The Future of Iran’s Geopolitical Project Amid Regional Strategic Developments

D. Abdul Raouf Al-Ghunaimi – Noura Al-Subaie

Introduction

The Middle East is undergoing a significant geopolitical transformation, with Iran experiencing historic setbacks. The “Axis of Resistance,” a cornerstone of Iran’s regional strategy, has suffered major blows that have exposed its weaknesses and miscalculations. Hezbollah’s diminishing role in Lebanon as it succumbs to Israel’s strategy of “isolating the arenas” instead of upholding the “unity of the arenas” approach, has been a key factor. Israel’s hybrid warfare tactics have crippled Hezbollah’s capabilities, eliminated its leaders and disrupted its operations. Similarly, Syria’s shift away from supporting Iranian interests came after Israel weakened Hezbollah on the Lebanese front, which had played a crucial role in Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s hold on power. This contributed to securing Assad’s influence and survival until his escape on December 8, 2024. The weakening of Hezbollah de-secured Assad’s hold on power, opening a historic opportunity for Syrian opposition groups to take control. Additionally, Israel has reshaped the Middle Eastern deterrence framework, demonstrating Iran’s miscalculation in believing Tel Aviv could not engage in a “multifront war.” By shifting Iran from an offensive stance to a defensive one, Israel exposed the flaws in Iran’s strategy. This shift significantly impacted the morale of Iran-affiliated militia leaders and fighters, undermining their capacity to provide the necessary support and assistance.

Recent regional developments raise significant questions about the future of the “Axis of Resistance,” due to their deep impact on the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East, power dynamics, regional conflicts and the balance of power. These developments also affect the region’s leadership struggles and the resolution of outstanding issues. Among the most pressing questions are: What are the actual losses Iran has incurred against the backdrop of a weakening of the “Axis of Resistance”? To what extent do these losses impact Iran’s broader geopolitical ambitions in the Middle East? What strategic errors did Iran make — its miscalculations — in attempting to expand its influence, leading to the rapid collapse of a project that took decades to build, at great material and human cost? What are the broader implications for the “Axis of Resistance” in other regions of expansion, and how will it affect Iran’s internal situation, especially given the frequent protests within the country, with slogans like “No Gaza, no Lebanon, my soul is for Iran,” rejecting an expansionist agenda that has cost Iran financial resources that could have been used for improving socioeconomic conditions? Will the Iranian establishment consider adopting more constructive approaches in light of regional changes, potentially leading to an Iran that is integrated and reconciled with its region and neighboring countries? Or will Iranian policy remain inflexible, pursuing further expansion? Responses to these questions would require Iranian policy makers to deeply reassess strategic decisions, particularly constitutional provisions related to exporting the revolution and supporting oppressed groups. In this context, does Iran have the capacity to reclaim lost ground? What are the possibilities for a new geopolitical resurgence, and how will the establishment convince its citizens of the legitimacy of its approach after facing increasing competition and challenges?

First: The Weakening of the “Axis of Resistance” and Iranian Losses

Over many decades, Iran has successfully established a network of military alliances in Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq and Syria, using these connections as key elements of its expansionist strategy, which gained momentum following the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime due to the US invasion of Iraq more than 20 years ago. These alliances became the bedrock of Iran’s regional project, providing crucial supply lines that bolstered its influence and played a significant role in regional and international power dynamics. Iranian leaders often boasted about their country’s control over four Arab capitals and Iran’s ability to create military and sectarian barriers that shielded its militias and prevented opposition forces from targeting Iran. However, recently, Iran faced a significant setback, suffering substantial losses at an unexpected pace because of a diminishing and weakening of its alliance network in the region.

1.  Hezbollah’s Weakening in Southern Lebanon

Israel launched a focused military campaign against Hezbollah’s positions, targeting its senior leaders and weapon stockpiles and dismantling its military infrastructure. This pressure forced the party — Iran’s armed ally in Lebanon — to retreat south of the Litani River, weakening its power, removing it from the conflict equation and compelling it to separate the Gaza front and other conflict areas. Hezbollah’s weakening is considered as one of the most significant regional setbacks for Iran, even by Iranian assessments, as Iran had consistently provided financial and military support to the party, amounting to billions of dollars[1] since its formation more than 40 years ago. This support played a major role in transforming the party from a local militia into a military force with a significant arsenal of weapons and missiles, making it one of Iran’s key defensive shields and the spearhead of its geopolitical project on military, political and ideological levels. The party became the backbone of Iran’s regional influence, earning it a central role in conflicts across the region, from Syria and Yemen to Iraq and Lebanon. The collapse experienced by the party in 2024, marked by a decline in its military capabilities due to security vulnerabilities, breaches and Israeli strikes, along with the targeted killings of its leaders, has led to discussions within Lebanon about its future. These discussions have critically reviewed the party’s role and questioned the cost Lebanon has paid for the party’s pursuit of the Iranian agenda at the expense of Lebanese interests. This review has included a scrutiny of the value of its interventions in Syria over nearly 15 years, during which thousands of young Lebanese Shiites lost their lives to secure the survival of Assad’s regime. Additionally, international pressure has been mounting to disarm Hezbollah and reintegrate it as a political party within Lebanon’s new political framework. This pressure culminated in the end of a two-year presidential vacuum, marking the beginning of a new chapter in Lebanese politics with the election of General Joseph Aoun as Lebanon’s president on January 9, 2025. In his inaugural address, Aoun unveiled a new political vision for Lebanon, reaffirming the country’s sovereignty, the state’s exclusive right to possess arms and a policy of neutrality with the aim to establish a balanced foreign policy while restoring Lebanon’s ties to the Arab sphere.

• The Exclusion of Syria From Iran’s Geopolitical Project

The departure of Syria from the Iranian geopolitical project following the fall of the Assad regime marks the second major regional loss for Iran, as Syria had long been a cornerstone of Iran’s regional strategy. General Behrouz Asbaty, a former IRGC officer, noted that Iran had suffered gruesome setbacks[2] in Syria. Some of Iran’s most notable losses in Syria include the following:

