Nearly a month after the overthrow of President Mohamed Bazoum, the new military authorities of Niger ordered French Ambassador Sylvain Itté to “leave the national territory within 48 hours” and announced their decision to “withdraw [his] approval.” In a letter from the Nigerien Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent to the French Foreign Office, the new military authorities justified this request by “the ambassador’s refusal to respond to the ministry’s invitation” for an interview, and by “other acts of the French government, contrary to the interests of Niger.” This new request is a reminder of the declining influence of France in the Sahel region. The decision of the new military authorities of Niger follows in the footsteps of Mali and Burkina Faso, where there is no longer a French ambassador.
There is also a regional dimension explaining the crisis in Niger and the possible consequences for French influence in the Sahel. If France has a large military presence in Niger, this is because of the redeployment of French military forces from Mali and Burkina Faso. In these two countries, the emergence of new military powers led to a rapid deterioration in relations with the former colonial power, France.
The new military authorities of Niger are asking for the withdrawal by early September 2023 of some 1,500 French soldiers stationed in the country. The fate of the French troops is at risk; they have been present since 2013 alongside the Nigerien army to fight against jihadist movements. Some 20,000 people gathered in Niamey, Niger’s capital city, to support the new military authorities, the day after announcing their 48-hour ultimatum given to the French ambassador to leave the country. Supporters of the new military authorities met in the Seyni Kountché stadium, the largest in Niger, with Nigerien, Algerian and Russian flags displayed at the gathering. The discourse of the new authorities underlines that the July 26 coup is an act of independence after more than 60 years of depending on an unbalanced relationship with the former colonial power.
The National Council for the Safeguarding of the Homeland (CNSP) which is now in power, headed by General Abdourahamane Tiani, has since taken France, the former colonial power, as its preferred target. This political discourse aims to gather popular support against the former colonial power and to build a new foreign policy with a key priority to establish new partnerships to be able to reduce French influence in Niger and across the whole Sahel region. The CNSP is ready to fight against the Economic Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS) threat of military intervention and the use of economic sanctions against it. Given the CNSP’s determination and unwavering stance, one has to consider the choice of diplomacy rather than the use of military force to resolve the political crisis in Niger.
Largely underestimated, the stakes of the fourth putsch in West Africa in two years (after Mali, Guinea and Burkina Faso) are indeed major for Niger, the region and beyond. Moreover, unlike Mali and Burkina Faso, the putschists do not represent a new rising and dissatisfied generation within the army. Aged 59, the main architect of the coup, General Tiani, had been the head of the presidential guard since 2011, while the deputy of the junta, General Salifou Mody, is 60 years old and was the chief of general staff from 2020 to April 2023.
The internal dimension of continuity inside the Nigerien military institution is not preventing the new authorities from using the anti-French feelings of part of the population to achieve policy objectives such as ending French influence in Niger. Beyond the popular challenge, France has to consider US posturing in the region and Washington’s choice of pursuing a diplomatic path. The immediate rapprochement with neighboring Mali, Burkina Faso and their Russian allies is a sign of a regional reorganization of alliances. A Sahel hostile to Western interests is ready to explore all alternative partnerships in the aid market (not just Russian but also Arab and Chinese). There are similarities between the coups in Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso. The first similarity is the failure of the so-called war against terrorism. The French military was initially ready to support Sahelian states fight against the jihadist threat, however, after a few years the French military presence became reflective of a post-colonial project. The second similarity is the use of anti-French sentiment as a political driver to build the legitimacy of the new military powers after the coups and, eventually, the proximity with Russia as a foreign policy choice of the new military authorities. The Sahel is becoming a new example of the decline of the Western international order in the African continent and, more particularly, the beginning of the end of French influence in the Sahel region. Despite these new geopolitical dynamics, one month after the coup, the diplomatic option remains the preferred tool of regional and international powers given the risk of further destabilization of the Sahel region in case of a military intervention.
Opinions in this article reflect the writer’s point of view, not necessarily the view of Rasanah
