Dr. Mahmoud Abu Alqassem & Dr. Mohammed al-Sayyad
Introduction
Following protracted diplomatic negotiations between Iran and the United States and the exhaustion of regional efforts to prevent conflict, the United States and Israel launched a comprehensive military operation against Iran on February 28, 2026. This marked the second such campaign in under a year, with regime change emerging as its primary objective, occurring after over 47 years of entrenched ideological hostility that had resulted in relations characterized by profound mistrust, tensions and conflict. Washington appears to have opted for regime change following Iran’s refusal to meet US President Donald Trump’s demands, its misreading of the post-October 7, 2023 regional landscape and the impossibility of returning to its prior patterns of influence.
The US decision was also shaped by Trump’s personal hardline approach toward Iran, his propensity for military interventions abroad to reshape geopolitical realities in the United States’ favor, his confidence in US military superiority and — above all — the ideological inclinations of certain administration officials and supporters. These orientations aligned closely with Israeli ambitions to restructure the Middle East and establish regional hegemony, aiming to secure peace through force — an objective reflected in the US National Security Strategy.
Although the United States has recorded notable successes, including decapitating the Iranian leadership, placing the new supreme leader in a religious and political dilemma, and generally weakening the ruling establishment, full erosion or collapse has yet to be achieved. This situation may prompt Washington to explore alternative strategies, maintaining regime change as a non-negotiable goal.
This paper explores the prospects of US success in changing the Iranian ruling system and possible alternatives through examining: the Iranian context that precipitated joint US-Israeli strikes; the tools employed and military stakes; the opportunities and challenges arising from the confrontation; and potential courses of action should the pursuit of regime change continue.
A Favorable Moment to Strike
Previous US-Israeli military operations created a strategically advantageous environment, as Iran and its regional axis experienced a weakening of their defensive network — that is, the system of deterrence operating through proxies and regional theaters (Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, etc.) designed to shield Iranian territory and raise the costs of any direct attack. Successive strikes against personnel, operational networks and logistical supply lines gradually eroded confidence in the axis’ capacity to prevent or disrupt a strategic strike on Iran.[1] Additionally, the outcomes of the 12-Day War heightened Iran’s military vulnerability, reflected in the reduction of its defensive capabilities, the establishment of air superiority by Washington and Tel Aviv, the mitigation of immediate concerns over nuclear escalation, and the provision of time, opportunity and planning space for the United States and Israel to prepare for this current operation.
Concurrently, recent popular Iranian protests signaled to Washington and Tel Aviv a decline in the ruling establishment’s legitimacy and an erosion of social cohesion, indicating an internal environment that could be leveraged to effect “political change” or at least plunge the country into a deep governance crisis that would undermine its strategic capacities, including nuclear, missile and regional support capabilities. In recent years, Iran has witnessed recurrent waves of popular demonstrations, frequently met with strict security responses, including arrests of political activists, journalists and some “reformist” figures, alongside restrictions on public discourse and freedom of expression.
One of the rationales cited in Western political and media discourses for waging war on Iran portrays the Iranian establishment as a highly centralized authority that relies heavily on security apparatuses to preserve its stability.
Critics use this as evidence of the establishment’s authoritarian character, highlighting the intertwining of religious and political power within a single structure that restricts political pluralism. Issues of financial corruption and the pervasive influence of networks tied to major security and economic institutions are frequently emphasized in this criticism. Analyses suggest that the concentration of economic resources within quasi-governmental bodies or entities affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has created a relatively closed economic system, criticized by both domestic and international observers for its lack of transparency and accountability.
Within this context, concerns about political freedoms and corruption are invoked as part of the justification for confronting Iran — not merely as a geopolitical contest over regional influence or the nuclear program, but also as a challenge with a political and moral dimension, directly linked to the nature of the ruling establishment and its internal legitimacy.