1.  The loss of Iran’s main link in its geopolitical project: The fall of Assad and the exclusion of Syria from the Iranian geopolitical project represents the loss of a crucial geographical component for Iran and a vital connection between Iran, Lebanon and Palestine via Iraq, often referred to in Iran as the “Shiite geopolitical theory,” the “Shiite crescent,” and the “Iranian corridor.” These concepts no longer hold true, as Shiite geopolitics are no longer applicable, the “crescent” has fragmented and the “corridor” is no longer Iranian, with the project losing its most significant geopolitical link: the Syrian arena. Syria had been the core of the project, crucial for linking its components and serving as a bridge between Iraq and Lebanon. The region’s stability and the project’s coherence were heavily dependent on maintaining control over Syria as a key channel.
2. The collapse of Iran’s military and logistical supply lines: Iran’s loss of military and logistical supply routes that ensured the delivery of Iranian military equipment from Tehran to its loyal militias in Syria and Lebanon marks another significant setback. Syria had served as both a transit point for smuggling weapons and a production hub for armaments. Iran maintained the largest foreign military presence in Syria, with approximately 295 military sites,[3] and mobilized tens of thousands of Shiite fighters, both Iranian and foreign, from countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq, to support Syrian regime forces. This presence granted Iran significant influence, often surpassing the control of regular forces. Consequently, the rebuilding of Hezbollah’s military capabilities, which had been severely damaged by Israeli strikes, is expected to be slow or challenging due to Syria’s exit from Iran’s project. This loss also hinders Iran’s ability to coordinate joint military operations with its regional proxies, potentially halting the presence of loyalist militias in Syria for decades.
3.  Loss of a strategic regional ally: Syria, under the Assad regime, served as a key strategic ally for Iran in its regional and international conflicts, particularly in countering what Tehran regarded as its regional adversaries. The Syrian regime consistently supported Iranian plans, both in Lebanon and Syria, driven by the regime’s own interests, survival and stability, rather than the welfare of its citizens, who endured the hardships of its policies until its collapse.
4. Loss of a fundamental sectarian buffer: One of the key buffers Iran sought to establish to protect the central state in its project and to create multiple defensive frontlines encircling and besieging Israel was through demographic manipulation in Syria. Iran made substantial efforts to carry out a systematic demographic change to create a Shiite sectarian link that would ensure its long-term presence in Syria. This involved displacing the indigenous population through what it termed displacement agreements, while settling Shiite communities to alter the demographic structure. Additionally, Iran aimed to establish sectarian geographical corridors connecting the components of its project from Baghdad to Damascus to Beirut. The importance of Syria in this expansionist project was poignantly expressed by Iranian cleric Mehdi Taeb, close to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who stated, “Syria represents the 35th province of Iran. If the enemies attack us and they want to take either Syria or Khuzestan Province, the priority here is to preserve Syria. If we preserve Syria, we can also regain Khuzestan, but if we lose Syria, we cannot preserve Tehran.”[4] Although Iran officially has 31 provinces, Taeb considered Syria as the 35th, seeing Iraq Bahrain and Yemen as the additional provinces completing the 35.[5]
5. Ending Iran’s ability to achieve its sectarian aim of cutting off the Sunni axis: By losing control of Syria, Iran has been deprived of the ability to achieve its strategic objective of severing the Sunni axis, which extends from Saudi Arabia to Türkiye. Iran’s plan was that controlling Syria would transform it into a regional power, capable of shaping future of regional dynamics[6] and preventing any Arab attempts to form a Sunni bloc that could challenge Iran and its project in its vital areas.
6. End to Iran’s footprint in the Mediterranean: During the Assad era, Iran secured agreements with the Syrian government to develop a port on the shores of Tartus. A number of reports from Syria also indicated that Iran’s efforts to obtain the port of Latakia as an alternative to developing the port in Tartus[7] were accepted by the Assad regime. This allowed Iran to secure a greater strategic presence on the Mediterranean. The Syrian locations offer a coastal gateway to the most important international sea, providing Iran with leverage over international trade routes and the ability to influence the interests of competing regional and international powers. In a scenario where the naval powers, such as the United States, the UK, Australia and Japan (parties to the Heartland[8] theory), decide to besiege the land powers (represented by Russia ), they must consider controlling the coastal states surrounding the targeted powers. Syria, strategically located on the Eastern Mediterranean, plays a crucial role in this scenario. It offers the ability to besiege land powers through its coastal strip, contributing to the depletion of their land forces. This strategic importance explains why Syria has been key in the strategies of empires and colonial powers, who have historically viewed it as pivotal for controlling the region.
7. Losses on the geo-economic and economic fronts: Alongside the strategic and geopolitical setbacks caused by the fall of Assad, Iran has also suffered significant geo-economic and economic losses:
8. Loss of an energy transfer corridor: Iran is now deprived of securing a future energy transfer corridor to Europe through Syria, hindering its efforts to block competing gas pipelines in the region. The loss of Syria means that Iran can no longer implement the “Persian” or “Islamic” pipeline project, a 2,000 kilometer-long[9] initiative designed to connect Iran to European markets via Syria and Iraq. The project, initially hindered by instability in Syria and sanctions on both Iran and Syria, faced delays during Iran’s presence in the country. With Syria no longer under Iran’s control, competing energy pipelines may now pass through Syrian territory, further exacerbating Iran’s economic loss.
9. Financial losses: Iran has incurred substantial financial losses due to its withdrawal from Syria, ranging from $30 billion to $50 billion in Iranian debts. These debts were incurred as Iran financed militias to secure control over the Syrian scene during the 2011 crisis and to support the Assad regime.[10] In addition, Iran has lost various long-term contracts with the Assad regime, spanning sectors like energy, infrastructure, communications, transportation, electricity, phosphates and petrochemicals, all valued at hundreds of millions of dollars. The fate of these debts and contracts has become uncertain, particularly as rising Syrian voices demand compensation for the human rights abuses and crimes committed by Iran and its militias in Syria, as well as their support for Assad’s regime in its atrocities against the Syrian people

• Losses Suffered by Palestinian Resistance Factions

Iran maintained a strong relationship with many Palestinian factions, including Hamas, transcending ideological and sectarian differences. Hamas was a key element of Tehran’s regional alliance network, and its importance grew following Operation Al-Aqsa Flood and the ensuing Gaza conflict. However, the weakening of Hamas, including the assassination of its Political Bureau Chief Ismail Haniyeh and Israeli strikes targeting its forces, posed a significant setback for both Hamas and Iran’s broader project. The destruction of Gaza severely depleted Hamas’ capabilities and resources, with Israeli reports suggesting the possibility of implementing a settlement policy in northern Gaza.

•  Iranian Incubators, Commanders and Milita Fighters Demoralized

There is an ongoing debate within Iranian expansionist circles about the psychological impact of recent Iranian defeats on the leaders and fighters of Iran-aligned militias. Many observers predict that these setbacks could lead to a possible distancing or even separation from Iran. Critics have pointed to Iran’s handling of the conflict with Israel, leaving Hezbollah in a state of confusion and indecision amid successive Israeli strikes that have weakened its capabilities. Growing concerns about Israeli intelligence infiltrations have also emerged, as Israel managed to eliminate key Hezbollah leaders, including the secretary-general, exposing vulnerabilities in the party’s security and intelligence structures. This has cast doubt on Iran’s ability to effectively support Hezbollah, leaving a significant void in the geopolitical sphere that Iran has worked to build over two decades, particularly between Syria and Iraq. Iranian President Massoud Pezeshkian’s warning that Hezbollah cannot stand alone against Israel[11] has only fueled Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s ambitions to shift the balance of power on the northern front and challenge Hezbollah’s deterrence narrative.

The psychological state of the militia leaders, fighters and their supporters has deteriorated significantly as Iran has distanced itself from its most powerful armed faction in a historic moment of existential crisis. The losses are mounting, and threats to the party’s remaining power have become dire. The absence of a geographically close Syrian ally, compounded by the emergence of a new administration hostile to Iran and the party, adds to the pressure. The memory of the crimes committed by these militias in Syria will haunt Syrians for generations, deepening the resentment. Meanwhile, the Iranian government’s decision to avoid military escalation against Israel in the latest confrontation, preferring compromise over conflict to prevent a direct war that could lead to greater losses or even threaten the ruling establishment itself, has only contributed to the growing sense of unease. This situation has led to widespread fear and suspicion among militia leaders, as concerns grow over the infiltration of agents and spies aimed at destabilizing their ranks. The social base that supports these militias looks on with regret and concern as they witness the rapid collapse of their forces, the heavy costs they have incurred and the deepening rift between the militias and their Iranian backers. This erosion of trust in Iran’s support has shaken the very foundation that once fueled the militias’ strength and determination.

• Ascendant Türkiye Versus Declining Iran

The fall of Syria as an ally, replaced by a new political regime opposed to Iran and loyal to Türkiye, represents a significant loss in the balance of Iran’s geopolitical strategy. This shift disrupts the regional power dynamics that Iran had worked to establish since the Assad era, where it had a strong presence in Syria, and opens the door for Ankara to replace Tehran and Moscow as the dominant external force in post-Assad Syria. Iran is growing increasingly concerned that, emboldened by Tehran’s weakened position, Türkiye may now seek to expand its influence in other regions of competition between the two, such as Iraq, Lebanon and the South Caucasus. In Iraq, Türkiye worked to enhance its relations with the Baghdad government in 2024. Meanwhile, in the South Caucasus, Türkiye’s efforts to operationalize the Zangezur Corridor — a strategic route linking Türkiye to Azerbaijan through Armenia — pose a direct threat to Iran’s land access to Armenia, a crucial partner in maintaining Tehran’s regional presence and trade routes in the Caucasus. This development risks isolating Iran both economically and geopolitically.

In general, the Iranian geopolitical project, which Iran has assembled over several decades, has suffered severe historical blows and defeats that caused it to swiftly collapse within a few months of Israeli escalation. This collapse will be difficult to recover from in the foreseeable future. The backbone of the project, Lebanese Hezbollah, was hit by a devastating, fatal blow that has destroyed its capabilities, eliminated its leadership and spread fear among remaining members regarding the complete disintegration of the once powerful group. The heart of the project, Syria, also ceased functioning, and the most dangerous development is the emergence of a new Syrian administration that is unwilling to cooperate with Iran. This has halted the flow of support to the rest of the Iranian project’s operations. If this disruption in support to the project’s other components persists, the remaining parts of the Iranian strategy are expected to suffer complications, potentially leading to complete paralysis. This would sound the death knell for Iran’s geopolitical project unless an unanticipated scenario unfolds that could allow Iran to attempt to revive its central operations or extend new connections for the project’s revival in the medium or long term. This is especially true in light of growing concerns within the narrower circles of the Iranian establishment about the possibility of an Israeli strike against the establishment itself, particularly after Netanyahu achieved significant successes in altering the dynamics of the conflict with Iran. The most notable of these successes include:

• Winning the long-term, multifront war against Iran, with Iranian propagandists insisting that Israel was unable of waging and continuing such a war.
• Removing Hezbollah from the conflict equation and forcing it to accept the separation of the Lebanese front from the Gaza front.
• Foiling the Iranian approach of the “unity of arenas” and the decline in Iranian attacks in the other arenas, except for the Yemeni front.
• Drawing a new conflict equation that put Iran in a defensive position, shifting from its previous offensive stance against Israel.
• Eliminating the Iranian and militia threat in Lebanon north of the Litani River, securing the border areas, facilitating the return of displaced Israelis and completely removing this threat from northern Israel by uprooting the militias from the Syrian arena, even occupying new Syrian territories with significant strategic value for Israel.
• Withdrawing Iran’s key negotiating cards in its conflict with Israel and the Western powers by weakening Iran’s military agents and undermining their political influence in various arenas.
• As a result of the exposure of Iranian power and its miscalculations, Israel projected its unsurpassed military and technological prowess, which will facilitate the normalization of relations process with some regional countries.

