Roughly five months after the announcement of the Iraqi parliamentary election results, the political forces within the Coordination Framework resolved the question of who would assume the premiership of the new Iraqi government by nominating Ali al-Zaidi for the post. Newly elected President Nizar Amidi subsequently issued a formal mandate appointing him to lead the government and tasking him with forming a cabinet within 30 days of the designation. This development raises a number of questions regarding what the incoming prime minister can realistically deliver in terms of practical approaches and political understandings to facilitate the formation of his cabinet. These questions are particularly pressing given the absence of a cohesive party base capable of supporting him and mitigating the pressures he faces from rival political blocs. The questions also extend to how effectively he can address the accumulated burdens of internal and external challenges confronting his government. At the same time, attention turns to the expectations held by Arab and Gulf countries, particularly in relation to strengthening partnership agreements grounded in a collective approach to safeguard national sovereignty and curb the influence of non-state actors as they are perceived as a threat to Arab and Gulf security.
The appointment of the new prime minister comes at a critical, highly sensitive and potentially perilous juncture. It requires experience, political acumen and strategic judgment to contain internal crises and polarization while balancing competing regional and international pressures. In this context, Zaidi indeed will be navigating a precarious path, akin to walking a tightrope between the orientations of the Coordination Framework and the expectations of external actors, particularly the United States, regarding Iraq at this stage.
Iraq is undergoing a phase marked by an intensifying struggle over power and influence domestically, alongside strained — and in some cases increasingly tense — relations with certain regional and international actors. This predicament is linked to the involvement of Iran-aligned militias operating within Iraq in the context of the US-Iran confrontation, as well as their role in targeting Gulf states during the current conflict.
Most observers of Iraqi affairs concur that the central challenge confronting successive Iraqi governments for more than two decades has been the encroachment of non-state actors on Iraqi sovereignty. This dynamic has generated a web of complex subsidiary issues that have adversely affected Iraq’s internal stability, its regional standing and its relations with its closest Arab and Gulf neighbors. These states engage with Iraq on the basis of shared interests and mutual benefit, with a view to fostering an active and balanced Iraqi role in its external relations.
In this context, Zaidi’s approach to constructive engagement with Arab states in general, and the Gulf states in particular, will serve as a critical measure of his capacity to pursue a balanced domestic and foreign policy — one that advances mutual interests broadly, while prioritizing Iraq’s national interests in accordance with established principles of national policy. Against this backdrop, a number of key issues remain under close scrutiny by observers of Iraqi affairs, and constitute pressing challenges that the incoming prime minister will be expected to address, as discussed below.
The Nation-state Versus the Militia Conundrum
The persistent failure to resolve this dilemma — namely, the inability to transition from a militia-dominated order, in which armed groups override Iraqi decision-making, to a sovereign national state that safeguards the country’s interests — has inflicted deep and ongoing harm on Iraq’s fundamental interests. After more than two decades under the weight of a prevailing militia-driven dynamic, Iraq remains without the development model or regional standing commensurate with its capabilities and potential.
Instead, the country is entangled in a dense and compounding web of challenges that have steadily eroded its capabilities. These pressures have been further intensified by sanctions and external constraints, as well as by the entrenched influence of militias whose actions — including attacks that have extended to the Gulf states seeking relations based on good neighborliness and mutual benefit —have compounded Iraq’s difficulties and strained its regional ties.
A Balanced Foreign Policy Versus Subordination
A core problem that has undermined Iraq’s progress, as reflected in the experience of successive Iraqi governments, is the failure to craft a balanced foreign policy. This failure has thwarted the realization of reconciliation, security and stability. Amid intensifying regional and international conflicts and competition over resources, power and influence, reliance on a single regional actor does not serve Iraq’s interests, particularly when that actor seeks to advance its own priorities at Iraq’s expense. Such dependence risks the imposition of external agendas that further complicate Iraq’s challenges.
