Significant debate abounds among experts and specialists within think tanks and research institutions regarding the strategy of the Iranian leadership in the aftermath of its geopolitical losses in the Middle East. The key questions are the following: Where will Iran’s leadership direct its policy following the historic setbacks faced by the so-called Axis of Resistance? Will Tehran introduce new, constructive approaches that facilitate its reintegration into regional and international systems —ensuring mutual interests and benefits — amid evolving geopolitical dynamics and the immense financial and human costs borne by Iran at the expense of its citizens in the relentless pursuit of its expansionist strategy? Or will the Iranian leadership adopt a strategy of gradual adaptation and distant observation, waiting for the right opportunity to reassert its influence in its lost spheres of influence? Alternatively, will Iran actively seek to create such an opportunity itself, accelerating its return to these arenas despite the massive financial and human toll?
A careful analysis of the Iranian establishment’s ideological framework, principles and constitutional orientations — particularly in light of the immense financial and human losses it has suffered — alongside repeated statements from senior political and military officials in the post-loss phase, suggests that Iran is incapable of introducing constructive initiatives to halt the cycle of losses or formulating new policies that diverge from the traditional approaches that led to the current historic setbacks.
Despite these losses, the establishment remains firmly committed to its geopolitical principles and orientations. Instead of acknowledging what some theorists have described as a major blow to the “Axis of Resistance,” it downplays the scale of regional setbacks and appears more inclined to seek an opportunity for reasserting its influence in Syria and Lebanon. This aligns with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s statements following the fall of the Assad regime, in which he emphasized the enduring strength of the “Axis of Resistance,” asserting that receiving blows would not weaken it but rather reinforce its resilience and fortitude. Similarly, senior officials within Khamenei’s inner circle have echoed this stance, arguing that maintaining control over Syria does not equate to a defeat for Iran and its regional proxies.
Iranian decision-makers recognize the challenges of reclaiming Tehran’s lost regional influence at this stage and may find it necessary to adopt a policy of “strategic latency.” This shift stems from the establishment’s growing concerns over its survival as the possibility of its overthrow has become more conceivable. The Iranian leadership also fears that domestic discontent could intensify as the public witnesses firsthand how the vast sums of money invested in long-term, costly geopolitical projects — sustained over decades — were squandered in mere days.
Furthermore, new power dynamics in Lebanon and Syria now include major regional players such as Türkiye and Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, intensified Israeli and US military actions have significantly weakened the “Axis of Resistance,” forcing Iran into a new deterrence equation — one that could push it into a defensive posture after years of maintaining an offensive strategy.
Among the most significant geopolitical variables is the beginning of Donald Trump’s second presidential term. Known for his hardline stance against Iran, Trump reinstated the maximum pressure campaign, rendering Iran’s return to the nuclear agreement conditional on strict terms, while simultaneously keeping the leadership on edge over potential US military strikes. Adding to Iran’s concerns is a key international development: US-Russia rapprochement. Trump has openly discussed the prospect of a meeting with his Russian counterpart in Riyadh aimed at halting the Russia-Ukraine war. If such an outcome materializes, it could diminish Iran’s strategic priority within Russia’s foreign policy calculus.
However, this does not suggest that Iran will remain passive or blind to developments in the region. Instead, Tehran is likely to closely monitor evolving geopolitical shifts while seeking opportunities to reassert its influence where possible.
Recent Iranian statements and actions suggest that Tehran’s strategy, given the current regional and international landscape, revolves around three primary objectives: preserving the Iranian establishment as the highest priority, safeguarding the remnants of its geopolitical project despite recent setbacks and strengthening its position in potential nuclear negotiations by leveraging regional losses to secure favorable terms. To achieve these objectives, Iran is pursuing a series of policies and strategic options that must be carefully analyzed and countered to prevent their success. The framework and details of these were highlighted in a speech delivered by Vice President for Strategic Affairs Mohammad Javad Zarif during a session titled “Prospects for Regional and Global Developments in the Trump Era,” held at the Institute of Iranian and Eurasian Studies (IRAS) on January 25, 2025.
The Syrian and Lebanese Arenas: Creating Chaos and Crises
Iran’s current strategy heavily depends on creating chaos and crises in the Syrian and Lebanese arenas, a goal that requires a certain level of resources which Iran claims to still possesses as inferred from Zarif’s speech in which he criticized Western Europe, the United States and Israel for claiming that Iran is at its weakest point and that it is simultaneously playing a destructive role. Zarif also accused these governments of destabilizing the Middle East. His remarks align with the supreme leader’s statements following the fall of the Assad regime, in which he anticipated instability in Syria and the rise of what he called “honorable forces” among Syrians to take control. Similarly, in February 2025, IRGC Commander-in-Chief Hossein Salami declared that the situation in Syria would not remain as it is. This position was reinforced by Nouri al-Maliki, the leader of the State of Law Coalition in Iraq and a staunch Assad supporter, who issued strong criticism of the new Syrian administration, calling it incapable of governing a country with diverse ethnic and sectarian divisions. He warned against attempts to replicate the Syrian regime’s experience in Iraq, claiming that so-called sectarian and Ba’athist elements were maneuvering to seize control, and asserted that as long as Iran and its allies remained armed, their opponents would regret their actions. These statements collectively indicate Iran’s intent to sustain its policy of fueling chaos and crises in Syria and Lebanon.