Second: Iran’s Mistakes Explain the Rapid Collapse of the “Axis of Resistance”

The speed of the collapse of the main pillars and backbone of the Iranian project, which represented the first real test to the Iranian regional deterrent force in the conflict against Israel, within such a short period of time, revealed a series of mistakes made by Iran in advancing its expansionist project. These errors will force Iran to reconsider proposing regional approaches that could lead to a further geopolitical retreat, especially as the future of its political system is uncertain. Some of the key points for reconsideration include:

1. Iran’s Promotion of an Ideological and Sectarian Identity Instead of a Civil and National One

The first Iranian mistake lies in the negative relationship between the state and society that Iran cultivated in the arenas of its geopolitical expansion. This relationship resulted from Iran’s repeated imposition of an ideological and sectarian model, particularly in countries like Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. This approach failed to position Iran as a model state for countries with a similar ideological framework, which no longer resonated with the reality of many of its premises, tools, goals and outcomes. The model leads to ideological and sectarian isolation as it emphasizes division.[12] It fosters a pattern of authoritarian monopoly, where a theocratic regime dominates all sources of power and the state and its institutions revolve around the power of the dominant sect to the exclusion of others. This not only undermines representation for other sects and trends in society but also reshapes societies to serve the interests of that dominant confession. Consequently, institutions in these countries struggle to fulfill their roles and instead become tools in the hands of the ruling Shiite political systems, as seen in Iraq and Syria, or in the hands of Shiite militias seeking to dominate the government, as in Lebanon and Yemen. These institutions are then used to implement policies, protect slogans, pass proposals and ensure the survival of a regime that centralizes power around a narrow ideological framework.

The official legal institutions of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen have undergone a process of erasing the core principles of nation-states such as legal and institutional rule, citizenship, sectarian and ethnic pluralism, social justice and the rule of law. The focus shifted from national decisions that serve the interests of the state to those serving foreign agendas. This shift facilitated the establishment of Shiite sectarian dominance over governance, with the political and military supporters of the sect gaining control over internal and external state decisions. In these countries, the Shiite sect monopolized key political and economic interests, gaining the largest share of their economies, while systematically eradicating, excluding, suppressing and marginalizing any movements or currents opposing this sectarian control. As a result, the clergy’s dominance and guardianship over society were entrenched.

Furthermore, Iran played a significant role in reinforcing the model of the “guardian or patriarchal state,” which aimed to reshape societal values in the four countries and align their forces and power structures with the intellectual framework of the Shiite sect. In Iraq, this model was instrumental in establishing the quota system within the Constitution, which ultimately facilitated Iran’s dominance over the government. In Syria, Iran was involved in demographic changes aimed at altering the national identity and strengthening the grip of the former president, allowing him to reclaim control of the regime. In Lebanon, Iran’s support for Hezbollah was crucial in preparing the ground for the imposition of Iranian-style guardianship over state institutions, aligning them with Tehran’s broader agenda.

Over more than four decades, the emphasis on ideology and doctrine in Iran has failed to achieve the “ideal society”[13] it aspired to create. This model, both in Iran and in the four countries influenced by it, has instead produced states whose institutions waver between fragility and failure. These countries face significant deficiencies, remain vulnerable to external security threats and are marked by pervasive chaos and widespread corruption. Social justice is absent, with parallel institutions overshadowing legitimate and elected bodies. These systems often prioritize Shiite communities over Sunni and other groups, undermining the social fabric. The ruling establishment in Iran[14] and the others mentioned adopt policies of repression and exclusion, fostering state-society tensions as rigid ideological frameworks clash with evolving social realities. Examples like Syria’s Sednaya prison illustrate this dynamic.

The failure of Shiite-led regimes that prioritize sectarian identity over collective national identity has deepened societal challenges and intensified internal crises. This approach has worsened political and sectarian conflicts, aiming to entrench sectarianism and political dominance. It has fostered clientelism reliant on loyalists and followers, turned parts of the four countries into havens for terrorist organizations and integrated militias like Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces into official state frameworks. These regimes’ sectarian policies have driven displacement and migration, exacerbated social injustice, poverty and class divisions and undermined national cohesion. The result is the collapse of the nation-state, growing external hostility toward the Iranian project rooted in ideology and sectarianism, and widespread societal resentment against sectarian rule both domestically and abroad.

• Iran’s Preference for a Military, Militia-dominated Approach Over a Political One

Iran’s second major misstep lies in prioritizing military and militia operations over legal and elected political institutions in executing its foreign policies. The IRGC and Quds Force overshadow the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, taking control of state functions and driving Tehran’s expansionist strategy. Similarly, Iran empowers loyal armed militias over allied political factions, equipping them with funding, weapons and training to dominate internal and external decisions in its target countries. Former Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif acknowledged this imbalance in 2021, stating, “We sacrificed diplomacy for the sake of the battlefield,”[15] referring to Soleimani’s influence over negotiations. This militarized approach has invited regional and international criticism, leading adversaries to impose sanctions, restrict cooperation and block aid to Iran and its allies. These measures have stifled economic development and investment in affected countries, deepening crises and fueling poverty. The resulting hardships have triggered widespread protests against Iran’s militias, whose actions foster civil unrest and tighten their grip over national decisions and interests.

•  Iran Favoring a Specific Faction Over the Rest

Iran’s third significant blunder lies in prioritizing the formation of unilaterally aligned governments in its spheres of geopolitical influence, depending on allied Shiite factions and movements while disregarding constitutional norms governing the formation of governments in these regions. For instance, after parliamentary elections in Iraq, Iran — an influential actor in the country — pushed for a consensus-based government that favored its interests, bypassing constitutional provisions granting the largest bloc the right to form the government. In Syria, Iran worked to maintain Shiite Alawite rule for decades. During the Syrian crisis, which began with the 2011 Arab uprisings, Tehran armed and trained fighters to support Assad’s forces and prevent his downfall, ensuring his continued rule. In Lebanon, Iran empowered Hezbollah to dominate the Lebanese political equation, paving the way for its eventual control over government decisions. Similarly, in Yemen, Iran backed the Ansarallah (Houthi) movement against Yemen’s legitimate government, facilitating the group’s takeover of Sana’a in August 2014 and enabling its seizure of national power. These actions have fueled sectarian tensions, created resentment against Shiite rule and contributed to widespread hostility in the four countries. The resulting conflicts have escalated sectarian violence, undermined national security and intensified feelings of hatred and violence against the Shiite community.

• Iran Prioritizing Non-state Actors Over Nation-states

Iran’s fourth critical misstep is its prioritization of non-state actors, such as armed militias operating in its geopolitical expansion zones, over legitimate nation-states and institutions. By empowering and equipping these militias, Iran aims to control the decisions, resources and futures of these countries to further its expansionist ambitions. However, this approach has backfired, as non-state actors disregard the core principles of national sovereignty, including safeguarding national security, collective identity and territorial integrity as well as protecting natural resources and ensuring the wellbeing of the populace.

Instead, these militias focus on serving the interests of their sponsor, undermining the foundations of nation-states. This has led to the erosion of collective identity, the weakening of national armies and the depletion of resources. The resulting chaos among political, ethnic and sectarian groups has sparked conflicts, as seen in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. These countries have subsequently entered phases of disintegration, collapse or fragility. Their wealth and resources have been squandered, security and stability lost and populations displaced through unregulated internal migration or external asylum. In turn, these countries have become incapable of resisting the dominance of non-state actors, leaving them vulnerable to further instability and eventual collapse.

The deliberate weakening of nation-states by Iran has backfired, ultimately undermining its own security. This vulnerability was highlighted by Israeli attacks on Iran, which were launched through Syrian and Iraqi territories — countries that Iran had destabilized to the extent that they could no longer defend their own sovereignty or prevent external threats. As a result, these countries’ territories became exposed, providing open corridors for Israeli operations that compromised both their security and Iran’s territorial integrity.

• Prioritizing External Ambitions Over Domestic Concerns

Iran’s prioritization of its own expansionist ambitions, without regard for the national interests or security of Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq, has significantly undermined the well-being of these countries. By advancing its agenda, Iran has risked their regional and international relations, leading many countries opposed to the Iranian project to limit or sever ties with these countries. The control exerted by Iran-backed militias over Iraqi decision-making, for example, has raised concerns about the safety of investments and the risks posed by instability and militia influence. This dynamic has worsened internal and external crises in these countries, diminished their global standing in key metrics such as governance, development, economic strength and unemployment, and entrenched fragility and corruption within their institutions.