Crucially, Israel and the United States aim to forge a new Middle East free from challenges to their strategic interests — a goal repeatedly articulated by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Achieving this requires eliminating any existing or potential power capable of constraining their regional dominance. The objective, therefore, extends beyond merely weakening or containing Iran; it involves reshaping the leadership to be less hostile — or even compliant — or at a minimum, reducing the state to a condition incapable of acting as a regional power. More specifically, a broader US-Israeli regional dominance is intended to facilitate new top-down security and economic arrangements.
Even with a negotiating track, the perception that Iran is approaching a technological or temporal threshold makes military action, in the view of decision-makers, less costly than waiting until prevention becomes impossible. This assessment, combined with the observation of Iran’s gradually diminishing defenses, encouraged a preemptive strike. The war thus reflects an effort to produce “major political outcomes” and a near-complete strategic overhaul through military means, rather than a limited bombing campaign intended only to improve bargaining positions. Its scale and the diversity of its battlefields reflect this ambition.
It is clear, then, that the decision to wage war represents a strategic opportunity for Washington and Tel Aviv to neutralize a longstanding regional adversary, secure Israel’s borders and reshape the Middle Eastern balance of power before a more complex deterrence equation emerges. Fundamentally, the conflict centers on who defines the regional order: one dictated by US power and reinforced by Israeli military superiority, or a multipolar environment in which regional actors pursue strategic independence.
The war, therefore, appears designed to prevent Iran from emerging as an uncontrollable regional power by simultaneously targeting its military and symbolic infrastructure, while reintegrating the region into a balance of power that secures ongoing Israeli supremacy. Therefore, the conflict is fundamentally a contest over the very nature of political authority in the Middle East.
From the perspective of its adversaries, Iran embodies a model of a state that combines political sovereignty with religious legitimacy within a transnational revolutionary project — a model perceived by Western countries and Israel as a threat to the established regional order. Consequently, undermining or weakening this model is seen as a strategic necessity to maintain a regional architecture where the center of military and political gravity is both clear and uncontested.
In this light, the war should be understood not as a limited military engagement, but as an effort to restructure the region’s strategic framework over the long term. Its aim is to redefine the balance of deterrence, establish the permissible limits of power for regional actors, and create a regional order more closely aligned with US-Israeli hegemonic logic.
A High Stakes War
The US-Israeli vision under Trump and Netanyahu can only be realized through the elimination of the Iranian political system, rather than merely containing or neutralizing its sources of power. This is why Trump characterized the objective of the “massive and sustained” military campaign as nothing less than regime change. Initially, the United States and Israel appeared to gamble on provoking an internal revolution to topple the establishment. With the launch of US and Israeli airstrikes and missile attacks on Iranian military and security infrastructure, including strikes targeting top leaders on February 28, 2026, both Trump and Netanyahu encouraged the Iranian populace to seize the moment and overthrow the government.[2] Their strategy was shaped by the weeks of demonstrations by hundreds of thousands of Iranians from December 2025 into early 2026, under the assumption that military intervention would catalyze the desired political change, given that the protesters, despite their numbers, lacked the power to overcome the state’s harsh repression, which had claimed thousands of lives.[3]
The weaknesses revealed during the 12-Day War and the deteriorating condition of the Iranian axis appear to have reinforced strategic convictions that a decisive new campaign could dismantle the establishment. Within this context, the United States and Israel launched a large-scale joint military operation, with clearly delineated roles. Both parties calculated that Iran would be particularly susceptible to sustained military pressure, technological superiority, overwhelming force, air dominance over Iranian territory and the sheer intensity of strikes. In the first two days alone, Washington carried out over 1,250 sorties, employing advanced airpower, concentrated firepower and sophisticated defense systems to neutralize Iran’s capacity to respond. The campaign subsequently targeted strategic assets, military and security installations, energy infrastructure and other vital facilities, thereby undermining the establishment’s functional capabilities and its legitimacy in the eyes of the population.