Instability in these two countries serves Iran’s interests by diverting regional and international attention away from the Iranian establishment and its remaining stronghold in Iraq — the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) — allowing it to use the country as a conduit to bypass the US maximum pressure strategy. In Iran’s strategic mindset, stability in Syria and Lebanon would shift focus toward Tehran and Baghdad as the next targets, which it seeks to avoid. Consequently, Iran is expected to persist in its crisis-generation strategy — an approach described as a “golden rule” by former Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki during Ahmadinejad’s presidency — exacerbating tensions through its networks, sleeper cells in Syria and ties with Afrin forces as well as militia groups composed of Assad loyalists who have reportedly relocated near the Iran-Iraq border, awaiting the right opportunity. Similar tactics apply to Lebanon, where Iran-backed Hezbollah continues to manufacture crises over seemingly trivial matters, such as protesting the Lebanese authorities’ decision to prevent an Iranian plane from landing at Beirut Airport.
The Likelihood of Cutting a Deal With Trump
Despite the supreme leader’s explicit statements about the futility of negotiations, his calls to advance Iran’s missile program and the unveiling of the IRGC Navy’s Bagheri drone carrier following Trump’s decision to reinstate the maximum pressure strategy, the possibility of a deal with the Trump administration remains a relevant consideration. While Trump has described Iran as terrified and speculated that Tehran would seek an agreement on its nuclear program to avoid military strikes, such rhetoric may be more tactical than strategic — part of a broader bargaining and maneuvering effort to raise the stakes. However, Iran cannot ignore the impact of its significant losses in the Middle East, particularly in Syria and Lebanon, on its position in potential nuclear negotiations. Notably, Khamenei previously granted the presidency permission to engage in talks with the West, and Zarif’s remarks about the potential for a deal with Trump carry weight in this context. Zarif argued that highly pragmatic figures like Trump can be swayed through deal-making, as their primary concern is material gain rather than ideological consistency. He asserted that Trump lacks a fixed foreign policy doctrine and is willing to shift his positions based on circumstances, “Trump’s mind can be changed, and it is not true that, for example, a thinker in international relations has a firm theory that nothing in his mind can be changed. Trump does not have a fixed mindset in this regard and is ready to change some of his models depending on the circumstances in which he finds himself at the present time.” Furthermore, Zarif suggested that Trump might not yet be fully convinced that Iran is actively pursuing nuclear weapons or that he could be persuaded that, under current conditions, striking a deal with Iran would be a preferable course of action. This perspective underscores the potential for Iran to prioritize pragmatism by engaging in negotiations should the United States present a viable offer.
Demonstrating Good Neighborliness
In response to the new equations in Syria and Lebanon, Iran is positioning itself as a latent force, waiting for the right opportunity to reassert its influence. It excels in the strategy of long-term patience and, at this stage, is once again employing a policy resembling the “deceptive snake”— akin to the spider-tailed snake found in Iran’s rocky mountains, which camouflages itself with its surroundings while luring prey with its deceptive tail. In parallel with its crisis-creation tactics, Iran masks its true intentions by pretending to adopt a good-neighborly policy. It does so by making positive diplomatic statements, expressing a desire for regional cooperation, and extending overtures even to states with which relations were previously adversarial. This extends to engaging with the new leadership in Syria while concealing its real objectives. Iran has a history of employing such duplicity, having previously fostered good relations with Arab nations while simultaneously conniving in the occupation of Iraq at the beginning of the 21st century, instigating chaos in various phases. It has also engaged with ideological and political adversaries when it served its interests, including cooperating with terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda and ISIS at different times. Similarly, Iran provided support both to the Afghan government and the Taliban at various points and in Kenya backed both rebels and the army simultaneously. This pattern underscores Iran’s longstanding practice of leveraging multiple, sometimes contradictory, alliances to maintain its strategic influence.
The strategy of maneuvering and concealing Iran’s true objectives during the current stage and in the foreseeable future is evident in Zarif’s statement, “We do not need to establish friendly relations with America, but we need to do something so that when others establish relations with us, they do not feel compelled to conflict with America because in this case they will not choose us, as we see now that they are not doing this.” This reflects Zarif’s recognition of the necessity for a temporary and tactical shift in Iranian foreign policy from its rigid ideological framework to a more flexible and pragmatic approach. The goal is to gain the trust of regional and international actors who have long opposed Iran due to its uncompromising ideological stance and have actively worked against it. By adopting a more adaptable strategy, Iran seeks to reduce hostility, avoid further isolation and create opportunities for engagement with parties that might otherwise distance themselves due to concerns over its ideological ambitions.
To conclude, Iran’s approach of creating chaos and crises and engaging in pragmatic bargaining — both current and potential — does not signify a strategic shift in its policies but rather a temporary tactic responding to regional developments. However, this tactic necessitates a strong and proactive response from regional actors supporting the new equations in Syria and Lebanon. To counter Iran’s maneuvers, these actors must employ innovative tools that force Iran into a reactive position, limiting its ability to dictate events. This requires continuous monitoring of Iranian policies, a deep understanding of their objectives and a concerted effort to close off opportunities for Iranian influence in Syria and Lebanon by prioritizing stability in these countries. The more stable these arenas become, the more scrutiny will be directed at the Iranian establishment and its remaining geopolitical footholds. Additionally, constructing development models that strengthen the longevity of the new governments in Syria and Lebanon, along with advancing policies in Iraq and Lebanon that deter Iranian interference, will be crucial. A key strategy is intensifying demands for state control over weapons, particularly in Lebanon, where ensuring that the Lebanese state holds a monopoly on arms would strike a major blow to Iran’s regional project. Such a move would effectively neutralize Iran’s armed leverage in Lebanon and pave the way for similar measures in Iraq, ultimately weakening Iran’s influence by dismantling its proxies. This can be achieved through the dissolution of irregular militias and the Iran-backed PMF, with a complete reintegration of their members into the Iraqi army as individuals rather than as a parallel military force.