• Miscalculation of Its Own Ability and Resources

Iran’s sixth misstep lies in the irrational foundation of its expansionist ambitions in four key Arab countries. Iranian officials have often boasted about controlling four Arab capitals and imposing a regional deterrence equation that positions Iran as a supra-regional power, as outlined in the 20-Year Vision Document.[16] However, this assertion lacks grounding in practical success, as none of these countries present a viable model for emulation. Instead, all four have descended into fragility due to Iranian intervention. This overconfidence reflects a miscalculation of Iran’s available resources versus the obligations needed to secure and sustain its influence. Unlike historical geopolitical powers that maintained their domains for extended periods through robust capabilities, Iran’s lack of such foundational strength has left its strategy vulnerable to eventual collapse and disintegration. Furthermore, Iran has underestimated the capacities, positions and strategies of neighboring and international actors whose interests are threatened by its expansionism. These miscalculations, coupled with its exploitation of Arab crises post-2003, fail to account for the demographic realities of the region, where Sunni populations far outnumber Shiites and the relative success of Sunni-led governance compared to Shiite governance in modern history. This irrational strategy, rooted in Article 154 of Iran’s Constitution advocating the export of its revolution,[17] has proven unworkable. Over the 45 years since the revolution, Iran has failed to transition from a revolutionary ideology to a state-focused mindset capable of harmonious coexistence with its region and the broader international community. Without a single successful case to validate its model, Iran’s expansionist agenda remains a testament to its miscalculations and highlights the country’s failure to secure sustainable influence.

• Opting for Ideological Stagnation Over Flexibility

The seventh and most critical error that undermines the core of Iran’s expansionist agenda is the intellectual stagnation — bordering on petrification — of its strategic decision-making. Iranian leaders have adhered to ideological doctrines that are outdated, uncreative and disconnected from the societal and technological realities of contemporary youth and other demographic groups in the four countries it seeks to influence. These doctrines are impervious to adaptation, review or the development of innovative solutions.

This intellectual inertia was glaringly evident during the massive popular protests that erupted within Shiite-majority areas of southern Iraq and Lebanon beginning in 2019. These protests signaled a dire warning for the future of Iran’s project, as demonstrators in Iraq chanted slogans like “Iran out, out… Iraq will remain free,” while Lebanese protesters declared “All of them means all of them, Nasrallah is one of them.” Protesters even went so far as to burn pictures of Iran’s supreme leader, Qassem Soleimani and other symbols of Iranian influence, including consular headquarters and militia offices. Despite these clear warning signs, Iran failed to respond with any meaningful reassessment or proactive measures. Its political alliances suffered significant defeats in parliamentary elections in Iraq and Lebanon, as voters rejected Iran-backed candidates. Yet, Iran remained stagnant, offering no new strategies or adaptations. Furthermore, Iran did not heed the lesson of Soleimani’s assassination, a pivotal event that disrupted the cohesion and direction of its geopolitical strategy. The vacuum created by Soleimani’s absence has led to infighting among Iran-loyalist militias in Iraq and Syria, with some groups even rebelling against Iranian control. This fragmentation gave rise to the term “rebellious militias,” referring to factions prioritizing their own interests — including profits from illicit cross-border trade — over allegiance to Tehran.

After enduring significant setbacks in its recent conflict with Israel, which nearly devastated its entire geopolitical project, Iran faces repercussions that could even threaten the foundations of the political system itself. Despite this, senior Iranian officials, including the supreme leader, continue to deny the extent of their defeats. On December 22, 2024, Khamenei addressed the Israelis, claiming, “You are not victorious, but defeated.” However, this raises the question of what exactly constitutes defeat. He further argued that “Advancing without resistance is not victory” and expressed his belief that “the brave and zealous youth in Syria will expel you from there,” anticipating that “an honorable force will emerge in Syria.” Khamenei emphasized that Iran does not have “parliamentary forces,” and noted that groups like the Houthis, Hezbollah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad fight because of their faith and doctrine, not on behalf of Iran.[18]

These statements contradict earlier Iranian assertions of control over four Arab capitals and Iran’s boastful statements about sending fighters to these countries. This shift suggests that the leadership has failed to learn from historical lessons and lacks the capacity to develop new ideas or strategies to reintegrate itself into regional and international systems. Such an approach would need to prioritize Iran’s interests, the welfare of its people and the security of neighboring countries in the Middle East, while steering clear of harmful and narrow ideological ideas.

Third: Implications of Iran’s Losses

The unexpected and rapid magnitude of the losses suffered by the “Axis of Resistance” has led to regional repercussions across its various arenas of influence. These losses are not confined to a decline in influence in specific areas but extend to broader impacts on the cohesion of the axis as a whole. This raises doubts among its armed affiliates in Iraq, Yemen and Lebanon about its ability to continue supporting them and securing their interests and continuity. The repercussions also extend to the Iranian interior, where citizens have repeatedly rallied against the geopolitical project.

1. Implications for the “Axis of Resistance” Arenas

Syria and Lebanon are central to Iran’s geopolitical project to enhance its regional influence and achieve strategic objectives. However, the fall of the Assad regime and the weakening of Hezbollah present Iran with unprecedented challenges that threaten to unravel its regional network across the Middle East. The repercussions of these developments are not confined to Syria and Lebanon but also extend to Iranian expansion efforts in Iraq and Yemen, where Tehran depends on militias and local proxies to safeguard its interests. These setbacks raise significant questions about Iran’s ability to sustain its influence amid mounting regional and international pressures. It is crucial to examine the strategic implications of the collapse of the Assad regime and the decimation of Hezbollah on Iran’s project, particularly in Iraq and Yemen, where the challenges facing the axis have become increasingly apparent.

1. Rising doubts within the axis about Iranian intentions: The swift losses suffered by Iran in Syria and Lebanon have deeply unsettled armed militias in Iraq and Yemen, leading to serious questions within the axis about Iran’s hesitation to intervene decisively in the conflict. Despite being aware of the potentially severe consequences, Iran chose not to leverage the “unity of the arenas” strategy more forcefully against Israel, raising doubts about its commitment and reliability as the leader of the resistance axis. Concerns have emerged about Iran’s capacity to safeguard its interests in Syria and Lebanon, sparking fears that similar vulnerabilities may arise in Iraq and Yemen.

The situation in Iraq is particularly complex, marked by fluctuating political dynamics, shifting alliances among Shiite factions and pressures from external actors. Meanwhile, the Houthis in Yemen may face increased challenges, even as they continue to strike Israel in symbolic defiance. Should Iran scale back its support for these factions to reduce its involvement in regional crises and pursue deals, doubts about its leadership could deepen further. Consequently, factions in Iraq and Yemen increasingly recognize that the erosion of Iranian influence in Syria and Lebanon may signal a broader collapse of the axis in the future.

These factions may be compelled to reconsider their positions, learning from Iran’s recent losses, which highlight its full withdrawal from supporting its allies. As a result, it is anticipated that the loyalist militias in Iraq will maintain their allegiance to the Iranian establishment, while the more pragmatic, non-loyalist militias might distance themselves from Iran and depend on their own strength to remain relevant. This shift will be particularly influenced by their understanding of the significant setbacks Iran has faced in the regional arena, which have affected its ability to support armed groups in Iraq.

The future actions of both loyalist and non-loyalist militias in Iraq will likely depend on internal developments and the pressures that President Trump may impose on these groups, which have long targeted US interests in Iraq. As for the Houthis in Yemen, who have played an increasingly prominent role in the conflict with Israel, they are expected to continue their strikes against Israel and potentially target international navigation and trade in the Red Sea to assert the ongoing relevance of the axis. While they may operate with more autonomy than Iran’s other militias in the region, Yemen’s strategic value to Iran and Moscow could be used to exert pressure on the West. Moreover, some Iranian leaders may shift their focus from Syria and Lebanon to Yemen, viewing it as a space less vulnerable to Israeli strikes, further strengthening the resistance axis.

• Reducing support for the militias in Iraq and Yemen: The downfall of Assad and the weakening of Hezbollah in Lebanon are expected to negatively impact the situations in Iraq and Yemen. Assad had long been a key strategic ally for both the Iraqi and Houthi militias, with a deep historical cooperation rooted in the Iranian geopolitical project. Syrian territory served as a critical transit route for fighters and weapons traveling between Lebanon, Baghdad and Tehran. Hezbollah was instrumental in training and supporting both Iraqi militias and the Houthis in Yemen, providing expertise in advanced weaponry and combat tactics used in various operations within and beyond Iraq and Yemen.[19] Additionally, Hezbollah’s media channels and the speeches of its political leaders helped bolster political and ideological support for the militias, enhancing their positions both on the battlefield and in the political arena. The loss of Assad as a key ally and Hezbollah as a powerful lever will severely undermine the Iraqi and Houthi militias, even though the full effects may not be immediate. Over time, this absence will likely delay or hinder the ability of these militias to modernize and arm their forces, diminishing their military effectiveness in future conflicts. Furthermore, it will create additional challenges in managing militia control and territorial distribution in Iraq and Yemen. This shift is also expected to affect the morale of militia leaders and their supporters, particularly in Yemen, where they may feel increasingly vulnerable to political and sectarian opposition. The growing disillusionment with their policies, which often serve Iranian interests rather than national ones, could lead to further attacks from local opponents, potentially eroding popular support, especially among Shiite communities that have historically backed them.

