The framework for the phased disarmament of Hamas and other Palestinian armed factions could mark an important turning point in the conflict triggered by the Hamas-led attacks of October 7, 2023 and Israel’s subsequent military campaign in Gaza. Announced by President Donald Trump on July 30, 2026 as part of his broader 20-point plan, the 15-point framework reportedly received the conditional approval of Hamas and other Palestinian factions.
Trump declared that the Board of Peace had reached a “historic agreement” for the “complete disarmament” of Hamas and all other armed groups in Gaza. As disarmament proceeds, he added, Israeli forces would withdraw, while an International Stabilization Force and a new Palestinian police force would assume responsibility for security. The framework thus links the verified decommissioning of weapons to a phased Israeli withdrawal, the transfer of Gaza’s administration to an independent Palestinian technocratic body, the deployment of international security personnel and the beginning of reconstruction.
However, the framework does not yet constitute an implemented settlement. Israel rejected it in its current form on August 9, insisting that Hamas must be fully disarmed before any Israeli withdrawal, while Hamas has linked disarmament to Israeli compliance with its own commitments. The sequencing, verification mechanisms and treatment of different categories of weapons therefore remain unresolved.
If implemented under sustained US pressure on Israel, the framework would constitute a significant diplomatic achievement. It should not, however, be mistaken for a comprehensive peace agreement. At best, the plan constitutes a necessary first step towards freezing the conflict and creating the conditions for a future political settlement. The rationale behind the plan is straightforward. No sustainable reconstruction of Gaza can begin while armed groups retain autonomous military capabilities, while Israel remains prepared to resume large-scale operations, and while no legitimate authority exercises a monopoly over the use of force. Hamas’ disarmament is therefore not merely an Israeli demand. It is also a prerequisite for the emergence of a viable Palestinian administration capable of governing Gaza, maintaining public order and reassuring international donors that reconstruction will not be followed by another destructive war.
The framework links Hamas’ phased disarmament to Israel’s withdrawal from the roughly 70 per cent of Gaza it occupies. Its apparent simplicity, however, conceals formidable obstacles: profound mutual distrust, political resistance, the devastation of Gaza and the immense human cost of the war. More than 2 million Palestinians continue to endure catastrophic conditions, with widespread destruction of homes and livelihoods and over 70,000 deaths reported by Gaza’s Health Ministry. Hamas political leader Khalil al-Hayya played a central role in overcoming the movement’s objections to the framework, following intensive mediation by Egypt and Türkiye.
Yet disarmament cannot be treated as a purely technical process involving the collection of weapons, the destruction of tunnels and the dismantling of production facilities. Hamas’ military infrastructure is embedded in a broader political and social system. Persuading Hamas to relinquish its weapons therefore requires more than military pressure. It requires a political framework capable of convincing both the movement and the population of Gaza that demilitarization will not simply leave Palestinians exposed to indefinite occupation, renewed Israeli operations or the permanent fragmentation of the Palestinian territories.
For this reason, a phased and reciprocal approach is more realistic than demanding immediate and unconditional surrender. Under the emerging framework, heavy weapons, rockets, explosives and military infrastructure would be addressed first. The process could then extend to lighter weapons, the registration or integration of eligible former fighters and the dismantling of parallel command structures. A Palestinian technocratic administration, supported by reformed security institutions and an international stabilization mechanism, would progressively assume responsibility for security and governance. Israeli forces would withdraw according to verifiable benchmarks, while humanitarian access and reconstruction would expand in parallel.
Such sequencing reflects the absence of trust between the parties. Hamas fears that it could disarm without obtaining an end to Israeli military operations or occupation. Israel fears that a ceasefire and withdrawal could allow Hamas to conceal part of its arsenal, rebuild its forces and eventually return to power. These concerns cannot be resolved through promises alone. An independent verification mechanism will consequently be indispensable. It would need a clear mandate, access to relevant sites, the ability to investigate violations and sufficient political backing to resist pressure from both sides. The international community must also avoid making Gaza’s civilian population entirely dependent on the speed of disarmament. Reconstruction should be connected to compliance, but humanitarian relief cannot be used as an instrument of collective pressure. Housing, healthcare, water, education and basic infrastructure must be restored from the beginning of the process. Otherwise, prolonged deprivation could delegitimize the transitional administration and allow Hamas or more radical organizations to portray disarmament as capitulation without compensation.
The plan’s chances of success will depend equally on the credibility of the alternative to Hamas rule. A committee of technocrats may be useful during an emergency transition, but technocratic governance cannot indefinitely replace political legitimacy. The new administration will need sufficient Palestinian ownership, a defined relationship with the Palestinian Authority and a clear timetable for broader institutional reform. It must not be perceived as an externally imposed structure operating under permanent Israeli supervision. Without credible Palestinian leadership, the removal of Hamas from government could produce an institutional vacuum rather than stable governance.
Regional actors will have an essential role. Egypt and Qatar can facilitate negotiations and influence Hamas, while Türkiye and several Arab governments may contribute political support, reconstruction financing or security assistance. The United States remains the only external power capable of exerting decisive pressure on Israel and providing guarantees for the implementation of Israeli commitments. European and Arab partners could support verification, police training and reconstruction. Their involvement, however, must be coordinated within a single political framework. Competing initiatives would weaken the transitional authority and enable the parties to avoid their obligations.
Even if the disarmament roadmap is fully implemented, it would freeze rather than resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It could end Gaza’s immediate military confrontation, reduce the risk of another large-scale war and create space for diplomacy. These would be considerable achievements after years of devastation. But the underlying sources of conflict would remain: the absence of a mutually accepted political settlement, the status of the West Bank and Jerusalem, Israeli security concerns, Palestinian national rights, settlements, borders, refugees and the question of sovereignty. A lasting settlement will therefore require a second and far more ambitious stage. The transitional arrangements for Gaza must eventually be incorporated into a comprehensive agreement covering both Gaza and the West Bank and defining the political future of the Palestinian territories. The Hamas disarmament plan should consequently be understood as an opening rather than a conclusion. Its immediate purpose is to stop the cycle of war, establish unified Palestinian governance and permit Gaza’s reconstruction. Its strategic value lies in its potential to transform a fragile ceasefire into a durable freezing of the conflict. But only a comprehensive political agreement can turn that suspension of hostilities into lasting peace. The success of the current initiative will ultimately be judged not only by the number of weapons collected or tunnels destroyed, but by whether it creates a credible pathway from demilitarization to governance, from governance to political negotiations and from negotiations to a definitive settlement.
