can help them a little bit, but we can get them where we need them and extract more from them that we want.”
From the above, the strategic partnership agreement between Russia and Iran cannot be viewed as a deal solely pertinent to the two parties, with limited implications. The timing of the document’s signing and some of its provisions represent a message to regional and international parties that both nations have overcome their historical trust crisis, with an enhanced commitment to achieving their strategic and geopolitical ambitions using all possible shared tools, including nuclear intimidation.
Looking ahead to the possibility of ending the Russian war in Ukraine, which could free Moscow from needing Arab and Gulf political and economic support, there appears to be a pressing need to prepare for any change in Moscow’s policy toward the Arab region, specifically toward the Gulf, including its efforts to elevate military and nuclear cooperation with Iran or increased collaboration with Iranian-aligned regional militias to accumulate leverage and influence while expanding its geopolitical space, especially following the fall of the Assad regime.
Opinions in this article reflect the writer’s point of view, not necessarily the view of Rasanah