This situation could strengthen the Sunni faction in Iraq, temporarily empowering it as a pressure tool against the Shiite-led Iraqi government, aligning with Iraqi interests rather than Iranian ones. It may also enhance the Sunnis’ position to regain influence over the government and its policies, especially with Iraq approaching parliamentary elections. However, for this influence to be effective in weakening Iran’s power and its affiliated groups within Iraq, it will be crucial for the Sunni factions to unite and present a cohesive strategy.

• Implications for Iran’s Domestic Front

The Iranian establishment is existentially, ideologically and strategically tied to its geopolitical project. As such, any setbacks within the project and the axis will inevitably have direct consequences on the establishment itself. The most significant repercussions on the Iranian interior are as follows:

1. Heightened possibility of regime change: The regional setbacks suffered by Iran, including the fall of the Assad regime and the weakening of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine, have prompted a shift in analytical perspectives regarding the future of the Iranian establishment. Many now view the possibility of its overthrow as a real and imminent prospect. Reports from both Western and Iranian sources suggest that the downfall of the establishment is no longer a distant scenario, but rather a tangible reality. For example, the French newspaper Liberation referred to the potential fall of the Iranian establishment as a “possible reality,” and noted that the fall of Assad sparked a wave of hope among Iranians that their own ruling order might face a similar fate. Notable American analyst Robin Wright highlighted in The New Yorker that the Iranian establishment is in a critical position. A report from Reuters suggested that following the defeats of Hamas and Hezbollah and the fall of Assad, Israel may focus on Iran as its next target. Additionally, US Republican Senator Ted Cruz stated that the Iranian establishment has become weak and fearful, and change is inevitably approaching, potentially occurring so swiftly that it could catch many by surprise.[20]

On December 26, 2024, the US Congress hosted a meeting titled “U.S. Officials See Assad’s Fall as Opportunity for Regime Change in Iran,” attended by the President of the National Council of Resistance of Iran Maryam Rajavi and Retired General Keith Kellogg, President Trump’s Special Representative for Russia and Ukraine. The meeting focused on exploring alternatives to the Iranian establishment.[21] Iranian reports and articles suggest that some experts and officials within the country have acknowledged the growing danger of the establishment’s collapse due to external pressures and developments. However, there is a division in how to address this threat. One faction advocates for more flexibility in foreign policy to mitigate external risks, while another insists on continuing the policy of resistance and steadfastness, even proposing measures such as pursuing the development of a nuclear bomb and withdrawing from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. These differing views highlight the crisis within the Iranian establishment, indicating that its future is marked by ambiguity and uncertainty, with the potential for significant changes occurring more swiftly than anticipated.

• The “hardliners’” dilemma: These successive Iranian defeats have placed the “hardliners,” who dominate the state’s institutions, in a difficult situation, particularly as the supreme leader seeks to secure his successor. Iran lost in less than two weeks in Syria and in a few months in Lebanon what it had spent two decades building in terms of geopolitical expansion across the Middle East. The criticisms of the “conservatives’” expansionist policies, voiced both within their own movement and by rival factions, have gained more validity. Many prominent figures have long advocated for shifting away from an expansionist strategy and focusing on internal issues to restore unity on the home front, which has been fractured by economic and living conditions.
•  Enhancing the “reformists’” chances: These setbacks have created a new opportunity for the “reformist” movement’s approach to both domestic and foreign issues, which has gained strength since President Masoud Pezeshkian took office. President Pezeshkian advocates for opening up to the West and resolving the nuclear agreement crisis with major powers to lift sanctions on Iran, viewing this as the most effective solution to address the crises caused by the “conservative” movement’s policies. Given the regional developments, there is a possibility that key figures within the “conservative” movement may be pushed to offer more flexibility and make concessions to the “reformist” vision, particularly concerning some political and constitutional demands, including the state’s foreign geopolitical priorities and principles.
• Mounting chances of popular implosion: Iranians are deeply frustrated by the substantial losses incurred due to the country’s expansionist policies and unwarranted involvement in regional conflicts. This frustration is increasing the likelihood of a broad popular explosion that could ignite unrest within the country at any moment. The Iranian people have gained nothing from the establishment’s geopolitical outlook except for losses of various kinds, along with rising levels of resentment and anger. The public has suffered greatly due to the establishment’s geopolitical ambitions, whether it be in terms of funding sectarian projects or enduring the harsh sanctions that have led to dire economic and living conditions, exacerbating the suffering endured by ordinary Iranians.

Fourth: Iranian Tactics and Alternatives for Restoring the “Axis of Resistance”

Considering the principles and orientations of the Iranian establishment regarding its vital arenas of influence, senior Iranian officials have expressed expectations that stability in Syria will not be achieved following Assad’s departure. The significant financial and human losses Iran has incurred in the arenas it has lost in the Middle East further complicate the situation. The future of Syria, Lebanon and Gaza appears uncertain, especially in light of the ongoing regional transformations. Israel’s open geopolitical ambitions, fueled by its victories over Iranian forces, could lead to instability in Syria. If certain groups allied with the new Syrian administration deviate from the established approach toward Israeli expansion in Syria, it could create opportunities for chaos, which might, in turn, open avenues for Iran’s potential return to the region.

The potential for Iran’s return to the geopolitical arenas it lost in order to restore the axis is closely tied to the future stability of those regions. If political movements in Lebanon succeed in establishing a new civil governance framework, if the new Syrian administration can bring security and stability (which would require a shift from group-based control to a state-led approach, supported by substantial Arab, regional and international backing), if efforts for a permanent ceasefire in Gaza succeed and Israel halts its geopolitical expansion, all these factors would complicate Iran’s ability to regain its influence in the region. However, if these new developments fail to achieve stability and lead instead to chaos, this could provide Iran with an opportunity to return to these arenas, as historical precedents suggest. Iran could exploit various pathways to regain its foothold, depending on how the situation evolves and whether chaos offers the openings needed for its reassertion in the region.

1. The Kurds

Iran maintains strong relations with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and, more specifically, with the Kurdish factions in Afrin, Syria. The SDF includes Kurdish fighters aligned with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), along with Iranian, Turkish and Iraqi fighters. The Kurdish forces in Afrin have developed robust ties with the IRGC, particularly since their deployment in northern Aleppo near towns like Nubl and Zahraa, which are controlled by Iran-backed militias in Syria.[22] Additionally, the SDF has forged a close alliance with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), led by Pavel Talabani, which is also supported by Iran.[23] There is alignment between Iranian and Syrian Kurdish parties when it comes to opposing Turkish hegemony over the broader Syrian and Kurdish territories. Iran perceives Türkiye’s ambitions for regional leadership as a direct challenge to its geopolitical interests, especially in Syria, and has thus opposed Türkiye’s presence in Afrin as well as its military operations against Kurdish forces in northern Syria. This has positioned the SDF within Iran’s geopolitical axis in Syria, creating an opportunity for cooperation. However, several challenges stand in the way of fully realizing this opportunity. The SDF is concerned about potential new Turkish military operations, especially given the strong ties between President Trump and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Moreover, the Trump administration has signaled support for the new Syrian administration, which has led to diminished US backing for the SDF, thus complicating Kurdish cooperation with Iran. These factors contribute to a fragmented Kurdish stance, limiting the prospects for a fully harmonious alignment with Iran.

• ISIS

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s warning regarding the return of terrorism to Syria reveals a potential opening for Iran to regain its lost influence in the region.[24] Despite significant ideological differences between the Iranian establishment and al-Qaeda, historical precedents show that Iran has pragmatically cooperated with the organization. This cooperation began after the September 11 attacks, during which Iran maintained a relatively good relationship with al-Qaeda. Additionally, Lebanese Hezbollah developed strong ties with al-Qaeda, particularly during the tenure of Imad Mughniyeh, who had close connections with Zawahiri, the former leader of al-Qaeda. These relationships contributed to joint operations targeting US and Israeli assets, according to Western reports.[25] Furthermore, retired IRGC General Saad Qassemi confirmed this collaboration, stating, “We fought alongside al-Qaeda.[26]” Moreover, Iran allowed al-Qaeda fighters to transit through its territory to Afghanistan and vice versa. There was also cooperation between Iran and al-Qaeda in Iraq between 2014 and 2017, before the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces, supported by Iran, turned their focus to combating ISIS. Former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s statement that al-Qaeda used Iran as a base for its operations adds to this narrative. Reports also suggest that the new leader of al-Qaeda Saif al-Adl, may be present in Iranian territory.[27] Given these historical ties, there remains an opportunity for further coordination between Iran and al-Qaeda in Syria, Iraq and other regions. Al-Qaeda continues to have a visible presence, with a network of leaders and fighters dispersed throughout the Syrian desert, notably in areas like Wadi Hauran. Furthermore, the Al-Hawl camp in northern Hasakah, near the Syrian-Iraqi border, continues to house ISIS members and their families, some of whom fled Nineveh and Anbar during the 2017 operations against ISIS. This suggests that Al-Qaeda still has significant popular support and operational capacity, providing a potential avenue for renewed cooperation with Iran in the region.