US and Israeli planners anticipated that a swift, decisive operation would achieve their strategic objectives. On March 3, 2026, Trump posted on Truth Social: “Their air defense, Air Force, Navy, and Leadership is gone. They want to talk. I said ‘Too late!’”
Central to the campaign was the targeting of Iran’s leadership. The US succeeded in killing Khamenei, along with 40 of his senior commanders, during a meeting at the supreme leader’s residence on the first day of the conflict. Trump announced that Khamenei had been killed in his Tehran compound and vowed that strikes would continue “as long as necessary to achieve our objective.” He also called on members of the security forces to surrender, promising immunity, adding that they would be “on the right side of history.” Iranian diplomats abroad were similarly encouraged to seek asylum and contribute to shaping “a new and better Iran,” reflecting an ongoing US effort to effect regime change.
It is evident that the United States and Israel initially relied on destabilizing the ruling system by targeting the supreme leader and senior officials at the outset of the conflict, betting that removing the central figure would accelerate state collapse or even lead to fragmentation. Planners assumed that state authority was concentrated around the supreme leader and that his absence could either trigger disintegration or allow Washington to influence the selection of his successor, as has occurred in Venezuela.
As the establishment demonstrated resilience and sought to fill the resulting power vacuum, Washington escalated military operations and signaled its readiness for a prolonged confrontation. In this phase, strikes focused on weakening Iran’s military strength and limiting governing capacity, evolving into a war of attrition aimed at undermining the state and isolating it domestically and internationally.
At the same time, reports indicated Israeli pressure on the Trump administration to exploit minority groups and armed factions as an alternative to a direct ground invasion — a strategy the US leadership was unwilling to undertake and for which neither the US military appeared fully prepared to participate in. This involved an apparent reliance on Kurdish opposition forces in Iraq to mount incursions into Western Iran. In line with this approach, US and Israeli strikes targeted security infrastructure in predominantly Kurdish provinces, with the intention of facilitating Kurdish confrontations state authorities. Some analysts suggest this may reflect a more ambitious objective: encouraging the fragmentation of the state, as these groups pursue a distinct nationalist agenda rooted in Kurdish identity.[4]
Opportunities and Challenges Associated With Change
Although the Iranian establishment appears cohesive and is attempting to fill the power vacuum while establishing a measure of deterrence against the United States and Israel, its post-war position has fundamentally changed. The assassination of Khamenei has produced an ideological crisis surrounding the future of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist (Wilayat al-Faqih). Appointing his son as successor could create instability, potentially marginalizing the theory within Shiite political thought and even challenging its principles, thereby placing the entire doctrine — which has historically justified hostility toward the United States — in an existential predicament.
Nonetheless, the establishment’s survival thus far does not ensure its long-term resilience. Military strikes continue, significant infrastructure and strategic assets have been destroyed and Washington has successfully degraded Iran’s naval and missile capabilities. The war has depleted Iran’s arsenal, and Iranian escalation appears to have peaked and begun to decline — a core objective of the United States. The ongoing strikes focus on compelling Iran to address issues it has refused to resolve diplomatically, and it is difficult to imagine such an extensive military campaign and associated costs without the ultimate goal of regime change.
Continued US and Israeli attacks against fuel depots, oil refineries, strategic sites, industrial and commercial centers and civilian institutions are likely to generate an internal legitimacy crisis. The state’s inability to function effectively could intensify public discontent and trigger protests, which, reinforced by US backing, might persist until the establishment is overthrown. Early indicators, including emerging fuel shortages and the scarcity of essential goods, already signal the beginnings of such a crisis.
Iran compounded its strategic errors by attacking the Gulf states, effectively isolating itself and losing the support of these key states. These states had previously served as critical gateways for international engagement under the Beijing Accord. Analysts argue that should the attacks against regional countries continue, this may indicate an Iranian drift toward political suicide. Moreover, Iran’s attacks on Gulf states and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz have prompted European powers, including France and the UK, to revise their positions, deploy military assets to defend their Gulf allies, safeguard freedom of navigation and prevent Iran from disrupting strategic oil exports in a manner that could trigger a global economic recession.