Consensual Approach Versus Sectarianism
The experience of successive Iraqi governments suggests that sectarian and ideological elites tend, in practice, to prioritize the interests of influential political forces and their external backers over Iraq’s collective national interests. This dynamic has weakened the state’s capacity to fulfill its core functions, including the provision of services, the maintenance of security and stability, the preservation of independence and the pursuit of balanced foreign relations.
Historically, government performance has been marred by the pursuit of factional interests over a unifying national vision, exacerbating systemic crises and deepening public disillusionment.
Accordingly, confronting the issue of uncontrolled weapons, restraining militia conduct, halting their repeated attacks on Arab and Gulf states and preventing the use of Iraqi territory as a platform for threatening Gulf security should rank among the foremost priorities of the incoming Iraqi government. Such steps would signal a clear commitment to repairing bilateral relations that have been strained by cross-border attacks and the summoning of Iraqi ambassadors — an unprecedented development in Arab diplomatic practice that underscores the seriousness of these breaches, especially among Gulf states that typically adhere to principles of good neighborliness and non-interference.
At the same time, these states maintain significant economic and development projects with Iraq, spanning energy, reconstruction, infrastructure investment, and electrical grid interconnection aimed at alleviating the country’s acute electricity deficit. They also seek to strengthen the effectiveness of states committed to development and institutional recovery, as reflected in their extensive support for the Syrian government in the post-Assad period, which has already made tangible progress in addressing the country’s challenges and rebuilding state institutions.
The Gulf states acknowledge that the Iraqi government is not directly responsible for the militias that target them and that these groups form part of Iran’s regional network and operate under its direction. However, they maintain that the Iraqi state bears primary legal responsibility in tackling this issue. This stems from the fact that these militias operate from Iraqi territory and that successive Iraqi governments have, in practice, contributed to consolidating an approach that reinforces the prevailing militia dynamic within the country.
The new government thus faces a persistent dilemma: militias exceeding the bounds of state authority and drawing Iraq into regional confrontations that undermine its external relations. In this context, the incoming Iraqi government is presented with a potential opening to challenge the militias’ hold over Iraqi decision-making. This opportunity is linked to the network of relations among influential Shiite forces backing Zaidi, particularly amid indications of Iran’s relative retrenchment under US pressure, its reduced capacity to sustain regional proxies and a growing prioritization of its own national interests.
As such, the new Iraqi leadership should work toward balanced regional and international policies, while distancing Iraq as much as possible from the dynamics of rival axes. In parallel, the formation of a national government grounded in practical necessities and the promotion of competence would help mitigate the severity of Iraq’s entrenched crises, reinforce Iraq-Arab relations essential to the country’s reconstruction and ease external pressures.
Such pressures are particularly evident in the stance of the United States under the Trump administration, which recently moved to halt a $500 million transfer to Iraq — funds held in Iraqi accounts at the US Federal Reserve derived from oil sales. This step reflects an additional lever of pressure aimed at compelling Iraq to curb militia influence, move toward their dismantlement and recalibrate its relationship with Iran.
In conclusion, Arab and Gulf states are not anticipating dramatic breakthroughs from the new Iraqi government, but rather tangible measures and clear answers to a set of fundamental questions that will serve as meaningful benchmarks for the future of Iraq-Arab and Gulf relations. Chief among these are whether the Iraqi government can bring the proliferation of weapons under state control, and whether it can prevent Iraq from being used as a platform to threaten Arab and Gulf security. The trajectory of these relations will hinge on the scope and limits of the progress achieved by Zaidi’s government in addressing these sensitive issues. Should it succeed in taking concrete steps to curb militia power and restrict their freedom of action, relations are likely to move toward a more robust bilateral partnership. Conversely, if existing conditions persist, ties with neighboring states may remain tenuous in light of the hostile actions carried out by militias against the Gulf states — particularly as the Gulf states continue to assess the viability and effectiveness of their development projects with Iraq. Accordingly, the new prime minister faces the task of exerting sustained efforts to reinvigorate frameworks of cooperation and rebuild trust, so that prospects for partnership do not dissipate and Iraq does not forfeit unique opportunities of long-term strategic significance.