• Shiite Groups and Remnants of the Former Syrian Regime

It is well-known that Shiites represent the smallest societal group in Syria, primarily concentrated in areas such as the villages of Damascus, Old Damascus neighborhoods, Al-Joura, Al-Kharab, Aleppo, Idlib, Daraa and Homs. However, Iran may potentially re-enter the Syrian arena through several key avenues. First, Shiite visitors to shrines in Damascus, Raqqa, Aleppo and Deir Ezzor, where approximately 50,000 Iranian Shiites visit annually,[28] along with thousands of Iraqi and Lebanese Shiites. These religious visits could serve as a channel for Iranian influence. Second, there is a significant presence of Twelver Shiites in regions like Damascus, Aleppo, Idlib, Hama, Homs and Daraa, along with Alawites in Latakia and Tartus. If these communities face harassment or restrictions under the new Syrian administration, they may become more receptive to Iran’s influence, particularly if their religious and cultural identity is threatened. Third, there is the possibility of dormant-armed Shiite cells loyal to Iran in the provinces with a significant Twelver Shiite, Alawite or regime-loyalist presence. These cells could be mobilized by Iran to assert its influence in the region. Some argue, however, that Iran may struggle to gain traction through the Alawites, as they are predominantly secular and do not depend heavily on religious practices in their daily lives. Additionally, with the fall of the Syrian regime — which previously helped foster a closer relationship between Iran and the Alawites — future collaboration may be limited. Many Alawites have come to realize that Iran’s engagement with them was partly motivated by its desire to exploit their religious sites to penetrate their social fabric and expand its influence.[29] Furthermore, there has been an effort by Iran to convert Alawites to the Twelver confession, which has led to some resentment and suspicion within the community.

• Militias Stationed at the Syrian Border

Media circles report that most of the armed militia elements deployed in Syria before the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime fled to Iraq and Lebanon following his downfall. A significant number of these militia fighters were concentrated in the Iraqi city of Al-Qaim, which borders Syria, including fighters from groups like the Abu Fadl al-Abbas Brigades, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Dhu al-Fiqar, Ammar bin Yasir and the Sayyid al-Shuhada Brigades. Additionally, the Fatemiyoun, Zainabiyoun and Haidariyoun Brigades, as well as those who served in Assad’s Syrian army, joined the exodus. Iran had financed, recruited and trained what is known as the Popular Defense Forces (NDF), a group consisting of approximately 100,000 Shiite fighters.[30] who operated under the supervision of the IRGC. Estimates suggest that the number of fighters affiliated with the IRGC and non-military forces — recruited by Iran from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and other areas — reached about 20,000.[31] Meanwhile, the Iranian opposition group Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization estimated the total number of fighters to be around 70,000, including 20,000 from Iraqi militias, the same number from Afghan recruits, 7,000 from Pakistan and about 10,000 from Hezbollah militias.[32]Additionally, about 1,000 officers and soldiers from the Syrian army are said to have fled to Iraq through the Al-Qaim crossing. Russian President Vladimir Putin also acknowledged that some Iranian-loyal units left Syria without engaging in combat, moving instead to Lebanon and Iraq, and revealed that Russia had evacuated around 4,000 Iranian fighters to Tehran via its Hmeimim military base at the request of Iranian authorities.[33] The presence of these fighters near the Iraqi border represents a significant threat that Iran may seek to exploit in the future as conditions in Syria change.

5- Netanyahu’s Geopolitical Ambitions

The ongoing Israeli geopolitical expansion in Syria presents opportunities to foster a scenario of chaos, a situation that could enable Iran to pursue its objectives, particularly if the new Syrian administration responds in a manner that exacerbates instability. Israel capitalized on the confusion following the overthrow of Assad, occupying strategic locations such as Mount Hermon and several sites in the occupied Syrian Golan,[34] located within the demilitarized buffer zone between Syria and the Golan Heights. Israel announced the collapse of the disengagement agreement with Syria from 1974 and extended its reach into the villages of Jamla and Ma’araba in the Yarmouk Basin of Daraa Governorate, after taking control of the villages of Mazraat Beit Jann and Mughr al-Mir, which fall under the Rif Dimashq Governorate. Additionally, Israel approved a plan to expand settlements in the strategically significant Golan Heights. On December 17, 2024, from the top of Mount Hermon, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared the fulfillment of Israel’s promises to reconfigure the Middle East. He attributed the changes in Syria to Israel’s role in weakening Hezbollah, dismantling its capabilities and removing it from the Syrian theater.

Mount Hermon holds significant strategic and security value for Israel as it offers a clear line of sight to the Syrian capital, Damascus, located just 45 kilometers away. This vantage point provides an unrivalled observation position, enabling surveillance of Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, as well as oversight of key strategic areas within Syria, including the capital itself. From Mount Hermon, Israel can also monitor Southern Lebanon, the western Lebanon mountain range, the Bekaa Valley and parts of the northern Jordanian and Palestinian borders, particularly the Hebron Mountains, Irbid Governorate and Lake Tiberias. This elevated position allows Israel to deploy advanced defense systems and construct long-range radar stations in a region that strengthens its intelligence-gathering capabilities and enhances its ability to track military movements. This, in turn, enhances the security of Israeli settlements in Upper Hebron and the Golan Heights. As a result, Israel’s actions are likely to provoke resentment from Syria’s new administration and neighboring countries, as Israel’s activities in Syria appear to go beyond mere security concerns and suggest a broader geopolitical strategy aimed at reshaping the security and political landscape of the Middle East.

6- Jordan

The shifting dynamics in the region, coupled with the severing of Iran’s logistical supply lines to its allies through Syria, are driving Iran to seek alternative corridors and arenas to replace those it has lost. In this context, Jordan emerges as a potential alternative arena that Tehran could exploit to compensate for its loss of the Syrian outlet. Iran may leverage unconventional methods, such as organized crime networks and armed groups to smuggle weapons to its agents in Lebanon and Palestine via Jordanian territory, passing through Iraq.[35] This comes against the backdrop of Jordan’s previous security challenges, including attempts to shatter its political stability through militias loyal to Iran along its borders with Iraq and Syria. Additionally, there has been an escalation in smuggling activities across Jordan’s borders, further highlighting the vulnerability of its security situation.

7- Enhancing the Houthis’ Capabilities and Gradually Recovering Lost Arenas

Iran may also adopt a pragmatic approach to dealing with its regional losses in the coming period, which could involve continuing multitrack support for the Houthis in Yemen, an important option for maintaining regional influence and compensating for its setbacks. It is likely that Iran will reduce Hezbollah’s external military engagements while increasing diplomatic efforts to solidify Hezbollah’s position politically, economically and ideologically. Although Hezbollah already holds significant political and economic power within Lebanon, Iran might encourage the party to adopt a more conciliatory stance toward other political factions in the country. This strategy aims to secure both Hezbollah’s and Iran’s position in Lebanon and ensure a strong Shiite political representation in the future. However, revitalizing Hezbollah’s influence on political, economic and ideological fronts faces significant challenges. Geopolitical shifts and strategic changes in the Middle East, coupled with transformations in Lebanon, particularly the weakening of Hezbollah and the election of a new Lebanese president with more Arab-leaning inclinations, suggest the possibility of Hezbollah evolving into a demilitarized political entity in Lebanon in the medium term. This shift, however, depends on several key factors, including the effective implementation of UN Resolution 1701 and the effectiveness of international pressures and broader regional developments.

Fifth: The Challenges Iran Faces in Restoring Its Regional Influence

Any Iranian intentions to return to its lost spheres of influence are hindered by several internal, regional and international factors, including the following:

1. Iran’s Domestic Affairs

Iran faces complex economic conditions due to its leadership’s nuclear, ballistic and expansionist policies, as well as ambitions for strategic expansion in regions that have led to the squandering of wealth, weakened capabilities and the imposition of international sanctions, pressures and isolation. Iran’s potential return to the arenas it lost in the near term would likely provoke anger among the increasingly disillusioned Iranian public. This anger has expanded to include various segments of society that have suffered economically. This dissatisfaction stems from the billions of dollars squandered in the Middle East, funds that could have been invested in desperately needed national development and economic programs. Additionally, the continued support for the remaining arenas of the axis adds to the leadership’s challenges, as the growing influence of protest movements within the country becomes a more prominent factor in decision-making compared to the period before Iran’s regional setbacks. This makes restoring the lost arenas of influence even more difficult for the establishment.

