Eroding Trust and the Future of Iran–Gulf Engagement

https://rasanah-iiis.org/english/?p=14308

ByNadeem Ahmed Moonakal

The Iran war has invariably changed the nature of regional dynamics in the Middle East. As Iran’s strategy to diversify the escalation to increase the cost of the war advanced, it severely damaged the progress made in recent years in establishing mechanisms and channels between Iran and the Gulf states to reduce mistrust and skepticism. Mistrust between Iran and the Gulf states has persisted since the 1979 revolution, rooted in the ideological foundations of the Iranian republic and reinforced by its longstanding rhetoric and repeated threats toward regional countries. Iran’s approach towards the recent ceasefire negotiations also reflects a prioritization of strategic leverage over genuine attempts to de-escalate, which further complicates its position within the region. The recent escalations have now further increased the distrust concerning Iran, which will shape the regional dynamics for years to come.

The Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) collective condemnation of Iran’s missile and drone strikes affirmed the consensus that Iran’s behavior has crossed all the red lines.  It is perceived as backstabbing in the face of past attempts by Gulf states to mediate and de-escalate tensions between the United States  and Iran. In a recent statement, the GCC reaffirmed its right under Article 51 of the UN Charter to take necessary collective or individual self-defense measures to protect its sovereignty and security. This is significant because the Gulf states have often had differences about how to deal with Iran and to what extent Iranian interests can be accommodated in the regional framework. However, the recent attacks have reduced these differences, leading to a stronger affirmation of the shared threat perception across the GCC concerning Iran’s role in the region. 

As mentioned earlier, at the core of this issue is the erosion of trust. Trust in international relations pertains to the adherence to rules and norms. Iran’s targeting of civilian infrastructure, including ports, airports and energy facilities, has established a dangerous precedent by blatantly violating international laws. For the Gulf states, this poses not just escalation, but a redefinition of the rules of the game. Civilian and critical infrastructure had, to an extent, remained insulated from direct confrontation and their targeting now signals that no facility is off-limits for the Iranian establishment. This is especially crucial as the Gulf states have reiterated on multiple occasions that they would not let external powers use their territories  to launch attacks on Iran. Moreover, despite initial apologies by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian for the attacks on the Gulf states, the strikes continued, casting doubts over Iran’s intentions. It is important to note that Iran has attacked the Gulf states more than it has targeted Israel. As per reports, nearly 83% of its missile and drone attacks have targeted the Gulf states, compared to just 17% directed at Israel. 

Concerns over Iran’s proxy networks in the region will remain a major factor shaping future dynamics. Attacks on shipping lanes, especially near critical chokepoints such as the Bab al-Mandab, reinforce the view that Iran’s strategy has become difficult to contain through traditional deterrence. Consequently, future engagement with Iran will no longer be confined to bilateral assurances but will require verifiable limits on its proxy activities and regional conduct. Although these issues were previously flagged by regional states, recent developments have further exemplified that they are central and not peripheral factors to regional stability and security.

Missile capabilities have also become a central sticking point. The Gulf states will have to work toward establishing verifiable limits on the range and deployment of Iranian missiles, seeing them as the primary enabler of recent attacks. Similarly, Iran’s nuclear program will remain a persistent source of concern. Questions surrounding enrichment levels, stockpiles and the potential weaponization of nuclear capabilities will continue to overshadow diplomatic efforts. Failure to incorporate these concerns into any deal would heighten the likelihood of a regional arms race and broader proliferation dynamics.

The Strait of Hormuz emerges as another critical dimension of the growing mistrust. Iran’s attempts to weaponize the strait, whether through threats, disruptions or proposed toll mechanisms, are widely viewed in the Gulf as a form of aggression and coercion. For states whose economic lifelines depend on the uninterrupted flow of energy exports, any suggestion of Iranian control over the strait is unacceptable. This issue also has global ramifications, as evident in the problems caused by supply disruptions. The concerns of the international community are clearly reflected as the majority of the countries opposed the payment of toll fees to Iran for safe passage. For instance, Singapore has explicitly refused to negotiate with Iran over proposed tolls in the Strait of Hormuz, emphasizing that transit passage is a legal right under international law, not a concession to be bargained for. In its view, engaging in such negotiations would give Iran’s claims credibility and could embolden further coercive behavior. Iran’s demands for control over the Strait of Hormuz during the negotiations reflected a notably hardline stance, with conditions that were widely seen as unrealistic and unlikely to gain acceptance, significantly reducing the prospects for any success in the negotiations.

The GCC states signaled a preference for de-escalation and stability by continuing a defensive approach during the war. However, the lack of reciprocity from Iran has deepened skepticism regarding Tehran’s willingness to engage in good faith. This divergence reinforces a perception that Iran is willing to exploit restraint as a strategic advantage rather than reciprocate it, thereby complicating the prospects for any confidence-building measures (CBMs). Whatever progress had been achieved, such as the China-mediated Saudi–Iran rapprochement, has been significantly damaged due to Iran’s insincerity. 

The crisis also highlights the complexity of engaging with Iran’s internal decision-making structures. The perception that multiple power centers operate in parallel amid wars complicates efforts to negotiate and implement agreements. For the Gulf states, this raises questions about the reliability of commitments and the extent to which trust can be sustained. Even when agreements are reached, the risk of divergence between different actors within Iran remains a concern, especially as the IRGC has consistently adopted an aggressive and escalatory approach. The recent ceasefire efforts mediated by Pakistan and the reported difficulties in reaching common ground highlight Iran’s hardline position aligned with the IRGC. While the Gulf states responded with cautious optimism, recognizing the urgency for de-escalation, the Iranian position has been rigid. 

Perhaps the most significant impact has been the erosion of public trust toward Iran, with growing negative perceptions of its regional role as attacks on Gulf states have led to civilian deaths and casualties. Iranian narratives portraying the Gulf states as targets and enemies are further deepening divisions. This framing casts the Gulf states as hostile, making the prospects for engagement extremely difficult, especially amid increasing polarization. This creates constraints on governments seeking to pursue diplomatic engagement, as any perceived concession could face backlash. Moreover, people-to-people ties will also face consequences. Iranian expatriate communities and businesses in the Gulf, which have contributed to economic linkages and remittance flows, may face increased scrutiny and restrictions. This damage to social and economic linkages further narrows the space for rebuilding trust. The consequences of Iran’s actions can also be understood in light of past regional conflicts, where unprecedented attacks on Gulf states have provoked collective hostility and unified opposition. As seen after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, such miscalculations  led to long-term reputational damage and regional isolation. Looking at the scale of attacks unleashed by Iran, the notion of Iran as a reliable partner for the GCC has been fundamentally damaged. The current crisis will not be easily forgotten; it will serve as a reference point for future interactions, shaping perceptions and policies for decades to come.

In the current context, because of the consequences of the attacks on the Gulf states and the broader implications for the international community, Iran will be looked at with suspicion and caution. Iran’s approach toward the region has reinforced and aggravated the threat perceptions. The Gulf states are likely to strengthen deterrence while maintaining limited, highly conditional diplomacy in the coming years. 

Nadeem Ahmed Moonakal
Nadeem Ahmed Moonakal
Research Analyst