In an attempt to bring all weapons under state control, the Iraqi government led by Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi set September 30, 2026 as the deadline for all militias to disarm. While several groups have complied, more powerful Iran-aligned groups have expressed apprehensions and rejected calls for disarmament. The recent developments highlight the complexities involved in Iraq’s efforts to assert state control over armed groups and also reveal the manner in which Iran interferes in the whole process.
Recently, Iraq’s National Security Adviser Qasim al-Araji clarified that September 30, which was earlier given as a deadline for militia disarmament, would only be the beginning of negotiations on disarmament, rather than the absolute deadline. Such a change of position in the current context seems to reflect the government’s concerns over the responses from powerful militias aligned with Iran. It also highlights the fragmented autonomy within the Iraqi state, where armed groups retain distinct interests and considerable leverage over government decision-making. Moreover, it reflects the Iraqi government’s difficulties in aligning with US pressure on Iraq to rein in Iran-aligned groups.
The Iraqi government is currently seeking to bring all weapons under state authority while avoiding a direct confrontation with major factions. As per reports, a possible compromise is emerging whereby Iraqi militias would transfer or store weapons within the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) rather than at Defense or Interior Ministry facilities or within the Counter-Terrorism Service. While some factions such as Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata’ib al-Imam Ali and Saraya al-Salam appear willing to accept greater state control over the use of their weapons, other groups like Kata’ib Hezbollah, Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba continue to reject disarmament. The groups that have agreed to surrender their weapons may also have calculations to preserve their political and institutional influence through alternative means after being integrated into the state security apparatus. The incorporation of armed actors into state security institutions can provide factions with access to coercive institutions while allowing them to preserve organizational influence from within. The Badr Organization’s case shows how formal integration does not naturally lead to transparency, accountability or neutrality. Therefore, the aim in Iraq cannot simply be to transfer militia personnel into the Iraqi security forces, rather, it must be to overcome independent chains of command, financing and intelligence linkages. Otherwise, the state risks transforming militias from an external challenge to state authority into an internalized form of factional control.
The challenges faced by the new Iraqi government are rather a recurring problem and have been encountered by previous governments as well. However, what makes the current developments different is the context in which they are happening as well as the broader regional geopolitical changes. Recent developments reflect growing urgency as the US-led coalition’s military presence in Iraq comes to an end. The foreign military presence in the country has been a reason cited by the militias for maintaining control over weapons. Recent developments also coincide with Iraqi attempts to strengthen its ties with Washington, including securing continued US political and economic support. Following Zaidi’s meeting with President Donald Trump in July, the Iraqi government also has to project its seriousness about consolidating state authority over armed groups as this remains a major problem for the United States. Therefore, the withdrawal of coalition forces has made the question of militia control not only a domestic security issue but also an important test of Iraq’s credibility in the eyes of the Trump administration.
Militia forces in Iraq are embedded within the Parliament and government institutions and have extensive economic networks. This has enabled corruption and unaccountability. Disarming an organization without altering the political structures through which it exercises influence cannot lead to any tangible long-term result. Under Iraqi Law No. 40 of 2016, the PMF is legally part of the Iraqi armed forces and formally falls under the prime minister’s command. However, the Iraqi government faces significant challenges in establishing complete control over the powerful factions within the PMF, as they enjoy significant autonomy and align their position with Iranian interests. This was also clear when attacks were launched from Iraq toward the Gulf states despite the Iraqi government’s promise that Iraq would not be used as a launchpad for attacks against neighbors. Iran recently launched attacks on the Kurdistan Region Prime Minister Masrour Barzani’s office and the office of the head of his party’s intelligence agency in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region. Structural factors, as well as complications in internal political dynamics, once again compel the Iraqi government to walk a tightrope in balancing ties with its neighbors, the United States and Iran.
Iran’s role and responses are significant in the current context. When it comes to Iran’s Iraq policy, Iranian official statements contradict its actual policy. Iranian officials reiterate the importance of Iraqi sovereignty and bilateral security cooperation; however, Iran has simultaneously supported groups that remain unwilling to disarm and has also encouraged such a position. IRGC Quds Force Commander Esmail Qaani recently travelled to Baghdad and met Iraqi political figures and militia leaders. As per reports, during his visit Qaani urged militia factions to retain their weapons and use them as leverage in negotiating with the United States, reportedly even describing these weapons as “Iran’s weapons.” As per sources from the Coordination Framework and the PMF, Qaani also urged Iraqi factions to leverage the weapons issue to pursue stronger Iraqi air defenses and prevent US and Israeli use of Iraqi airspace to monitor Iran. Qaani reportedly said during his recent visit to Iraq, “We oppose disarming the resistance front. We do not want the experiences of Lebanon and Syria to be repeated in Iraq.” Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf’s visit to Baghdad also reinforces Iranian interference amid Iraqi attempts to assert control over armed groups. These developments highlight the Iranian agenda to preserve its influence in Iraq as well as link developments within Iraq to the ongoing war and use it as leverage.
There are several considerations and priorities for Iran, as its proxies and allies in Iraq constitute part of a broader regional network through which it has historically been able to exert pressure on the United States. From this perspective, surrendering weapons without ensuring alternate mechanisms to preserve its strategic leverage would be a significant loss for Iran. This is particularly critical given the damage incurred during the war and the significant erosion of Iran’s regional position as well as its severe economic crisis. The prospects for Iran building constructive and stable relations with its neighbors have considerably weakened. Tehran has also suffered substantial setbacks, with its influence in Syria severely diminished and its position in Lebanon facing serious challenges. This leaves Iraq as one of the few remaining arenas where it can preserve its strategic influence. The prospect of losing leverage in Iraq is extremely consequential for Iran, especially considering the centrality of Iraq to its forward defense doctrine and broader regional deterrence strategy.
Growing calls for disarmament across the region, including in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, reflect a broader trend toward preventing countries from becoming battlegrounds for proxy conflicts, which can undermine internal stability and prospects for economic growth. Given Iraq’s fragmented political environment, each faction has its own interests and calculations, making the real test whether the new government can assert its dominance and control while navigating competing internal and external pressures. Its success in doing so will ultimately be critical for creating the conditions necessary for attracting investment and advancing Iraq’s reconstruction efforts.
