At a particularly sensitive and consequential moment, Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi made a brief, unannounced visit to Saudi Arabia on October 14, 2026. The trip followed the postponement of a previously scheduled visit, originally set for July 2026. The delay came after militia factions, seeking to undermine Zaidi’s efforts to strengthen ties with Riyadh, launched attacks on Saudi territory, prompting targeted US-Saudi strikes against militia positions in several parts of Iraq. The timing of Zaidi’s visit, the issues discussed and the positions adopted raise questions about its underlying messages, strategic objectives and broader regional implications, particularly given the ongoing military confrontations in Yemen.
Importance and Significations of the Visit’s Timing
The significance of the visit lies in its timing, as the region faces a dangerous period of instability that could reshape the region’s security landscape. Its implications therefore extend well beyond bilateral relations to encompass broader regional security dynamics. The regional order is undergoing shifts in its strategic calculations, power structures and security arrangements, driven by recurring cycles of escalation and retaliation. These developments are being compounded by the policies of states pursuing revisionist ambitions at the expense of the security of Arab countries.
The visit occurred just days after the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq. Zaidi expressed his determination to pursue a balanced foreign policy, arguing that consolidating Iraqi sovereignty after the US withdrawal necessitated diversifying the country’s external relations rather than allowing them to revolve around a single regional power. He outlined this position in an article published in Asharq Al-Awsat to coincide with his visit to Saudi Arabia, titled “Iraq and Saudi Arabia: Toward a Stable Regional Order.”
The visit took place amid renewed security challenges, with mounting indications of a possible resumption of direct confrontation between the United States and Iran. Washington’s ongoing military buildup in the region could signal preparations for strikes intended to pressure Tehran and its regional proxies into making concessions on outstanding issues. Such a confrontation could, in turn, trigger far-reaching strategic realignments across the region.
Meanwhile, tensions are mounting in Yemen, where Iran is reportedly directing the Houthis to seek control of the Bab al-Mandab Strait. Such a move would give Tehran additional leverage over regional and international powers, potentially allowing it to deter or raise the costs of any prospective US strikes against it.
The visit also occurred against the backdrop of Iraqi militias failing to meet the Iraqi government’s September 30 deadline to surrender their weapons to the state. At the same time, Iran has resumed stoking regional conflicts and reactivating multiple fronts as part of a broader strategy to demonstrate its capacity to exert influence, raise the costs for its adversaries and deter potential attacks against its territory.
Within this strategy, Iraqi militias are reportedly being reorganized into a different operational model: small, clandestine cells comprising a limited number of ideologically committed fighters with close ties to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). These groups, which have emerged from established Iraqi militias, reportedly operate under the direction of Iranian advisers, including Hamed Abdollahi, a Quds Force officer known as “Haji Hamed.” This organizational shift is intended to preserve a covert armed network in Iraq that can advance Iranian objectives while operating beyond the reach of state-led disarmament initiatives and agreements.
Arab and Gulf governments are increasingly concerned about the implications of these clandestine networks, both for efforts to establish state control over weapons in Iraq and for Baghdad’s relations with the wider Arab and Gulf region. These concerns have been reinforced by Western intelligence reports identifying the small cells as the principal active elements within Iraq’s armed networks. According to these reports, the same units were responsible for attacks on Arab and Gulf countries during the US-Iran confrontations. The reported deaths of Iranian advisers in US-Saudi strikes on militia positions across several Iraqi provinces provide further context for these concerns. The strikes were carried out in retaliation for militia attacks on Saudi territory.
The Visit’s Messages and Dimensions
The timing of the visit, the accompanying statements and Iraq’s position amid mounting regional tensions point to several underlying messages and strategic implications. Chief among them is an effort to reassure Riyadh that Iraqi territory will not be used to threaten Saudi national security, particularly as intelligence reports continue to fuel speculation about possible US strikes against Iran. The visit also represents an attempt to contain the fallout from previous militia attacks on Saudi territory and restore confidence between Baghdad and Riyadh. This includes condemning attacks on King Khalid International Airport and other Saudi civilian facilities, while affirming that Iraq will not allow its territory to be used as a launchpad for attacks against the kingdom.
In his article, Zaidi presents Iraq as a potential bridge for dialogue rather than an arena for conflict or a platform for threatening neighboring states. He argues that Baghdad should avoid aligning itself with competing regional blocs, recognizing that Iraq’s national interests are closely tied to the stability of its surrounding region and that relations with Saudi Arabia are central to that objective. The issue is particularly sensitive given Riyadh’s awareness of the connections between the Houthis and Iraqi militias, as well as the possibility that these groups could be mobilized in broader regional confrontations.
