Introduction
The European Union (EU) has long considered the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region a strategic priority. This attention is primarily due to geographical proximity, energy inter-dependence, migration flows, and intertwined security concerns. Events in MENA – conflict, political instability, migration surges, and economic crises – have historically had direct repercussions on European societies, influencing political debates, shaping public opinion, and even determining electoral outcomes. This inter-connection has created both challenges and opportunities for the EU, making the development of a coherent and effective policy toward MENA essential for European prosperity and stability.
For decades, the EU presented itself as a normative power, seeking to export values such as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, alongside economic integration and development support. Initiatives such as the 1995 Barcelona Process, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), and the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) were built on the assumption that encouraging inclusive governance and shared prosperity would create a stable, peaceful neighborhood to the south. The EU sought to shape MENA societies through “soft power” rather than military force, positioning itself as an alternative to the more militarized approach associated with the United States. For a time, this vision appeared to gain some traction, with Europe regarded as a benign partner willing to support transitions to more open, market-oriented societies.
However, this normative approach has gradually given way to more transactional, short-term engagement, a shift that accelerated after Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine in 2022. The war exposed Europe’s structural vulnerabilities, particularly its reliance on Russian energy supplies. Faced with an urgent need to diversify energy imports, EU member states turned increasingly to North African and Eastern Mediterranean suppliers. Simultaneously, migration flows across the Mediterranean increased, driven by conflict, poverty, and climate change. These developments elevated migration control and energy security to top policy priorities, often at the expense of governance reform. What had previously been a balance between values and interests tilted heavily toward interests, with normative goals relegated to secondary objectives.
This shift coincides with intensifying geopolitical competition in MENA. China and Russia, two non-Western international powers seeking to challenge Western influence globally, have seized opportunities created by EU weaknesses and internal divisions. China has significantly expanded its economic presence through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), investing in infrastructure, telecommunications, and energy projects. Its development model – focused on rapid delivery and devoid of political conditionality – has resonated with many MENA governments, particularly those wary of Western pressure related to governance and human rights.
Russia reasserted itself militarily and diplomatically, most visibly in Syria, where its intervention preserved the Assad regime. Since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, Moscow has managed to establish relations with the new Syrian authorities while consolidating its military presence in the country.
Russia currently operates three key military bases in Syria:
- Hmeimim Air Base (near Latakia, on the Mediterranean coast),
- Tartus Naval Facility (its only permanent naval base in the Mediterranean)
- Qamishli Air Base (in the strategic northeast of Syria, used to extend operational reach toward the Middle East and Africa).
These bases have been central to diplomatic engagement between Russia and the new Syrian authorities and play a pivotal role in projecting Russian military power toward Africa, particularly via the Qamishli base, which supports logistical and operational links with the African continent. Moreover, Russia has pursued an innovative form of energy diplomacy through its OPEC+ cooperation with Gulf producers. Both Russia and its Gulf partners have positioned themselves as reliable and pragmatic actors, in sharp contrast to what many in the region perceive as Europe’s indecision and inconsistency. This dynamic has created a challenging environment in which the EU’s influence is increasingly contested and its credibility called into question.
Yet Europe retains significant economic and normative potential. Whether it can harness this potential effectively depends on overcoming internal divisions, finding a sustainable balance between values and interests, and adapting to a multipolar geopolitical context where competition is fierce and transactional politics increasingly dominate.
Internal Disagreements and Divisions
I Internal divisions among its member states and institutions is a central obstacle to effective EU policy in MENA. The EU’s foreign policy operates on consensus, requiring all 27-member states to agree on major decisions. While this principle ensures inclusivity, it often produces lowest-common-denominator outcomes or outright paralysis when views diverge sharply.
EU member states’ interests in the MENA region are fragmented, often shaped by historical legacies, domestic political considerations, or divergent strategic priorities that rarely align seamlessly. One clear example is the Visegrád Group, consisting of Poland, Hungary, Czechia, and Slovakia. These states frequently adopt positions at odds with broader EU consensus, especially on contentious issues such as Iran, Syria, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Hungary, in particular, has cultivated close ties with Israel, often vetoing or diluting EU statements critical of Israeli settlement expansion or human rights violations in the Occupied Territories. This stance contrasts sharply with positions taken by Ireland, Spain, Belgium, and Sweden, which have consistently emphasized Palestinian rights and, in some cases, formally recognized Palestinian statehood.
