The Iran war has exposed the role of extra-regional powers in the Middle East, while highlighting how their responses are redefining contemporary great power politics. Regional instability has significant consequences for critical sea lanes, energy supplies and global trade, which have direct implications for energy-importing countries in Asia. In this context, China’s considerations and role become important both for the nature of its ties with Iran and its regional priorities. Over onefifth of the world’s oil supply transits the Strait of Hormuz, and for China, whose manufacturingdriven economy depends on stable and affordable energy, disruptions in this chokepoint carry strategic weight far beyond the Middle East, despite Beijing’s energy diversification and large oil stockpiles. While China has significant stakes in the region, it has so far refrained from direct military involvement, instead adopting alternative approaches to safeguard its interests and influence Iranian responses.
For decades, Beijing benefited from a regional order in which the United States led the responsibility for maintaining regional security. China leveraged this USanchored system while expanding its economic footprint without accepting the liabilities of any kind of alliance commitments. The US-Israel-Iran war has disrupted this comfortable equilibrium. Threats to close the Strait of Hormuz and the deteriorating security situation have increased insurance premiums and heightened volatility in global energy markets, which invariably threaten Chinese interests in the region.
Beijing’s response has been cautious, deliberate and consistent with its previous responses aligned with its Arab Policy Paper (January 2016), rooted in the ideas of non-interference and mutual benefit. China has condemned US and Israeli strikes as violations of sovereignty and international law while urging restraint and calling for immediate ceasefire arrangements. At the same time, it has avoided any overt military involvement. China’s diplomacy and coordination with other regional countries during the war highlight its preference for backchannel mediation. Reports that Beijing pressed Tehran to accept a ceasefire, even as it avoided confirming any role publicly, reflect a pattern of Beijing’s attempts to influence outcomes quietly.
China’s position in the UN Security Council, particularly its veto power, along with its continued engagement with Iran through large-scale oil purchases despite sanctions, is critically important for Tehran. No other country has the capacity to absorb Iranian oil exports at the scale that China does, making Beijing an indispensable economic partner. Moreover, China’s role will be equally crucial in the post-war phase, where its economic support could significantly shape Iran’s recovery trajectory. As per reports, Iran’s economy is facing a severe crisis with inflation projected at 68.9% and the Iranian rial collapsing to around 1.32 million per US dollar. The war and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz have affected oil exports and could wipe out nearly 70% of Iran’s export revenues. As per the IMF forecast, Iran could experience a 6.1% economic contraction amid sanctions and disrupted trade. In this context, Iran views its ties with China as extremely critical for its economy.
China’s role also becomes indispensable given its strong ties with other regional and Gulf powers, alongside its demonstrated ability to mediate and reduce tensions. In a post-war scenario, this will be particularly significant, as Iran’s attacks on the Gulf states have deepened distrust. Efforts to rebuild confidence will therefore require an external actor with both credibility in the Gulf and sustained engagement with Tehran. Hence, China’s presence could prove especially valuable, as few other countries combine such influence with consistent economic and political support for Iran, despite the limitations and caveats surrounding Beijing’s role.
China’s relations with Iran, in spite of its strategic partnership agreement, have faced several challenges and limitations. Chinese investment has progressed slowly, financing has been cautious and institutionalization has been minimal. These constraints contrast sharply with China’s expanding relations with Saudi Arabia, the UAE and other Gulf states, each of which accounts for more than $100 billion in annual trade with China. It is important to note that China condemned Iran’s attacks on the Gulf states and urged to engage in dialogue and diplomacy. China’s convergence with Iran is largely based on Iran’s ability to challenge the United States. China’s position has largely been consistent, emphasizing Iran’s compliance with non-proliferation norms and opposition to unilateral military action. However, Beijing deliberately avoids publicly pressuring Tehran. Its approach is calibrated as China seeks to shape and influence the broader diplomatic and political environment. This is also consistent with China’s attempts to project itself as a responsible power.
However, China’s leverage over Iran remains inherently constrained. Iran’s foreign policy approach is deeply tied to its domestic narratives and internal political dynamics. This poses challenges and structural constraints for China to be certain of Iranian actions. Moreover, in the context of intensifying great power competition, China is likely to prioritize the protection of its broader strategic interests, making it unlikely to shape Iranian behavior in ways that could undermine its wider regional and global engagements.
At the same time, Iran’s decision-making is driven foremost by state survival, which limits the extent to which Tehran is responsive to external influence, including from China. Beijing recognizes this priority but remains unwilling to directly support it through military or security guarantees. Its core objective is the protection of its own economic and strategic interests. As a result, China has adopted a more nuanced regional approach by leveraging its ties with countries like Pakistan and other intermediaries to play a more substantive role. Coordinating with partners like Pakistan while maintaining engagement with Tehran allows Beijing to influence outcomes without overcommitting, reflecting a strategy of cautious maneuvering rather than direct intervention. Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar had stated before he visited China that Beijing had extended full support to Islamabad’s initiative to host representatives from Iran and the United States, viewing it as a constructive step toward ending the long conflict. The five-point initiative jointly proposed by China and Pakistan calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities, the prompt resumption of peace talks, the protection of non-military targets, the security of vital shipping lanes (particularly around the Strait of Hormuz) and adherence to the UN Charter as the guiding framework for conflict resolution. Such an approach leverages Pakistan’s intermediary role and China’s broader influence to create momentum for US–Iran engagement while aligning with Global South concerns over energy and trade disruptions. At the same time, it reinforces Beijing’s preference for multilateralism and a rules-based order, while avoiding any kind of security commitments. China has also been engaging closely with the Gulf states amid the recent escalations. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has been actively engaged in diplomatic efforts, holding discussions with his counterparts in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain and the UAE. So far, he has conducted dozens of calls related to these escalations with regional counterparts. In short, while China has extended diplomatic, political and economic support to Iran, it continues to maintain a posture of neutrality and maximizes its influence within those limits.
In the current context, China is seeking de-escalation while primarily ensuring the protection of its long-term interests. Despite possessing significant structural influence over Iran through economic ties, Beijing cannot completely shape Iranian behavior, particularly amid high-intensity conflicts where state survival and complex internal power structures within Iran complicate the nature of Iranian responses. China recognizes that Iran has limited strategic options, yet it lacks the ability to completely control Tehran’s responses. Instead, Beijing seeks to shape the broader environment, creating diplomatic and economic conditions in which de-escalation becomes a more attractive choice for Iran, particularly given Tehran’s structural limitations.