Protesters in various rounds of demonstrations in Iran have demanded an end to the squandering of wealth and resources on foreign misadventures that have only resulted in the country’s isolation and siege, urging instead a focus on addressing internal and external crises. As a result, the establishment may recognize the growing discontent and frustration among the public over the massive financial resources that have been wasted. There is fear of a potential popular uprising that could threaten the establishment’s very foundations, and many “conservative” figures have openly criticized the government for what they see as grave strategic errors, using major media platforms to express their concerns. These critiques present a serious threat to the establishment, which depends heavily on its “hardliner” support base. Furthermore, there are concerns that the victories of Sunni groups in Syria could embolden Sunni groups in Iran’s volatile southern regions, particularly those populated by Arabs and Balochis, leading to increased unrest at a time when the government is already weakened. The perspective of the “reformists,” who advocate for continued openness to the outside world in order to prevent an internal explosion, may also gain traction in this context.

• Regional Challenges

The orientations of the new Syrian administration are at the forefront, differing significantly from those of the previous regime, which depended heavily on an alliance with Iran and Russia to maintain its hold on power and the exclusion of opposition factions that had the potential to overthrow it. This alliance allowed Iran to extend its geopolitical influence in Syria. In contrast, the new Syrian administration is focusing on openness to the world, particularly to Arab and Gulf states. This shift is evident as Syria has become a destination for official Arab visits, including the Syrian foreign minister’s first visit to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. As a result, the new administration may adopt a stance that could be hostile toward Iran, given its support for the former Assad regime and its involvement in the siege of Idlib. Additionally, the new administration aims to fulfill the aspirations of the Syrian people by eliminating parallel armies, auxiliary forces, armed organizations and ending the proliferation of arms while also working to integrate them into the national army and restore the state’s monopoly on weapons.[36] The political speeches and diplomatic meetings of the commander-in-chief of the new Syrian administration Ahmed al-Sharaa since the fall of the Assad regime, indicate that Iran is viewed as fully responsible for the conditions that Syria experienced under the former regime and emphasize a commitment to closer ties with Arab countries.

Another challenge comes from the rise of Israel’s regional role as Tel Aviv works to establish a new regional deterrence equation aimed at preventing Iran from returning to the arenas it has lost or been weakened in. As a result, it is expected that Israel will escalate its actions against Iran should it attempt to rebuild its military networks in Syria. Additionally, the efforts of many Arab and Gulf states to fill the power vacuum in Syria — potentially extending to Lebanon and Palestine — aim to avoid repeating the inward-looking Arab policies that have enabled the infiltration of countries with expansionist ambitions in the region. Furthermore, Türkiye’s role in sponsoring the new Syrian equation, coupled with Ankara’s efforts to consolidate its gains in Syria, is set to influence its broader regional interests, particularly in Lebanon and Iraq, especially in light of the regional setbacks Iran has faced. If this scenario unfolds, it will shift the regional balance of power, intensifying the longstanding Turkish-Iranian competition that has been a defining feature of their geopolitical rivalry since the era of the Safavid and Qajar dynasties, which competed with the Ottoman Empire over strategic points of contact between their respective territories.

• International Challenges

President Trump’s victory in securing a second term poses significant challenges to Iran’s efforts to restore the “Axis of Resistance.” His first term was marked by a notably hostile stance toward Iran’s geopolitical and nuclear ambitions, which led to what is known as the “Trump complex” for the Iranian establishment. His aggressive containment policies heavily strained Iran, contributing to widespread protests reminiscent of the tensions experienced before the 1979 revolution. Trump’s strategy of maximum pressure, aimed at crippling Iran’s economy, significantly reduced its oil exports from 2.5 million barrels per day to less than 300,000, further exacerbating the country’s challenges. Many analysts view the US strike that killed General Qassem Soleimani in 2020 as the pivotal moment marking the beginning of Iran’s successive defeats and the subsequent decline of its regional influence. Netanyahu’s actions have since been seen as the second phase in this process, further weakening Iran’s position in the region.

Soleimani played a pivotal role in maintaining the cohesion of Iran’s regional project, ensuring harmony between its various military factions. While not officially the second most powerful figure in the establishment, his influence and impact made him an indispensable figure in Iran’s geopolitical strategy. His leadership enabled him to secure vital support for managing military operations in Iran’s arenas of influence, an advantage that his successor Esmail Qaani does not have at his disposal.

Soleimani was crucial in militarizing various population groups beyond Iranian borders, effectively taking control of many militia networks and coordinating their actions. His control over field operations was not limited to his diplomatic authority but extended to personal connections with local militia leaders and fighters. This was made possible by his deep involvement in founding and supporting many of these groups, often fostering strong sectarian loyalties to Iran’s cause. His command of Arabic, coupled with his considerable charisma and field experience, allowed him to build robust trust among local leaders, ensuring the expansion of Iran’s influence. Soleimani’s central role in the Iranian cross-border project, as exposed in the leaked recording of former Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif in March 2021,[37] demonstrated his ability to manage both the military and diplomatic aspects of Iran’s regional ambitions. His strategic brilliance in military planning and battle management further solidified his legacy as the mastermind behind Iran’s expansive cross-border network.

On January 9, 2025,[38] the United States planned to ease restrictions on Syria, permitting the provision of basic aid and services. However, this move does not include the removal of major sanctions or restrictions on Syrian oil imports. This action is seen as a significant signal indicating the United States’ conditional acceptance of the new Syrian administration. It also reflects a recognition of the need to alleviate economic and humanitarian pressures on Syria, while reducing its previous dependence on Iran.

An additional challenge for Iran comes from the growing European resentment and hostility due to its military support for Russia in the Russia-Ukraine war. As a result, Europe aligns with the United States in potential policies against Iran with the arrival of President Trump. This alignment is driven by Iran’s backing of Russia, which threatens European security and stability. The increase in Russian influence is seen as a direct security risk to Eastern Europe, making the European stance on Iran another significant challenge for Tehran.

Conclusion

In light of the geopolitical developments in its arenas of influence and the weakening capabilities of its agents, Iran has faced significant losses and geopolitical defeats. Hezbollah’s power has declined in Lebanon, Iran lost Syria as a geopolitical link to its project and as a strategic ally, the Palestinian resistance factions have been weakened, the Lebanese equation has changed, and the confidence of militia leaders and fighters in the Iranian arenas of influence has been shaken as a result of the losses suffered by the “Axis of Resistance” and Iran’s hesitation to provide support. All of these setbacks and losses reveal Iran’s waning presence in many files and arenas, especially after the situation in Syria turned to Iran’s disadvantage, and after Hezbollah’s political and military power declined in Lebanon, and what was previously known as the “unity of the arenas” approach disintegrated.

Today, Iran faces a new reality that highlights the weakness of its strategy and the errors in its regional calculations. By prioritizing ideology and doctrine over security and social stability in neighboring countries, and emphasizing military and militia dimensions over politics and diplomacy, Iran has contributed to growing internal discontent in countries affected by its geopolitical expansion. Moreover, Iran’s insistence on forming sectarian governments and favoring non-state actors over national governments has complicated its regional strategy, even jeopardizing the future of the Iranian establishment itself. Iran has also miscalculated the balance between its geopolitical ambitions and the positions of countries opposing its regional expansion.

This shifting strategic landscape requires Iran to adapt its approach to reclaim what it has lost in some arenas of influence and maintain its presence in others. However, internal, regional and international challenges could severely impact the stability of the Iranian establishment and hinder its ability to restore its regional and global influence. These challenges may force Iran to reconsider its sectarian policies and seek to rebuild relations with neighboring countries in a way that supports regional stability and its own national interests. This may represent Iran’s last opportunity to reassess its policies and mitigate further losses across domestic, regional and international fronts.

Over the course of 45 years, Iran has not been able to move beyond the ideology of the revolution to a new framework based on establishing statehood and good relations with neighboring countries. Consequently, the negative indicators in Iran have become a point of comparison for the Iranian people, who look to the achievements of countries that have adopted logical approaches and constructive participatory plans with their neighbors. Iranian decision-makers undertake a deep reassessment and review to convince the Iranian youth of a bright future, if not, the establishment itself will collapse as quickly as the previous Syrian regime did.