France – Saudi Arabia Initiative
In July 2025, France and Saudi Arabia co‑chaired a UN conference in New York aimed at advancing a two‑state solution and “recognizing Palestinian statehood” as part of a peace framework. As part of this effort, French President Emmanuel Macron formally announced that France will recognize Palestinian statehood at the UN General Assembly in September 2025 – the first G7 country and first permanent UN Security Council member to do so. This move is intended to set a political milestone and rally other European capitals to follow suit.
Several European countries are either actively planning or have already committed to recognizing Palestinian statehood. As of mid‑2025, Norway, Ireland, Spain and Slovenia have already formally recognized Palestinian statehood, contributing to eleven EU member states that do so – a figure that will rise to twelve once France joins in September 2025. Meanwhile, Malta will also formally recognize Palestine at the upcoming UN General Assembly in September, aligning with similar declarations from the UK and Canada. Portugal is in active consultation and considering recognition, while Belgium, Luxembourg, Greece, Croatia, and possibly others are seen as potential next movers amid growing momentum in Brussels.
Finally, on July 31, 2025, German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul stated that the process leading to the recognition of a Palestinian state “must begin now.” He insisted that initiating this process is essential and that Germany “will not deviate from this goal.” Wadephul reaffirmed that a negotiated two-state solution remains the only viable path to ensure peace, security, and dignity for both peoples.
He warned that Germany might be forced to respond to unilateral actions, potentially accelerating its timeline for recognition, particularly amid threats of annexation from segments of the Israeli government. Wadephul also highlighted that a growing number of countries, including those within Europe, are prepared to recognize Palestinian statehood without prior negotiations, putting the region and the Middle East peace process at “a crossroads.”
Overall, the result of internal European divisions has been repeated failures to adopt unified EU declarations or to take collective action during crises such as the 2023–2024 Gaza war, when member states could not even agree on calling for an immediate ceasefire. In a December 2023 UN vote on a Gaza ceasefire, 17 EU member states voted in favor, but 8 (including Germany and Italy) abstained and 2 (Austria and Czechia) opposed – and even in February 2024 the EU Foreign Affairs Council could not unanimously call for an “immediate ceasefire,” settling only on a humanitarian pause after Hungary’s objections. Such disunity not only undermined the EU’s credibility as a mediator, but also prompted frustration from officials; EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas noted that proposing sanctions or actions was futile given the disunity and “it will just show that we don’t have a common position,” she warned, in reference to the impasse over EU policy regarding the Israeli-Palestine conflict .
Internal debates are not limited to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Rivalries regarding the situation in Libya among major EU member states also hinder coherence. France and Italy provide a striking example of how bilateral competition undermines common EU approaches. Both countries have historical and energy interests in Libya but have backed opposing sides in the Libyan conflict. Paris has been perceived as sympathetic to eastern factions led by General Khalifa Haftar, viewing him as a bulwark against terrorism, whereas Rome has prioritized relations with the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord, partly to stem irregular migration through the central Mediterranean. Divergent agendas have undermined EU mediation efforts and enabled external actors, notably Russia and regional powers such as Türkiye, to deepen their influence.
Institutional weaknesses compound these divisions. The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HRVP) – the EU’s chief diplomat – is formally tasked with ensuring policy coherence and representing the EU abroad. In practice, however, the HRVP is often overshadowed by national leaders or the President of the European Commission. Under Ursula von der Leyen, the Commission has taken the lead on key MENA files, focusing on energy security and migration.
The controversial 2023 Memorandum of Understanding with Tunisia on migration was negotiated primarily by the Commission, in coordination with Italy and the Netherlands, while the European External Action Service (EEAS), headed by HRVP Josep Borrell at the time, had limited input. The deal provoked political backlash and legal challenges, not only because it appeared to reward an increasingly authoritarian Tunisian regime but also because it highlighted the procedural sidelining of EU foreign policy structures.