Overall, the war against Iran has generated three simultaneous crises. The first is a state crisis under sustained pressure. As strikes on critical infrastructure intensify, the establishment is compelled to further militarize, mobilize security forces and expand the role of military institutions. While this may provide short-term cohesion, it undermines the government’s capacity to manage society beyond the battlefield.
The second is a crisis of internal legitimacy. The Iranian establishment has long rested on the premise that an “ideological state” ensures independence, protection and deterrence. Yet as the conflict penetrates deeper into Iranian territory, the central question shifts: does ideology continue to safeguard the state, or has it become a rationale that exposes society to significant costs and threatens the state’s survival?
The third is a crisis between the center and periphery within governance. During wartime, power increasingly concentrates in the military-security complex — the IRGC, security forces and the military — marginalizing civilian politics and state bureaucracy. This restructuring prioritizes survival above all else. While it does not guarantee immediate collapse, it produces temporary stability at the expense of long-term institutional strength.
Moreover, the conflict fuels a societal debate over the very meaning of the state. In normal circumstances, an ideological state is presented as the embodiment of dignity, independence and resistance to hegemony. In a protracted war, however, this narrative is tested as citizens bear ongoing socioeconomic and security costs. The longer the conflict persists, the more public concern shifts from identifying the enemy to questioning what the state is delivering in terms of life, livelihood and dignity.
However, Washington faces significant challenges. The notion of achieving regime change in Iran through military force lacks broad consensus within the United States and has sparked concern across the region and globally. Public opinion in the United States is largely opposed to war, and the Trump administration has struggled to provide compelling justifications for undertaking it. Across the political spectrum, many view the conflict as failing to serve the United States’ core strategic interests. Trump has also encountered sharp criticism from some of his former staunch supporters, including prominent media figures such as Tucker Carlson, Megyn Kelly and Matt Walsh, prompting the White House to adopt a defensive posture in interviews and on social media. Even Trump himself has publicly remarked that Carlson “lost his way.”[5]
On the other hand, doubts persist regarding the air campaign’s ability to effect political change, and Washington does not yet appear prepared to launch a ground operation to complete regime change and install a replacement government.[6] A related challenge is the question of US willingness to sustain a protracted conflict until regime change is achieved, including the readiness to endure a long-term war of attrition waged by Iran, which would significantly increase the overall costs of the conflict for all parties involved.[7]
Moreover, the scope of the war is expanding and may open additional fronts, such as in Yemen. While Iran is rapidly depleting its stockpiles and offensive capabilities, the United States has also experienced significant strain on its arsenal of interceptor weapons and munitions. Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Keane cautioned that current US stocks of ammunition and air-and missile-defense systems are insufficient.
Under the pressure of Iranian attacks, Washington has been compelled to reposition its assets beyond the reach of Iranian missiles and drones, incurring additional operational costs. This was illustrated by the redeployment of the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln to a location 1,000 meters outside the range of Iranian missiles and drones, highlighting the growing expense and logistical strain imposed by the conflict.[8]
Adding to the challenges facing Washington and Israel is the apparent lack of full regional support from allies, which has constrained military operations. The Gulf states have refused to permit the use of their territory or airspace for attacks against Iran, despite being targeted by Iranian strikes. For perhaps the second time in less than a year, the United States is conducting a war in the Gulf without full coordination or explicit political backing from these states, relying instead on operational coordination solely with Israel. This limitation has fueled regional concerns that the conflict aims not merely at regime change in Iran, but at reshaping the Middle East in ways that could harm Gulf interests.
