Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s visits to Russia and China, as well as his meeting with former US President Donald Trump, hold significant implications for European Union (EU) unity and foreign policy. Firstly, Orbán’s engagements with Russia and China were seen as contrary to the collective stance of the EU, particularly regarding sanctions on Russia following its actions in Ukraine and the EU’s cautious approach toward China’s growing influence. These visits can create friction within the EU, as member states strive to present a united front on major international issues. Orbán’s actions can exacerbate existing divisions within the EU, between liberal European countries that favor a more confrontational stance against Russia and China, and more conservative countries that may be more open to engagement due to historical ties, their political ideologies (especially given the rise of far-right political parties across the continent) or economic interests such as bilateral oil contracts with Russia. The unity of the EU relies heavily on solidarity and trust among its members. Orbán’s independent and proactive diplomacy is undermining this trust, thus making it harder to achieve consensus on key issues during the six months of the Hungarian presidency of the EU Council.
The EU’s foreign policy depends on a coherent and unified approach. Divergent actions by member states, such as Hungary’s bilateral dealings with Russia and China and privately meeting Trump, are possible means of undermining the EU’s credibility on the global stage. The EU’s ability to effectively impose sanctions and apply diplomatic pressure on countries like Russia is weakened when member states do not adhere to agreed policies. Increased engagement with Russia and China by EU member states can lead to greater influence of these powers within the EU, potentially shaping policies in ways that might not align with the broader interests of other EU member states.
Possible actions against Hungary are nevertheless limited. EU institutions will probably try to boycott and ignore Hungary’s diplomatic initiatives for the next five months. This strategy could fail in the scenario of a Trump victory in the US presidential elections in November 2024. This would not only reinforce the diplomatic actions of individual member states like Hungary and Slovakia but also stimulate the rise of far-right political parties across the European continent.
The EU can increase political pressure on Hungary through diplomatic channels, urging compliance with common policies and highlighting the importance of unity. Public statements and resolutions by the European Parliament can also serve as a form of political censure. While direct economic sanctions against Hungary are unlikely and could be counterproductive, the EU could consider measures such as reducing funding from EU budgets allocated to Hungary if it continues to act against EU interests. Moreover, the EU could initiate infringement procedures against Hungary for violating EU treaties or regulations. The use of Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union, which allows the EU to suspend certain rights of a member state, including voting rights, if it is found to be in serious breach of EU values, is a possibility but an extreme measure. The most probable action of other EU member states is to increase Budapest’s economic isolation within the EU. Other member states could, therefore, limit their bilateral engagements and cooperation with Hungary.
The EU must balance the need to maintain unity and enforce common policies with the risk of pushing Hungary further towards Russia and China if punitive measures are too harsh. Continuous engagement and dialogue with Hungary to understand its perspectives and address underlying concerns might be more effective in bringing it back into alignment with EU policies.
The EU could focus on strengthening internal cohesion by addressing the economic and political concerns of member states that might be driving them toward Russia and China. Orbán’s visits to Russia and China represent a complex challenge for the EU, necessitating a nuanced and multifaceted response to maintain unity and coherence in its foreign policy.
What is certain is that top EU officials will boycott informal meetings hosted by Hungary while the country holds the EU’s rotating y. This decision was met with anger in Budapest. Hungary’s European Affairs Minister János Bóka lashed out at the European Commission’s decision, writing on X on July 15, 2024 that the body “cannot cherry pick institutions and member states it wants to cooperate with.” Boka added, “Are all Commission decisions now based on political considerations?” According to official Hungarian sources, behind the legal arguments of the EU, there are ideological and political motives. The decision by the European Commission applies to informal meetings hosted by Hungary and means senior civil servants will attend events organized by the Hungarian presidency until the end of December 2024. The EU tradition is that top officials like the European Commission president, currently Ursula von der Leyen, should attend meetings of the rotating EU Council presidency.
There is also the possibility of Orbán seeking to become an intermediary between Trump and Putin in the scenario of a Republican electoral victory. Indeed, before going to Washington, the Hungarian prime minister had praised Trump in an interview with Politico, describing him as “the man of peace.” It should also be noted that the slogan of the Hungarian presidency of the EU Council is inspired by Trump’s campaign slogan: “Make America Great Again.” Furthermore, the Hungarian prime minister, like the Republican candidate, has expressed skepticism about the role played by NATO in supporting Ukraine and refused to send military aid to Kyiv, obtaining a waiver on this point.
EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell announced after the EU Foreign Affairs Council meeting on July 22, 2024 that the informal meeting of EU foreign and defense ministers at the end of August will be held in Brussels instead of Budapest. This meeting is traditionally hosted by the member state holding the rotating presidency. Overall, it is likely that, on the bilateral level, other EU member states will try to weaken Hungary by ignoring Budapest’s diplomatic initiatives as much as possible. On the collective front, the strategy could be to offer a collective EU response after every attempt by Hungary to use the EU Council presidency as a platform to promote an alternative EU policy towards the Russia-Ukraine war or the rise of China on the international scene.