The cumulative effect of these divisions and institutional tensions is a diminished ability to act strategically and coherently. In Libya, competing member state agendas undermined European leverage at peace talks and enabled external actors to shape outcomes. In Gaza, contradictory national positions during the 2023-2025 war weakened Europe’s credibility as a potential mediator, leaving space for the United States and regional actors such as Egypt and Qatar to lead negotiations. On Iran, inconsistent EU stances – oscillating between engagement and pressure depending on member state influence – undermined efforts to salvage the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action after the U.S. withdrawal in 2018. These examples illustrate how internal fragmentation not only erodes policy effectiveness but also undermines the EU’s aspiration to be a strategically autonomous actor.
The EU’s Influence in the MENA Region
Despite these shortcomings, the EU retains significant economic and normative influence in the MENA region, underpinned by its status as the region’s largest trading partner. Over the past three years, trade volumes between the EU and MENA countries have remained strong, averaging approximately $630–650 billion annually, with the EU accounting for more than 30 percent of the region’s total trade. This relationship spans hydrocarbons, manufactured goods, agriculture, and, increasingly, digital services and telecommunications. European foreign direct investment (FDI) has remained resilient at roughly $290–300 billion annually, concentrated in Egypt, the UAE, and Morocco, with growing flows directed toward renewable energy projects aligned with EU climate ambitions and the diversification strategies of MENA economies.
Looking ahead, the EU’s economic footprint in the region is expected to remain robust, even as overall European FDI experienced a modest decline in 2023–2024. The rollout of green transition initiatives, including the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) from 2026, is set to deepen cross-border cooperation in renewable energy, clean technologies, and regulatory convergence. However, Europe faces mounting competition from extra-regional actors, particularly China, whose high-capital investments in infrastructure and technology increasingly challenge the EU’s economic primacy. Maintaining and expanding the EU’s influence will require a renewed focus on competitiveness, innovation, and strategic alignment with regional development priorities.
The EU is also a leading provider of development and humanitarian aid, delivering about €8.2 billion annually through the ENP, EU Trust Fund for Africa, and bilateral programs. These funds support infrastructure development, governance reform, and social services, often in partnership with local civil society organizations. Education and cultural exchanges add another layer of influence: programs such as Erasmus+ facilitate academic mobility and foster long-term personal and professional ties between MENA and European societies. This network of people-to-people links generates goodwill and strengthens Europe’s normative appeal.
Diplomatically, the EU has demonstrated an ability to play constructive roles when it manages to act with unity. Its involvement in negotiating the 2015 Iran nuclear deal appears as a success story, illustrating the potential for European diplomacy to deliver meaningful results even in complex geopolitical environments. Similarly, Europe’s support for the 2023 normalization process between Iran and Saudi Arabia, though largely brokered by China, built on earlier EU-facilitated dialogues and highlighted the potential for Europe to contribute to conflict de-escalation.
However, these advantages have not translated into consistent strategic influence. Regional actors often perceive the EU as slow, indecisive, and overly dependent on U.S. leadership. The EU’s lack of hard power is a major limitation: it has no standing military force comparable to the United States , and its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions are limited in scale and scope. As a result, Europe frequently defers to NATO or ad hoc coalitions led by other powers. This reliance reduces European bargaining power and credibility when security guarantees or rapid responses are required.
Economic leverage has also proved difficult to wield effectively. After the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 and the re-imposition of sanctions on Iran, the EU sought to sustain trade with Iran through the creation of the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX). Yet the mechanism failed to deliver meaningful results, processing only a handful of transactions before being dissolved. European firms, fearful of losing access to U.S. markets, complied with U.S. sanctions despite EU assurances. This episode highlighted Europe’s inability to shield its own economic actors from external pressure, undermining its credibility not only in Tehran but across the region.
Main Challenges and Limitations
The EU’s reduced influence in MENA stems from structural and contextual factors that limit its ability to convert economic and normative power into tangible strategic outcomes. One key challenge is the shift toward transactionalism and short-termism. The urgency of controlling migration flows and securing energy supplies has led to deals that often ignore governance considerations. This tendency applies to energy partnerships with Algeria, Egypt, and Israel, which prioritize immediate supply needs over longer-term reforms or governance concerns. While politically expedient, such deals reflect a shift away from prioritizing Europe’s normative credibility and long-term political principles, favoring short-term interests and a focus on bilateral ties rather than a global approach rooted in universal values.