The United States is also proceeding without full cooperation from Western allies. It took considerable effort to secure the UK’s consent to use bases in the Indian Ocean, while countries such as Spain refused to permit use of their bases. In response to Spain’s stance, including remarks by Foreign Minister José Manuel Álvarez denouncing US strikes not sanctioned by the UN Charter, Trump threatened to cut off trade. This European position reflects both frustration with Trump’s unilateral approach and reactions to his perceived lack of support for Europe in its confrontation with Russia. These dynamics complicate the US campaign against Iran and undermine the transatlantic consensus that has historically been instrumental in containing Iranian influence.
It appears that the United States and Israel miscalculated strategically in assuming that military support would trigger an internal revolution or foster divisions within the establishment. Intelligence assessments indicate that, despite the US-Israeli air campaign that decimated Iran’s top political and military leadership and destroyed critical infrastructure, the Iranian establishment has largely maintained control. This resilience is attributed to a “multilayered system” established prior to the conflict to withstand crises.[9]
Relying on armed opposition groups has also proven problematic. There is little evidence that these factions are prepared to confront the state effectively at this stage, and many pursue nationalist or separatist agendas, creating potential instability not only within Iran but also across the region, affecting US allies such as Türkiye and Iraq, countries which are highly sensitive to minority-related tensions. Iran has further intensified pressure on the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq to counter such challenges.
Although the beleaguered Iranian leadership faces deep social discontent and a growing legitimacy crisis, this has not produced a cohesive political alternative capable of seizing power or restructuring the state. Opposition remains fragmented among monarchists, the People’s Mujahedin of Iran (MEK), ethnic-nationalist movements, online activists and protest movements lacking unified leadership. Many of these groups also lack broad domestic legitimacy or an effective organizational presence within the country.
Outcomes and Alternative US Trajectories
The United States’ determination to achieve radical change in Iran and its commitment to regime change — viewing the current government as untenable, particularly after its attacks on regional states, its threats to close the Strait of Hormuz, and its potential impact on the global economy — may prompt Washington to adjust its strategy. This could include pursuing alternative measures, such as engaging in a protracted conflict, intensifying military strikes to delegitimize the establishment and hasten its collapse, or even undertaking a ground intervention if necessary. This potential adjustment is reinforced by Trump’s personal reluctance to frame the establishment’s resilience as a setback. The United States retains the flexibility and resources to implement such a strategic shift.
Israel’s firm stance further supports this trajectory, reflecting its insistence on eliminating what its decision-makers perceive as existential threats from Iran and its regional proxies. Additionally, Washington may gain increased European support if the conflict’s risks to European interests become more apparent. Iran’s miscalculations regarding the Gulf states and its failure to recognize their pre-war diplomatic efforts may lead these states to alter their position, further isolating Tehran, increasing its legal and political costs, reigniting tensions and posing serious challenges to the Beijing Accord.
However, the question of achieving decisive success remains beyond Washington’s control, and this uncertainty could transform the war into a major strategic predicament with consequences for both the region and the wider world. In such a scenario, Washington might distance itself from Israel’s more ambitious goals, believing it has achieved key objectives: halting Iran’s nuclear program, destroying its missile capabilities and leaving the political system weakened. This could lead to a declaration of a ceasefire and the assertion that strategic goals have been met.
Evidence of this approach is reflected in recent statements by Trump suggesting that the military campaign against Iran is approaching its objectives, signaling a potential preparation for a ceasefire. While personally averse to defeat, Trump is not inclined toward long-term military engagements and weighs his decisions against anticipated costs.
The war carries significant domestic political risks. It could affect Trump’s standing ahead of the 2026 midterm elections, in which a Republican defeat would damage his influence and impede his programs and policies. Opposition to the war among his “America First” base, which views it as a proxy conflict serving Israeli rather than US interests, further complicates his political calculus.
Economically, the conflict undermines Trump’s platform of revitalizing the US economy. Iranian strikes on Gulf oil and gas facilities, along with threats to close the Strait of Hormuz, have already pushed up global energy prices, impacting public opinion in the United States and Western countries — factors likely to influence election outcomes.