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[1] محمد خواجویی، محاسبات اشتباه به حزب‏‌الله آسیب زد، سایت هم میهن، 16 مهر 1403ه.ش، تاريخ الإطلاع: 04 يناير 2024م. https://bit.ly/424yvMC

[2] حساب عبدي ميديا على منصة إكس، فایل بدون سانسور / افشاگری و سخنان فوق جنجالی سردار اثباتی از فرماندهان ارشد سپاه در سوریه در خصوص چگونگی فروپاشی حکومت بشار اسد، (7 يناير 2025م)، تاريخ الاطلاع: 8 يناير 2025، https://x.com/abdolah_abdi/status/1876373616444535217

[3] جسور، خريطة المواقع العسكرية للقوى الخارجية في سورية منتصف 2024، 02 يوليو 2024م، تاريخ الإطلاع: 24 ديسمبر 2024. https://bit.ly/3DKa2lu

[4] عصر إيران، رئیس قرارگاه عمار: سوریه استان سی و پنجم است/ اگر دشمن بخواهد سوریه یا خوزستان را بگیرد اولویت حفظ سوریه است / تحریم ها مثل قبل نیست، 24 بهمن 1391ه.ش، تاريخ الإطلاع: 07 ديسمبر 2024م. https://bit.ly/3W6EVXD

[5] عباس الكعبي، إيران والمستنقع السوري.. سوريا المحافظة الإيرانية رقم 35، صحيفة العرب، 06 نوفمبر 2011، تاريخ الإطلاع: 06 يناير 2025. https://bit.ly/428SaLn

[6] د. عبد الرحمن الحاج، أثر التدخُّل الإيراني في سوريا على الخريطة المذهبية، (الرياض: المعهد الدولي للدراسات الإيرانية، مجلة الدراسات الإيرانية، العدد 6، مارس 2028م)، https://linksshortcut.com/aOUdn

[7] خبرگزاری دانشجو، تحفه لاذقیه را دریابید / پای ایران در سواحل مدیترانه، 25 آذر 1399ه.ش، تاريخ الإطلاع: 06 يناير 2024م. https://bit.ly/3PoqkTt

[8] The theory of the Heartland, proposed by English geographer Mackinder, divides the world into three regions: the Heartland, the Rimland and the Crash Zone located between them.

[9] جلال سلمي، خط الأنابيب “الإسلامي” والصراع في سوريا، نون بوست، 19 مايو 2017م، تاريخ الإطلاع: 06 ديسمبر 2024. https://bit.ly/4gKuDoc

[10] اطلاعات، ۳۰ میلیارد دلار پول ایران با سقوط بشار اسد بر باد رفت؟، 20آذر 1403ه.ش، تاريخ الإطلاع: 06 ديسمبر 2024م. https://bit.ly/40pr3dH

[11] همشهرى اونلاين، اظهارنظر تازه پزشکیان در نیویورک: حزب الله نمی‌تواند به تنهایی در برابر اسرائیل بایستد + ویدئو، 03 مهر 1403ه.ش، تاريخ الإطلاع: 06 يناير 2024م. https://bit.ly/3Wc9Wt9

[12] د. على الدين هلال، الأزمة في إيران بين الدولة الايديولويجة والمناعة السلطوية، (الرياض: المعهد الدولي للدراسات الإيرانية، مجلة الدراسات الإيرانية، العدد 8، سبتمبر 2018م)، https://linksshortcut.com/mCUQq

[13]. دستور إيران 1979 (المعدل 1989)، ترجمة المؤسسة الدولية للديمقراطية والانتخابات؛ تحديث مشروع الدساتير المقارنة، تاريخ الاطلاع: 08 يناير 2025م، https://linksshortcut.com/mGJGF

[14] Rahim Hamid, “Iran’s Ethnic Minorities Are Finding Their Own Voices — America Can Help,” Washington Institute, accessed December 12, 2024. https://bit.ly/2UrnIaP.

[15] راديو فردا، فایل صوتی ظریف؛ قاسم سلیمانی مانع دیپلماسی بود، (۰۵ اردیبهشت۱۴۰۰ه.ش)، تاريخ الاطلاع: 25 ديسمبر 2024م، https://bit.ly/3pJsC40.

[16] موقع مكتب المرشد على خامنئي، السياسات العامة للخطة الخمسية الخامسة، السياسات العامة للخطة الخمسية الخامسة، تاريخ الاطلاع: 08 يناير 2025م، https://linksshortcut.com/FQMYY

[17] Iran’s Constitution of 1979 (Amended in 1989), Article 154.

[18] خامنه‌ای: جمهوری اسلامی نیروی نیابتی در منطقه ندارد، (22/12/2024)، https://2u.pw/iAyRsNZJ.

[19] Mathew Levitt, “Hezbollah’s Regional Activities in Support of Iran’s Proxy Networks,” The Middle East Institute, July 2021, accessed December 22, 2024, 13-14.

[20] مراد ويسي، بين أزمات داخلية وهزيمة إقليمية.. سقوط النظام الإيراني يلوح في الأفق، إيران انترناشيونال، (28 ديسمبر 2024م)، تاريخ الاطلاع: 01 يناير 2025م، https://linksshortcut.com/sFEyl

[21] فريد ماهوشي، الكونغرس الأميركي يناقش مستقبل النظام الإيراني، (26 ديسمبر 2024م)، تاريخ الاطلاع: 1 يناير 2025م، https://linksshortcut.com/lCYtb

[22] فراس فحام، قوات سوريا الديمقراطية وخياراتها الصعبة بعد سقوط الأسد، الجزيرة، 13 ديسمبر 2024، تاريخ الإطلاع: 06 يناير 2024. https://bit.ly/422Egdm

[23] تليفزيون سوريا، “قسد” تعزز التنسيق مع إيران لمواجهة الضغوط التركية، 29 يونيو 2024م، تاريخ الاطلاع 08 يناير 2025م، https://linksshortcut.com/JMRys

[24] دنیای اقتصاد، عراقچی نسبت به بازگشت تهدید تروریسم به سوریه هشدار داد، 30/09/1403هـ.ش، تاریخ الاطلاع: 12 ینایر 2025 م https://bit.ly/3ZZPeOi

[25] Asfandyar Mir & Colin P. Clarke, “Making Sense of Iran and al-Qaeda’s Relationship,” Lawfare, March 21, 2021 accessed December 30, 2024, https://bit.ly/3BTKpy5.

[26] سكاي نيوز، إيران والقاعدة.. جنرال في الحرس الثوري يفضح العلاقة الخفية، 18 أبريل 2019، تاريخ الإطلاع: 30 ديسمبر 2024م، https://bit.ly/3BMUlJP

[27] Ahmad Sharawi, “Profiles of the New Syrian Military Leadership, Part 2,” Long War Journal, January 06, 2025, accessed December 30, 2024, https://bit.ly/3W9hugj.

[28] تلفزيون سوريا، اتفاق إيراني مع النظام لإيفاد 50 ألف زائر سنوياً للأضرحة المقدسة في سوريا، 06 أبريل 2023، تاريخ الإطلاع: 06 يناير 2025. https://bit.ly/3PmeklE

[29] فضل عبدالغني، العلويون في سوريا “قلقون”… هكذا تحاول إيران التمدد في “ساحلهم”، 19 أغسطس 2022، تاريخ الإطلاع: 06 يناير 2025. https://bit.ly/4h23AEP

[30] Seth G. Jones, “War by Proxy: Iran’s Growing Footprint in the Middle East,” CSIS, accessed June, 10,2020, https://bit.ly/2zljOK3.

[31] חדשות מדיני ביטחוני، הצמרת הביטחונית דוחפת לקו התקפי מול איראן בסוריה، הארץ،9 09 أبريل 2018م، تاريخ الاطلاع: 01 يناير 2024م، goo.gl/VaUZj3

[32] شبكة شام، منظمة ايرانية تكشف وجود 70 ألف مقاتل من الميليشيات الايرانية في سوريا، تاريخ الاطلاع: 10/2/2019، https://bit.ly/2XR3Lv1        

[33] روسيا اليوم، بوتين: روسيا أجلت 4 آلاف مقاتل إيراني إلى طهران عبر قاعدة حميميم، 19 ديسمبر 2024م، تاريخ الاطلاع: 8 يناير 2025م، https://linksshortcut.com/cKLAd

[34] The buffer zone controlled by Israel is about 235 square kilometers, equivalent to about 60% of the area of ​​the Gaza Strip.

[35] اقتصاد انلاين، سه گام احیای بازدارندگی ایران / محور مقاومت توان بازیابی قدرت پیشین را دارد؟، 09 دى 14.3ه.ش، تاريخ الاطلاع: 07 ديسمبر 2025م، https://bit.ly/4fuEope

[36] العربية، الشرع: هيكلة جديدة للجيش السوري خلال أيام.. ولا سلاح خارج سلطة الدولة، 21 ديسمبر 2024، تاريخ الإطلاع: 04 ديسمبر 2024. https://bit.ly/3BFvdob

[37] راديو فردا، فایل صوتی ظریف؛ قاسم سلیمانی مانع دیپلماسی بود، (۰۵ اردیبهشت۱۴۰۰ه.ش)، تاريخ الاطلاع: 08 ديسمبر 2025م، https://bit.ly/3pJsC40.

[38] “U.S. Treasury Issues Additional Sanctions Relief for Syrian People,” US Department of the Treasury, January 06, 2025, accessed January 09, 2025, https://bit.ly/422soIz.

Rasanah

Editorial Team