Another challenge is Europe’s limited strategic autonomy. The EU’s foreign policy is often closely aligned with U.S. positions, a reflection of both transatlantic solidarity and European dependence on U.S. security guarantees. Yet this alignment constrains flexibility. On Iran, for example, Europe’s inability to counter U.S. sanctions following the JCPOA withdrawal signaled to MENA actors that the EU lacks the capacity – or will – to chart an independent course. Similarly, in conflicts such as Syria or Libya, European responses have often been reactive, shaped by U.S. or NATO initiatives rather than autonomous European strategies.
Regional instability adds complexity. North Africa, the Levant and part of the Gulf region are characterized by fragile states, ongoing conflicts, and social unrest. Countries such as Libya, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen continue to face significant governance challenges, while socioeconomic crises – including those exacerbated by COVID-19 and fragmented political entities – have fueled poverty, unemployment, and political discontent.
These conditions not only drive migration but also create fertile ground for extremism and authoritarian entrenchment. Environmental stresses, including water scarcity and climate change, compound these challenges, threatening livelihoods and destabilizing already fragile political systems. The EU’s slow-moving, consensus-based policymaking is ill suited to managing such fast-evolving crises, often leaving Europe in a reactive posture.
Finally, reputational risks undermine Europe’s soft power. Perceived double standards – such as the EU’s strong defense of Ukrainian sovereignty compared to its muted responses to Israeli occupation policies – erode credibility in the MENA region . Internal fragmentation is also visible to external actors, prompting some regional leaders to view the EU as an unreliable partner. Adversaries exploit these weaknesses: Russian disinformation campaigns, for example, actively amplify narratives of Western hypocrisy and European dysfunction, further diminishing trust.
Opportunities Amid Geopolitical Competition
Despite these challenges, the EU retains opportunities to play a constructive and influential role in MENA, especially through diplomacy and mediation. Europe’s relative neutrality and technical expertise position it well to facilitate dialogue in conflict settings where other actors lack credibility. For instance, the EU could reinvigorate efforts to prevent future military escalation between Iran and Israel or play a constructive role in post-conflict reconstruction and political processes in Syria. Its long-standing experience in power-sharing negotiations and institution-building, both within Europe and abroad, offers valuable insights applicable to the fragile states of the MENA region.
Another opportunity lies in governance and development support. Many MENA states, especially those undergoing political transitions, need assistance in reforming institutions, building inclusive economies, and addressing social grievances. The EU can leverage its expertise and financial resources to support such transitions, offering a constructive alternative to state failure and fostering political stability in the region. By linking economic assistance to governance reforms – a principle already embedded in the ENP’s “more for more” approach – the EU can incentivize change while advancing its values and promoting regional stability.
Strategic initiatives such as the New Agenda for the Mediterranean (2021–2027) and the Global Gateway initiative are designed to align EU engagement with emerging global priorities. These frameworks emphasize sustainable energy, digital transformation, and trade connectivity, providing a platform to strengthen partnerships in areas where Europe has comparative advantages. Renewable energy is a particularly promising domain: North Africa’s solar and wind potential could help meet Europe’s decarbonization goals while supporting economic diversification in partner states.
Economic leverage remains another tool. The EU can deepen trade ties, invest in infrastructure, and foster joint ventures in emerging sectors like green hydrogen, information technology, and sustainable agriculture. Conditionality, if applied consistently, the EU can transform these economic linkages into instruments of normative influence. Sanctions, while controversial, can also signal Europe’s commitment to upholding international norms, provided they are coupled with diplomatic outreach to mitigate perceptions of unilateral coercion.
Rising Competition from China and Russia
The urgency of enhancing EU engagement in MENA is underscored by the rapidly rising influence of China and Russia in the region. China’s trade with the MENA region accounted for nearly 8% of its total goods trade in 2022, and remains robust into 2024, supported by major infrastructure financing through the BRI. Beijing’s non‑conditional model – eschewing governance-related political prerequisites in favor of swift project delivery – has resonated with many MENA governments.
