The recent changes in Iran’s armed forces point to the strengthening of not just its traditional defensive posture but also of its offensive military strategy. The new strategy will allow Iran to support its regional proxies, and to prepare for potential warfare beyond its borders.
By constitutional decree, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei serves as the army’s Commander-In-Chief. He appoints the highest ranking officers in the armed forces, and in the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). The frequent appointments made by Khamenei aim to keep Iran’s armed forces in a state of preparation to react swiftly to counter any domestic unrest in Iran or if regional tensions increase.
Regular reshuffling in Iran’s armed forces indicate concerns over its growing regional military commitments. Iran fears that the Islamic State (IS) might reemerge in Iraq and Syria, and threaten Iran’s internal security. Iran’s tensions with its Gulf Arab neighbors are also on the rise, as is the potential for a conflict to emerge between Iran and the US, in which US Arab allies and Israel could side against Iran.
To meet these security concerns, Khamenei appointed a veteran of the Iran-Iraq War, Abdolrahim Mousavi, to head the army including its ground, naval and air forces. He is preceded by the long-serving head of the Armed Forces, Major General Ataollah Salehi, who was appointed to the position in 2005 until 2017. Mousavi is considered a vocal figure and is known as somebody who challenges the US and Israel in his public speeches. He is also an advocate for advancing Iran’s indigenous military industry, including investment in a state of the art missile systems program.
Earlier in mid-2016, Major General Mohammad Bagheri was appointed as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. Brigadier General Ahmad Reza Purdastan was appointed as Second in Command of the Army. The appointments aimed to improve and advance the operational capabilities of the armed forces.
Then in May 2018, Farzad Esmaili was appointed as the Assistant Commander of Iran’s Army. Esmaili, who was formerly the Commander of the Khatam al-Anbiya’s Air Defense Base, is an advocate for Iran’s operations in Syria that could threaten Israel in the Golan Heights. He has also supported the ban on US and Saudi aircrafts crossing Iran’s airspace, stating that the ban aims to ensure Iran’s internal security.
Within the ranks of the IRGC, Mohsen Kazemi was removed as Commander of the Mohammad Rasulullah Division days after IS attacked the Iranian Parliament and the shrine of Imam Khomeini, killing 17 people in 2017. The Second Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Yazdi, a former Deputy Commander of the IRGC and a strong advocate of Iran’s nuclear program, replaced Kazemi.
Meanwhile, Iran’s military Intelligence Units continue to operate directly under the command of Khamenei. Hossein Taeb, a Shia cleric, is in charge of the intelligence units of the IRGC. He is known to be supportive of harsh policies towards Iran’s internal opposition, and has held on to his post since 2009. The ultra-conservative cleric Hojatoleslam Ali Saidi who previously served in the Intelligence Units of the IRGC now heads the Supreme Leader’s own Ideational-Political Office, a unit that allows for the Commander-in-Chief’s direct supervision over military intelligence.
The appointment of these figures along with Iran’s tougher than usual offensive posturing, especially recently against IS in Iraq and in building up Iranian military installations in Syria, suggest that Iran’s armed forces will retain an important role in ensuring state security at home and the success of its military operations abroad. This implies that the future of Iran’s armed forces will remain tied to its constant ability to project power both domestically and across the region.