The visit therefore confronts Zaidi with a challenge that extends well beyond conventional diplomacy. He must offer credible, tangible guarantees that militia attacks will not originate from Iraqi territory, while preventing Baghdad’s relations with its neighbors from deteriorating into open confrontation. At the same time, he must navigate the considerable domestic influence wielded by these armed factions without triggering a direct confrontation with them. This raises a fundamental question: does Zaidi have the political and security leverage to honor his commitments, prevent Iraqi territory from being used to attack Saudi interests and restrain militias from intervening on behalf of Iran or the Houthis in conflicts across the region? Equally important is whether he can consistently prioritize Iraq’s national interests. These questions have assumed greater urgency as efforts to bring militia weapons under state control remain unresolved, despite the September 30, 2026 deadline.
The security relationship between Iraq and Saudi Arabia has consequently evolved beyond a conventional bilateral issue. It has become a prerequisite for building a stable and sustainable partnership, particularly after repeated militia attacks against Gulf targets. The visit offers both countries an opportunity to reassess their channels of communication and establish clearer expectations regarding Baghdad’s responsibility to prevent its territory from being used to threaten Saudi security. The urgency is underscored by the timeline Riyadh has reportedly given to Baghdad to meaningfully address the problem.
A different interpretation has also emerged among some observers, who believe the visit may reflect an Iranian effort to use Zaidi as an intermediary to soften Saudi Arabia’s position and secure Riyadh’s acceptance of Iranian mediation with the Houthis in Yemen. From this perspective, Tehran is seeking to halt the cycle of reciprocal attacks because it recognizes the risks of the Houthis crossing Saudi Arabia’s red lines, particularly through strikes against civilian infrastructure. Such attacks have contributed to broader Arab, regional and international support for Saudi Arabia and opposition to Houthi actions, while Iran’s own efforts to engage Riyadh regarding mediation with the Houthis have reportedly failed. Tehran may therefore see Zaidi as a potentially effective channel to Saudi leaders, given Riyadh’s interest in maintaining constructive relations with his government.
There is also a precedent for Saudi restraint in its dealings with Baghdad. Following militia attacks on the East-West oil pipeline, Riyadh reportedly agreed to refrain from striking militia positions inside Iraq after a request from the Iraqi prime minister. That decision was influenced, in part, by Saudi Arabia’s appreciation of his efforts to strengthen state control over weapons and combat corruption.
Nevertheless, regional developments suggest that Riyadh’s immediate priority is obtaining credible security guarantees from the Zaidi government, rather than securing Iraqi mediation over Yemen or any potential wider regional confrontation. Saudi Arabia understands that any diplomatic initiative by Baghdad will have limited value unless the Iraqi government can address the underlying threat posed by armed groups operating from its territory — a responsibility that rests primarily with Baghdad itself.
The Iraqi government must therefore convince Riyadh that its assurances are not temporary political gestures vulnerable to shifting realities on the ground, but commitments backed by effective measures to prevent attacks before they occur. Even if mediation was proposed, it could not substitute for the security guarantees Saudi Arabia is seeking. Riyadh regards attacks on its infrastructure and civilian facilities as a matter of national security, requiring a prompt and credible response to prevent further escalation and the possibility of decisive retaliation.
Conclusion
Zaidi is navigating an exceptionally complex regional landscape in which Iraq’s relations with Saudi Arabia, Iran and the United States are closely intertwined. His visit therefore presents a dual challenge: restoring Riyadh’s confidence through concrete measures to rein in armed militias and prevent further attacks on the kingdom, while preserving domestic stability without undermining the political future of his government. This balancing act is complicated by the considerable military, political and economic influence that these groups wield within Iraq.
To conclude, the success of the visit will be measured not by the diplomatic gesture itself — which Riyadh would welcome at any time — but by Zaidi’s ability to translate security assurances into credible, deterrent action against Iran-aligned militias. This requires moving beyond rhetoric to tangible steps, including making public the findings of investigations into attacks on the East-West pipeline and previous assaults on Saudi territory, and ensuring that those responsible face meaningful legal consequences. Iraq’s national interest lies in strengthening its relations with the Gulf states by preventing militia attacks, not as a means of aligning against any particular regional power, but as an exercise of its sovereign responsibility to protect its territory and safeguard its security. By grounding its foreign policy in the fundamental requirements of state security and overriding national interests, Baghdad would be better positioned to contain regional risks, ease tensions with its neighbors and manage the country’s delicate balance of power without provoking further domestic instability.