In early 2025, China reported total foreign trade of 43.85 trillion yuan (~$6 trillion), with commerce with BRI partners now exceeding 50% of its overall trade for the first time. Major MENA countries – including Gulf states, Iraq, and Iran – together comprised roughly 7-8% of Chinese goods trade by 2022 and continue to be key suppliers and markets. By contrast, Russia’s economic footprint in MENA remains modest. Between 2005 and June 2024, China’s total investment in infrastructure projects in Saudi Arabia amounted to $53.85 billion, while Russian FDI was negligible.
China continues to consolidate its sphere through multilateral mechanisms such as the China‑Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF) and the BRI, which now includes 146–150 countries as of 2025. Within CASCF, launched in 2004 and relaunched at the ministerial level in 2024, China has committed to region‑wide infrastructure projects. Meanwhile, European policymakers have increasingly criticized the EU’s approach toward developing regions, including MENA, for being overly moralistic or patronizing. Charles Michel, President of the European Council, emphasized that China’s infrastructure-first, non‑interventionist model has often proven more appealing to Global South partners than the EU’s normative diplomacy. Europa’s best response should combine pragmatic engagement (e.g. infrastructure, finance, technology) with credible political and security partnerships, rather than relying solely on normative appeals. Failure to do so will leave the field open to Beijing and Moscow, whose non‑conditional and commercially driven engagement continues to win favor in a region actively diversifying its external alliances.
Both powers have capitalized on Europe’s perceived weaknesses. China presents itself as a development partner free of colonial baggage, while Russia portrays itself as a reliable ally willing to use hard power where the West hesitates. Their growing presence complicates European diplomacy and limits the EU’s leverage, especially when MENA states that are aiming to diversify partnerships to hedge against Western pressure.
Reflections on the Future Role of the EU
The EU’s future role in MENA will depend on its ability to address internal divisions, reconcile values and interests, and adapt institutional structures to a more competitive environment. Overcoming fragmentation requires strong political will from member states and leadership from EU institutions. The post-2024 European Parliament elections and the new European Commission term present an opportunity to reset priorities and clarify responsibilities, particularly by empowering the High Representative to coordinate policy more effectively and by adopting flexible decision-making mechanisms that prevent paralysis caused by single-member vetoes.
Balancing normative commitments with pragmatic interests will also be essential. The EU must acknowledge the urgency of issues like migration control and energy security. A more transparent, conditional approach – where cooperation on security and energy is paired with governance benchmarks – could reconcile these priorities. Equally important is greater investment in diplomatic capacity, including more robust EU delegations in the region and enhanced Arabic-language and technical expertise, enabling Europe to respond swiftly and credibly to emerging crises.
Flexible coalitions of willing EU member states may offer a practical workaround to unanimity constraints, as demonstrated by the E3 format on Iran.
Similar ad hoc groupings could focus on Libya, Lebanon, Yemen, or Eastern Mediterranean energy cooperation. Enhancing CSDP missions, particularly related to maritime security and border management, would also bolster EU credibility. At the same time, continued support for civil society, education, and people-to-people exchanges is critical to sustaining Europe’s long-term soft power and building constituencies that support cooperative relations.
Conclusion and Recommendations
The EU faces a strategic choice in its engagement with the MENA region. It can persist as a fragmented, reactive actor increasingly overshadowed by China, Russia, and regional powers, or it can assert itself as a coherent, values-based power capable of shaping outcomes. Achieving the latter will require several key adjustments.
First, Europe must prioritize strategic autonomy. Reducing reliance on U.S. policies and capabilities, particularly in energy diplomacy and conflict mediation, will give the EU more freedom to pursue its interests. Second, internal divisions must be bridged through stronger leadership structures and, where possible, more flexible decision-making. Third, values and interests must be balanced with migration and energy deals; explicitly incorporating governance issues to avoid reputational damage. Fourth, the EU must invest in its diplomatic capacity, expanding its presence on the ground and building regional expertise to enhance both situational awareness and credibility.
Despite its current challenges, the EU retains significant comparative advantages, including economic weight, normative appeal, and technical expertise. Leveraging these strengths effectively, while addressing structural weaknesses and adapting to a more competitive geopolitical environment, can enable the EU to transition from a peripheral to a pivotal actor in MENA. The coming years will reveal whether Europe can seize this opportunity or whether it will remain constrained by internal divisions and external dependence, leaving its southern neighborhood increasingly shaped by others.
