The war between the United States and Iran dominated the 81st UN General Assembly in September 2026. More than six months after the US-Iran conflict began, the fighting has expanded beyond strikes on military and nuclear facilities to include economic warfare and a contest for control of the Strait of Hormuz. In New York, President Donald Trump threatened further military confrontation while predicting that a deal remained possible. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian answered with a declaration of ideological confrontation and an offer of dialogue. Their speeches exposed the distance between the two governments, even as indirect contacts resumed on the sidelines.
Trump used his September 22 address to defend the war as a response to Iran’s nuclear ambitions and regional activities. He accused Tehran of spreading violence across the Middle East, claimed that US strikes had severely damaged its nuclear infrastructure and urged other countries to join Washington in isolating Iran economically. He also described US naval operations as necessary to keep oil moving through the Strait of Hormuz. His most consequential remarks concerned Iran’s future. Trump presented an agreement that would allow the country to rebuild as one possible outcome. The other was his threat to “annihilate the Islamic Republic.” He nevertheless suggested that an agreement might follow the US midterm elections in November. The official statements were accompanied by a resumption of US-Iranian diplomatic contacts, which had been suspended since the failure of the June 2026 memorandum of understanding.
Pezeshkian’s speech sought to preserve room for diplomacy without appearing to retreat. Yet the recovery of regional oil exports complicates the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) claim that it can control the flow of energy through Hormuz. Kpler’s aggregate data, which include shipments through the strait as well as exports routed through the Gulf of Oman and the Red Sea, show a seven-day average returning to around its prewar benchmark of 18 million barrels per day in late September. This does not mean that shipping through Hormuz itself has fully recovered, or that Iran can no longer disrupt it. It does suggest that alternative routes and shipping practices are reducing the economic leverage Tehran can derive from threatening the strait. For the IRGC, the gap between their message of control and the continued movement of regional oil poses a growing problem of credibility. Moreover, Pezeshkian objected to a situation in which other countries could benefit from the waterway while Iran faced restrictions on its own maritime access. Washington argues that its naval operations protect commercial shipping; Tehran regards the US blockade of Iranian ports as a major obstacle to de-escalation.
The nuclear program remains the central obstacle. Pezeshkian repeated Iran’s position that it does not seek nuclear weapons while defending access to peaceful nuclear technology. Washington, by contrast, wants restrictions strong enough to prevent weaponization. These positions leave difficult questions about enrichment, verification and the future of facilities struck during the war. An agreement would require more than a declaration of peaceful intent: it would need terms that both governments could present as protecting their security and finding common ground on economic sanctions. This helps explain why the diplomatic activity in New York mattered despite the hostile speeches. The General Assembly created an opportunity for indirect US-Iranian dialogue after months of limited contact. Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi presented a seven-day plan under which, he said, normal passage through the Strait of Hormuz could be restored if the United States met the conditions set out in the June memorandum of understanding. The proposal offered a possible sequence for de-escalation, but it left the central dispute intact: each side expects the other to act first. Without an agreed ceasefire and steps to reduce pressure at sea, a new attack on shipping or regional infrastructure could quickly draw the two countries into another round of military escalation.
Other regional governments will also shape the prospects for a deal. The Gulf states seek security arrangements that can deter renewed attacks while safeguarding freedom of navigation through Hormuz and other vital waterways, which Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister described as essential to global trade and energy security. European governments, meanwhile, have an interest in limiting further disruption to energy markets and restoring a framework for monitoring Iran’s nuclear activities. None can settle the conflict on behalf of Washington and Tehran, but their security concerns will help determine whether any agreement endures.
The two presidents’ appearances also showed the value and the limits of the UN forum. The United States permitted Pezeshkian and Araghchi to attend the General Assembly despite the war, allowing Iran to address other governments directly. Yet the speeches did little to narrow the disagreements. Trump framed an agreement as an alternative to overwhelming force; Pezeshkian framed dialogue as possible only without coercion. The General Assembly gave each leader an international audience, while the practical work of testing compromises took place elsewhere.
The immediate test is whether those contacts result in reciprocal measures before another escalation closes the opening. Iran has indicated that relief from the blockade and reduced military pressure could change Iranian military strategy toward Hormuz. Washington seeks assurances about maritime security and Iran’s nuclear activities. A limited arrangement on shipping might build confidence, but it would leave the larger political and security disputes unresolved. At the General Assembly, Trump and Pezeshkian agreed on little beyond the possibility that a deal might still be reached. Whether diplomacy succeeds will depend first on domestic politics in both countries. After the US midterm elections, Trump may have more room to pursue either a negotiated agreement or a military solution. Pezeshkian, for his part, can argue that the risk of economic collapse makes a settlement urgent, but he must overcome resistance from the IRGC and other powerful figures within Iran’s security establishment who favor continued confrontation. The coming weeks may open a negotiating process, but the choices made in Washington and Tehran will determine whether it can end the war.