From a strategic perspective, the Iranian establishment is not a political authority that can be easily replaced, but a deeply rooted theocratic-political system anchored in three pillars: the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist, as the source of supreme legitimacy, the IRGC, as the physical enforcer of ideology and state authority, and the absence of an organized alternative capable of assuming power. While the war may exhaust the establishment, weaken its factions and intensify social unrest, it alone is insufficient to dismantle the state unless the external crisis evolves into an internal schism affecting the doctrine, institutions and coercive apparatus at the heart of Iran’s power.
A final strategic option may remain, given the establishment’s ongoing hostility: sustaining pressure and sanctions while conducting occasional targeted military strikes, similar to the US approach applied to Iraq between 1991 and 2003, focusing on leaders and symbolic sites. This strategy could either pave the way for the establishment’s eventual collapse or prepare the conditions for a decisive campaign aimed at achieving Washington and Israel’s ultimate objectives. Yet Iran may not remain passive, potentially escalating the conflict further. Simultaneously, domestic shifts in US politics could alter the landscape, placing pressure on Trump or even removing him from office, while US policymakers might become less constrained by Israeli influence — which is waning — and prioritize diplomacy over costly military measures that have strained Washington’s standing and alienated allies and adversaries alike. Meanwhile, Russia and China could recalibrate their positions to avoid losing a regional partner and safeguard their reputations as reliable actors on the international stage.
Conclusion Iran’s strikes continue to pose a significant regional security threat. Nevertheless, Trump’s gamble to instigate political change and install a new leadership has encountered persistent obstacles and risks. Washington’s insistence on achieving this objective may compel it to adopt an alternative military approach and engage in a protracted conflict it had not originally sought — particularly in light of Iran’s miscalculations regarding the Gulf states, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and attempts to disrupt the global economy. These actions have reinforced the perception of Iran as a destabilizing force in both the regional and global order, one with which coexistence is considered impossible.
[1] “Explainer: How Iran’s Network of Middle East Power Faded,” Reuters, June 12, 2025, https://bit.ly/46QfTBq.
[2] Alan Pino, “Trump Wants Iranians to ‘Take Back Their Country’ From the Regime. Can They?” Atlantic Council, March 3, 2026, accessed March 11, 2026, https://tinyurl.com/2352dhcv.
[3] David Frum, “The Paradox of Trump’s Iran Attack,” The Atlantic, February 28, 2026, accessed March 11, 2026, https://tinyurl.com/247xjggl.
[4] “Speculation Rises About a Kurdish Attack Coinciding With Israeli and US Strikes in Western Iran,” Amwaj Media, March 3, 2026, accessed March 11, 2026, https://tinyurl.com/2cnfrfym. [Arabic].
[5] David Bauder, Meg Kinnard and Ali Swenson, “Cracks Appear in Trump’s MAGA Base as Leading Figures Criticize the Iran War,” AP News, March 4, 2026, accessed March 11, 2026, https://tinyurl.com/26p5jrv2.
[6] Daniel Block, “Will Iranians Rise Up? Here Are the Odds,” Politico, March 1, 2026, accessed March 11, 2026, https://tinyurl.com/24sznygp.
[7] Daniel Byman, “6 Questions About Operation Epic Fury,” Foreign Policy, February 28, 2026, accessed March 11, 2026, https://tinyurl.com/27tk473d.
[8] “Analysis: The Assassination of Khamenei Upended Calculations and Led Washington Into a Complex Path,” Al Baboor, March 2, 2026, accessed March 11, 2026, https://albaboor.com/ar/archives/82323. [Arabic].
[9] Wessam al-Jurdi, “No Defections, No Uprisings… Intelligence Assessments: The Iranian Regime’s Grip Is Tight,” Euronews, March 6, 2026, accessed March 11, 2026, https://tinyurl.com/23nffdrj. [Arabic].
